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This thesis explores the implications of René Girard’s mimetic theory on Genesis 1 and 2 in the 
Old Testament.  It tests the extent to which Genesis 1 and 2 are structured sacrificially or 
mythically as outlined by Girard.  René Girard’s theory is summarized and clarified as to how 
the theory can be applied to biblical texts.  In addition, Girard’s theory is explained in the context 
of theory-making in late modernity, and critiques of Girard from biblical, anthropological, 
sociological, and theological perspectives are addressed.  A sacrificial structure is explored in 
Genesis and Exodus that informs the exegesis of Genesis 1 and 2.  The critical elements in 
Girard’s scapegoat mechanism—acquisitive desire leading to rivalry, crisis, and ultimately to an 
expulsion—are examined in the expulsion of the Hebrews from Egypt (Exodus 1) and the 
expulsions of Abraham and Isaac in Genesis (Gen 12-21).  A particular pattern takes shape that 
structures the narratives in the Pentateuch.  An exegesis of Israel’s narrative of origins in Genesis 
1 and 2 follows, incorporating Girard’s theoretical insights with higher critical methods 
conventionally employed to the Old Testament.  The thesis discovers striking parallels with 
Israel’s narrative of origins.  They are indeed sacrificially structured, but they also interrogate 
that structure and describe an alternative sacrificial response.  The sacrifice that Yahweh 
instigates dismantles the mythical structure even as it moves through the sequence.  The thesis 
concludes with a validation of Girard’s theory and explains how Girard’s theory can be useful to 
the current exegetical tasks.     
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1 CHAPTER 1   INTRODUCTION   
 
1.1  Religion and Violence: a Heightened Contemporary Concern 
Violence, conflict, and animosity are normative to the human experience.  One could set 
before us an endless parade of examples, but that is unnecessary.  Occasionally, as in 
America with the downing of the World Trade Towers or the bombing of Pearl Harbor, a 
society can be jolted into a reality check on how repugnant human violence is.  What 
should be equally repugnant is our high tolerance for it in nearly all aspects of our 
personal and social being, but this is not the case.  Instead, there is a variety of ingenious 
ways to isolate, camouflage, and deflect violence away from us.  This is usually 
accompanied by an assuring confidence that we have it under control.  So, on American 
television we are hypnotized by a steady flow of programs that dramatize the 
reprehensible villain whose violent actions are apprehended and the criminal taken care 
of.   It is rarely questioned why people are violent.  Even more so, a non-violent society is 
never envisioned because, well, it is not very interesting.  The interest is only in our 
ability to best take care of it.  We have police forces, armies, civil law, governments and 
some would add religion to keep human violence from breaking out into an orgy of death. 
 Yet, perhaps we are living in a time when our more conventional measures for 
controlling violence are being challenged like never before.  Again the examples are too 
numerous to chronicle here.  Our sophisticated arsenal of mass destructive weaponry is 
refined to a high-tuned efficiency from two world wars and the steady stream of 
genocides in the twentieth century.  But one need not take the effort to probe our recent 
history.  One only needs to go to the local newspaper.  In Denver, gang-related violence 
is on the increase, this time threatening to „saturate‟1 the whole city with a more virulent 
and indiscriminant form of violence.   
Nothing challenges our established procedures for controlling violence more than the 
suicide killer, the grossest attack on the value of human life imaginable.  He makes a 
parody of human life, creating in himself both killer and victim and challenging our 
                                                 
1
 Osher, 2007:1A 
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notion of fare combat.  Probably most disturbing is how he leaves us with no immediate 
and clear way to retaliate.  There is no clear enemy to attack, no criminal to execute.  We 
are left with confounding feelings of anger and bewilderment.  The suicide killer shuts 
down completely a fundamental mechanism humanity resorts to when coping with any 
kind of untimely and unnatural death—finding a cause.  We always ask—why?  The idea 
that one can secure a privileged place in the next life is a completely unsatisfying answer, 
especially in the West.  After the Crusades, the Religious Wars, and two World Wars, 
Western societies are not too convinced about giving up one‟s life for God, the nation, or 
the current ideology.  
But even more disturbing is the kind of suicide killer who consistently appears in 
America—going into a school or workplace and meticulously executing innocent people 
with shear rage and revenge as the only reason. The execution style killing of several 
girls in an Amish schoolhouse was particularly shocking, especially since the Amish are 
known for their dedication to a life of non-violence.  Of particular note for the discussion 
here is that it appeared to have been in imitation of another schoolhouse killing that 
occurred the week before in Colorado.  It is now an established procedure nationwide to 
place schools on „high alert‟ after an attack of this sort due to its imitative power. Why, 
oh why was it necessary to take out innocent and uninvolved children? All answers seem 
completely unsatisfactory.  Even so, it only takes a matter of days before the 
ramifications are smothered by our daily routines.  
 
Yet as always, the anthropological question turns into theological, or at least religious, 
questions. The question of God and evil come to the fore in situations like this. 
 
Shortly after the attack on the World Trade Towers, Witney (2002:e) documented the 
challenge this tragedy created for many concerning the connection between violence/evil 
and faith/religion, for God appeared to be on the side of both malevolent and benevolent 
forces: 
                                          Chapter 1 - Introduction                                                         3 
 
3 
 
„From the first moment I looked into that horror on Sept. 11, into that fireball, into that explosion 
of horror, I knew it,‟ says Monsignor Lorenzo Albacete. „I recognized an old companion. I 
recognized religion.‟ 
Rabbi Brad Hirschfield agrees. „Religion drove those planes into those buildings," he says. „It's 
amazing how good religion is at mobilizing people to do awful, murderous things. There is a dark 
side to it, and anyone who loves religious experience, including me, better begin to [admit] that 
there is a serious shadow side to this thing.‟ 
The documentary (Witney, 2002:e) acknowledged the powerful connection between 
violence and religion while at the same time chronicled an array of personal responses.  
For some, it strengthened their faith; for others, it destroyed it.  
Some people, even those who lost loved ones in the attacks, say the tragedy only affirms their 
belief in a higher power. „At this stage, I have not questioned Him,‟ says Bernie Heeran, a retired 
firefighter whose son Charlie was killed on Sept. 11. „He had nothing to do with this. There were a 
lot more people who could have been killed. He was fighting evil that day like He does every day.‟ 
Others are neither so certain nor forgiving. „I can't bring myself to speak to Him anymore because 
I feel so abandoned,‟ says Marian Fontana, whose husband, David, was one of the 343 firefighters 
killed that day. „I guess deep down inside I know that He stills exists, and that I have to forgive 
and move on. But I'm not ready to do that yet.‟ 
Tragic events of an accidental kind or by natural forces have always provoked deep 
questions of faith, but they take on an unparalleled intensity when people create and 
carryout monstrous acts of cruelty and violence on others. With the kind of retreat from 
God that has progressed over the past few centuries, the question of God may be taking a 
back seat to the question of humankind.  We have an uncanny ability to go after the ones 
closest to us.  Can we keep from destroying ourselves completely? 
In his seminal works Violence and the Sacred (1972) and Things Hidden from the 
Foundations of the World (1978), René Girard has probed the connection between human 
violence and not only religion, but nearly all fundamental human social structures.  His 
explorations have a resounding conclusion—human violence is solely our own.   Girard 
(1972:255) places human violence at the forefront of our anthropological dilemma: 
„violence…permeates all human relationships.‟  It is oft amazing to what extent people 
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accept violence—even the most virulent forms—as something unpleasant but necessary.  
It is also amazing to what extent we generally ignore it once things have settled down.  
Girard shares this amazement and believes he has a reasonable explanation for it.  For 
Girard, the power of human violence goes beyond a connection with religion.  The way 
humans deal with violence permeates every aspect of our individual and collective make 
up.    
Unique, and to the consternation of his critics most daring, is Girard‟s assertion that he 
has identified the genesis of human culture in an original mob-style murder where, in a 
spontaneous act of convergence on a single victim, all the internal anxieties and tensions 
of individuals within the group find a miraculous resolve—a sacrificial victim. Thus 
Girard speaks of generative violence, violent unanimity, or unanimity-minus-one.  
Understanding the original victim as the focal point of social order assures Girard 
(1972:309): „should be viewed as an absolute beginning, signifying the passage from 
nonhuman to human, as well as a relative beginning for the societies in question.‟ 
Girard‟s theory of generative violence developed slowly and from what some might deem 
a suspicious direction.  A critic of first French literature and then that of the great Russian 
novels and Greek tragedies, Girard observed the ever present theme of rivalry fueled by 
what he calls mimetic or acquisitive desire.  The tragedians as well as the novelist, such 
as Proust and Dostoyevsky, seemed captivated by the endless variety of ways humans are 
attracted to what they see others desiring and how that attraction creates conflict. One of 
his earliest works, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure 
(1961), jettisoned a literary pursuit into the arena having been pursued since the late 
nineteenth century by anthropology and ethnology—the nature of ritual, sacrifice, 
religion and social cohesion.   
There are many, I suppose, who suggest that humanity‟s propensity towards violence is 
no more a problem now that it has ever been.  It only appears worse simply because there 
are more people.  But for many, the seemingly spiraling cycles of violence in our world 
compels us to examine more seriously the origins of our violence, how we deal with it, 
and where we are headed.  It is time to deal straightaway with humanity‟s violence and 
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the symbiotic relationship with nearly every aspect of human interaction.  As Girard 
(1978:6) states: „No single question has more of a future today than the question of man.‟ 
1.2 Focus of Inquiry 
Girard‟s theory of violence and the sacred pivots on the role of the sacrificial victim, 
sacrifice, and the scapegoat mechanism.  Girard (1972:306) explains:  
The surrogate victim, as the founder of the rite, appears as the ideal educator of humanity, in the 
etymological sense of e-ducatio, a leading out.  The rite gradually leads men away from the 
sacred; it permits them to escape their own violence, removes them from violence, and bestows on 
them all the institutions and beliefs that define their humanity. 
  He (1972:306) further clarifies:   „All religious rituals spring from the surrogate victim, 
and all the great institutions of mankind, both secular and religious, spring from ritual.  
Such is the case, as we have seen, with political power, legal institutions, medicine, the 
theater, philosophy and anthropology.‟ Girard (1972:305) adds: „concepts of sovereignty 
and, indeed, all forms of central power owe their existence to the surrogate victim.‟ 
„…central authority essentially monarchal in character…tends to cluster around a single 
representative of the original victim…the tendency towards centralism exists.‟ 
It has long been noted how common sacrifice is in almost all religious phenomenon.  Yet 
the significance and meaning has eluded the social sciences.
2
  A theory of sacrifice is not 
new with Girard, but his theory has penetrated the reason for it like few others.  Several 
anthropologists have followed the lead of Levi-Strauss in assigning a role or function to 
sacrifice within a given cultural setting, but do not assign the reason why sacrifice, and 
not something else, performs that function.  
The Old Testament is not unique in that it too engages sacrifice both positively and 
negatively. Indeed, one could readily connect Girard‟s (1978:28) theory of sacrifice to 
Israel‟s origins in stories such as the exodus:  „…one must postulate a mimetic crisis of 
such duration and severity, that the sudden resolution, at the expense of a single victim 
has the effect of a miraculous deliverance.  The experience of a [supreme being] whose 
appearance and disappearance are punctuated by collective murder, cannot fail to be 
                                                 
2
 This will discussed at length in Chapter 3. 
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literally gripping.‟  The strong anti-cultic current in Old Testament scholarship of the last 
century reflects a reluctance to place the oft-distasteful aspects of sacrifice as more 
prominent than the ethical demands of the prophets.  There are many issues involved in 
the relationship between violence and religion.  Girard offers a viable model or „matrix‟ 
in which to approach such things.   
Of central concern here is Girard‟s notion of sacrifice.  As Strenski (2002:10) points out, 
sacrifice has deep socio/political implications: „Thus, at least for our subject of sacrifice, 
the religious and political sectors of life are firmly bound together.‟  There are theological 
implications as well, or shall we say apologetical implications.  Oddly, as the human race 
remains steeped in violence, a resurgence of a Marcion-type view of God on a popular 
level can be detected.  In the age of mistrust of religious institutions (of all institutions) 
and the steady emphasis on personal choice and individuation, there is often a steadfast 
refusal to view God in any kind of terms that would even remotely smack of anger, 
retribution, and wrath.  Theological constructs of sacrifice, atonement, propitiation and a 
vengeful deity are serious stumbling blocks for many.  Viewing God as one whose anger 
is appeased or recompensed by a bloody sacrifice seems repulsive and the very heart of 
the problem of human violence.  Girard has reopened the discussion of atonement in the 
late modern world.  
The inquiry here seeks to contribute to a reevaluation or reinterpretation of theological 
conceptions of sacrifice, atonement, the sacred and the wrath of God.  A reinterpretation 
of things does not imply a new view of it or an abolition of it.  Rather, Judaism and the 
Church have always been able to remember the past by incorporating and reshaping it in 
order to dialogue within the culture it finds itself in.   
Of particular interest here are Israel‟s stories of origins found in Genesis 1 and 2.  Most 
do not read these with any clear understanding that the narrative is structured along 
sacrificial lines.  If are we willing, however, to engage Girard‟s ideas, the sacrificial 
elements in such narratives become more evident.  The question to be examined is 
whether key ingredients of Girard‟s generative violence—mimetic rivalry leading to a 
sacrificial crisis, its resolve in a sacrificial victim, and the establishment of prohibitions to 
                                          Chapter 1 - Introduction                                                         7 
 
7 
 
prevent rivalries and rituals to reenact the original sacrificial crisis and its resolve—can 
be detected.   
From his critical work with the Oedipus myth, Girard has found what he believes be to a 
fundamental structure to myth in which the primary function is to displace the internal 
violence of the community away from the community. Thus he (1972:87) states: „The 
functioning of the surrogate victim explains the principle motifs of the Oedipus myth and 
illuminates the genesis and structure of these motifs.  Moreover, I believe that this same 
process serves to explain a great many other myths; so many, in fact, that we cannot help 
wondering whether it might not be the structural mold of all mythology.‟ For Girard the 
displacement, or misinterpretation, of the myth is the key characteristic of the mythical 
structure.  It is how the scapegoat mechanism can work.  
An array of biblical stories appears to easily fit aspects of Girard‟s „mythical structure.‟  
As one follows the development of his theory, however, Girard alludes more and more to 
something askew in the biblical stories.  Girard discovers in the Greek tragedies and then 
even more so in the Old Testament a partial revealing of the mythical structure.  Working 
with the same themes as in myth, the tragedies in Girard‟s analysis struggle to uncover 
the mechanism.  For Girard, the Greek tragedies never quite see through the structure and 
in the end serve a sacrificial function.  But Girard (1978:154ff) progressively views the 
biblical stories as challenging the mythical structure, perhaps to such a degree as to say 
that many of the biblical stories subvert the scapegoat mechanism.  Girard arrives at the 
conclusion that in the story of Jesus Christ the operative mechanism found in the 
surrogate victim is dismantled.  In the death and resurrection of Jesus, the community is 
forced to see the face of the victim.  The victim is „revealed‟ to be innocent and human.  
This, says Girard (1978:174), completely neutralizes the effect of sacrifice—its ability to 
unify the community: „The Gospels make all forms of “mythologizing” impossible since, 
by revealing the founding mechanism, they stop it from functioning.  That is why we 
have fewer and fewer myths all the time, in our universe dominated by the Gospels, and 
more and more texts bearing on persecution.‟  
In a similar fashion as Patristic interpretation, Girard views much of the Old Testament as 
foreshadowing the Gospel event but in that the biblical stories repeatedly sympathize and 
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empathize with the victim.
3
  Of particular note is the resounding criticism of sacrifice by 
the prophets.  With this in mind, the examination here has three main objectives.  First, it 
seeks to verify the extent in which Genesis 1 and 2 can be viewed as „mythically or 
sacrificially structured‟ as expounded by Girard.   Second, it inquires into the extent to 
which the narratives of Israel‟s primeval origins in Genesis 1 and 2 subverts or upholds a 
mythical structure as Girard believes.  How far do these stories go beyond expressing 
„misapprehensions of the victimage principle?‟  Although Genesis 1 and 2 grapple with 
the sacrificial crisis in sometimes strikingly similar ways as the Oedipus myth, does it 
ultimately and once again only conceal the „violent impulse‟ that upholds the cohesion of 
a culture, as Girard (1978:158) seemingly concludes?  Do Israel‟s primeval narratives 
only adapt the standard view of sacrifice in the ancient world to its own generative story, 
or do they in some way critically address the issue of sacrifice and its origins in human 
violence and launch Israel into an ongoing struggle with it? 
Last, the inquiry here seeks to clarify the implications that Girard‟s theory has for current 
exegetical and theological work in the Old Testament.   
 
1.3  Thesis 
René Girard devotes a good deal of his books to the explication, implication, and defense 
of his theory that all of culture finds its genesis in an original victim whose death first 
centralized all the malevolent forces of a community and then transformed those forces 
into the benevolent qualities for that community.  He rarely speaks theologically.  He 
does not comment much on the very nature of a God who might exist outside of the 
human endeavor.  Girard does speak of gods or how, from a human point of view, the 
malevolent and benevolent aspects of violence transform to the sacred via the scapegoat 
mechanism.  He (1978:436) is quite clear of one thing.  Human violence is always 
generated from humans and is directed at humans. „This limitless violence appears for the 
first time as purely human rather than divine in origin.‟ 
                                                 
3
 Milbank (1990:397) has especially identified Girard‟s thinking with Augustine.  
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What is of interest here concerns Girard‟s solution to human violence—the sacrificial 
system must go.  Even up until this very moment in history, „The notion that the 
victimage process is a universal one remains hidden from view,‟ insists Girard 
(1978:440).  For Girard, humanity‟s hope and future lies in our all out ownership of 
human violence along with a thorough repudiation of a violent God.  He asserts, 
humanity must „…give up sacrifice by common agreement, simultaneously, and 
unanimously.‟ 
For Girard (1978:436), a major step towards this is for Christianity to give up its 
„sacrificial reading of the text.‟  Paradoxically, he (1978:440) understands the Gospel to 
have fully brought to light the „mediating role of mimetic desire and the sacrificial 
impulse.‟  Elsewhere he (1978:429) states: „The quintessential scandal is the fact that the 
founding victim has finally been revealed as such and that Christ has a role to play in this 
revelation.‟  He argues that as Christianity developed, it gradually cloaked itself with the 
language of sacrifice, conceding, with similar reasoning as does Paul in the New 
Testament in regards to the Law, that the sacrificial reading of the Gospel event was an 
„inevitable first stage.‟  Referencing Moses Maimonides Girard argues (1978:444) that 
sacrifice was not „an eternal institution that God genuinely wished to found, but as a 
temporary crutch made necessary by the weakness of humankind.  Sacrifice is an 
imperfect means, which humanity must do without.‟  He (1978:443) insists that there is a 
„dynamic, anti-sacrificial current running all through the Judaeo-Christian scriptures.  We 
are able to detect a series of stages in the Bible that invariably point toward the 
attenuation and later elimination of the practice of sacrifice.‟ 
The reading of Genesis sets up a considerable challenge to an „anti-sacrificial current‟ in 
the Old Testament.  At least from the perspective of some of the Pentateuch, such as what 
will be discussed in Genesis and Exodus as I proceed, there is no fundamental challenge 
to the necessity for sacrifice.  The story is, however, subverting the mythical structure, 
exposing the mechanism, and twisting the sacrificial system to such a degree that Israel is 
set on a path of eking out a radical understanding of sacrifice and what it signifies against 
the backdrop of its sacralizing neighbors.  Israel grows in its realization that the 
scapegoat mechanism is faulty.  It is constantly breaking down, which leads to more 
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violence.  The Old Testament offers a solution only through sacrifice, however, and not 
in denying, eliminating, or avoiding it.   
The assertion is that Genesis 1 and 2 do indeed address the „structural mode of all myth.‟ 
It does not, however, offer an anti-sacrificial or a-sacrificial solution as much as an 
alternative sacrificial view.  
Girard mainly concerns himself with what he offers as the solution to human violence—a 
full and complete understanding of the role of „generative violence‟ in all cultures will 
somehow be enough.  But when one reads his elaboration of mimetic rivalry, Girard 
reiterates just what a powerful force it is.  We seem hard-wired toward imitation. Girard 
over and over again speaks of it as an irresistible force.  Is it enough to fundamentally 
grasp the mechanism?  Or is mimetic desire so deep and strong a pull, as Girard makes it 
to be, that we cannot in and of ourselves simply correct it—stop doing it?  The biblical 
perspective does not advocate an anti-sacrificial reading of human culture, but a supra-
sacrificial one.  It is the kind of sacrifice that ultimately exposes our abhorrent 
counterfeits.  Texts such as Genesis 1 and 2 speak profoundly of human violence and 
sacrifice along the lines Girard has outlined, but only posthumously, only through 
sacrifice and on the other side of it.  It is the kind of sacrifice offered and its 
implementation—Yahweh himself provides the victim and only under certain 
conditions—that the issue of sacrifice, and who in the end is requiring it, is 
fundamentally revealed.  Perhaps it is better to speak of the Old Testament‟s trans-
sacrificial reading.
4
 
Something will be gravely lost in the discussion of human violence if we seek to bypass 
or negate the language of sacrifice and an angry God.  It is the task of Old Testament 
scholarship to continue to offer clarity and insight into our volatile existence.  The Old 
Testament does not allow us the neatly packaged prescriptions of an all-loving God who 
is disinterested in our volatile existence nor of an all-vengeful God often referenced by 
the faithful.  This inquiry seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding and yes 
appreciation of the more troubling depictions of God in the Old Testament.  
                                                 
4
 Girard, I believe, significantly modifies his formulations of sacrifice described above in his book The 
Scapegoat (1982).   Much of the discussion of Genesis 1 and 2 echoes and relies on this qualified position.   
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1.4 Approach  
Shortly after the September 11
th
 attack on the World Trade Towers, it was declared that 
things would never be the same from this time on.  In many ways, at least in America, 
this appears true.  Ideological conflict has risen in intensity.  The words „bipartisanship‟ 
ring shallow. It has become more important than ever to not only defeat an ideological 
opponent, but to annihilate him.  Indeed, one could readily connect the rising ideological 
fervor with a weakening epistemological base.  Attacks on the predilections under-
girding an ideology are often openly hostile.  On a similar vein, steady now are the 
inquisitions into the very notions of authority and hierarchical/patriarchal structures that 
seem to go hand-in-hand with oppression, injustice, and violence.
5
 
Approaching issues of violence, institution, religion, political ideologies, etc. from an 
anthropological perspective appears to offer a viable avenue in which to breakthrough 
seemingly dead ends.  For Frank (2006), focusing on the common belief that human 
beings are intrinsically valuable provides a fertile field for dialogue and growth amidst 
seemingly intransigent positions of all kinds.   
Theological and biblical studies are certainly engaged in the evaluation and reformulation 
of epistemological and methodological directions.  Brueggemann concludes (1997:20): 
„Thus there is no easy choice about interpretive assumption.  Through the present 
century, an endless adjudication of this issue has taken place.‟  Towards the end of the 
Twentieth Century Brueggemann perceives that Old Testament interpretive enterprise has 
lead to an „unsettled dualism‟ and a „confusion of methods‟ due in part to „higher 
criticism‟s vigilance against authority.‟  An interesting choice of labels from the 
perspective of what Girard (1972:161) calls the monstrous double.  Brueggemann 
(1997:40) summarizes various new attempts at moving forward and lays out his own 
argument which accepts that the plurality of approaches can only be worked out ad 
judiciously. 
                                                 
5
 By way of example is the Journal of Biblical Literature‟s Symposium Series (2004): Ezekiel’s Hierarchal 
World: Wrestling with a Tiered Reality or Nancy Jay‟s (1992) book:  Throughout Your Generations 
Forever: Sacrifice, Religion, and Paternity which will be discussed in the ensuing chapters.  
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In keeping with Brueggemann‟s assessment as well as perhaps a growing sense that our 
understanding of humanity may offer a positive way forward. The topic of religion and 
its origins in violence as it relates to Old Testament texts will take on an anthropological 
criticism.  This is not new nor, as we shall see, is the application of Girard‟s 
anthropological criticism
6
 to biblical and literary texts.  The approach here is in keeping 
with many who find enough validity and insight in Girard‟s proposal to warrant serious 
consideration.  Girard (1972:309) calls for a testing out of it himself, especially with 
biblical texts.  He (1978:141) is aware that his ideas present a hypothesis to be tested, but 
expresses confidence that inquiries such as the one pursued in the following pages „will 
supply us new proofs, and increasingly striking ones.‟ Hence the thesis here seeks to 
apply an existing model to evaluate how effective it is, to what extent the theory can be 
applied, and what the implications may be. 
Although there will be an evaluation of Girard‟s proposal, it is not necessary to provide a 
thorough analysis of varying aspects of it.  Girard has catalogued an impressive 
bibliography and has provided ample response to major objections to his theory.
7
  The 
presentation here accepts the basic contours of his insights as a qualified starting point.  
This is in keeping with the practice of many.  Miller (2002:2), for instance, applied a 
particular anthropological theory of sacrifice to his literary criticism of topoi dealing with 
the sacrifice of children.  Of note, Miller did not even entertain conflicting theories of 
sacrifice nor does he offer his own critique of the approach.  Dismissing Girard‟s theory 
in a footnote, Miller (2002:3ff) starts with the whole-hearted support for Jay‟s (1992) 
theory and proceeds to apply it towards literary criticism.   
In Old Testament studies, Halperin (1993) employed a psychoanalytic model to the 
reading of Ezekiel.  Unlike Miller, Halperin does address the problems of adapting an 
interpretive approach outside the more conventional bounds of higher criticism and 
integrates those methodologies into his commentary.  Furthermore, he does address, 
albeit to a limited degree, the criticisms directed at psychoanalysis itself.  While in the 
case of both Miller and Halperin, their conclusions are dictated by the approach, Halperin 
                                                 
6
 A term coined by Nuechterlein (2006:e) applying Girard‟s theory to Biblical interpretation. 
7
 Of interesting note here, Girard (1978:435) claims that he has not discovered anything new and in a sense 
it is not his theory as if he owned a copyright on the sacrificial mechanism. 
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at least concedes that his treatise does not address the broader dialogue and criticism 
around psychoanalysis.   In keeping with Halperin‟s example, the overlay of Girard‟s 
theory as an approach to Old Testament exegesis will not close in on itself and therefore 
eliminate ongoing dialogue with what has been the more conventional Old Testament 
criticisms of the past century. Being dominated by particular presuppositions, of course, 
is a concern of all methodological applications, hence turning methodologies into 
ideologies.
8
  Regardless of the way one comes to a text, one must always be open to 
letting the text speak for itself.  Thus, an attempt will be made to avoid cramming the text 
to fit the model.
9
  
Conventional Old Testament approaches are viewed here as valid and important 
contributions.  Girard‟s theory has, however, a peculiar twist to it when it comes to 
methodologies, for he claims that the text itself participates in the mythological structure, 
concealing the scapegoat mechanism.  The text and the very ways we approach a text are 
still enveloped in the sacrificial system.  A text, like the Greek tragedies, function the 
same as sacrifices and rituals do—to divert the violent contagion of the community away 
from it.  For Girard, even theories and methodologies develop sacrificially.  In a sense, an 
approach grounds itself by feeding on and deconstructing the „corpse‟ of that which came 
before it.   
Girard‟s (1978:310) model dictates to some degree the direction taken here.  „The 
comparative method is the only one possible.‟  Greek tragedies, and in particular the 
Oedipus myth, „lead to the theory of the surrogate victim and violent unanimity through a 
much more direct [way]‟ Girard (1978:310) argues.  In this sense then, applying Girard‟s 
theory hearkens back to the „myth and ritual‟ school of the early 20th century.  Girard 
views the Oedipus myth in particular as seminal to understanding his theory, and he has 
devoted a considerable amount of effort in critiquing it.  Thus, the inquiry here will also 
                                                 
8
 Girard is fully aware of the accusation that his theory is more a „sacrificial ideology‟ (Miller, 2002:2).  In 
my mind, Girard‟s (1978:435ff) apologetic towards that is clear and accurate, albeit not satisfying to his 
critics especially since he uncovers the predilections often accompanying such objections. 
9
 It is fitting to refer to it as a model in a scientific sense.  Since the rise of extremely effective computers, 
scientific research is increasingly resorting to computer generated models to test what cannot be directly 
observed or repeated in a laboratory.  Scientific debate now centers more and more on the extent one can 
make accurate scientific proposals based on a generated model.  One objector (Erickson, 2007:15) in the 
global warming discussion has contested scientific models that are often „over-stating the capacity of the 
models.‟ 
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look to the myths of Israel‟s neighbors with a keen eye toward „the mythic structure.‟  
Girard‟s analysis of the Oedipus myths in comparison to the Genesis narratives is worthy 
of special attention to see whether or not Israel‟s generative story diverges from this 
structure and to what extent. 
 
1.5 Outline 
 
An introduction to the thesis is provided in Chapter One setting forth the thesis and 
setting the perimeters of it. 
Chapter Two explains Girard‟s theory of generative violence and how it should be 
understood in methodological terms.  Of particular interest is Girard‟s own understanding 
and exegesis of the Old Testament as well as his understanding of how the text functions 
within and as part of the sacrificial mechanism.  No attempt will be made to systematize 
Girard‟s thought into hermeneutical principles; however, the conclusions drawn will 
serve as the perimeters for the kinds of concerns taken up in the proceeding chapters. 
Chapter Three situates Girard‟s mimetic theory within the context of current discussions 
and applications of theory and methodology.   The most common criticisms of Girard‟s 
theory are fielded especially from those coming from theological and biblical 
perspectives.  The purpose here is not to offer a full-blown apologetic of Girard‟s theory.  
For one, that would go far beyond the scope of this work.  Girard has addressed 
numerous criticisms coming from an array of academic domains during his prolific 
career.  But even more so, the thesis here is an attempt to „test‟ Girard‟s hypothesis, so 
the validity of Girard‟s theory will be examined as I proceed.  Particular attention will be 
given to alternative Old Testament exegetical applications of „social theory‟ (although it 
is inaccurate to label Girard‟s theory as such) and their interaction with Girard.  
Chapter Four takes a central aspect of what Girard calls the „mythical structure‟ or „the 
scapegoat mechanism‟—the expulsion of a victim—and examines to what extent the 
book of Genesis and the Pentateuch could be structured by it. The expulsion narratives of 
Abraham and of the Israelites from Egypt and used as case studies. The conclusions 
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drawn from this examination will be employed to guide the exegesis of Genesis chapter 1 
and 2.  
Chapter Five exegetes Genesis 1 employing Girard‟s mimetic theory as a starting point.  
Girard‟s „structural mode of myth‟ is placed in dialogue with the more conventional Old 
Testament criticisms of the last century.  The structural pattern examined in Chapter four 
is explored in more detail.  The main question pursued is whether Genesis 1 could be 
understood as being sacrificially structured.  
Building on the findings of the preceding chapters, Chapter Six examines Genesis 2 in 
similar fashion to evaluate the extent it upholds the same structure.  
Chapter Seven synthesizes the inquiry.  A summary of the findings will be applied to the 
main aspect of this thesis which is first an issue within the Girardian perspective.  It 
clarifies to what extent Girard‟s view of sacrifice plays out in Israel‟s narratives of 
origins.  Conclusions are also drawn as to the extent mimetic theory can or should be 
incorporated into current trends in Old Testament theology and exegesis.  
 
1.6 Definition of Terms 
 
Many of Girard‟s concepts are multi-faceted and so are not always easily summarized.  
As others have noticed, as well as I, French thinkers tend to formulate straightforward 
maxims that are nonetheless heavily nuanced. Bottum (1996:e) points out: „Following a 
tradition dating back to Descartes' 1648 Conversation with Burman, French intellectuals 
often use interviews to put on record major qualifications of their work.‟  
 
Labeling concepts peculiar to Girard is also precarious.  Almost any advocate or critic of 
Girard tends to alter designations, often giving it his or her particular bent on the concept. 
With this in mind, every attempt is made to use Girard‟s terms consistent with and 
accurate to his use.   
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1.6.1  Mythical structure and sacrificial or scapegoat mechanism.  Girard repeatedly 
speaks of the operative mechanism of sacrifice that has uniform contours yet infinite 
variation.  „The structure of the sacrificial crisis and of generative violence,‟ says Girard 
(1972:285), „permits us to understand the means by which violence is deflected and 
diffused in human society.‟ „Sacrifice serves to protect the entire community from its 
own violence‟ (1972:8).  Elsewhere he (1972:83) reiterates: „…a surrogate victim 
constitutes a major means, perhaps the sole means, by which men expel from their 
consciousness the truth about their violent nature.‟ 
 
The sacrificial mechanism is where the bad violence of the community is consolidated in 
a single victim and then, by means of his death (good violence) is transformed into 
benevolent effects for the community.  This mechanism is nearly synonymous with 
Girard‟s repeated mention of a structure that is mythical.   The mythical structure is the 
infinite and ingenious ways all societies and cultures conceal, displace, of misinterpret 
the sacrificial operative mechanism.  The mythical structure entails an „aura of 
misunderstanding‟ (1972:22) where the malevolent and the benevolent aspects of „good 
violence‟ and „bad violence‟ remain in suspension (1972:36).  Sacrifice can only work 
when the violence that has been redirected into its proper channel remains „mysterious.‟  
Concealment is the key element to effectual sacrifice, and things are structured or ordered 
in order to conceal, displace, or veil the sacrificial mechanism.  Girard (1972:96) states: 
„In the scapegoat theme we should recognize the very real metamorphosis of reciprocal 
violence into restraining violence through the agency of unanimity.  This unique 
mechanism structures all cultural values even as it conceals itself behind them.‟ 
Girard (1972:82) further clarifies what is at stake in this camouflaging of the sacrificial 
operation: „Men cannot confront the naked truth of their own violence without the risk of 
abandoning themselves to it entirely.  They have never had a very clear idea of this 
violence, and it is possible that the survival of all human societies of the past was 
dependent on this fundamental lack of understanding.‟ 
1.6.2 Generative violence.   This term is often used by Girard to refer back to the 
original scapegoat murder of a community that resulted in a sense of unity or cohesion 
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for the group.  Says Girard (1972:256): „…the origin of any cultural order involves a 
human death and that the decisive death is that of a member of the community.‟ „Death, 
contains the germ of life.  There is no life on the communal level that does not originate 
in death‟ (1972:253).  Girard clarifies (1972:297): „…generative violence penetrates all 
forms of mythology and ritual…there can be nothing in the whole range of human culture 
that is not rooted in violent unanimity—nothing that does not find its source in the 
surrogate victim.‟ 
1.6.3  Sacrificial or surrogate victim.  Girard (1972:269) provides an important 
clarification to his use of sacrificial or surrogate victim: 
 
All sacrificial rites are based on two substitutions.  The first is provided by generative violence, 
which substitutes a single victim for all the members of the community.  The second, the only 
strictly ritualistic substitution, is that of a victim for the surrogate victim.  As we know it, it is 
essential that the victim be drawn from outside the community.  The surrogate victim, by contrast, 
is a member of the community.   
 
Every attempt is made in ritual to create an exact replica of the original scapegoat, but to 
limited success.  The original surrogate victim best „becomes the receptacle of human 
passions‟ (Girard, 1972:269). 
 
1.6.4  Mimetic desire A fundamental aspect of Girard‟s theory relies heavily on the 
notion that human desire is essentially imitative.  We learn desires by what others close to 
us desire.  Girard (1978:9): „If imitation does indeed play the fundamental role for man, 
as everything seems to indicate, there must certainly exist an acquisitive imitation, or, if 
one prefers, a possessive mimesis…‟  Girard (1978:11) believes that this „acquisitive 
desire‟ inevitably leads to „conflictual mimesis‟ or „mimetic rivalry‟ which in turn leads 
to internal conflict.  Girard (1978:18) explains his particular choice of mimetic over 
imitation: 
Then compared to earlier forms of religious thought, the modern use of the term imitation 
produces a corresponding but reversed and aggravated ignorance.  Rather than the exhausted word 
imitation, then, I chose to employ the Greek word mimesis…The only advantage of the Greek 
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word is that it makes the conflictual aspect of mimesis conceivable, even if it never reveals its 
cause. 
Because acquisitive mimesis is Girard‟s „point of departure,‟ he as well as others often 
label his ideas as mimetic theory. 
1.6.5  Monstrous double.  The monster, for Girard (1972:252), is an incarnation of 
maleficent violence where there is a complete breakdown of difference or where all 
difference is on equal terms.  It is where the conflict between two rivals grows to such an 
intensity that for all intensive purposes the two look the same.  They become a single 
unmanageable monstrosity that threatens a whole community.  The two seemingly radical 
oppositions become one monstrosity of chaos, indifference, and unchecked violence,   
a conglomeration of difference.  
1.6.6  Sacrificial Crisis.  The sacrificial crisis is signaled by the increased impotency of 
the sacrificial mechanism.  Girard argues that the scapegoat mechanism is inherently 
weak; it only carries weight because of its virulent and awe-inspiring birth.  As ritual 
sacrifice loses its efficacy, the differences—order—that ritual maintains begin to unravel.  
Hence: „The sacrificial crisis can be defined…as a crisis of distinctions—that is, a crisis 
affecting the cultural order‟ (1972:49).  A sacrificial crisis is a „ritualistic crisis‟ 
(1972:55) where distinctions and differences necessary for social cohesion begin to 
disintegrate.  Girard (1972:49) explains: 
 
A single principle is at work in primitive religion and classical tragedy alike, a principle implicit 
but fundamental.  Order, peace, and fecundity depend on cultural distinctions; it is not these 
distinctions but the loss of them that gives birth to fierce rivalries and sets members of the same 
family or social group at one another‟s throats. 
A sacrificial crisis is where sacrifice turns against those it is designed to protect 
(1972:41ff) and good violence turns to bad violence.  When this begins to occur, there is 
often an intensifying of sacrificial activity and a orgy-like proliferation of sacrifice which 
will ultimately lead to rivalry, „a terrible equilibrium,‟ „cyclical violence,‟ a „violent 
effacement of difference‟ (1972:63). 
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1.7  Hebrew word studies.   
Girard‟s theory challenges various aspects of conventional theories and methodologies of 
literary criticism developed during the modern period.
10
  Lexicography does not escape 
the challenge of Girard.  Lexicographers, as well as ethnographers, have failed to see the 
duality inherent in the ancient notion of the sacred.  This failure has skewed the 
categorizing of denotations.  With this in mind, it is necessary to explore the particular 
Hebrew words of a text to see if conventional word studies have perhaps missed an 
important correlation.  The thesis here understands the precarious nature of making 
emphatic conclusion based on word studies alone and seeks to avoid that.  The goal is 
more to simply explore the possibility that vestigial traces of the founding death are 
retained in the language of the sacred.  Thus the investigation can be compared to 
ethnographers who study ritual or social behaviors or archeologists who comb through a 
site looking for clues for something that perhaps was missed by earlier investigators. 
Hence, the elaboration of Hebrew word-meanings in this work is based on my own 
investigations.  The primary source for the word studies is Brown, Driver, and Briggs‟ 
Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament (BDB) and Harris, Archer, and 
Waltke‟s Theological Words of the Old Testament (TWOT).  The attempt is made to 
confirm my conclusions with other commentaries as much as possible.  BDB is especially 
useful in categorizing the various denotations of a word and supplying key Hebrew texts 
to compare and reference.  Sometimes extensive information and explanation of a word 
study is provided within the body of this work.  At other times, an abbreviated 
explanation is found in a footnote.  Since the nature of the thesis presented here cannot 
accommodate full explanations of every word studied, it is necessary at times to simply 
state the conclusion of my study and provide a short reference.  The particular debates 
peculiar to lexicographic inquiry will challenge conclusions made here, but this is, of 
course, a part of the ongoing work of scholarship.  
 
 
                                                 
10
 Girard (1972:262).  This will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 5 (5.1.3) below.  
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1.8 Documentation notes 
Since the gap between an original work and its English translation can sometimes be 
extensive, this work cites the date of the original work, not the date of the English 
translation.  This allows for a more accurate picture of the proper chronological sequence 
of the works. 
Where Internet sources do not provide page numbers an „e‟ will be used instead of a page 
number, such as (1990:e).  
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2 GIRARD’S THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
Girard‘s bibliography is enough to demonstrate his own attempt to explicate his theory.  
The full explanation of his theory will be left to him.  As stated earlier, the focus of the 
inquiry is not a full-blown analysis of his theory.  Even though the heated issues of theory 
itself will be addressed as well as the array of criticisms directed at Girard‘s in particular, 
this work accepts it as worthy of consideration. Girard
1
 has repeatedly appealed for the 
validity of the theory to be tested by application rather than dismissed on purely 
philosophical, predilective, or capricious grounds.   
This chapter, then, seeks more to describe the application of his theory as it is explained 
and utilized by Girard and hence to describe a methodology.  An attempt to categorize 
principles
2
 for interpretation below is primarily based on Girard‘s own commentary on 
biblical texts and is supplemented by adherents who have applied it to biblical texts.
3
    
There are several underlying patterns that Girard not only consistently applies, but also 
suggests when interpreting a text from the structural perspective of the scapegoat 
mechanism, and that is, after all, what a methodology is.  At times, Girard is elusive 
about such systematizing, yet if the theory is ‗a new interpretive tool,‘4 then we should 
denominate various aspects of it.  One must concede that there is a distinctive twist to his 
approach, for what applies to a text just as equally applies to criticisms and 
methodologies. 
If we are to allow the author to speak for himself (and not psychologically or politically 
deconstruct him), then we should yield to the author‘s own precautions and 
qualifications.  Girard believes that the tendency for humans to turn on each other to 
spare themselves so powerfully grips us on an individual and corporate level that it 
moves far beyond our theories and methodologies.  This tendency has its own force and 
operates especially when we are not aware of it and can limp along quite well even we 
                                                 
1
 Williams 1991:vii  
2
 The use of terms such as category and principle are apt to constrict and misdirect without a broader 
understanding of the theory.  I hope to avoid an injustice to Girard, yet to date, not a lot of discussion has 
centered on an application of the theory to a biblical methodology.  Most of what can be found about 
Girard concerns his theory.  If one is to ‗test‘ the theory, then summarizing and organizing concepts is 
inevitable. 
3
 See Hamerton-Kelly (1994:129ff) and Williams (1991) 
4
 Williams 1991:viii 
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are.  In a sense, it isn‘t a methodology, theory, ideology anymore than looking up at the 
stars at night is.  As time goes on, it is only our perspective that has changed.   
Ultimately, texts that reveal and dismantle this tendency should be allowed to read us, 
rather than us reading the text.  We don‘t come to the text as an objective outside 
observer, scientifically diagnosing, analyzing, and categorizing it until we have a 
hermetically sealed museum artifact.    Girard‘s (1985b:112) approach is profoundly 
anthropological because it radically addresses the core of who we are: 
I do not believe, therefore, that the theory of mythology I have outlined here is new.  I do not think 
that it is mine at all.  I think that it is nothing more than a weak, scholarly translation and 
transposition of the anthropological content of the Bible.  I also believe that the ability we have in 
the modern world not to be fooled by scapegoat persecutions of the type I have discussed, those in 
the Middle Ages, or the ones today in the totalitarian world—our ability not to be deceived by 
such collective persecution—comes from the Bible…It is not the fruit of unaided human reason as 
the philosophers of the eighteenth century and the humanists would like us to believe, but it is the 
influence of the Bible on us, an influence that is not perceived most of the time. 
It needs mentioning before we proceed as to what to call Girard‘s theory.  Almost any 
label seems inadequate.  As in the quote above, Girard would prefer that it not even be 
called ‗Girard‘s theory.‘ At times, he is comfortable with calling it a theory or even a 
‗matrix,‘ but even Girard casts doubt about such labels (Bottum, 1996:e).  As the next 
chapter will address to a limited degree and as Strenski
5
 postulates, for instance, we must 
question whether any theorizing can hold its sway in an academic milieu where as of 
right now, only difference can be affirmed and skepticism muddles claims of an 
advantaged perspective.  
Nonetheless, Girard (Williams,1991:vii) concedes that labels must be given if one is to 
talk about it at all.  Conventionally, names for theories come not from the originator but 
from those willing to engage it.  It is a theory—a construct of ideas proposing to explain 
certain phenomena—, and it is a methodology—a particular approach to interpreting a 
text conceding to certain presuppositions which guide and dictate the direction of the 
inquiry and the conclusions thereof.  As much as it is bothersome to juxtapose oneself 
                                                 
5
 See Strenski‘s (2003:1-6) first chapter of his book Theology and the First Theory of Sacrifice. 
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among the minefield of methodologies before anything can be said about a text, for most, 
it is still more dubious to claim not to have any method and then proceed with obvious 
assumptions.  Nonetheless, Girard (Hamerton-Kelly 1994:xi) fairly warns of a peculiar 
twist to his ‗approach‘: 
Of most theories, such as psychoanalysis or structuralism, it is legitimate to say that they are 
―applied‖ to the Gospels.  In the case of mimetic theory, the language of ―application‖ falters.  
Whenever the theory is used as intelligently as it is in this book, it tends to disappear behind the 
text.  It is so close to the text that, when the two are brought together, the text wins out.  The 
theory dissolves into the text, and this annihilation is its greatest triumph. 
Hamerton-Kelly (1994:129) has attempted an overarching label—‗The Generative 
Mimetic Scapegoating Mechanism‘ (GMSM for short)—and attempts to concisely 
package it to a general audience. Although this may be helpful, I would agree with 
Bottum (1996:e) that this gives the impression of a ‗system‘ which inevitably creates 
fodder for critics.  Throughout this inquiry, various designations will be given depending 
on where the emphasis lays in a similar vein to what Girard seems to do.  Where the 
scapegoating operation of collective violence is emphasized, terms like ‗scapegoat 
mechanism,‘ ‗mythic structure,‘ or ‗sacral violence‘ is preferred.  At times, the more 
foundational aspects of the theory require one to speak in terms of mimetic theory.
6
 
Of course, I will direct the focus particularly on the Old Testament, but conceding that, 
unlike Old Testament theologies that attempt to interpret it in its own right, this cannot be 
done without comparison and contrast with a wide variety of texts, both ancient and 
modern.  Since this chapter attempts to describe Girard‘s theory and practice primarily as 
he speaks of it and applies it, most critical interaction is by way of introduction and is 
reserved for the next chapter. 
 
2.1 From Theory to Methodology 
 
                                                 
6
 Chilton (1993:28) is one of the few who questions Girard‘s notion that mimesis is fundamentally a bad 
characteristic.  Instead, he argues for its neutrality.  
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The focus here is on Girard‘s theory and method as it specifically applies to biblical texts, 
especially the Old Testament.  It is critical, however, in which this focus does not and 
indeed cannot be examined separately from the broader context that Girard places it.  
What applies to the Old Testament applies to all texts, mythological, religious, literary, 
and in ideological, political and ‗scientific‘ texts of modern times.  Indeed, it applies to 
human institutions of every kind.
7
  Girard did not set out to be a biblical exegete, nor 
does he claim to be one.  Applying his formal training as an historian, the insipient 
formulation of a theory began with the medieval literature, then novels of Proust, 
Dostoyevsky, Stendahl, also Shakespeare, and with Greek tragedies to which his original 
notoriety as a gifted literary critic came in the 1960s.  His early critics oddly criticized 
him as an anti-religionist or a religionist simultaneously (Bottum:1996:e).  Girard‘s focus 
on biblical texts, and his developing preference for them, comes as a result or application 
of his theory rather than the cause.  Because the Old Testament and above all the Gospels 
reveal the scapegoat mechanism more extensively than other texts, Girard gives priority 
to them.  
Girard‘s study of great novels propelled him into an increasing awareness of the role that 
desire plays in creating tensions and rivalry.  This concern, he concludes, in fact 
dominates the novel, and it seemed that imitative desire profoundly affected the author‘s 
construct.  It became clear to Girard that the main cause of rivalry, conflict, and violence 
in novels had its genesis in human desire that is looking for an object.  It is here where he 
solidified the idea that human desire is imitative and hence the label ‗mimetic.‘8  This 
interest propelled him to explore ‗mimetic desire‘ beyond literature and into the social 
sciences, particularly psychology, sociology, and anthropology.
9
 This pursuit was the 
impetus for his seminal theoretical works—Violence and the Sacred (1972), delving into 
the field of ethnology and anthropology, and Things Hidden From the Foundations of the 
World (1978), interacting more with psychology where he calls for the ‗testing‘ out of his 
ideas.   
                                                 
7
 The Colloquium on Violence and Religion (http://www.uibk.ac.at/theol/cover/ ) is an organization 
established by Girard and others precisely to explore the ramifications of Girard‘s theory to an array of 
contemporary issues.  
8
 Refer to Chapter 1 (1.6.4) for Girard‘s preference for ‗mimetic‘ over ‗imitative.‘ 
9
 Mack (1987:17) suggests that it was Girard‘s analysis of the Bacchae myth that solidified the connection 
between desire for a shared object and religious notions of the sacred. 
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In Violence and the Sacred, there are only casual biblical references, mainly to the Old 
Testament, especially the prophets and Genesis, and usually in comparison to the Greek 
tragedies, like Oedipus Rex and Bacchae.  By the second book, one can sense that the 
implications drawn from Violence and the Sacred were being pressed in on Girard where 
he devotes a more direct application to Biblical texts, mostly with the Gospels and the 
more ‗sacrificial texts‘ in the New Testament, primarily the book of Hebrews.  Even here, 
however, Girard only opens the door for more inquiry.  He does proceed to apply his 
theory directly to an Old Testament book, one that interestingly enough is oft neglected 
in Old Testament theologies—Job: the Victim of his People (1985).  One must say that 
this delving into biblical texts was left considerably wide-open.   Girard (Williams 
1991:ix) admits as such, and invites those qualified in the field to explore ahead. 
It is after this period that most criticisms of Girard emerge.  The next chapter will 
examine an array of these criticisms most of which are on the theoretical level.  The 
affects of criticism is apparent in The Scapegoat (1982) and Job (1985) both of which are 
clear attempts to clarify and defend aspects of his theory.  At times, there are direct 
responses to criticism.  His book, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning (1999), is considered to 
be his most theological of works.  In it, Girard primarily limits his discussion to the 
ramifications of his thinking on the New Testament.   
Along with the varied responses to Girard‘s theory is found a positive reaction among 
various Christian perspectives. Raymund Schwager (1978) and James Williams (1991) 
initially applied Girard‘s theory in a more concentrated fashion to biblical texts.  Both 
apply the theory in broad strokes, addressing Old Testament and New Testament themes 
and theologies.  Robert G Hamerton-Kelly (1994) applies the theory to the Gospel of 
Mark and also makes a more direct and systematized attempt at clarifying the theory as 
an approach.  Bottum (1996) views the latter negatively:  ‗…over-extending his thought 
and yet simultaneously narrowing it into a ―Girardian System.‖ Bottum prefers ‗insight‘ 
over method and reports that Girard renounces a system. At times, Girard prefers his 
theory supplement interpretive endeavors.  At other times, however, he calls it a model or 
matrix for interpretation.   There is, then, a certain tension between theory and method 
within the Girardian school. Implementation is not evenly applied.  Of importance at the 
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moment, however, is to take note of the immediate and enduring appeal the theory has 
had among Christian theologians and scholars.
10
  In fact, Girard (Golsan, 2002:130) 
attests to a conversion to the Catholic faith, and it does appear that the swell of criticism 
against Girard is proportionate to his preference for biblical texts.  A phenomenon that 
has not escaped his notice (Golsan, 2002:129). 
As we move from theory to application, it is important to remind that Girard has 
produced a general theory of culture that can go many directions.  This flexibility is due 
to his emphasis on a structure or mechanism over and against theme.  In this regard, he 
does not start with a different set of premises for biblical texts than any other.  The 
distinction of and preference for biblical texts emerges for Girard only in the degree to 
which the scapegoat mechanism is revealed.  More of this will discussed below. 
Before I begin, it is important to recognize a couple of underlying assumptions that 
consistently operate with Girard‘s approach.  For one, Girard views sacrifice as 
resoundingly negative.  Above all, sacrifice originates in a founding ‗collective murder,‘ 
and that murder has everything to do with directing the violence of the community away 
from itself.  In conjunction with this is another assumption that underpins much of 
Girard‘s work.  Fundamentally, sacrifice—or more accurately our sacrificial violence 
towards one another—profoundly disturbs us, and it always has.  These assumptions have 
been readily pointed out by more than one critic and have lead to labeling Girard a 
‗moralist.‘11  This will be addressed in more detail in the next chapter. 
 
2.2 A Theory-laden Approach to Biblical Text 
 
We have discovered, at the heart of every religion, the same single central event that generates its 
mythical significance and its ritual acts: the action of a crowd as it turns on someone it adored 
                                                 
10
 Already mentioned are Raymund Schwager (1978), James Williams (1991), Robert Hamerton-Kelly 
(1991).  As will be discussed in Chapter 3, John Milbank (1990), William Schweiker (1991), and Urs von 
Balthaser (1988) have taken note of Girard‘s contribution to theology and hermeneutics. 
11
 This is a basic criticism of Strenski (2003:3). The charge of moralism is one Girard (1982:143) is aware 
of. 
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yesterday, and may adore again tomorrow, and transforms him into a scapegoat in order to secure 
by his death a period of peace for the community (Girard, 1985a:160). 
 
We have in a nutshell above a grid for approaching a text, especially of a mythic or 
religious nature.  A generative communal killing of a prominent member is embedded in 
the narrative, albeit at various stages of disappearance.  The rising of dangerous rivalries 
within the community find an outlet as it turns at the moment of accusation.   The 
community ‗miraculously‘ discovers a unanimity as it presses upon a victim.  In a 
decisive and violent act, the victim is expelled from the community.  The victim, who a 
moment earlier was the lightning rod of the community‘s malevolence, has now restored 
the community to peace and security and is revered.  The community then arranges 
through ritual a way to safely revisit the founding event and recapture its benevolent 
effects.  
2.2.1  Mimetic or acquisitive desire.  The pulse of Girard‘s approach is always 
mimetic desire.
12
  It is, as Girard (1985a:50) says, ‗the essential dimension.‘  Mimetic 
desire is the irresistible tendency in humans to borrow or acquire desire from a ‗model‘ to 
which a ‗disciple‘ begins to imitate. Critical to the operation of mimetic desire is the 
understanding that the powerful draw for the disciple is not in the ‗object‘; rather, it is the 
apparent power of the ‗model‘ to posses ‗it.‘  Initially for the model, the emulation of a 
disciple is welcomed and encouraged, mostly because the model has been elevated to a 
privileged status.  What the model enjoys is not that the disciple desires the object as 
he/she does, but that the disciple desires him/her.
13
  In essence, the model has become 
‗it.‘ The object quickly disappears, and really from the outset, was of little importance.  
                                                 
12
 Girard (1978) addresses mimetic desire in considerable detail in his book Things Hidden Since the 
Foundations of the World.  Of particular note are: Chapter 1 of Book I, ‗The Victimage Mechanism as the 
Basis of Religion,‘ Chapter 1 and 2 of Book III, ‗Mimetic Desire‘ and ‗Desire without Object.‘   
13
 A recent discipline of psychology called ‗social cognition‘ is researching this triangular dimension in 
human development.  Interestingly, the same dimension which creates violence among humans may also be 
the mechanism which spawned the uniquely human abilities to reason and to teach others. Rebecca Saxe 
(2006,16:235), a leading researcher at MIT states: ‗This second unique component of human social 
cognition requires representing triadic relations: You, and Me, collaboratively looking at, working on or 
talking about This.‘ 
Chapter 2 – Girard‘s Theory and Methodology               28 
 
28 
 
As soon as this desire is immolated, however, an inevitable rivalry has begun, for if the 
disciple continues in his/her pursuit for ‗it,‘ the model will perceive an inevitable loss of 
‗it‘ to the disciple.  An irreversible competition ensues where both model and disciple are 
obstacles to each other.  Rivalry begins to escalate to a dangerous and violent pitch at the 
point where both the model and the disciple reach an equilibrium—both are on level 
ground for displacing the other for possession of ‗it.‘  There is no essential difference 
between them, and the ‗object‘ has disappeared completely.  The two become one 
‗monstrous double‘ whose violence threatens to engulf the whole community.  Imitative 
rivalry is contagious. 
This equilibrium of reciprocal rivalry is what Girard calls symmetry and to which he sees 
consistently structuring not only mythological and religious texts, but ritual as well.  The 
amount of interplay between this symmetry and its breakdown, dissymmetry, is an 
indispensable key for interpretation.
14
  Girard never loses sight of this when discussing 
the text.  
This ‗terrible paradox‘ of desire thrusts the entire community into a ‗sacrificial crisis.‘  
Sensing the threat of all, the all desperately seek an outlet to divert the impending 
destruction of the community—a scapegoat. Girard‘s explanations of the scapegoat 
mechanism are numerous.  For now, this summary will suffice: 
The diffusion of mimeticism at the height of its intensity guarantees the absence of any real object 
for the desire.  Beyond a certain threshold hate exists without cause.  It no longer has need of 
cause or pretext; there remain only intertwined desires, buttressed against one another.  If these 
desires are divided and set in opposition as they focus on an object, they wish to preserve—alive, 
in order to monopolize it,..—then by becoming purely destructive these same desires may be 
reconciled.  This is the terrible paradox of human desires.  They can never be reconciled in the 
preservation of their object but only through its destruction; they can only find agreement at the 
expense of a victim (Girard, 1982:146). 
This sacrificial crisis is precisely the stuff of the sacred, that realm where the symmetry of 
reciprocity spirals ever more tightly into a paroxysm where ‗opposition is most radical 
and difference non-existence‘ (1972:40).  As Girard (1972:39) understands myth, this 
                                                 
14
 See Girard (1968) ‗Symmetry and Dissymmetry in the Myth of Oedipus.‘ 
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symmetry of reciprocal violence is always reversing what it first undoes.  Thus 
reciprocity spins tighter towards a ‗reduction,‘ ‗condensation,‘ ‗abbreviation,‘ or 
‗foreshortening‘ of reciprocity (1968:80).  This centrifugal ‗simplification‘ of reciprocity 
brings to light the scapegoat with an impeccable internal logic.  This is what Girard has 
variously labeled the coherence of myth or the mythical structure.  It is ‗the unanimous 
polarization of hostility [toward a single victim] that produces the reconciliation‘ 
(1972:287).  The sacrificial crisis is the ‗derisory‘ or ‗savage‘ realm of man’s sacredness.  
That sacred realm is the place of ‗dazzling ambiguity‘ and an ‗anarchy of value‘.  The 
‗evanescent difference,‘ the ‗circularity of myth,‘ the ‗duality of myth,‘ the realm of 
‗perpetual reversals‘ is the sacredness of myth and the scapegoat mechanism.15  Only in 
this realm does the scapegoat come to light.  It is here where the expulsion of the one will 
relieve the crisis.   
The brief description is inadequate in comparison to Girard‘s full-blown explanations; 
nevertheless, mimetic desire and its irresistible movement toward rivalry, communal 
crisis, and resolve in the scapegoat are the resolute underpinnings of all to be discussed 
below.   
2.2.2  Within deconstruction perimeters.  Deconstruction is admittedly an elusive 
term, yet Girard‘s thought reveals affinities with the general contours of the movement.16  
Girard‘s scholarly interest of history and literature in post-war France assures proximity 
to its influence.  Certainly, his reluctance to evade the label of ‗theory‘ or ‗method‘ 
echoes that of Derrida.
17
  Girard (Williams 1991:viii) admits as such in his insistence that 
the ubiquitous simplicity of the scapegoat as the foundation of religion and social 
cohesion perpetually eludes us.  He insists, however, that his affinities with 
deconstructionism decisively break from it in that the ‗new scapegoat theory‘s 
effectiveness ‗with religious texts undermines the epistemological nihilism to which other 
forms of ―deconstruction‖ invariably lead.‘  It is one thing to deconstruct a text and yet 
                                                 
15
 Girard has compiled an extensive glossary of terms referring to violence, the sacred, sacrifice, and the 
sacrificial crisis.  See Girard (1972:250-273) and  (1978:29-47, 58-87)  
16
 Wallace 1989:322 
17
 ‗For a deconstructive operation possibility would rather be a danger, the danger of becoming an available 
set of rule-governed procedures, methods, accessible practices. The interest of deconstruction, of such force 
and desire as it may have, is a certain experience of the impossible.... Deconstruction is inventive or it is 
nothing at all; it does not settle for methodological procedures‘ (Derrida, 1984:e). 
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another to reconstruct it.
18
  Thus, Girard speaks often of demythologizing, deciphering, 
decoding, decomposing, and demystifying the text, but equally of interpreting or 
translating one.  Furthermore, he, like the deconstructionists, does not limit the enterprise 
to text, but extends their ‗approach‘ to almost every aspect of life and thought.  We must 
deconstruct every aspect of reality in order to get at the truth of things.  
A critical juncture in this regard concerns who or what controls the text.  For Girard, 
mimetic desire and the scapegoat structure hold a powerful sway over the author‘s pen.  
We cannot underestimate the power and scope of mimetic rivalry operating within a 
group.  The text functions in a similar way as ritual.  The writer, therefore, is an 
intermediary like a priest or shaman would be.  There can be a considerable amount of 
imagination or creativity on the part of the author or redactors, but this is always dictated 
by and in the service of the mechanism.  Speaking of the Greek tragedies, Girard 
(1985a:43) says: ‗Whether pure invention or the closest imitation, the result is always in 
strict conformity with the great models bequeathed by the tragedies closest to the 
sacrificial origin.‘ 
Current strands of Old Testament theology
19
, especially with rhetorical approaches, have 
made much of the imagination of the author, but Girard would argue that for the most 
part, imitation is more at play than imagination. Old Testament scholarship has proffered 
a variety of interpretive grids explaining the borrowing of theme, structure, and genre 
from other texts
20
, but this is relatively inconsequential.
21
  There is a powerful religious 
and social utility at play, especially with ancient texts that overrides any individual 
artistic, historic, or religious concern.  As Girard sees it, there is an interplay between the 
intentions of the author and the unintentional, between awareness and the unawares.  The 
                                                 
18
 Golson, 2002:138-140 
19
 See for example: David’s Truth: In Israel’s Imagination and Memory by Brueggemann (1985) and 
Genesis as Dialogue: A Literary, Historical, and Theological Commentary by Brodie, Thomas L. 2001.  
Both give interpretive license to the literary ‗imagination‘ of the author(s).   
20
 One can recall Gunkel‘s (1901) classic work on Genesis inspired by the discovery of mythological texts. 
21
 Girard (1985a:43) downplays the significance ancient writer‘s borrowed from other sources, for the 
author ‗demonstrates the same control in dealing with violence and the sacred.‘  This approach has caused 
some, like Levine (1985:26), to criticize Girard for his ‗disdainful attitude toward the role of languages in 
the interpretation of ancient classics.‘ 
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scapegoat mechanism is such a powerful undertow behind our social experience that in a 
significant way, the authors ‗know not what they do.‘22   
As will be discussed in more detail below, Girard sees varying degrees to which the 
author perceives the operative structure of his narrative.   Mythological texts
23
 can work 
in two directions.  The ones close to the original murder have an awareness of the 
mechanism and more openly strive to uphold it.  Oddly, texts or rituals that are more 
removed from the founding murder may actually reveal an author or redactor who is less 
aware of the structure or one who is only aware of the beneficent utility of the mechanism 
all the while being blind to the operation of the scapegoat.  These typically have less 
overt violence in them and a scapegoat victim is less obvious.  It is like the majority of 
people who drive automobiles; we know how to operate them all the while knowing next 
to nothing as to how they work.  To another degree, there are mythical texts where 
‗cracks‘ appear.  These texts or rituals show evidence of questioning the mechanism.  
There is a second-guessing of the victim‘s absolute guilt.  There is a rote, dubious 
rereading of the myth as in the Greek tragedies. 
We can take this one step further where the author is aware of the mechanism to some 
degree and is attempting to get at it himself.  Even here, there may be: ‗…a keen 
awareness in the author that he is articulating things never heard before‘ (Girard, 
1985a:139).  We may even find the author‘s perspective embedded in one of the 
characters (Girard, 1985a:43).
24
  Of all ancient texts before the Gospels, the Greek 
                                                 
22
 Saying of Job‘s friends: ‗As the Gospels will say later of a similar affair, the three friends ‗know not 
what they do‘ on the moral and religious plane.  They know very well, on the other hand, what they should 
and should not do to someone whose punishment is a sacred task, to be accomplished with art.  The 
meaning of this art may escape us, but it can always be recovered‘ (Girard, 1985a:28).  
23
 Definitions of ‗myth‘ are so varied that one could wonder what any of us mean when we use the word.    
A full explanation of what Girard means by myth can be found in the chapter ‗The Science of Myth‘ in The 
Scapegoat (1982).  For now, this concise definition will do: ‗…all myth is—an absolute faith in the 
victim‘s total power of evil that liberates the persecutors from reciprocal recriminations and, therefore, is 
identical with an absolute faith in the total power of good‘ (1985a:34).  
24
 Goodhart (2007:69) takes this further than Girard.  He postulates that the author may originally have 
intended to deconstruct the mechanism, but is sucked into the limited perspective of one of the characters 
who is disillusioned. Saying of Genesis 3: ‗It is as if the text itself has taken over the perspective of the 
characters within the text, of ishah and the iysh after their eating of the fruit, and as if the text itself is now 
being written from within that perspective… The text itself, in other words, has now become a distortion, 
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tragedies and the Old Testament are demythologizing, attempting to dismantle the truth 
or at least peek behind the mask.  For Girard (1985a:120), there is the sense that the 
authors are on the cusp of a great discovery: ‗It is no accident that the texts most capable 
of enlightening us on what is happening are the great texts that belong to the tragic and 
prophetic universe, the works most inspired by the sacrificial decadence of the ancient 
world.‘  Of the two, Girard (1985a:39) believes the Greek tragedies ‗retreat back into the 
mechanism‘ while the Old Testament ‗crosses the threshold.‘  Girard understands some 
texts, including theories in the social sciences of the 20
th
 century, as regressive, coming 
close to understanding the mechanism, but then retreating. 
Every text or ritual indicates the state of flux a community is in regarding their proximity 
to its generative act and/or the ritual maintenance of it.  A mythological text intentionally 
or unintentionally upholds or hides its generative structure.  A demythological text is at 
various stages of exposing the mechanism, again consciously or unconsciously.  And 
there are texts that appear to be doing both, the Old Testament appears unique for Girard 
in this regard.  Ultimately, there are two forces that are outside the author and to which 
the author can interact with, but is not in control of.  It is either the scapegoat structure or 
a force working to dismantle the mechanism—God.   
The interplay between intention and imagination or conscious and unconscious equally 
applies to redactors and to interpreters of the text.  Again, we must understand the 
reading of the text in a similar way as participating in a festival or ritual.  There are 
certain things that are operational that we may or may not be aware of, but those who 
preside over this process may be ‗mystified‘ by the actual workings of the process even 
more than those closer to the original crisis. 
Thus redactors may, in fact, do more to confuse our vision of the text than to clarify it.  
Girard certainly would not hold to a ‗univocal‘ reading of the Bible.  If it doesn‘t fit ‗the 
model‘ then it is discounted and even denounced, usually as a misshapen distortion of the 
text.  Certainly, in Girard‘s most in-depth exploration of the Old Testament, he has no 
                                                                                                                                                 
and as a result the task of reading has become infinitely more complicated… what we are reading now is 
what may itself be termed a ―text of transgression.‖  
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problem delineating between sections of the text that go against his thesis. The case in 
point is the introductory and concluding sections of Job where Girard (1985a:58) believes 
a redactor retreated from the profound implications of Job‘s speeches.  Thus he points to 
parts of the Old Testament that are, ‗not the highest tradition of biblical inspiration‘ 
precisely because ‗the voice of the victim is not heard.‘   
Even though a god of the persecutors is evident in parts of the Bible, Girard (1985a:9) 
believes that in the Bible, the perspective of the victim is ‗always and everywhere‘ 
prominent.  Girard (1999:170-181) provides an important qualifier here.  If, he argues, 
we are only given the perspective of the victim then we only create, in fact, just another 
rivalry to replace the old one.  We succumb to Nietzsche‘s ‗slave morality for that of the 
master.‘  It is critical that we be confronted with both perspectives—that of both victim of 
the crowd and the crowd.  This is a significant interpretive component.  If we do not 
include the perspective of the scapegoat mechanism, we will confuse the religion, and 
god, of the crowd with that of the true god.   
Girard (1985a:126-127) calls for a reliance on a ‗global interpretation‘25 in discerning not 
only the extent of redaction, but in which direction it is going.  As in the case of Job, 
Girard admits to several texts that blur the distinction between the god of vengeance and 
the god of the victim, reducing a text to inevitable enigmatic interpretations.  Thus any 
adoption of the ‗language of the persecutors‘ makes it ‗more difficult to recognize him in 
his role as victim.‘  Girard (Job 1985a:71-72) speaks of the scapegoat rubric translating 
the text. 
Girard does not stray far from what has long been a staple of Old Testament theology—
there are varying and oft competing views of God and traditions in the Old Testament.
26
    
It has gotten a hold of something that it cannot wield nor discard.  Certainly, this can be 
no more evident in the Deuteronomist‘s framing of Israel‘s story almost exclusively in 
terms of a struggle against idolatry.  Certainly, one cannot walk away with even a casual 
reading of the Old Testament without a gnawing sense of an unresolved tension emerging 
from the text.  
                                                 
25
 It seems he is referring to the ubiquitous nature of the scapegoat mechanism.  It is infinitely repeatable.   
26
 Hanson (1986) provides an example of this as well as Terrien (1983) and Brueggemann (1997:61-114). 
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The deconstructive task operates to the degree that we understand the mythical structure.  
Again, we are at a vantage point today, not because we are brighter than past generations 
(or that Girard is more insightful than other scholars) but because of the 2,000 year effect 
of the Gospel on Western civilization (Girard, 1999:182-193).  Girard (1985a:167) 
employs the Gospel stories of the two disciples on the road to Emmaus, the prodigal son, 
and the Ethiopian eunuch as analogous to the process of anyone ‗decoding‘ the meaning 
of the Jesus event.  More accurately, it is the process that the Jesus event has of decoding 
those who encounter it. At first contact, there is curiosity and superficial sympathy.  
Then, disenchantment and disaffection set in.  There is a necessary ‗collapse of hope‘ and 
a ‗skeptical and suspicious discouragement‘ (a deconstruction) prior to the revelatory 
moment where by the light of Jesus‘ resurrection, the meaning of ‗Moses and the 
Prophets‘ is revealed (Luke 24:25). 
A reader, informed especially by the Gospel, holds an interpretive advantage even over 
the author and previous interpreters of the text.  The Gospel itself is deconstructing the 
mythical structure, and it is our task as readers to see that.  There is another critical 
departure with 20th century deconstructionism.  Ultimately, it is the Gospel that is 
deconstructing culture and not we who are deconstructing the author, usually along 
psychological, philosophical, and historical assumptions.  ‗The violence of our cultural 
order is revealed…and the cultural order cannot survive such revelation.  Once the basic 
mechanism is revealed, the scapegoat, that expulsion of violence by violence, is rendered 
useless by the revelation‘ (Girard, 1982:188-89). 
Girard (1982:5, 118) insists that we ‗interpret the text‘ beyond what the author knows, 
understands, or intends.  There is a scapegoat in the text and for it.
27
 
From our several centuries‘ distance we know better than he and can correct what he has written.  
We even believe that we have discovered a truth not seen by the author and, with still greater 
audacity, do not hesitate to state that he provides us with this truth even though he does not 
perceive it himself.  
                                                 
27
 One critic (Wetzel, 2006:e) would say that Girard neglects to go one step further and see the scapegoat 
behind the text. 
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2.2.3  A Hermeneutic of Absence. It doesn‘t take long before a reader of Girard notices 
the ease to which Girard finds the scapegoat mechanism in narratives even and especially 
when it is not apparent.  Indeed this seems a readymade criticism that Girard is 
‗fantasizing.‘28  This is where many could find fault with Girard‘s interpretive method.  
Arguing from what is not in the text has always been precarious. Girard (1985a:31) 
answers his critics saying the absence of an overt scapegoat reveals all the more that it 
was founded by it: ‗the very fact that they are [structured by the scapegoat] implies that 
the mechanism is nowhere present.‘  His argument is based on several considerations. 
It is one thing to argue from the absence of a noticeable scapegoat in the text, but Girard 
makes his argument on what is characteristically and persistently absent and juxtaposed 
to what is characteristically present.  Girard
29
 develops this position most fully in his 
discussion of myth and ‗texts of persecution.‘30 
As mentioned earlier, Girard (1985a:31) divides texts into one of two fundamental 
categories—myth, ‗for which there is no direct proof that they are structured by the 
scapegoat mechanism‘ and texts in which the mechanism is being revealed and 
dismantled to various degrees: ‗They are no longer there to reveal for us the structuring 
effect that the process exercises on their language, their vision and their behavior.‘ There 
is a bottom line reason why there is no overt scapegoat in myth: ‗As with all those who 
create scapegoats, they consider their victim to be guilty.  Therefore, for them, there is no 
scapegoat.‘ 
There are varying degrees to which a text (or ritual) has distanced itself from its 
generative murder, and one of the tell-tale signs is the loss of the original symmetry 
where the benevolent and malevolent forces polarized around the victim are held in 
                                                 
28
 Girard, 1982:93.  Wallace (1985:322)  states: ‗The demand that this hypothesis be accepted in its 
totality, with no pick-and-choose such as Girard shows toward Freud and Lévi-Strauss, is made especially 
taxing by the unawareness essential to his victimary mechanism, in virtue of which whatever fits fits, and 
whatever does not fit, fits the "built-in unawareness.‘ 
29
 Girard, 1982:12-91,  
30
 Girard (1982:6-7) builds much of his case on texts, such as The Judgment of the king of Navarre by the 
14
th
 Century French poet, Guillaume de Machaut, where the persecution from a religious minority is 
obvious and equally obvious are the distorted accusations.  By comparing an obvious persecution text—
from our historically removed position—with the less obvious myth, one can more readily see the same 
operation. 
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tension.  Another indicator is how vivid the description of the crime and how violent the 
punishment.  Myths approximating the real situation tend to view the ‗criminal‘ as guilty 
of gross crimes—classic mythological crimes such as plague, draught, loss in war, 
incest—and the punishment reflects the actual sacrifice of the scapegoat.31  Girard 
(1985a:31) admits the difficulty of detecting the mechanism at work in a text, yet most of 
all, there is inevitably one clear indicator—the collective murder. ‗Collective murder may 
certainly disappear from mythology.  It does in fact nothing else; but once gone, it cannot 
reappear…‘ (Girard 1982:73).  
Girard (1985a:31) believes the book of Job is a prime example where ‗the two visions‘—
myth and texts that reveal the mechanism—are presented in counterpart.‘32  For Girard, 
only when the voice of the victim comes through will you have a revelation of the 
mechanism.  This again is important in that we are dealing with assonance and 
dissonance in text.  When there is contradiction, disarray, dissymmetry, or ‗competing 
traditions,‘ we have an indication of how developed the text is, how removed it is from 
the generative event.    
Here Girard addresses something which has been a staple of OT interpretation over the 
last century—the awareness of competing traditions within the OT which are put side by 
side.  The ‗object‘ of such a juxtaposition is for Girard (1985a:32) ‗not catharsis but the 
disappearance of all catharsis.‘ Speaking of the book of Job, Girard says: ‗The difference 
in perspective on the same act of collective violence is the true subject of the Dialogues.  
The sacred lie of the friends is contrasted with the true realism of Job.‘ 
Here we have a text in travail.  A text in which it isn‘t sure what to make of a vision of 
God that is similar to that of Israel‘s neighbors—a god of vengeance, exacting 
retribution, one who both rewards and punishes.  It is a text not willing to disregard 
tradition, but also seeing a problem with it.  Perhaps the strategy of putting both 
perspectives together is in order for the community to see through to a different kind of 
                                                 
31
 Girard, 1982:31 
32
 Girard‘s view of the book of Job may well reflect his understanding of the Old Testament.  The 
interpretive task then is to distinguish the two and the interplay between them. 
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god.
33
  Certainly, Girard views the Old Testament as a text struggling to uncover a great 
mystery.  The text itself is in a sacrificial crisis of sorts. 
Refuting Frazer‘s earlier ideas of scapegoat rituals, Girard (1982:120) repeatedly 
emphasizes that it is the absence of a scapegoat theme that assures a scapegoat structure. 
Most cultures are too steeped in its structure to be capable of standing outside its 
influence.  
This is precisely what many critics find most problematic to Girard‘s theory.34  How can 
one observe something in which he participates?  This alone would tend to lead us away 
from talking about a scientific theory.  Girard agrees that one cannot directly observe the 
phenomenon; one can, however, look at the effects.  In Violence and the Sacred, Girard 
(1972:309) compares his theory to that of evolution.  Evolution cannot be directly 
observed, yet when examining the countless traces—effects—the theory of evolution 
gives a cohesive and plausible explanation for a plethora of diversity.  Williams 
(1991:13) prefers to say it is ‗supported by a social scientific model of explanation,‘ 
which has ‗analytic power.‘  Admitting that in the positivistic sense of the scientific 
method, the theory cannot be falsified, he affirms: ‗it certainly can be ranged against 
other theories and compared for adequacy in clarifying the data in question.‘ 
Girard (Williams, 1991: viii) argues on a similar base: ‗Thematic and structural traces are 
everywhere, and their pattern is so consistent throughout the world that, in my view, they 
make skepticism more untenable than direct evidence would if it were available.‘ 
Furthermore, Girard argues that even today we are very aware of the scapegoats of 
others, but still not of our own.  What continues to elude us is the invisible scapegoat.  
‗This paradoxical dimension of scapegoating, even (and especially) in a world literally 
obsessed with this evil, is the true reason why the new scapegoat theory remains elusive 
in its simplicity, why it cannot fail to be widely misunderstood.‘  
                                                 
33
 The historical ramifications of Girard‘s theory are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
34
 Bottum (1996) Reineke (2009:11) lists the inability to observe the scapegoat mechanism in any 
documented rituals of sacrifice as one of several ‗standard-issue criticisms‘ of Girard‘s theory.  
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Based on the characteristic absence of the scapegoat and the communal rivalry leading up 
to it, Girard (1982:75-82) asserts that we can trace the evolution or history of a myth, the 
basis being the community‘s underlying propensity to shirk its own violence.  Myth and 
ritual are rarely stagnant.  They are always in a process of eliminating traces of the 
collective murder.
35
  A first stage is when the collective murder is replaced by individual 
violence.  The community has successfully receded to the background.
36
   
The process continues until eventually all traces of violence are gone.  Myths that appear 
benign probably reflect a considerable distancing from its origins.  This stage reflects a 
kind of moral philosophizing which is uncomfortable with all forms of violence in the 
myth.  Girard would view much of the Old Testament and the Greek tragedies and 
philosophical works in this way.
37
  There is an attempt to clean up the myth and 
transform it into a tradition or civic religion.  A kind of ‗moral dualism‘ results which 
eliminates the connection between a god as ruthless persecutor (representing the mob) or 
as the victim.  A god now retains only the beneficiary characteristics and the malevolent 
qualities are relegated to demons.  Violent content may be retained here, but is now 
transformed to an idyllic, imaginary past.
38
  Critical to Girard‘s approach is an 
understanding that it is the very nature of myth to conceal the mechanism while 
simultaneously gleaning the benefits of it.  The absence of the scapegoat is what makes it 
myth. The absence of the collective murder is infinitely repeatable and predictable.  It is 
the characteristic of a myth moving away from its genesis precisely because the original 
collective murder is as repulsive to the ‗primitives‘ as it is for us. 
The characteristic absence of the scapegoat and the violence associated with it is the 
primary historical referent for Girard.  Girard believes the author of myth—and we must 
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 ‗The evolution of mythology is governed by the determination to eliminate any representation of 
violence‘ (Girard, 1982:76).  ‗…human culture is predisposed to the permanent concealment of its origins 
in collective violence.  Such a definition of culture enables us to understand the successive stages of an 
entire culture as well as the transition from one stage to the next…‘ (Girard, 1982:100). 
36
 This dimension will be an important consideration when looking at the Genesis narrative where the 
dominant roles are individualized in Adam, Eve, and Yahweh Elohim. 
37
 This becomes an important consideration in the examination of Genesis 1 where on the surface; the 
narrative does not appear to have anything to do with sacrifice and rivalry.  The writing is considerably 
removed from its more violent origins.  
38
 Van Seters (1992:26) notes that mythological accounts of origins in the Ancient Near East were attempts 
to give a society a universal and unifying depth to it.   
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be reminded that myth is any text that is mostly interested in upholding the scapegoat 
mechanism—is guided primarily by the structural element.  The bottom line is the 
preservation of the community from its own violence.  Elements of theme, historical 
detail, and story (with its oft supernatural elements) are in the service of this concern.  
The historical referents are on the generative level.  As long as the structure is in place, 
there can be a great deal of ‗creativity‘ on the part of an author.  This may be an 
uncomfortable proposition for the more scientifically oriented interpreter, but for anyone 
trained in the art of jazz music, this makes perfect sense.  It is strict adherence to the 
structure that allows for limitless ‗improvisation.‘  Hence, Girard (1982:1) counters the 
deep skepticism that is now prevalent in the social sciences. There is a real event being 
referred to in a text, and the ‗false‘ statements are just as informative, and maybe even 
more so, as to the true nature of that original event as the statements which appear more 
historically realistic.  Distortion—the false accusation and bloated culpability of the 
victim—is fundamentally inherent to the real event—a collective, sacrificial act of 
violence.
39
 
This is significant as far as methodologies go.  Girard starts with the presupposition of all 
methodologies that one must determine what kind of text we are interpreting.  Is it 
historical epic,
40
 myth, liturgy, or a variety of other designations?  Girard‘s textual 
starting point is reductionistic.  How should we interpret a text, psychoanalytically, socio-
politically, literarily?  Primarily it must be interpreted by the extent it is mythological or a 
text of persecution, and Girard conceives this on a scale of degrees based on what he calls 
‗stereotypes of persecution.‘  Suffice it to say, Girard (1982:29) offers an interesting 
direction to the issues of the historicity of an ancient text.  ‗My hypothesis relies on 
nothing historical in the critic‘s sense.  It is purely ―structural‖ as in our interpretation of 
historical representations of persecution…If we accept this thesis the obscurity of the text 
is immediately dispelled…Thus the interpretation does not rest on whether it is or is not 
set in a framework of historical detail.‘  The presuppositions of past methodologies based 
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 Girard, 1982:24, 30, 55, 89ff 
40
 Brodie (2001:68) argues for a unified reading of much of the Old Testament under the Greek conception 
of historical epic. 
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on the historical and the imaginary or mythical breaks down: ‗The decision to define a 
text as historical or mythological is arbitrary.‘41 
There is then a discernible history in a mythic narrative.  Unlike the documentary 
hypothesis in Old Testament scholarship, the diachronic evolution of the narrative is less 
tied to fixed histories and more dependent on a ‗structural‘ analysis.  Girard (1982:121) 
strains to clarify this central aspect to his thesis and yet is the target of persistent 
criticism.  Blaming it partly on the logical positivism that dominated much of 20
th
 century 
scholarship, he writes: ‗The concept of a structural principle that is absent from the text it 
structures would have seemed epistemologically incomprehensible…It is the same for 
most scholars, and I am not even sure that I can make myself understood despite my 
reference in the interpretation of Guillaume de Machaut…to a scapegoat that cannot be 
found in the text.‘ Girard (1982:121) call‘s the scapegoat structure a radical structure and 
clarifies the interpretive task: 
…a successful interpretation would not be possible without taking into account either collective 
murder, whenever it is present, or the uneasiness caused by its disappearance: all the images are 
arranged around its absence.  Unless we recognize this uneasiness, even those aspects relating 
strictly to the combination and transformation of the relationships among certain myths must 
remain hidden. (Emphasis mine) 
This hermeneutic of absence does not necessarily put Girard in an antagonistic 
relationship with convention historical criticisms.  He insists, however, that a major ‗key‘ 
to the historical road map has been left out.   
2.2.4  Text as ritual, sacrificial participant.  Form Criticism had attempted to place 
certain texts within a liturgical setting.  By determining the symbiotic connection 
between liturgy and text, the hope was to come to a clearer understanding of the text and 
the oral traditions that generated it.  It was deemed important to move away from a 
reading that considered a text as having an objective reality apart from the worship 
expressions of the community.   
                                                 
41
 Girard 1982:47 
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Girard takes the notion inherent in form criticism considerably further.  Girard eradicates 
any sense in which the text has a separate, objective reality.  A text is not neutral.  Ritual 
seeks in a controlled way to imitate the generative sequence that produces social cohesion 
and reconciliation among the community.  A text is only an extension of this function, 
sometimes in conjunction with ritual and sometimes replacing ritual.
42
  Girard 
consistently insists that mythological texts are performative.
43
  
 Speaking of the exaggeration of violent language found in speeches of Job‘s ‗friends,‘ 
which Girard considers to be a clear presentation of the logic of communal sacrifice, 
Girard (1985a:26, 27) explains: ‗By equating all the acts of violence against Job with 
services rendered to God, these speeches justify past brutalities and incite new ones.  
They are more formidable than any spitting.  Their performative value is obvious.‘   
Girard (1985a:27, 28) speaks of ‗linguistic sacrifice‘ or sacred language that acts with the 
same violence towards its victim as a ritual.  
Words, too, form a crowd; countless, they swirl about the head of the victim, gathering to deliver 
the coup de grace…Their hostile speeches are not merely an image of collective violence, they are 
a form of active participation in it. The ‗turbulence of the crowd‘ is reflected in a swirl of 
discourses of accusation…they are ‗carried away by their own barbaric lyricism.‘  
As is ritual, so texts perform the double purpose of dealing with collective violence while 
simultaneously covering it up.  The ‗justice‘ of the crowd is, in this case, transferred to a 
sense of divine or absolute justice.  Hence the recurring theme of fate, destiny, or chance 
always can be found, for the collective violence has been effectively transcended into 
supernatural forces. 
 
                                                 
42
 In Watts‘ (2007:202) rhetorical approach to ritual and text, he argues that texts on ritual practice and 
interpretation, such as Leviticus, appear when the ritual has ceased and/or is in the midst of considerable 
social conflict over ritual.  These kinds of texts, then, are designed to lend credibility to the ritual and to 
those performing it.  The authority of the text itself emerges only from ‗the authority of the temples ritual 
traditions‘ (Watts, 2007:214).  Although Watts‘ approach agrees with Girard on the interaction between 
text and ritual, he distinguishes his approach from Girard in key areas.  This will be addressed in the next 
chapter. 
43
 Thus Girard has affinities with one of his harshest critics from Old Testament scholarship, Janzen (2004).  
The radical divergence comes in understanding what is being performed. 
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Girard (1982:93) believes a prime example is the founding myth of Romulus: ‗It 
[collective murder] is in fact central to the myth and disappears gradually by a process of 
suffocation and strangulation, the true intellectual equivalent of what the patricians did to 
Romulus himself.‘ 
The process of elimination of the traces of the scapegoat mechanism—the collective 
murder—has the same fundamental motivation as the original mob murder.  It is 
functioning on the same logic as the victim itself—going from a collective act that is 
channeled into the one. 
2.2.5   Passion of Christ structural model of inversion.  Girard has no qualms 
admitting that his theory led him to the Gospels where he sees the scapegoat mechanism 
profoundly addressed as no other literature before or after has been able to do. The 
passion of Christ is for Girard, ‗the structural model.‘  In a modified sense, Girard has 
returned to a basic hermeneutic of Christian tradition before the influence of the 
enlightenment—reading the whole Bible through the lens of the passion of Christ.  
Thus, Girard stands in contrast to the historical criticisms that prevailed in Biblical 
scholarship since the 19
th
 century seeking to break the text free of dogmatic limitations.  
Apart from the Gospels, Girard places the Greek tragedies and even more so the Old 
Testament as approaching the revelation of the mechanism most profoundly, yet neither 
one is quite able to break through to a profound reversal.  Girard is comfortable with 
what has been resisted in much of the methodologies applied to the Old Testament over 
the past centuries.  He fully allows for the passion story to ‗intervene‘44 in Old Testament 
texts which have been muddled because of a reluctance to relinquish the god of 
persecution, the punishing god. 
Girard is in line with Old Testament approaches that view it in broad strokes, seeing the 
interconnectedness and cohesion.
45
  Again, because Girard approaches a ‗story‘ from a 
structural or foundational level, he does not bog himself down with too many ‗parasitic‘ 
features primarily for embellishment. The structural perspective overrides ‗theme,‘ 
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 Girard, 1982:162 
45
 Von Rad (1962) Old Testament Theology; Brodie 2001 Genesis as Dialogue: A Literary, Historical, and 
Theological Commentary.   
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‗tradition,‘ or ‗history.‘  Girard consistently points to the common and ‗stereotypical‘ 
themes that have an amazing ubiquitous application.  Girard (1982:141) argues that 
recurring themes are not dependent on ‗intertextuality‘ in a narrow sense.  He insists that 
some themes, like the exorbitant offer in the John the Baptist story, rival brothers, orphan 
sacrifice, or plague, are so common in myth that we must owe it to a structure common to 
all more than a conscience borrowing from or even allusion to other sources.   
Girard‘s approach to Scripture is parabolic.  In this regard, a commonly held 
hermeneutical principle for parables is to focus on one central point for the story in which 
all the details are in service of.
46
  Details can provide interesting twists, be entertaining or 
provocative, yet they are subordinate to the core force or impression which the story is 
leading.
47
  In addition, it is held that the parables of Jesus have a fundamental structure 
with multiple variations.
48
  Girard steers away from the kind of atomization of the text 
peculiar to some higher criticisms.  He is not against attention to detail per se, but when it 
ignores the structure, it can be at best distracting and at worse misleading.  We can, in 
fact, end up comprehending things the exact opposite of its goal or exactly as it intends to 
direct our attention away from the victim.  As with ritual, peculiarities and details can be 
haphazard or coincidental.  This will be discussed more in Chapter 3. 
How Girard understands the parables of Jesus is paradigmic to much of his 
interpretations of other texts and rituals.  Speaking of Jesus‘ discourse concerning his 
teaching the crowd in parables (Mark 4:10, 33), Girard explains the ‗parabolic distortion‘ 
which is being aggressively undermined by Jesus‘ parables.  Fundamentally, a parable 
has always been used to bolster the sacrificial mechanism.  It is a metaphor ‗thrown 
alongside‘ as a part of the appeasement of the crowd in order to divert attention away 
                                                 
46
 The subject of parables, as perhaps no other, follows the hotly debated methodological arenas of the 20
th
 
century.  Blomberg‘s analysis in Interpreting the Parables (1990) is careful and thoughtful.  Synthesizing 
the legitimate gains from various approaches, Blomberg applies a structural model to the parables 
remarkably similar to Girard.  Girard (1982:118) concedes that his approach is ‗structuralism at its best.‘ 
47
 For instance, Jeremias‘ (1954:115) statement of this idea, prominent among the form-critical method 
(Blomberg, 1990:72) finds an easy echo in Girard.  ‗We shall find that many parables express one and the 
same idea by means of varying symbols.  Differences which are commonplaces to us are now seen to be 
secondary.  As a result, a few simple essential ideas stand out with increased importance.  It becomes clear 
that Jesus was never tired of expressing the central ideas of his message in constantly changing images.‘  
48
 The structural make up of the parable is a foundational principle for interpreting the parables.  Blomberg 
(1990:171) for instance, divides most into three, two, and one point parables.  This is primarily based on 
key characters whose allegorical correspondence would be readily recognizable.  
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from potential scapegoat victims.  It is a ‗concession to mythological representation.‘49  
In this regard, metaphor is the language of the mob.  It is a fundamental tool of the 
persecutor and ‗the language of expulsion.‘ ‗Ultimately, there is no discourse that is not a 
parable.  All human language, and other cultural institutions, in fact, originated in 
collective murder.  After some of Jesus‘ most hard hitting parables, the crowd often 
makes a movement of violence‘ (Girard, 1982:193). Read too literally or with too much 
attention to superfluous detail, one is more likely to side with gods of vengeance and 
persecution than a god of love.  Jesus warns the disciples, and Girard his listeners, that 
one must find the ‗key‘ to understanding the story or else be ‗hearing but understanding, 
seeing but not perceiving.‘   
There are, Girard concedes
50
, overt reference to a scapegoating theme in the Gospels, but 
when it occurs, it is completely derogatory—scandalous. Jesus‘ preferred language is of 
skandalon—transforming the language of the scapegoat (metaphor)—into the scandal of 
mimetic desire.  It is within this context that Girard subordinates all other mythological 
and religious language.  The parables of Jesus, far from having a calming effect, are a 
cause of stumbling.  They are meant to trip up and derail the sacrificial mechanism.  The 
parables are as it were, mini-bombs or tremors
51
 wreaking havoc on the collective force 
of communal violence. Girard sees this evident within the very text of the Gospels were 
the narrative sections more accurately portray the disciple‘s perpetual befuddlement than 
the sometimes enigmatic transcriptions of Jesus‘ teaching.  Even here, the authors 
struggle to tear themselves away from ‗literalness‘ of sacrificial representations of the 
mechanism to the reality of the structure.  Sometimes even the Gospels recoil back into 
comfortable ‗religious‘ language. 
 
                                                 
49
 In a an interview discussing Eric Gan‘s anthropoetic ideas about the origin of culture, Girard 
(Muller,1996:e) makes his case that language, as one of many representations, could not precede the 
archetype of all representation—the sacrificial victim.  Williams (1991:17) defends the primacy of action 
over word as does Hamerton-Kelly (1994:145).  Watts (2007:180ff), who is not a Girard proponent, also 
argues that ritual precedes the word. 
50
 Williams 1991:viii 
51
 Some critical approaches to the parables have emphasized their intended shock value.  The ‗new 
hermeneutic‘ approach of Paul Ricoeur and others, suggests that the two things put in comparison have a 
‗shocking juxtaposition‘ (Blomberg, 1990:138). 
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Girard (1982:194-95) views the language of demons and Satan, although still religious 
language, as movement in the direction of scandal.  It is an intermediary between mythic 
and scandal language especially because of its turn toward ‗conflictual mimesis.‘52  
Within this context, Girard (1982:195) provides the centrality he places on the Gospels: 
A close correspondence exists between what the Gospels tell us of demons and the truth of 
mimetic relationships as defined by Jesus and as revealed in certain great literary works or in 
theoretical analysis.  This is not true of most texts that reflect a belief in demons, but most 
contemporary commentators fail to recognize such a distinction and consider all such tests to be 
contaminated by the same superstition without ever really examining the content.  The Gospels, in 
fact, are not only superior to all the texts placed in the category of magical thought but are also 
superior to all the modern interpretations of human relationships.  The superiority lies both in the 
mimetic concept and in the combination of mimesis with demonology found in a text such as 
Gerasa. 
Hence, the Gospels are ‗the model,‘ ‗the counter force,‘ and ‗the essential articulation‘53 
for interpreting most texts.  Girard certainly applies this to his reading of the Old 
Testament.  In some respects, Girard is a return to the traditional typological reading of 
the Old Testament.
54
  Girard‘s neo-allegoricalism has placed him alongside the 
hermeneutic of the Church Fathers, as Janzen (2004:3) has critically pointed out.
55
  
Girard‘s approach differs from the Patristic interpretation of the Old Testament.  Whereas 
the Fathers focused more on archetypes in characters or themes, Girard (1985a:166) finds 
it in its deconstructing of the mechanism, in its structure and its peculiar portrayal of 
mimetic relationships: ‗The truth of prophecy in the Christian sense appears from the 
moment mimetic processes are emphasized rather than characters treated as Christ 
figures.‘  Indeed, Girard‘s approach finds a common perspective with the early Christian 
church.  Both claimed to have ‗discovered‘ a fundamental thread through the Old 
Testament.  Eliciting that thread did not require exhausting the content of the Old 
                                                 
52
 ‗…the disappearance of the contested objects in the midst of mimetic conflict.‘ (Hamerton-Kelly 
1994:135). 
53
 Girard 1982:100, 1985a:162 
54
 Lienhard (2001:xxiii) warns that the ‗literal‘ verse ‗allegorical‘ split is misleading.  The Father‘s reading 
of the Old Testament was much more nuanced and quite exegetical for the hermeneutical practices of the 
day.  Most importantly, they saw the Old Testament as a puzzle that needed to be unlocked.  
55
 This point is brought up in the refutation of universal theories of sacrifice.  It makes sense that allegorical 
interpretations are connected to more unifying perspectives.  Allegory is the way to compare seemingly 
different ‗contexts.‘  
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Testament and lent itself to the selective emphasis of passages that best corresponded to 
Christ‘s passion.   
The Old Testament for the early Church prefigures the gospel, and for Girard (1982:103) 
it does so in that the persecutor‘s account is constantly exposed, broken up, and 
abrogated:  ‗The Old Testament provides an inexhaustible source of legitimated 
references to the extraordinary work of the Gospels, which is an account of persecution 
that has been…revoked.‘ The Christ event profoundly exposes the crowd logic in the face 
of an innocent victim. Romans, Jews (who are at odds with each other), and Jesus‘ own 
followers all strangely perform like clockwork to coalesce against a lonely insurrectionist 
even when they are aware of and resisting its force.
56
  The Gospels, in fact, go through 
great pains accentuating the bowing of human will to that of the crowd in key figures 
such as Peter, Judas, Pilate, Herod, and Caiaphas as well as their counterparts who 
remained with Jesus through his crucifixion—a small group of women, Roman soldiers, 
and mockers. The mechanism breaks down completely in the face of a profoundly 
innocent victim who refuses to keep silent about the truth of what is happening to him.
57
   
 
The Psalms, a favorite source of reference for the New Testament, in particular ‗highlight 
the continuity between the Passion crowd and the persecution crowds already stigmatized 
in the Psalms.  Neither the Gospels nor the Psalms accept the cruel illusions of these cruel 
crowds‘ (Girard, 1982:103).  Girard (1982:102) defends the oft belittled early Christian‘s 
allegorical use of the Psalms and other relevant Old Testament passages on the basis that 
the structural similarity is so striking that contradictory detail pale in comparison.  What 
is ‗at stake‘ in the Passion—‗the control exercised by persecutors and their accounts of 
persecution over the whole of humanity‘—is constantly pressing its case in the Psalms.58  
Raymond Schwager (1978:91ff), whom Girard references, views the Psalms as struggling 
to tear itself away from mythology.  Schwager acknowledges that much of the Psalms 
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 Girard, 1982:145 
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 Joseph Zepherelli‘s film, Jesus of Nazareth, powerfully portrays this when a member of the Sanhedrin, 
viewing the crucifixion from a distance (as all participants in the mob murder do) confoundedly observes, 
‗even now he quotes the Scriptures.‘ 
58
 Brueggemann (1988:xi) correctly addresses the competing ‗worlds‘ within the Psalms where the singular 
voice struggles not to be snuffed out by the ‗business as usual‘ of  ‗royal management.‘ 
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agree with basic tenants of Girard‘s theory.  The collective and ambivalent nature of the 
‗enemy‘ is by far one of the most common themes in the Psalms.  Both Schwager and 
Girard make a strong case for this particular perspective struggling to emerge in Israel‘s 
history.  In Girard‘s (1985a) most comprehensive delving into the Old Testament, he 
finds the book of Job most suitable in bringing to the fore the tension of ‗crowd 
theologies‘ with an uncooperative, non-acquiescing victim. 
This view addresses the kind of historical skepticism that has found some notoriety 
among Old Testament scholarship.  Based on the seemingly minimal historical evidence 
for an ‗Israel‘ that inhabited Palestine in the early iron age, Davies (1992:11) and Perdue 
(1994:1ff) have proposed that most of the Old Testament is a post-exilic work of 
imagination, serving to bolster a new and foreign aristocratic claim for the land. The 
voice of the victim, however, will not show up on the historical map. It is the very nature 
not to. ‗Particularly in the penitential Psalms we see the word shift from the persecutors 
to the victims, from those who are making history to those who are subjected to it‘ 
(Girard, 1982:104). Indeed, it seems the Old Testament consistently gives witness to the 
perpetual breakdown of what is supposed to work.   In this case, the failure of Israel to 
emerge as a significant historical presence may be due to their dubious interaction with 
the scapegoat system and, in fact, give witness to an authentic voice.
59
  If the voice of the 
victim is then a hallmark of the Old Testament, it hardly seems possible that a ruling 
group seeking to legitimate their claims over the land would dare want the voice of the 
victim to be so prominent. 
Girard (1985a:165) defends his allegorical reading of the Old Testament but insists that it 
is especially the structuring of human relationships along the lines of the persecuting 
crowd (my enemies) and the victim (penitent) and God (or a saving king).  It is of 
particular note that Schwager (1978:94) points to this tripartite structure to many Psalms 
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 Girard (1982:162-164) likens the working of scandal language on the Gospel text to ‗aligning‘ 
misarranged pieces of a puzzle.  The very fact that the gospel writers cannot fully grasp the profound 
implications of the Jesus event and thus often confuse or complicate the text ‗increases the credibility and 
power of the witness…the messenger‘s ignorance guarantees the authenticity of the message.‘  More of this 
will be discussed below.      
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as does Blomberg mentioned above.
60
  To the extent this is valid, it would be no wonder 
why the early Christians saw how amazingly ‗predictive‘ certain portions of the Old 
Testament seemed. 
 
2.3   Applied Methodology – Towards a Hermeneutic 
So far, we have examined the theoretical development and basis of an approach to 
ancient texts from a generative scapegoat mechanism perspective.  What follows is again 
an attempt to flesh out more specifically how this effects and determines the 
interpretation of the text.  In other words, accepting the contours of Girard‘s theory, what 
are the key considerations, fixed points, or yes, principles that guide the interpretation.  
The focus is mainly on how Girard proceeds from his theory to interpretation.  The 
priority here is given to Girard‘s reading of Biblical passages, especially the Old 
Testament.  He, of course, is not an Old Testament scholar, so we do not have a full 
treatise of any biblical work, although his book, Job: the Victim of his People (1985), is 
an attempt to apply his theory in a thorough way and would appear to be applicable to a 
broader view of the Old Testament.  Mostly, his references to biblical texts are by way of 
examples within a broader context of discussion.  How others have applied Girard‘s 
theory to biblical texts will also be delineated as well to supplement Girard‘s 
interpretations.  Although the determinants discussed below are a kind of starting point 
for an interpreter, it bears repeating that they are for Girard an ending point.  They have 
been arrived at through a process of thinking going back to the ever present and mutating 
power of mimesis. 
2.3.1   Biblical revelation – God of victims, not persecutors.  The most critical 
revelation of any text is that sacrifice is something demanded by the community in order 
to save itself from implosion. The sacred and its representations—deities, monsters, 
ancestors, heroes, and kings—are in the end attempts by the community to distance itself 
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 As Blomberg (1990:166) synthesizes, the limited allegory employed in Jesus‘ parables are directly 
related to the ‗triadic structure‘ of most of them.  Only the key referents have explicit allusions to another 
person.  The characters are paradigmic: ‗The main characters of a parable will probably be the most 
common candidates for allegorical interpretation, and the main points of the parable will most likely be 
associated with these characters.‘ 
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from its own collective violence.  It is as Girard would put it, a ‗false transcendence.‘  
Violence with its demand for a scapegoat victim belongs to humanity along with its 
varied mythological expressions in ritual and narrative.  A mythical theology defined by 
Girard (1985a:131) is ‗the transcendent expression of collective violence.‘ It is a theology 
of the crowd directed toward a victim. In it is the reasoning of the persecutors.  
Mythical theologies can only operate as the voice of the victim is silenced.  It is the voice 
of the victim that creates fissures which break down the efficacy of ritual sacrifice.  It is 
precisely the victim perspective that ekes its way to the surface throughout the collection 
of works called the Old Testament and along with it or behind it is a belief that the God 
of the Israelites is sympathetic to such a perspective. A perspective sympathetic to the 
victim is more in line with a people dwelling in Palestine in the early iron age, for despite 
the idyllic picture of Solomon‘s reign, the sparse archeological evidence to date indicates 
the likelihood that Israel was more likely a subject to persecution than a persecutor.
61
  
Similar to the kind of internal conflict evidenced in the Old Testament over the issue of 
idolatry and ‗high places,‘ Girard views the God of victim theology as struggling to 
emerge amidst mythological formulations.  Evidence of ‗cracks in the system‘ where the 
victim‘s absolute guilt is questioned is not exclusive to the Old Testament, so again 
comparison with other mythological narratives is not excluded.  Girard finds in many 
myths a variety of ‗theological solutions‘ were the sacrificial system is weakened.   They 
are still mythical in that they are attempting to shore up the operation, yet they also 
demonstrate attempts to bolster a mechanism that has lost force. They, as Hamerton-
Kelly (1994:125) says, ‗reveil‘ rather than reveal. 
Girard (1982:84ff) explains the kind of ‗theologies‘ that emerge in mythology to 
reinforce the absolute responsibility of the victim, transformed by the murder into a deity, 
one who now watches over the community and preserves the very operation that caused 
its death.  Mythical theologies reflect a development away from early versions of the 
myth where questioning of the myth did not occur.  Thus mythical theologies are a move 
toward ‗religious belief,‘ a mythological narrative seeking to take the rough edges out of 
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 This will be addressed in detail in the ensuing chapters.  
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the original myth.  It reflects certain repugnance toward the overt expressions of violence.  
These theologies must resolve the community‘s contradiction of ‗the victim who it thinks 
is truly guilty becoming the means of reconciliation.‘   
According to Girard (1982:84ff) the ‗two great theologies‘ developed to solve the 
problem are the ‗theology of divine caprice‘ and the ‗theology of divine anger.‘62  Both of 
these have clear affinities with pictures of Israel‘s god found in the Old Testament.  Both 
indicate fissures in the mechanism and a community who is unsettled with its own 
resolution.  They both see the inherent problem; nonetheless, they justify its continued 
operation.
63
   
The first is the development of a ‗trickster‘ god who enjoys doing evil and is amused by 
it.  The god is a kind of capricious gamester, and the harshness of the sacrificial demand 
is inoculated by turning it into a game.  In this regard, Girard (1972:311-315) makes the 
direct connection between ritual and games, especially games of chance.  Games of 
chance are prominent in mythological ritual because they reinforce the arbitrary choice of 
the victim.  The picture of a gamey type god comes into play in the first part of Job and 
with stories around Saul.  Girard (1982:85) points to the Cadmus myth by way of 
example of a trickster god who creates a ruse. ‗Cadmus is seen here as a kind of trickster.  
In one sense, he causes the social crisis, the great disorder that ravages a group of men to 
the point of complete destruction.‘  Girard argues that in a myth like Cadmus, you have 
one of the most precise pictures of violent reciprocity.  The god uses mimetic rivalry as a 
means to destroy.  ‗This reveals in a spectacular way how reciprocity…eliminates 
differences as it accelerates and takes over societies in crisis.‘  It reveals the end result of 
unmitigated violence.  The picture of a god who is simply toying with his constituents 
reveals an awareness of the workings of the mechanism while simultaneously seeks to 
maintain its operation.  It becomes a veiled threat to the community that the god will 
simply ‗leave us to our own destruction,‘ if controls are not in place.  Something similar 
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 In his book, Peoples of an Almighty God, Goldstein (2002:5) outlines similar theologies of Persia and 
Babylon where, for instance, the faithful rationalize the loss of a temple because of their own sin rather 
than the god‘s impotence. 
63
 The other solutions are: 1) gods who do evil unwittingly 2) gods who are forced irresistibly to do evil. 
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to this theology is evident in stories around Yahweh as ‗a warrior,‘ such as the Reed Sea 
passage (Ex. 14-15), the Assyrians besieging Jerusalem in Hezekiah‘s day, and Yahweh‘s 
dealings with Pharaoh in the Exodus narrative. 
The second theology is that of divine wrath.  Obviously, this is much more prominent in 
the Old Testament and even to this day presents challenges to Jewish and Christian 
theological traditions. The wrathful god, Girard (1982:85) maintains, comes even closer 
to the truth—that violence is collective—because it forces the community to accept that 
they are at least partly responsible for ‗forcing‘ the god to do something he/she doesn‘t 
want to.  ‗It begins to be guilty of its own disorders.‘64 This view of god, however, 
believes god‘s wrath is proportionate to his love and is still not able to completely break 
free of the persecutor‘s god mainly because it cannot envision a solution to the 
community‘s fundamental dilemma.   
For Girard (1985a:140), the attempt to hold divine wrath in balance with divine love 
creates, in essence, a bipolar god, a ‗double divinity‘ where the god of the crowd no 
longer ‗monopolizes the idea of God‘ and the voice of the victim finds an appeal.  This 
symmetry between a wrathful god—punishing evildoers—and a loving god—hearing the 
cries of those unjustly treated—never stabilizes in the Old Testament.  ‗They are 
incomparable and incompatible.‘  Girard (1985a:140-141) believes it is constantly 
steering toward a god who sides with the victim. When this comes to light in the 
Dialogues of Job (Job 16:19-21, 19:25-27), it ‗constitutes the high point of the 
Dialogues.‘  The Dialogues are symptomatic of the competing theologies reflective in the 
issue of high places and perhaps what scholars have recognized in the varying J, P, and D 
traditions.  
Girard reasons that this duality within divinity gradually polarizes even more. We can 
delineate the devil and demons with idols of old simply by a progression of viewing 
certain aspects of the ‗sacred‘ more negatively.  It has isolated and made distinct the 
beneficent aspects of the sacred from the maleficent.   
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 This plays out rather obviously in the Deuteronomic agenda in the Old Testament to be discussed at some 
length in the proceeding chapters.  In a broader sense, Westermann (1974:47-56) has identified a ‗crime 
and punishment‘ theme that is prominent among mythological cosmologies. He structures his own 
interpretation of Genesis 2-3 along these lines.  
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The ‗false transcendence‘ of the maleficent aspects of the sacred65 are contrasted to the 
true transcendence which only the Gospels reveal.  ‗…the expulsion of violence by 
violence [clearly identified with Satan‘s kingdom] is rendered useless by the 
revelation…God is not violent, the true God has nothing to do with violence…‘ (Girard, 
1982:189). 
It should be reiterated here, that the principle of God‘s non-violence and ‗true 
transcendence‘ is not an underlying assumption guiding Girard, but the necessary 
conclusion, based mainly on the observations of mimetic rivalry, the most pessimistic of 
starting points.  As Girard (1982:194) says, ‗There is only one transcendence in the 
Gospels, the transcendence of divine love that triumphs over all manifestations of 
violence and the sacred by revealing their nothingness.‘66  
2.3.2   Revelation from inside out.  If Girard‘s insights prove valid, one must ask to 
what extent a ‗solution‘ is also foreseen.  Herein lies what is perhaps one of the more 
difficult and objectionable aspects of the scapegoat theory, for Girard insists that it is 
only from within the scapegoat mechanism that a full revealing of it can take place.  
There is great irony or paradox here, but Girard would insist that it is inherent to our 
peculiar way of dealing with disorder.  Simply put, human history has practiced a 
‗solution‘ since its inception.  It is all encompassing, a closed system, so in what way is it 
possible to speak of fixing the solution?  Certainly, the sacrificial system is flawed and 
civilizations run an ingenious course of bolstering and renewing it via ritual and law.
67
  
Humanity is too deeply engrained in the framework of the scapegoat for a completely 
foreign structure to simply overtake it.  There is no neutral mitigating third party other 
than the scapegoat.
68
  This would mean that the outside perspective function precisely as 
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 Girard, 1982:166 ‗When the false transcendence is envisaged in its fundamental unity, the Gospels call it 
the devil or Satan, but when it is envisaged in its multiplicity then the mention is always of demons or 
demonic forces.‘   
66
 We might even venture to speak as does Olivier Clement (2000:49) of a ‗trans-descendence‘ where ‗God 
transcends his own transcendence.‘  
67
 Law is a more refined sacrificial system and in many ways shores up the weakness of a more sacrificial 
social order; nonetheless, it is still based on violent reciprocity (Girard, 1972:17). 
68
 Girard (1985a:157): ‗In that fundamental moment for human culture, there are only persecutors and a 
victim confronting them.  There is no third position, no way out…‘ 
Chapter 2 – Girard‘s Theory and Methodology               53 
 
53 
 
the system dictates—a violent expulsion of the ‗old‘ to bring in the new.69  Even more so, 
it is the sacrificial mechanism that creates the ‗outside‘ perspective via sacral violence.  
Girard (1985a:159) explains this ‗paradoxical logic‘: 
In a world of violence, divinity purified of every act of violence must be revealed by means of the 
event that already provides the sacrificial religion with its generative mechanism.  The epiphany of 
the god of victims follows the same ‗ancient trail‘ and goes through the exact same phases as all 
the epiphanies of the sacred of persecutors.  As a result, from the perspective of violence, there is 
absolutely not distinction between the god of victims and the god of persecutors. 
Here it is important that one follow Girard‘s progression of thought, for in his first in-
depth address of the sacrificial aspects of Christianity,
70
  he believes that Christianity 
regressed and was not able to completely free itself of sacrificial elements.  This initial 
formulation appears to have been modified in his later works, especially in The 
Scapegoat.  Girard understands the necessity of a thorough revelation of the scapegoat 
mechanism via the structure itself.  There must be a return to the generative event and a 
duplication of it in every fundamental aspect. ‗This same drama is also needed to present 
the perspective of a victim dedicated to the rejection of the illusions of the persecutors.  
Thus, the same drama is needed to give birth to the only text that can bring an end to all 
of mythology‘ (Girard, 1982:101).   The only effective way to bring down the structure is 
through a meticulous understanding and dismantling of it.  By way of analogy, 
demolition experts are able to neatly collapse a large building by placing numerous small 
explosives at strategic points in the building‘s structure.  By weakening key structural 
elements and at strategic moments, the building is destroyed by its own force falling in on 
itself.
71
  
It is not possible to reveal and dismantle the structure of myth other than by an inversion.  
In order to comprehend this, Girard turns to the Gospels as the primary interpretive 
model.  Jesus‘ encounters and discourse with the demonic critically demonstrate the 
inside-out breakthrough that is essential.  As mentioned above, religious language 
developed as societies became uncomfortable with the overt references to violence within 
                                                 
69
 Baile‘s (1997:99-106) recounting of the myth of Quetzalcoatl and Tezcatlipoca is but one of many 
examples Baile references to demonstrate how ‗outsiders‘ only replace one sacrificial system with another.  
70
 See Girard (1978:224-262): ‗The Sacrificial Reading and Historical Christianity.‘ 
71
 Girard (1982:101) also speaks of the inversion of the Gospel as mythology collapsing in on itself. 
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their myths.  The founding myth is moralized by a separating of the benevolent aspects of 
the deity—the sacralized victim—and the malevolent aspects.  Hence, there is a good god 
or realm and an evil realm.  The language of Satan, demons and a good god in heaven is 
valuable because it brings the mimetic power of relationships to the fore.   
Girard (1982:186) resorts to a common ‗hermeneutic‘ of accommodation.  Jesus 
accommodates religious language because it is the only language his listeners know, but 
he does so only to transcend it.  Jesus employs the language of the sacred only to 
scandalize the sacrificial mechanism.  ‗Jesus uses the resources of the system in such a 
way as to warn people of what awaits them in the only language they understand.  By 
doing this he reveals both the impending end of the system and the incoherence and 
internal contradiction of the discourse.‘   
The drive toward the mechanism is not haphazard or unfortunate but absolutely 
necessary.  The Gospels make Jesus‘ Jerusalem destiny and the necessity of his 
crucifixion obvious.  Again, it is not on the part of God but because of humanity‘s need 
for a scapegoat. This is a critical point which will influence the reading of Genesis 1 and 
2, both of which deal with a problematic idea of a God who ‗creates chaos‘ in order to 
bring something forth.  This is further played out in the story of Exodus and in the 
Gospels, God leads his ‗chosen‘ speedily into the eye of generative disorder, also to 
generate.  But it is done in such a way, that reveals the mechanism at is goes.  In 
mythology, the narrative drives relentlessly toward its resolve—the victim; likewise, an 
inverted narrative marches toward the demise of the mechanism, the dissolution of a 
resolution in a victim. 
The inversion of the mechanism happens when in the process of the scapegoat 
mechanism, the victim‘s guilt is shown to be unconvincing.  The victim does not need to 
be proven completely innocent, only that the guilt the community has placed on him fails 
to attract convincing unanimous consensus.  Also, the mechanism breaks down if the 
victim fails to become a sacred object, a god.  The sacralization of the victim fails to 
happen.  Ultimately, the victim does not create a regenerating unity for the community, 
and in fact, exacerbates the communal tension even further.  
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Girard (1982:200) has argued against the more conservative Christian trend to always 
contrast divine revelation from myth.  No, there is nothing unique about the Biblical 
literature when it comes to its language, symbolism, themes, and structure. It is, however, 
only within this commonality that ‗the absolute specificity‘ of the Gospel can be 
revealed.  Thus, the Gospels appear to be based on the same sacrificial mechanism as 
anything else, yet it discovers from its very inception that it can no longer operate 
sacrificially.  It discovers that the generative sacrifice, rather than being imitated and 
perpetuated in ritual, continues to function only to deny sacrifice its power.  It was a 
sacrifice to end all sacrifice.
72
  
Girard appears to have modified his earlier critique of sacrificial Christianity.
73
  He 
(1982:200) concedes that Christianity did not shed its ‗sacrificial‘ veneer, but there is no 
other way for the sacrificial mechanism to be scandalized from without.  Girard 
(1982:200) insists that the mechanism that has such a tight grip on humanity can only be 
undone via this ‗indirect path.‘  
It is especially the discourse over expulsion of demons that radically falters when 
confronted by Jesus.  Expulsion is the decisive moment for the community, the crux of 
myth, the moment where all the powers of disorder generate the ‗perverse affect‘—social 
order.
74
  Expulsion is the language of persecutors and of the crowd.  The issue of casting 
out demons and Satan becomes the crux of the matter, and it is here where Girard 
navigates through the difficult proposition that only through an expulsion can the violent 
mechanism of community and the non-violent God be fully revealed at the same time.  It 
is the kind and nature of the expulsion where the distinction is drawn in the Gospels, 
Girard argues. 
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 This notion will play itself out in the exegesis of Genesis 1 and 2 to follow.  
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 In his chapter A Non-Sacrificial Reading of the Gospel Text, Girard (1978:180) begins: ‗There is nothing 
in the Gospels to suggest that the death of Jesus is a sacrifice, whatever definition (expiation, substitution, 
etc.) we may give for that sacrifice.  At no point in the Gospels is the death of Jesus defined as a sacrifice.  
The passages that are invoked to justify a sacrificial conception of the Passion both can and should be 
interpreted with no reference to sacrifice in any of the accepted meanings.‘  Apparently, a sacrificial 
reading of the Christ event entails an ‗irrational requirement of sacrifice that absolve them [humankind] of 
responsibility‘ (1978:213).  The ‗non-sacrificial reading‘ is a rejection that God demands a sacrifice, and an 
embracing of Christ‘s ‗absolute devotion‘ to his disciples and humankind (1978:243). 
74
 Girard, 1982:184 ‗The central subject, then, is an expulsion, the expulsion that will rid the universe 
forever of its demons and the demonic.‘  If the Bible is to address this, then it must use the language of 
expulsion 
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In the story of the demon(s) of Geresa, Girard (1982:171,191) points to a ‗double 
expulsion.‘  First, there is a ‗mitigating‘ expulsion.  The picture of the madman among 
the tombs, expelled from the town and perpetually inflicting on himself the guilt of the 
community demonstrates the convenient way that communities process their own 
violence.  It is a symmetrical relationship, ‗an example of reciprocal relationship of 
mimetic rivalry.‘  ‗This is a sort of conspiracy between the victim and his torturers to 
keep the balance of the game because it is obviously necessary to keep the balance of the 
Gerasene community…The possessed imitates these Gerasenes who stone their victims, 
but the Gerasenes in return imitate the possessed.‘  As long as the victim acquiesces to 
the crowd, all is well.   
Jesus, unfortunately for the unhappy Gerasenes, introduces another expulsion, a ‗final 
expulsion.‘ By expelling the demons from the community‘s self-serving victim, Jesus has 
brought the true crisis to the fore.  This second expulsion becomes truly a frightening 
prospect to the community because it means the community must once again deal with its 
own violence, which may in fact mean self-destruction.  The Gerasenes understand 
completely that the herd of pigs hurtling into the lake is a picture of them without an 
operative mechanism, and they are not at all ready for such a radical innovation.  Hence, 
they beg him to leave.  Herein, Girard proposes something of what a final break with the 
mechanism would entail—the expulsion of the crowd and the saving of the victim.  
Girard takes as significant the negotiation of ‗legion‘ with Jesus, for it is the many who 
speak as one.  It can be no other way. The mechanism is completely inverted. 
In Jesus‘ critical discourse on the meaning of his own practice of casting out demons, the 
‗double expulsion‘ is further explained, for here, Jesus must explain what is the 
substantial difference between his casting out of demons and that of others (Mt. 12:24ff).  
For Girard, Jesus affirms a fundamental truth of humankind‘s sacrificial system that 
Satan has always cast out Satan.  Satan‘s realm is the ambiguous realm of sacral violence 
where its effectiveness relies on a steady stream of mitigating expulsions.  This is the 
theology of the crowd coming from the mouth of Job‘s friends—there must be expulsions 
and it is God (the god of the mob) who requires it.  In the first part of Jesus‘ response, 
Jesus tells the truth of humankind who perpetually ‗casts out demons.‘  Expulsion 
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addresses internal division, so in a very real sense, the sacrificial system is divided 
against itself.  Rather than all against all, the community opts for all against one.  It is this 
mitigating expulsion that is Satan‘s kingdom.  Humanity has always maintained its order 
by violent expulsion and ingenious deception. It works quite well as one strong man 
comes in and robs the other.  Here Girard
75
 believes you have essential sociology or 
anthropology.   
Paradoxically, Jesus‘ exorcisms are substantially and essentially different in that they 
reveal the truth of humanity—‗what is in man‘s heart.‘  Superficially, Jesus‘ response 
appears the same as his critics.  Everyone is casting out demons, and Jesus is just one 
more rival to expel and be expelled. The superiority of Jesus‘ expulsions—ultimately 
expressed in his own crucifixion—is not that he proves to be the stronger man, but in the 
complete absence of deception.  It is an expulsion that reveals the fundamental truth of 
who we are and how we corporately behave. 
This same drama is also needed to present the perspective of a victim dedicated to the rejection of 
the illusions of the persecutors.  Thus the same drama is needed to give birth to the only text that 
can bring an end to all of mythology…The essential factor…is that the persecutor‘s perception of 
their persecution is finally defeated  (Girard, 1982:101). 
Yes, Jesus‘ expulsion looks like all others.  It is in complete conformity with the way 
humankind has always resolved conflict—one should die for the many.  Jesus‘ death, on 
the contrary, exacerbates the system, for Jesus steadfastly refuses, although it is his most 
profound temptation, to expel by force.  Like Oedipus, he allows himself to be the victim, 
but unlike any other, Jesus reveals every step of the way what is really going on, and in 
so doing, dismantles the system, one step at a time.
76
  It is most profoundly revealed in 
the Gospels in the innocence of Jesus.  The claim of Jesus‘ innocence is hotly debated, 
but the Gospels give witness to a fundamental reality—Jesus died at the hands of all, and 
his innocence, although never defended by Jesus himself, was blatantly obvious to all.   
                                                 
75
 Girard (1982:188) notices the emphasis on ‗every‘ in Jesus‘ explanation ‗Every kingdom divided against 
itself is headed for ruin, and every city or house, divided against itself.‘  He comments: ‗All human 
communities without exception are based on the one principle, both constructive and destructive…Thus the 
first two sentences are richer than they seem: an entire sociology or basic anthropology is summarized in 
them. ‗ 
76
 We should take not that Oedipus inflicts his own expulsion, thereby acquiescing to the mechanism.  
Jesus, on the contrary, steadfastly refuses such an option, requiring all to acquiesce to his execution. 
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 Girard maintains an important distinction here, one in which if confused, leads to 
dramatically contradictory conclusions.  He is emphatic that the God of victims must be 
revealed through the mechanism even though this god is not the author of the 
mechanism.
77
  It is not a proposition of fighting fire with fire or violence to end violence. 
‗The defender of victims must have as adversary the prince of this world, but does not 
oppose him with violence‘ (1985a:158).  Girard is insistent; humankind is the originator 
and perpetuator of lethal force.  The true God, the god of victims, is not violent and 
cannot be coercive.  He did not invent it, nor does He use it.  Here Girard (1985a:155) 
resorts to a common theological proposition concerning human freedom.  ‘…a God of 
victims cannot impose his will on men without ceasing to exist.  He would have to resort 
to a violence more violent than that of the wicked.‘   
Both the religion of persecutors and of victims believes they are defending the innocent, 
and both concede to the necessity of sacrificial victims.  But one always drives toward its 
continued operation, wittingly and unwittingly.  The other drives toward its failure in 
order to ‗convert it into a startling victory.‘  The one sacrifices to avoid or deflect a 
sacrificial crisis.  The other drives toward a communal crisis in order to ruin the utility of 
sacrifice.
78
  
The final crisis that determines the final revelation both is and is not specific.  In principle it is the 
same as the disintegration of all sacrificial systems that are based on the ―satanic‖ expulsion of 
violence by violence. For better or worse, the Gospel revelation makes the crisis inevitable 
(Girard, 1982:190). 
What God demands is not a sacrifice of his Son, not a perfect scapegoat, but the unconditional 
refusal of scapegoating, even if the price must be death, even if this very refusal, in a world such 
as ours, inevitability entails that we must be scapegoated (Williams, 1991:viii). 
Girard attempts to explicate the seemingly self-contradictory proposition that God is 
emphatically non-violent, yet it is only through our violence that God can stop it.  
Perhaps the distinction, whether it works or not, is that Girard always maintains that 
violence belongs to humankind, especially collectively, and that the true God never is 
                                                 
77
 This reasoning plays a crucial role in the exegesis to follow where, for instance in Gen 1:1-2, an intense 
debate has ensued over the extent that God created the situation of verse 2 or simply came upon it.  
78
 This is the conclusion reached in the exegesis of Genesis 1 and 2 to follow.  
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violent nor employs violence.  This seems at times untenable.  The exodus story, 
however, does maintain such a distinction.  Yahweh does not expel Israel; it must be 
Pharaoh who does.   
2.3.3  Real event behind the fantastical elements.  A significant feature of Girard‘s 
approach is in the unique perspective towards the fantastical, miraculous, or supernatural 
features in a narrative.  Whereas modern criticism increasingly concludes historical 
content of the Old Testament to be dubious on such accounts, Girard rejects the 
proposition that the story and its content are pure imagination.  There is a real event 
portrayed in the story, albeit the historical context is only secondary.  The pursuit of 
Biblical scholarship has looked to connect the content to historical situations as key to 
interpretation.  Girard does not. 
Whereas higher criticisms find it necessary to explain away the fantastical features in a 
text, Girard understands the relationship between the likely and probable and the unlikely 
supernatural elements to yield critical insight.  The confluence of the two is precisely the 
point of the mechanism‘s uneasy contradiction.  It is in the stereotypical miraculous 
features where the truth is found.  Imagination is not in the service of creative expression, 
but it is to satiate a craving for violence.
79
  Mythological texts are stories from the 
persecutor‘s perspective.  They are inevitably ‗fantastic,‘ imagining a host of social 
maladies emanating from the victim.  Much of the story may seem ‗unbelievable‘ from 
on outside perspective, but assuredly, Girard reminds, there is a real act of persecution 
being recounted here.  The act must be recounted if it is to serve the good of the group, 
but only to support the justification for the victim‘s demise at the hands of the group.   
Hence Girard speaks of the ‗golden rule of texts of persecution‘—the illusory elements 
assure the truth of the event precisely because illusion is the critical element in its 
operative force.  There is no mob murder without the persecutors duping themselves.
80
 
                                                 
79
 Campbell and O‘Brian‘s (2005:6) emphasize the performative nature of the text.  Since storytellers are 
the main ‗users‘ of the text, they ‗adjust, abbreviate, extend, delete,‘ and even place contradictory detail in 
parallel for effect.  Problematic to Campbell and O‘Brians approach is that they just never get around to 
saying why a storyteller would do it. 
80
 This element, also, will play in heavily come the exegesis of Genesis 1 and 2.  Genesis 1-11 are 
designated as ‗primeval‘ precisely because it is taken out of a historical setting and given a universal 
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Girard (1982:105) has categorized the ‗stereotypes of persecution‘ believing them to be 
ubiquitous distortions found in myth.  The heart of the ‗distortion‘ lay in the nature of the 
accusation leveled against the victim.  The accusation is patently false, but this all the 
more assures that such a persecution happened.   Typical of mythological accusations are 
that they are: 
1) Leveled at people whom it is most criminal to attack, either in the absolute sense 
or in reference to the individual committing the act: a king, a father, the symbol of 
supreme authority, and in biblical and modern societies the weakest and most 
defenseless, especially children. 
2) Sexual crimes: rape, incest, bestiality.  The ones most frequently invoked 
transgress the taboos that are considered the strictest in the society in question. 
3) Religious crimes, such as profanation of the host.  Here, too, it is the strictest 
taboos that are transgressed. 
 
A ‗mythological crystallization‘ of the accusation occurs in a narrative when the listener 
loses herself in the story and disregards what is behind it.  The ancient recipient, contrary 
to much modern assumption, recognizes and accepts the ‗imaginative‘ features as part of 
a good story.
81
  In the end, the persecutors ‗version‘ is embraced and all move 
comfortably on in the order of the community.
82
 
The critical link between the real and the imagined is the victim.  The scapegoat is the 
primary symbol who is characteristically attributed with both monstrous and then divine 
features.  That the victim/turned god is often portrayed as a monstrous cacophony of 
animal and human reflects the confusion around the victim, not only of the paradoxical 
                                                                                                                                                 
perspective.  The universal ‗mythological‘ perspective more accurately reflects a community‘s origins in an 
event.  
81
 Campbell and O‘Brian (2005:6) postulate a ‗user‘ centered theory of Pentateuch origins where a 
storyteller used a grab bag of details to a fixed structured story for different situations. ‗Texts were written 
for users [not readers] as a base for operations and allowed for variants and a role for the storytellers.‘ 
82
 Girard (1985a:38) understands modern perspectives, such as the rhetorical approach which places 
emphasis on the imaginative features of the text for purposes of persuasion, as equally pulling the reader 
into a blind acceptance of it.  The myth crystallizes for the reader, ancient and modern, when one no longer 
concerns himself with what is behind the myth.  ‗The idea that myth is totally fictional makes it as 
impenetrable as its opposite, religion, which accepts it as truth.‘ 
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mixture of the benevolent and malevolent effects of the slaughter, but also the 
dangerously conflictive desires of the community (Girard, 1982:48).  
The victim incarnates mimetic desire.  It is the lightning rod for it.  There is a paradox 
here which cannot be overlooked.  Mimetic desire is ‗disincarnate‘ by nature, which is 
precisely what we humans can‘t stand.  Our desires elude us.  They never seem to 
‗become a reality,‘ and if they do, suddenly the desire is gone.  Thus the victim ‗appears‘ 
to incarnate this illusion of desire (Girard, 1982:134).  The significant miracle of 
mythological narrative is then, when conflicting passions of the community miraculously 
find a repository in a single insignificant person.  By deifying this repository, the 
community is able to retain the benefits of the victim into perpetuity and simultaneously 
distance itself from its own violence.   
Girard is in keeping with biblical criticisms that manage textual incongruities.  Girard 
believes that in such cases the author sticks to a ‗literal‘ understanding precisely because 
he does not comprehend the logic of mimesis. The interplay of the miraculous or 
supernatural elements with mimetic elements (or shall we just say with ‗historical,‘ 
meaning discernible in the common actions in the world) goes a different direction 
depending on whether the text is mythological—helping the scapegoat mechanism to 
function all the while covering its tracks—or whether to some degree it is seeing through 
the mechanism. 
Girard (1982:159-l63) locates this interplay between the fantastic and real features, 
incarnate and disincarnate desire, and malevolent and benevolent forces in the victim 
within the author/redactors themselves.  Because the author does not fully comprehend 
the role of mimetic desire, some things are given a miraculous correspondence.  The 
miraculous or supernatural are often ‗imposed‘ in the story precisely because the writers 
don‘t comprehend the inner workings of mimetic scapegoating.  They are able to perceive 
it, but not identify it. So for Girard, inaccuracies or incongruities in a text do not 
necessarily lead to a fragmentation of the text.  In fact, it could lead to its cohesion and 
indicates its close proximity to the event.  It is the literal juxtaposition of the partially 
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coherent and the incoherent that enables us (who truly do understand scapegoating more 
than in the past) to see the function of both.
83
 
Elements of a story may in fact be misaligned due to the author or redactor‘s lack of full 
comprehension of the mechanism.  Girard, (1982:162) like our higher critics in Old 
Testament, believes that the text provides pieces of a puzzle that are not necessarily in the 
correct order.  An exegete must ‗rearrange‘ certain parts of the story. 
We are therefore dealing with an extraordinarily coherent unity that was never perceived by the 
exegetes because its components are muddled, and sometimes a little deformed, due to the 
author‘s lack of control…They have all the details in their hands, but these are disorganized and 
contaminated with miracles because the authors have only partial control over them. 
For Girard (1982:163), revelation of who we are and how we behave in a group towards 
one another is the greatest miracle.  Miraculous elements in a revealing text have a 
characteristically awkward quality because the ‗ambiguity of myth is becoming 
transparent.‘  This is no different than the attempts to give ‗natural‘ explanations to what 
was in the past considered ‗supernatural.‘  Girard insists that we have a profound 
propensity to perceive everything around us, both natural and human phenomenon, in 
terms of mimesis.  
In Girard‘s (1982:161) interpretation of Peter‘s denial, we are presented with a narrative 
that is uncovering something that ‗they know not what they are doing.‘  In this case, 
because miracles and supernatural events of myth are connecting to the miracle located in 
the victim, a writer may sense a compulsion to include them in a text that is inverting the 
mechanism, simply to help legitimize it. The miraculous elements work differently in 
mythological stories.  There the supernatural elements direct the community away from 
the collective murder, usually by divinizing the victim.  On the other hand, it is the 
incongruities between what we consider a reasonable human event and the ‗supernatural‘ 
occurrences in a narrative where the mimeticism is exposed and an unwieldy truth is 
                                                 
83
 Since this thesis will give way to mimetic assumptions beforehand, the exegesis of Genesis 1 and 2 
presume a coherence and unity.  The trend within the Old Testament interpretive community, however, has 
also moved in this direction, especially those working with a rhetorical interpretive grid, Brodie (2001) for 
example.   
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more evident.  We may pick up what Girard identifies as ‗mimetic exacerbation‘—a 
relapse into divinizing the victim especially when the writer is ‗too close to his model.‘ 
The incongruities in the story, especially clouded by fantastic elements, can in fact lend 
itself to the reliability of the story. ‗Their insufficiency becomes a positive quality.  It 
increases the credibility and power of the witness:‘ Girard states (1982:161).  It is the 
combination of a desire to be as accurate as possible with the lack of understanding of 
what they are dealing with that makes the story accurate—leading more toward the 
revealing of the mechanism rather than covering it up.  It lends itself to an immediacy to 
the event without intermediaries or redaction.  This counters the trend of higher criticism 
which tends to see inconsistencies as problematic resulting in ever widening distance 
between the ‗origin‘ and its telling.  Even more so, it reverses the assumption that the 
stories are shear imagination and ultimately have no direct connection with real events. 
In those passages that suddenly become clear, the Gospel text is somewhat like a password 
communicated by go-betweens who are not included in the secret.  Those of us who receive the 
password are all the more grateful because the messenger‘s ignorance guarantees the authenticity 
of the message (Girard, 1982:164). 
A similar interplay occurs between natural phenomenon and the crisis in the community. 
One of the big challenges to be worked through because of our scientific perspective is 
the congealing of natural forces with cosmological and theological paradigms.  It is clear 
enough for a reader of Biblical texts that the interchange between natural and 
supernatural forces was, at times, almost indistinguishable, although certainly to a lesser 
degree than more ‗mythological‘ sources.  Debates over the ‗anthropomorphic‘ views of 
God have been a preoccupation for centuries.  From our modern perspective, we can 
reason how natural it would have been in pre-scientific times to project the behavior of 
nature onto social structures.  From the pattern of planting and harvest come notions of 
dying and rebirth of kings and kingdoms.
84
  
 
                                                 
84
 Anderson (1967:11-40) provides an eloquent formation of this kind of thinking brought on by the 
discovery of the library of Ashurbanipal and Herman Gunkel‘s seminal works with it.   
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Girard, however, insists that the reverse is true.
85
  From the earliest of times, humanity 
has projected and infused one of its fundament notions of communal existence onto the 
cosmological world.  Humanity‘s unique mechanism for dealing with its own escalation 
of rival desires leading to an escalation of violence and a resolve through the scapegoat is 
seen as functioning on every level of the natural world.  Thus the turbulent  crisis brought 
on by a draught, plague, flood, or storm is viewed as acting under the same ‗rules‘ as a 
communal crisis does—sacrificially.  In Sophocles, Girard (1982:25) reminds ‗we 
establish that to lack difference is to be plague-stricken.‘ 
Girard carries the correspondence between real events and fantastical elements in the 
massive topic of representation and linguistics.  The victim is the original signifier, and 
even if one argues that language development preceded sacrifice (or more accurately, 
sacrificial ritual), Girard would still insist that it did not develop independently of the 
scapegoat mechanism. Here again, analogies, metaphors, and symbols are symbiotically 
related to real-to-life events.   
This interplay, Girard (1985a:106) reasons, is demonstrated in ritual sacrifice where the 
surrogate victim is a metaphor or symbol of the original victim, while at the same time, it 
functions the same as the original victim, only to a diminished degree.
86
  Both original 
victim and ritual victim function as scapegoats.  Girard (1982:55) maintains a close 
connection between ritual and myth especially in the symbolic ‗transfiguration‘ of the 
victim.
87
  The magical moment when the terrible ills of the community convert into 
wonderful benefits is the model for representation. In myth (Girard, 1982:55), it serves as 
the model for commemorating religious epiphany, and in ritual, it provides a pattern for 
reenacting (reproducing) the benevolent results of the victim‘s expulsion.  It also 
functions, however, as a countermodel for prohibition—‗by virtue of the principle that 
one must never repeat the same actions of the victim, insofar as they are harmful.‘ The 
victim as counter model, Girard (1982:55) insists, is what many who have discussed the 
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 Girard 1972: 31ff, 96ff, 182, 255, 282ff 
86
 Girard (1972:235): ‗The origin of symbolic thought lies in the mechanism of the surrogate victim.‘ 
87
 We should take note at this point that the connection between ritual and myth is an important issue with a 
wide array of perspectives, often predetermined by the methodology peculiar to the academic discipline. 
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relationship of ritual to myth have failed to see—the counter model is but a reflection of 
the model.
88
   
More pertinent to the discussion here is that for Girard, myth (narrative about the original 
murder) is more apt to distort, than ritual (reenactment of the original murder).
89
  We can 
more readily recognize the discrepancy in ritual where a third party observer can view an 
obvious reenactment of a mob murder, all the while having the ritual explained in terms 
of a god saving the people. In myth, there is much more opportunity and license to 
embellish the representations of the victim, now turned god. Myths ‗are more difficult to 
decode because they contain greater distortions‘ (Girard, 1982:55).  ‗Words,‘ Girard 
(1982:56) insists, ‗are more deceptive that actions,‘ and paradoxically appear very 
different from ritual precisely at the point of ‗greatest resemblance‘—the sequence 
leading to the expulsion of the victim. 
 Mimetic desire always drives toward representation.  It seeks an incarnation of what is 
by nature disincarnate.  Representation provides an illusion of possession of the elusory 
object.  Most representations of the victim function to veil the mechanism; thus they are 
false.  They belong to the logic of the persecutors and the crowd.
90
  Girard (1982:101) 
speaks of the Gospel destroying the representations of myth ‗with an even greater force 
of a true representation.‘  Both myth and Gospel have representation, the one being 
representation of the persecuting crowd and the logic of the scapegoat, the other being of 
the vocal victim who at every step of the process understands and reveals what is 
happening.  The one is nurtured by imagination because it doesn‘t understand the 
mechanism; the other is strictly structured by its understanding of it.  Girard (1982:35) 
also believes that representations of myth, false representation, are more prominent since 
‗We always rely on the imagination in order to avoid reality.‘ 
                                                 
88
 It is on this point where Girard (1982:55) diverges from the ‗binary‘ view of the structuralists. 
Prohibition is not independent of ritual and myth, but is subordinate to them. 
89
 Baile (1997:33) aptly reminds that myth comes from the Greek muthos meaning to close or keep secret, 
hence the word mute.  At its core, myth is a mutation or mutilated recollection, a selective and discrete 
‗remembrance.‘ 
90
 Interestingly, Watts (2007:182-184) argues away from Girard and others who interpret ritual based on 
narrative explanations of the ritual.  He points to a disjunction between a ritual and its interpretation.  
Girard (1982:56), however, argues the similar point.  What the community says is the meaning of the ritual 
does not match an objective observation of it. 
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Girard (1982:35-36) believes ‗…it becomes clear that we are dealing with a single 
principle of distorted presentation, though in mythology the mechanism operates in a 
higher register than in history.  It is undeniably and universally true that the less rational 
the persecutors‘ conviction the more formidable that conviction becomes.‘ 
The more fantastic the crime or monstrous the scapegoat is represented, the more 
mythical it is.  Girard (1982:37) insists that the more we move from ‗monster‘ to ‗human‘ 
the less ‗distorted‘ the victim appears, the more we are moving from myth to texts of 
persecution.  Knowing this gives us a way to ‗decode‘ myth.  All through Girard‘s 
discussion in The Scapegoat, he reiterates that our hermeneutics must work backwards. 
From what we knew of the ‗logic‘ of persecution and victimization, we must interject that 
into these ancient stories.   
2.3.4  The Role of the Crowd.  Girard‘s approach explores the interplay between the 
author(s) and the community‘s generative event, fueled by mimesis. To varying degrees, 
we may perceive the extent to which the author manages the content and outcome.  
Whether the text appears to uphold the scapegoat mechanism or is deconstructing it, the 
composer of the text has varying degrees of control over the composition.  We may 
pursue as in traditional criticisms the author‘s intent and historical setting, the historical 
settings of the recipients, or the impact the text is intended or has had on the audience, 
but Girard would hold that these are not of primary importance.  It is not what the author 
controls or constructs that is critical; it is what controls the author and the narrative or 
ritual.  It is the unmanageability of reciprocal violence fueled by mimetic desires that 
engines a communal drive toward a resolution that can relieve the community.  In a very 
strong and real sense, it is the crowd, the collective that yields an immense influence over 
the text. 
The role of the crowd occupies considerable attention for Girard.  But here, we return to 
what is characteristically absent from scapegoat narratives.  The crowd is never at the 
fore front, and indeed, if the narrative or ritual has masked the generative murder well, it 
is not there at all.  Characteristically present in narratives are central characters who are 
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usually in a triangular relationship.
91
  Yet the crowd yields tremendous force, especially 
once it has polarized around a single victim. ‗No one decides, no one can really control 
the mechanism…the crowd always seems to be responsible for unleashing the fatal 
process:‘ Girard (1985a:82) says.   
Within a mythological text, there is an apparent manageability of the mechanism on the 
part of characters.  But unlike, the kind of popular conspiracy speculation of our day that 
sees leaders as power brokers, leading characters can be keen to the operation of the 
mechanism and steer it toward a victim even though they themselves don‘t understand 
the operation.  They, ‗…do not know why this mechanism has such a beneficial effect on 
their mutual relationships and the entire community, but they are aware of its operation 
and are very receptive to it…they are fulfilling a social and religious function.  They are 
there to watch over the successful operation of the scapegoat mechanism‘ (Girard, 
1985a:76). 
Leading characters in narrative function similarly to priests in ritual; they are a policing 
operation, a crowd control.
92
  The director of ritual who is able to ‗collect‘ the 
scandalized desires toward a central figure must be careful lest he/she become the victim.  
Leaders understand this.  Even though the community may despise leaders for doing this, 
the community is always the driving force of it.  Once mimetic desire has reached a 
‗crisis‘ pitch, it drives with an automated self-determination toward a resolution in the 
victim.  Within the text, we can see the dynamic between the author and characters in 
which the author is himself swept along by the mimetic force of the crowd. 
One narrative where Girard (1982:140) explores the dynamic between a leader and the 
crowd is the story of John the Baptist‘s execution.  There, the crowd seems to play a 
passive, acquiescent role, and the story is controlled by dominant characters.  But we 
should not be overly occupied with the idiosyncrasies of characters, especially leading 
figures, for they inevitably end up servicing a utilitarian function for the group. Herod is 
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 Noticing the triangular relationship of characters, Williams (1994:131-133) reminds, was the starting 
point for Girard‘s theory.  Girard reconnects what Platonism had separated—mimesis and desire.  Society 
can equally be a source of desire as an individual.  A representative character, then, can readily be 
exchanged for a collective mimesis. ‗The configuration of desire is therefore triangular.  It runs from 
subject through the mediator to the object.  
92
 Girard (1982:135)  
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an intermediary.  We must not be overly distracted by nuances of his personality (or 
apparent historical inaccuracies) over against his management, or lack thereof, of 
collective mimesis.  Herod, in this case, understands that he could easily become the 
target for the collective drive toward a repository of reciprocal violence. 
The role of the crowd is always present.  In Oedipus, it is the chorus, but Teiresias and 
Creon repeatedly speak the ‗theology‘ of the collective as do Job‘s counselors.  The 
power of crowd is present, for Girard (1982:141), in Herod‘s exaggerated offer of ‗half 
the kingdom‘ to Solome.  It is obviously unrealistic, even in the text, but it plays a role 
(ritually) for the group to which the reader is actually a part of.  ‗The exorbitant offer is 
the fascinated spectator‘s response.‘  In this case it is meant to draw the participants (the 
reader) into the original mimesis.  At the end of the story, at the height of mimesis, the 
guests, Solome, and Herod all act as one: 
The guests all react identically. At the supreme stage of mimetic crisis they provide the type of 
crowd that alone can intervene decisively.  When the crowd is unanimously murderous the 
decision always rests with it.  Subjected to such formidable pressure Herod can only ratify nolens 
volens the decision of the crowd, just as Pilate does a little later.  By yielding to this pressure he 
loses himself in the crowd; he is no more than the least of its members (Girard, 1982:145). 
In the case of the Gospel story, we are already privy to understanding the mechanism 
because it is written and read from the perspective of the innocent victim.  Thus the 
author and the reader are not infatuated with the mimetic force.  In more mythological 
texts, both author and recipient are themselves participants in the mimetic force of the all 
against one.
93
 
What ultimately rules is the unanimous mimeticism of the scapegoat.  It controls the text, 
even for the gospels that demystify it, and for Girard (1985a:59), it is a critical 
component for interpretation. ‗By recognizing the role played by the hysterical crowd in 
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 Goodhart (2007:73) thus states: ‗For there are now always two different perspectives that must be 
considered: what we are told is taking place in the narrative, and the extent to which the narrative itself is 
imitating what is taking place within it.‘  This two-fold task—later the author presents a four-tiered 
‗hermeneutic‘ to which a discerning reader must go from the ‗plain sense of the reading‘ to a ‗scene of 
instruction‘—becomes much more challenging in the Old Testament where the lines between a 
mythologically tinged text and a demythological text are much less distinct.  
Chapter 2 – Girard‘s Theory and Methodology               69 
 
69 
 
religions of violence we can separate the wheat from the tares and make use of the reality 
of what is hidden by the language of the sacred, without any fear of becoming its dupe.‘  
Girard (1985a:43) insists: ‗…it is always a matter, above all else, of collective murder.‘ 
This eye for the crowd will be essential to our approach to Genesis 1 and 2.  In Genesis 2, 
for instance, ‗the adam‘ has a strong corporate feel to it.  A mimetic interpreter must be 
vigilant to the ever present undertow of the community. 
For Girard, the tell-tale indicator of the crowd‘s presence in the narrative is its unanimous 
double-mindedness, a double mimesis.  In forms of myth closer to the original event, the 
‗amazing sequence‘ is more readily detected. The veneration of victim is perfectly 
symmetrical to the community‘s hatred of it.  We love you (as model of desire), we hate 
you (victim of contagious violence), we love you (as sacred being, reconciling the 
community).   
The symmetry in the original myth, however, inevitably breaks down, and if we are 
aware of the imbalance, then it is an interpretive tool for deciphering the oft contradictory 
details in a text.  Girard (1985a:101) calls this the ‗principle of incoherence‘—the attempt 
to stay true to the genesis of the community while avoiding, oft unconsciously, any 
implications of the group‘s association with the violence against the victim.  Depending 
on the evolution of ritual, one aspect of this symmetry fades to the background and may 
eventually be absent altogether.  Girard (1985a:95) attributes this tendency toward a 
deep-seated aversion to the conjunction of the symmetry.  This is characteristically 
reflected in either an over emphasis on one aspect of the mechanism—the idol or the 
victim—or in overly complex or contradictory detail. 
Another key interpretive principle concerns how the crowd is represented in ritual or 
mythological narrative. Simply put, the crowd is constantly distancing itself from its 
visible involvement in the victim‘s death.  The more the crowd is absent from a narrative, 
the further it is from its origins.  The collective representation is always moving towards 
disappearance.  ‗As culture evolves, these traces are always expelled and eliminated‘ 
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(1982:91).
94
  Even so, Girard (1985a:98) insists that no matter how buried the symmetry 
has been by ritual, it still leaves traces of the original crisis—one of the key traces is the 
‗double relationship of the crowd.‘  We may also notice, that in narratives, such as the 
Gospels, that are dismantling the mechanism, the crowd is exposed for what it is and is 
given ultimate responsibility for the death of Jesus.  Ironically, the expelled one becomes 
beloved and the crowd is expelled. 
Here as well, Girard sees a characteristic pattern.  First, representation of the crowd 
transfers to individual characters and then disappears altogether.  But because the crowd 
is always controlled by mimesis, it is always given to extremes, most often reflected in 
the introduction of fantastical elements, exaggeration or imagination.  There is an absence 
of moderation.  There is either extreme excess or depravity (Girard, 1985a:62).   
Again, the key to recognizing the crowd is to look for the double mimesis—we love you 
(excess, lavishness, flood), or we hate your (depravity, lack, drought).   States Girard 
(1985a:62): ‗This absence of moderation, the perpetual combination of lack and excess, 
characterizes a universe that has surrendered to mimeticism.‘  This bi-polar wavering is 
for Girard an indispensable tool for ferreting out the mob from underneath its 
representations.  
Ultimately, deities are representations of the collective, especially the ‗insane community 
of mimesis.‘  This shows up clearly in representations of supernatural justice.  There are 
for one, celestial armies.  The violent unanimity of the collective toward a single victim is 
transcended, along with the victim, to a supernatural realm, and hence removed from the 
community.  It is no longer the community who demands the death of a victim, but the 
host of heaven. Again, we have the interplay between the real and the fantastic.  ‗…these 
armies are in no way celestial and therefore all the more real…‘celestial warriors are in 
fact everyone involved‘ (Girard, 1985a:27). 
                                                 
94
 Watts (2007:182) offers a valuable insight that sacrificial rituals must be understood as distinct from 
narratives about sacrifice.  Indeed, explanations of sacrifice enter in precisely because the ritual has become 
considerably distanced from the community.  This indicates a couple of things: one, the community has so 
successfully distanced itself from its own genesis myth that the ritual has become ‗dead‘ or ritual for ritual 
sake; second, the reintroduction of a ritual (which Watts believes is what is going on in Leviticus) would 
already be prone to placing the crowd in the background or to leaving it out all together.  
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Representations of supernatural justice are further extended to angels of death or celestial 
avengers (1985a:29-30).  These are extensions of an angry god.  Even though the notion 
of an angry god moves the community toward some sense of corporate responsibility, it 
reflects a kind of ‗collective bad faith‘ where a sense that the responsibility for a draught 
or plague is not being equally shared (Girard, 1982:3).  In this case, the angry god—the 
crowds drive towards a justice that can exonerate them—is a protector, always looking 
out for the good of all.  
Any narrative moving away from mythological representations of the crowd will bring 
the crowd down to earth and make it readily apparent.  In the Gospels, for instance, the 
crowd is exposed for what it is and is given ultimate responsibility for the death of Jesus. 
The extent to which a text reveals the responsibility of the group for its own violence, 
both corporately and individually, is the extent it is demythologized. A demythologized 
text drives with equal veracity toward expulsion only toward a reverse affect.  In the one, 
the crowd is spared at the expense of the victim, and in the other, the victim is spared at 
the expense of the crowd.
95
  
The accusation of the crowd towards its victim is one more aspect that can reveal the 
crowd‘s presence.  ‗The real concept of myth,‘ says Girard (1985a:45) is in the 
assumption behind the accusation ‗that the plague of Thebes was actually caused by 
parricide and incest.‘  In the case of Oedipus, Sophocles knows that the accusation was 
ridiculous, but not the sacrificial system.  In a sense, Oedipus deserves what he got by 
messing with the system.  Ultimately the accusation of the crowd serves to relocate the 
cause of an internal crisis outside of the community.  Hence the accusation is a first sign 
of the mechanism revving up. 
There is potential for confusion on this.  The scapegoat does not have to be proven 
entirely innocent.  He may in fact have a serious charge against him.  But in order for the 
criminal to function sacrificially, he must become absolutely guilty of one or more of the 
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 The exegesis of Genesis 2 to follow concludes this very thing in the relationship of the woman to ‗the 
adam.‘ 
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stereotypical crimes against him.  ‗The fact that some of the details are imagined does not 
persuade us to consider the whole text imaginary.  On the contrary, the more incredible 
accusations strengthen rather than diminish the credibility of the other facts‘ (Girard, 
1982:105).  Here is but one more example of the interplay between imagination and 
reality. 
One final trace of the collective that is associated with accusation and is often the critical 
stepping stone for an accusation to take hold is the rumor.  Rumor is often the 
undercurrent of a narrative.  It easily evades our convenient assessment of truth and 
falsehood, and thus can generate accusatory force unabated.  The rumor places in motion 
the deification of the victim and his ‗magical powers‘ over the community long before his 
inevitable death (Girard 1982:90ff).  Rumor has its partner in divine decree.  In the case 
of Oedipus, the oracle of Laos—the son will murder the father or in other words, the 
community kills its own in order to spare itself—is ‗the truth of myth‘ that everyone 
scrambles to flee from in a ‗delirium of exclusion and expulsion‘ (Girard 1965:51).  The 
oracle undergirds the subtle turning of accusation toward Oedipus with such force that 
Oedipus finally succumbs.  
 
2.4  Conclusion 
What is important here is simply to lay out the considerations that will dominate the 
inquiry into the Genesis 1 and 2.  They are starting points which dictate to some degree 
the limitations and direction.  Of primary concern will be: 
 The triangular interplay of mimetic desire.  This is especially pertinent to the 
Adam‘s placement in the garden and the placement of the trees.  
 The sacrificial victim(s). 
 The presence, or lack thereof, of the community converging on a victim—the 
symmetry or dissymmetry of the crowd. 
 Identifying key structural features over thematic. 
 Distinguishing between mythological features—‗reveiling‘ the sacrificial 
mechanism—and demythological features—‗revealing‘ it. 
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This is not at the exclusion of methodologies that have been employed in the last century.  
The next chapter will place Girard‘s ideology and methodology within the current 
discourse in Old Testament theology and the broader discussions of theory and ideology 
in the post-modern current.   
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3 GIRARD WITHIN LATE MODERNITY’S CHALLENGE AND 
PROSPECT OF THEORY AND METHODOLOGIES  
 
I had intended at first to limit the fielding of criticisms of Girard to a minimum.  As 
mentioned in the introduction, it is not out of the ordinary for scholars to apply a 
particular theoretical approach with little to no critical evaluation of the theory itself. It is 
still the overall goal to test the validity of the Girard‘s ideas as an insightful tool for 
contributing to biblical interpretation and theology.  Why, then, should a more thorough 
fielding of criticisms be important? 
For one, Girard, in my view, has fueled a particularly heated backlash, and this alone 
should be explored.
1 
 Girard is fully aware of the accusation that his theory is a 
‗sacrificial ideology.‘2  Girard‘s (1978:435ff) apologetic towards this kind of critique is 
clear and accurate, albeit not satisfying to his critics, especially since he uncovers the 
predilections often accompanying such objections. As will become evident in what 
follows, the sacrificial mechanism can apply equally to theory-making and modern 
critique as it can to mythological texts and ritual.   
Mainly, however, any serious inquiry into the topic of sacrifice jettisons one into an 
unavoidable byzantine vortex.  Jay (1992:1) states it well: ‗A survey of social-scientific 
interpretations of other people‘s ritual action (especially rituals of so-called primitive 
religions) looks like a free-for-all of apparently unlimited combinations of speculation, 
wild projective fantasy, and careful scholarship.‘ To talk of sacrifice is to include ritual.  
From ritual, we embark on discussions of myth, religion, culture, magic, theology, 
theory, paradigm, ideology, post-modern, methodology, epistemology, politics, 
psychology, and the list goes on.  Strenski concludes (2003:1) ‗Sacrifice and its attendant 
                                                 
1
 Mack (1985:137) speaks of Girard‘s ‗explosive reading of the text‘ and an ‗invasion‘ into the field of 
biblical scholarship. 
2
 Jay (1992:131); Miller (2002:2) 
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rhetoric have fallen on hard times.‘  Currently, there is no abatement to the intensity and 
variety of disagreement to the point where some call for giving up altogether.
3
 
The topic itself then, really does not allow one to blithely evaluate in a corner.  As I shall 
discuss, the main objection of Girard is a ‗contextual‘ one, and in the spirit of our times, I 
wish to place Girard within the ‗context‘ of our times.  Our topic is too complex to do 
otherwise.  Girard‘s thinking has affinities with an array of categories, academic 
disciplines, theories and methodologies, yet mimetic theory cannot be easily categorized 
without distorting it.  This can go one of two ways.  It can mean that his thinking is 
insufficient and too simplistic to seriously engage the more well-established academic 
disciplines, or it means that there is a synthetic quality in his thinking.  The fact that one 
can find engagement with Girard in theology, anthropology, sociology, philosophy, 
literary and cultural criticisms, and the like should readily point us to the latter.
4
 
There are a few preliminary observations to make about Girard‘s ‗theory‘ and those who 
have critically engaged it.  For one, many critiques tend to be limited to Girard‘s seminal 
works that engage sociological perspectives, Violence and the Sacred (1972) and 
psychological perspectives, Things Hidden From the Foundations of the World (1978) 
and short circuit the progressive nature of Girard‘s thinking.5  Some demonstrate little 
knowledge or awareness of the mimetic underpinnings in his work. Even worse, some 
appear to rely on secondary sources for their understanding of Girard.  Girard, as Strenski 
(2003:18) states, has offered a ‗full-blown‘ theory of sacrifice, but even here, one must 
realize that Girard is not primarily concerned with sacrifice as much as the playing out of 
mimetic desire in human interaction.  Some summaries of Girard‘s work are limited to 
truncated explanations of sacrifice, less about religion, and even less about culture.  
Girard addresses, of course, all of these things, but they are an out-growth of his growing 
conviction about human nature and interaction—humans acquire desire. 
                                                 
3
 Following the lead of the structuralist thinking of Levi-Strauss, Detienne and Vernant (1989:20) state: 
‗…it seems important to say that the notion of sacrifice is indeed a category of the thought of yesterday, 
conceived as arbitrary as totemism…‘ 
4
 In the recent issue of Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, Culture. 2008/2009 Volume 15/16, 
contributing articles come from scholars in the fields of: theology, English literature, history, culture, 
political philosophy, philosophy, classics, political science, computer science and mathematics.  
5
 Levine (1985:127), for instance, builds a case against Girard based on the scapegoat rituals such as found 
in Leviticus 16.  This is despite the fact of Girard‘s (1972:28-30) emphatic and repeated appeals that his 
notion of the scapegoat has almost nothing to do with the scapegoat rituals categorized by Frazer.  
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  Finally, locating Girard‘s thinking within the current context of ‗post-modern‘ thinking6 
will enable us to readily make the transition from theory to currents in Old Testament 
studies and theology.
7
  Hence, the first part of this chapter will address a rejection of 
Girard‘s theory within the anthropological and sociological fields embraced by some Old 
Testament scholarship.  The conclusion of this section will comment on some important 
points of departure for entertaining theory in a ‗post-modern‘ context.  The second part 
addresses a sampling of objections within the field of theology.   
Although there have been a variety of objections to Girard, most can be predictably 
placed within a general negative sentiment towards its ubiquitous scope.
8
  There have 
been numerous theories of sacrifice going all the way back to the Middle Ages, and none 
have been able to take hold as a dominant rubric. 
There is a ‗post-modern‘ sentiment that disdains ‗grand narratives‘ that have at times run 
roughshod over peculiar cultural sensitivities and bolstered ideological and ethnocentric 
agendas, sometimes oppressively so.
9
  Kogler (2007:333) asserts at the heart of late 
modern theory is the contesting and rejection of modern theories.  Of particular interest is 
the ‗rejection of trans-contextual notions of truth and truth claims, moralities that speak in 
the name of all, and grand theories, so–called ‗meta-narratives‘ that construct historical 
and social developments imposed on and alien to the cultures discussed.‘  
It is when Girard is placed within this broader concern that we find ourselves in a 
daunting whirl of intersecting concerns and positions to which one could not thoroughly 
address in a book, let alone a chapter. 
                                                 
6
 Wallace (1989:322) 
7
 As will become more apparent as I proceed, ‗post modernity‘ is a disputed designation.  I agree with those 
(discussed below) who would argue that we can‘t really say we have left modernity.  We are more 
accurately in a ‗late modern‘ period.  I will use throughout this work both terms, but prefer ‗late 
modernity.‘ 
8
 Reineke (2009:11) speaks of the ‗standard-issue criticisms‘ such as: no correspondence to any 
documented examples of ritual sacrifice; its favorable outlook toward Christianity; reducing sacrifice to 
aggression, ignoring positive expressions of sacrifice such as communal festivals.   Perhaps more 
accurately, McKenna (1985:4) asserts that Girard‘s insistence on origins and foundations inevitably 
provokes conflict with other theories.  See North (1985:26).  J. Z. Smith (1987:192, 195) vigorously objects 
to the whole pursuit of an origin to ritual or religion as fruitless speculation. 
9
 The term ‗grand narratives‘ is one coined by Terry Eagleton‘s in his insightful book After Theory 
(2003:23-24).  The idiomatic phrase aptly reflects a general negative connotation in current thinking, ‗a 
heinous thought crime,‘ as Eagleton puts it.  In his book, Eagleton mainly refers to the ‗grand narratives‘  
that held a powerful sway in modernity: Marxism and capitalism. 
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Accordingly, I have limited my engagement with the topic to an interaction with a work 
by David Janzen entitled The Social Meanings of Sacrifice in the Hebrew Bible for 
several reasons.  First, Janzen (2004:4) deals directly with Girard and uses his theory as a 
model argument counter to his approach.  He is openly aggressive in opposition to 
Girard.  Second, Janzen aptly reflects most of what I believe to be the pivotal objections 
to Girard at this point, and these objections can be addressed within the discussion of Old 
Testament exegesis and theology on sacrifice.  Third, Janzen (2004:57) engages a wide 
variety of recent scholarship on the subject and claims to represent or to be congruent 
with current anthropological and social scientific approaches, where the rejection of 
Girard is decided and alternative approaches are being explored.  From here, we will be 
able to examine the weakness of the ‗contextual‘ argument, explore the validity of 
scientific theory verses just theory, and expand the discussion beyond sociological 
frameworks.   Finally, Janzen‘s work is relatively recent and should reflect the full 
progression of Girard‘s work as well as a settling of criticisms from the flurry at the end 
of the 20
th
 century.  
 
3.1 Theory-making in Modernity and  Late Modernity  
 
Janzen‘s starting point and indeed the driving force behind  his approach can be placed 
within the current sentiment of what can be and is oft labeled ‗post-modern,‘ mentioned 
above.  There is an exhaustion over ‗universal theories.‘10  This has all the appearance of 
objective concerns and an offer for a reasonable way forward.  It postulates a basic logic. 
For one, ‗universal theory,‘ such as Marxism, has lent itself to totalizing applications, 
eliminating competing ideologies and imposing massive conformity at the cost of 
millions of lives. And because there have been so many different and conflicting theories 
of sacrifice, none of which has held the day, all of which have definitive and direct 
influences from the socio-political culture they arose in, it is best to give up on ‗universal 
                                                 
10
 As to be discussed below, the distinction between a ‗theory‘ and a ‗universal theory‘ is fallacious.  A 
theory is universal by its very nature.  Janzen consistently uses ‗theory‘ positively but ‗universal theory‘ 
pejoratively.  Even though it might seem redundant, I have chosen to put ‗universal theory‘ in quotes to 
consistently remind of this dubious distinction. 
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theories,‘ stick to ‗scientific‘ observation, and restrict our conclusions to the ‗context‘ the 
ritual is found in.  It is an avoidance of ‗grand narratives‘ and ‗trans-contextualization‘ all 
together. 
This disposition opposing universals, ‗grand narratives,‘ or ‗trans-contextualization‘ is 
identified with the elusive term ‗post-modern.‘  A term which is often loosely tossed 
about to fit whatever one wants it to mean.  Connotations run deep.  But post-modernism 
is mainly a closing period.  Its most distinguishing feature is simply signaling the end of a 
period of immense and intense theory-constructing.  All we are doing is as Eagleton 
(2003:2) says, ‗trading on the past.‘  Post-modernity is just borrowing on modernity.  It 
carries with it a certain negative disposition which is legitimate, but overblown.  
Repeatedly, there is a resistance to ‗imposing‘ ideas or agendas—ideology.  It is a 
sentiment that rejects anything that smacks of a forced and funneled agenda, of 
‗unilateral‘ formulations or coercive uniformity.  Hence, there is a bit of irony or edge to 
Girard‘s ideas because they get at the heart of the ‗use of force.‘  
With that in mind, one must clarify what went on in the modern period.  
3.1.1 Theory-making in the Modern period. In a span of about one hundred years, 
from the late nineteenth century to the late 20
th
 century, an unparalleled flurry of theory-
making emerged in the academic centers of Europe and America.  Indeed, the  ‗social 
sciences‘ such as anthropology, sociology, psychology, ethnology, political science, 
history and the like were solely fueled by the emergence of dominant and oft contentious 
theories.  Theory-making equally dominated fields of economics, sciences, the arts, 
education, biblical and religious studies.  In the twentieth century, one did not proceed to 
application without a theoretical basis.  
Ivan Strenski has chronicled the history of religious theory-making in the twentieth 
century in a series of works.
11
  Strenski has demonstrated several pertinent observations.  
For one, theory was emerging as the replacement for theology as the basis for public 
discourse.  Theory-making, then, begins with an antagonistic sentiment towards theology 
                                                 
11
 2002 Contesting Sacrifice: Religion, Nationalism, and Social Thought in France; 2003 Theology and the 
First Theory of Sacrifice; 2006 Thinking About Religion: An Historical Introduction to Theories of 
Religion. 
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which runs all the way to today.  It is fueled by a sense of exhaustion over the kind of 
confessional wars spurred by recalcitrant theological positions and the control of clerics 
who defended them. Theory was viewed as the way forward, especially in the 
development of national identities.  It shunned metaphysical explanations for what 
seemed a more solid foundation for building society provided by the then emerging 
evolutionary model.  Science, reason, and nature could put an end to speculative thinking 
which only served to provoke contentious and ruthless exchange.  By the turn of the 
century, the sense that human society was evolving into more complicated and refined 
forms was prevalent.  Human potential would only progress to greater heights once the 
superstition of a bygone time could be put away.  As I proceed, then, the concern for 
what constitutes ‗public exchange‘ will be a recurrent one, taking many interesting twists 
and turns. 
The question of the moral and social cohesion for a society became pressing since 
theology and the Church were deemed inadequate and even worse, counter-productive to 
human progress.  This was further exacerbated by the gauntlet laid down by Nietzsche 
that borrowing the ethic of Christianity while rejected its core was disingenuous and 
worse, outright hypocrisy.
12
  As much as modernity rejected theology, however, it still 
solidly shared one thing in common with it—the conviction that human societies must 
have a unifying factor to them.  Modernity, and most of its flurry of theory-making, 
confidently embarked on that endeavor to find that core, center, germ, or cohesive force 
that naturally holds humans together.  Though theology and evolution are often viewed 
as being at odds with each other, both share a foundational conviction that there is a 
unifying model that can explain the great diversity of life.  Theory-making assumed such 
a conviction in its search for the common thread.  It is dominated by the comparison 
method, the belief that one could find, mainly through scientific inquiry and method, 
characteristics common to all humanity.
13
  What drives theory-making was its conviction 
that diversity is best explained from the starting point of commonality.  This thinking, for 
                                                 
12
 Walsh (1990:20-31) and Milbank (1990:280-295) 
13
 Walsh (1990:12) speaks of the ‗original‘ branch of ideology—science: ‗It was coincided to describe the 
application of the methods of natural sciences to the study of individual and society; the intention was to 
reduce all human behavior to a single causal system that could be fitted within the comprehensive science 
of zoology.‘ 
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instance, fueled the comparative religious movement of Gunkel and others in Old 
Testament.
14
  The compulsion to have a ‗grid‘ to explain complex and diverse 
phenomena is fundamental to scientific inquiry. 
As Strenski (2003:232) reminds, at fundamental concern behind theory-making was what 
could replace theology as the common ground by which a diverse society could operate:  
‗Thus, all along, for the Durkheimians and for me, the critical perennial issue in this 
rivalry has been the question of whether theological discourse…can qualify as public 
discourse—especially in the domain of religion...The Durkheimians represent the view 
that it cannot.‘ 
For this reason, Strenski examines the political, historical development of Emile 
Durkheim in France.  What went on there, in Strenski‘s view, epitomizes much of what 
we can deduce of theory-making in ‗post-modernity‘ and lays down important 
foundations for fielding criticisms of Girard.  For one, theory-making is emphatically not 
devoid of politics.  As Strenski 2003:230 says, ‗…we need to recognize that theories are 
often worked out within the context of the politics of certain social institutions, and that 
these politics are as real as in any other domain of life in the ‗real world.‘  On the 
contrary, it has everything to do with gaining and then wielding political power.
15
   
In his book Thinking About Religion (2006), Strenski effectively chronicles the 
development of religious theories and demonstrates the malaise that theory-making fell 
into during modernity.  Essentially, theory-making simply reproduced a different version 
of what it set out to correct in theology—an exhaustion and skepticism over the 
contentious and dangerous entrenchment of warring theoretical perspectives, now 
identified as ideologies.
16
 
There are several pointed observations made by Strenski about theories of religion in 
modernity.  Theorists quickly encountered the dilemma of attempting to be an outside 
                                                 
14
 Gunkel‘s work 1895  Creation and Chaos in the Primeval Era and the Eschaton was especially spurred 
by the discovery of ancient Babylonian works. 
15
 Watts‘ (2007:67) premise to his study of Leviticus is that ritual was as politically charged in the ancient 
world as it is today.  Aaron (2002) also deals with competing meanings around image in the ancient world.  
16
 See Walsh (1990:10-12) 
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observer to something that one is deeply involved in.  How can one objectively observe 
society while being in society oneself.  Upon review of theories and theorists, it becomes 
abundantly clear how the social, political, and psychological situations of the theorist and 
his time—the context of the theorist—powerfully determined the shaping and outcome of 
the theory.  All the more true when there is the high stakes of controlling influential 
academic institutions and determining public policy as in the case of France at the turn of 
the twentieth century.  One can find the theorist in the theory, his (and yes, it is telling 
that theory-making is a male-dominated activity) own experiences, political adversaries, 
bias, and crisis effectively shaped the theory.  I would conclude with Stenski (2006:339) 
that knowing this does not in and of itself invalidate the contribution made, but it does 
reveal the kind of trouble that ‗post-modernists‘ have with theories.  They seem to 
explain as much about the theorist and his times than anything useful for society.   
3.1.2 Skepticism of theory post-modern. Tellingly, by the end of the twentieth 
century, theories of religion and ‗studies of religion‘ are ill-defined.  To repeat Strenski 
(2003:1): ‗Sacrifice and its attendant rhetoric have fallen on hard times.‘  There was 
anything but a consensus and the assumption of a common foundation seemed hopeless 
and wrong-headed.  This was not only true for religious studies but all of the ‗humanities‘ 
and indeed, science is increasingly understanding this.
17
  The dilemma is glaringly the 
same—the observer is part of the thing being observed.  There is no privileged 
perspective, no outside vantage point to observe objectively.    
Post-modernism is simply a signaled end to modernity.  It is best characterized by a 
rejection of much of it.  Kogler (2007:333) defines post-modernism as simply 
‗conceptual and methodological positions that contest modernist positions.‘  Once more, 
we take note of an antagonistic disposition underlying the current general paradigm.  
One‘s ideas, apparently, are still built on a rejection of what came before.  The question 
still remains as to whether this rejection of modernist positions is significantly the end of 
modernity or just a flip side of it.  Have we really left modernity behind? 
                                                 
17
 Hauerwas  (2007:129), Barrow (2007:246) 
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To many, especially with a Christian perspective, this abandonment of universal truth 
claims can only lead to a nihilistic outlook
18
 or a new religion based on social theory.
19
   
Kogler (2007:334), on the other hand, believes a hopeful way lies not in a nihilistic 
rejection of all reason, but in ‗a reformulation of the scope and nature of truth claims and 
normative commitments…‘  He identifies ‗postmodern‘ themes which one would need to 
embrace for such a ‗reformulation‘ to be fruitful: 
1) ‗context-dependency‘ of theoretically articulated truth positions 
2) ‗sensitivity to the cultural embeddedness of moral attitudes and rules‘ 
3) carefully integrating ‗conceptual frames and empirical-hermeneutic processes‘20 
 
Strenski (2003:236,238) concludes something quite similar to Kogler, especially 
addressing the issue of relativism.  Strenski believes that history—as something that can 
be objectively assessed—can determine the relative importance and legitimacy of a 
theory.  Theories, Strenski asserts, shouldn‘t be expected to have a permanent shelf-life.  
The validity or power of a theory is in passing the ‗so what?‘ test.  In other words, does 
or did the theory make a significant contribution for the time it was written, and if so, 
what is or should be its impact on current thinking. Along with this, Strenski explores 
why the theorist thought he was right.  What kind of social/political/psychological 
conditions compelled the theorist to such deep convictions?  
Milbank (1990:1-3) has taken the current ‗skeptical relativism‘ to bring theological 
perspectives back into the mainstream of current intellectual thought.  He, like Strenski, 
examines the ‗genesis‘ of secular reasoning contributing to social theory and concludes 
something similar to Strenski—theories of humans are made up of, well, theorizing 
humans.  They have their flaws.  Milbank grants that social theory has enabled a certain 
bridge between theology and ‗secular‘ thinking.  This has been some of the excitement 
around Girard in this regard.  Milbank (1990:3) believes that mimetic theory was a way 
                                                 
18
 Walsh 1990:17-37 
19
 Milbank 1990:2 
20
 In his critique of Girard‘s reading of Job, Levine (1989:125ff) reiterates the higher critical concerns 
developed during modernity and advocates a ‗contextual‘ approach similar to Kogler in opposition to 
Girard.  
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to find a common basis for which theological and ‗secular‘ thinking could engage, and he 
upbraids theologians ‗to acknowledge theoretical developments which they have 
woefully ignored.‘  Nonetheless, Milbank (1990:2) challenges the underlying premise of 
social theory which seeks to engulf ‗religion‘ within its explanatory grids, arguing that 
sociology is only a disguised theology and that the Christian theological heritage still 
passes muster as a ‗metanarrative‘, especially in our current skeptical impasse.  
Strenski (2003:240), however, rejects such reasoning based on what he believes is a 
generally understood truth—‗Except in rare circumstances, we are not generally 
nihilistic.‘  Most societies make value judgments from sheer practicality.  The utilitarian 
element determines to a large degree the ‗decisions about the givens of knowledge about 
the world.‘21  He explains his epistemological view point of a kind of ‗(relative) absolute 
within a given world—context—which is for the most part determined by a kind of 
common sense about survival:  
Now these practical considerations about getting on with life are of the highest importance to the 
existence of civilized life.  They are to be found in the epistemological principles undergirding our 
judicial and legal systems, that is the priority of sense perception and empirical knowledge. 
For Strenski (2003:241), drawing the line at the empirical, as we do in our legal and 
judicial systems, is our practical way of getting on with having a civilized society:  
…our so called secular political systems in the West in a way rest on the wager that civilized 
society stands a better chance of success if we remove religion, or better yet, any single religion, 
from a foundational role in our society. 
Needless to say, there is no easy resolve at this point. There are a myriad of issues in 
which all need consider.  Both of Milbank and Strenski, however, surprising coincide in 
that they call for a fundamental and pragmatic understanding of our social reality as 
humans.  More of this will be addressed as I proceed.   
 
3.2 A ‘Contextual’ Approach to Sacrifice and Ritual in the Old Testament.  
                                                 
21
 Perhaps Strenski underestimates the Christian influence of the last two millennia on such propensities 
away from nihilism.  
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I have chosen to engage David Janzen‘s approach to sacrifice in the Old Testament as a 
paradigmic way to field the core criticisms to Girard.  I will proceed first to describe and 
summarize the basic contours of a ‗contextual‘ approach.  Janzen, in typical ‗post-
modern‘ fashion builds much of his case on the foundational rejection of ‗universal 
theories.‘  He exemplifies the approach laid out by Kogler mentioned above.  From there, 
I will first address the inconsistencies of the anthropological alternative ‗contextual‘ 
approach, at least as Janzen presents it.  This will lead us into a discussion of the broader 
issues involved.   
By proceeding in this manner, several objectives can be demonstrated.  For one, the 
‗contextual‘ approach is fraught with difficulties.  It reveals its own unanswerable 
predilections. In a similar vein as Milbank, then, social theory is shown to be as much a 
problem as it is a solution. It is not offering a way forward, and in many ways it is a 
regress.  Contra to Milbank, however, Girard‘s theory does not neatly fit into the ‗social 
theory‘ category.  Second, Janzen provides, seemingly unawares, a ‗universal theory‘ that 
has remarkable affinities with Girard, thus demonstrating a fundamental lack of 
understanding of both Girard and theory.  Finally, I seek to identify the context or 
framework of this complex issue—and after all, that is what theory-making is—and to 
demonstrate that Girard‘s insights, far from being dismissed, offers a lively and fruitful 
engagement for ever more pertinent issues of the nature of man, religion, sacrifice, 
culture, and violence.     
By way of preliminary ground work, it is needful here to mention the general theoretical 
views of sacrifice and ritual and of ritual and religion, for Janzen consistently holds to a 
particular starting point. 
There are generally three theoretical outlooks on sacrifice in relationship to other rituals. 
For Durkheim,
22
 sacrifice is the topic par excellence of religion, the sacred, and ritual – to 
grasp this is to grasp the essence, mainly because of its extensive practice, its universal 
appeal.  For others, the central place given to sacrifice is an ethnocentric carry-over from 
Christianity, especially Catholicism‘s centrality of the Eucharist.  It is rather only one of 
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 Strenski (2003:22) 
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many different kinds of rituals and does not hold a central place among ritual.
23
  Janzen 
(2004:9) holds this view and claims it for the general anthropological approach.
24
  
Finally, Levi-Strauss and the structuralists would take this second proposition one step 
further; there is nothing even religious about sacrifice.
25
  It is strictly a social function.  
Ritual and sacrifice are the same.  Furthermore, it is argued that sacrifice is a construct of 
theologians and theorists and is essentially meaningless, and the whole pursuit for a 
‗meaning‘ in it is folly.26  
Also of interest here is the debate over whether ritual is different than other socially 
coordinated behavior, from other ‗social acts.‘  Some hold to a distinction between 
religious and non-religious social behavior.  Janzen (2004:9), again claiming this for 
anthropologists in general, embraces the view that all socially coordinating behavior is 
ritual, or at least ritualistic, and thus is religious.  There is no essential distinction. 
3.2.1  The anthropological, contextual approach of Janzen.  Janzen, then, starts from 
the premise that ‗universal theories‘ of ritual, sacrifice being just one kind of ritual, in no 
way clarifies anything and in fact, only distorts our understanding of the ‗meaning(s)‘ of 
sacrifice.  A clearer understanding of sacrifice can only be gained by limiting the inquiry 
to the social context that the particular ritual is being performed in.  Simply put, Janzen 
(2004:3) purports: ‗…sacrifice can have very different meanings for different biblical 
authors.‘  Janzen (2004:4) explains: 
The field of anthropology, however, has abandoned universal theories like Girard‘s, in large part 
because these amount to attempts to impose a theory on all sacrifices enacted in all societies with 
no regard to their cultural or historical contexts. Anthropologists who study rituals in various 
cultures point consistently to the contexts in which the rituals are performed and argue 
convincingly that if we are to interpret their social meanings we need to understand as much as 
possible about these contexts. 
27
 
                                                 
23
 Wallace (1989:322) views Girard‘s singular focus on sacrifice as ‗eurocentric‘ and  ‗myopic.‘ 
24
 Thus, for most of this chapter the terms ‗ritual‘ and ‗sacrifice‘ will be used interchangeably. 
25
 See Detienne and Vernant 1989:1-20) 
26
 See J. Z. Smith (1987:191ff) 
27
 This is a bit overstated here.  No theory, including Girard‘s, completely disregards contexts.  Theory can 
only be generated by a context.  The issue is really how big the context we want to consider.  
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Although Janzen‘s attack on ‗universal theory‘ is rigorous, it must be pointed out that 
both he, social scientists, and ‗universal theorists‘ are after the same question—what does 
this particular social act mean?  The distinction, which Janzen holds to be significant, is 
simply in avoiding a reductionist answer.  There can be, and indeed only be, multiple 
meanings, depending on the immediate and particular context.  Each particular ritual has 
its own meaning. 
Janzen (2004:4) quickly moves from the ‗meaning‘ of sacrifice to the ‗social meaning‘ of 
sacrifice.  Without question, he places himself within the long line of modernists, best 
exemplified by Durkheim, who believed that sacrifice, ritual, and indeed religion must be 
understood as a social phenomenon.  Ritual after all is the most observable aspect of 
religion and is definitively a social act. Janzen‘s (2004:14) attempt to distance himself 
from Durkheimian theory is unconvincing, for he simply offers a variation on a theme.   
There are immediate differences depending on context and worldview, but overall, ritual 
still performs an essential task of social cohesion for the group.  
Ritual is then the starting point to which we embark on the question of its meaning for the 
social group enacting it.
28
  It is a vehicle or media that communicates a meaning for that 
group.  A ritual effectively re-presents and reinforces the worldview of the social group. 
Janzen uses interchangeably terms such as: worldview, social goods, social desiderata 
(desires), or ideology.  Contrary to the sour connotation that ‗ideology‘ has now, Janzen 
(2004:35) defines it as positively normal for any social group.
29
  Ritual is an accurate 
reflection of a community‘s ideology, its most deeply rooted values and moral codes.  
Every socially functioning community has an engrained understanding of how they 
understand themselves and their relation to the world around them.  
It is here were a careful distinction of terms must be clarified.  The social meaning of a 
ritual is a reflection of the community‘s worldview, its ideology.  It is not to be equated 
with the ‗social goods‘ of the community, but is a rhetorical communication of it.  The 
                                                 
28
 Janzen‘s use of terms and concepts are sophisticated and intertwined.  Figure 1 below is an attempt to 
sort these out according to the distinctions Janzen makes.  As to be discussed, I do not think Janzen nor 
others who use such terms successfully delineate his concepts.  In my chart, one can notice that every 
distinct concept overlaps the others. I think this is an honest demonstration of Janzen‘s presentation.  
29
 This positive view of ideology as ‗world-making‘ is shared by other Old Testament scholars such as 
Watts (2007:16 ) and Brueggemann (1988:xi). 
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deeply rooted intrinsic desiderata of the community exists apart from its expression, i.e. 
the ritual.  
 
 
Figure 1 
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For Janzen, the social meaning of a ritual is the product of the ritual.  The ritual serves to 
express a bifurcated ‗meaning‘ to the participants.  It inculcates the significance and the 
function of the ritual.  By significance, Janzen means the communicated or represented 
ideology of the group.  Thus, social significance is synonymous with worldview.  Janzen 
(2004:9), however, distinguishes significance in two ways: it is the communicated social 
desires or worldview of the community, and it may only reflect part of the total 
worldview.  The other part of the social meaning of ritual is its function.  The ritual 
serves to inform and persuade the members to act in certain ways.  It communicates the 
social morality of the group.  Hence, Janzen (2004:10) sums up: ‗The social significance 
of ritual and sacrifice is to alert members of a community to the being and ordering of the 
world, and the ritual ties this to the ways in which the members of the community should 
act.‘  Social meaning, therefore, as the product of ritual is a binding force, linking social 
significance with function.  Janzen (2004:43) states: ‗Ritual rhetoric links its social 
significance to its social function and thus communicates a social meaning.‘   
This bifurcated social meaning of a ritual to its participants consequently serves not only 
to reinforce the worldview or ideology of the community but also to establish it.  There is 
a circularity to ritual.  A community‘s worldview compels ritual, and through ritual that 
worldview is expressed along with the behaviors congruent with it.  All of this together, 
then, informs the group of ‗the way things are‘ and urges their allegiance to it; 
consequently, the community‘s ideology is maintained and fortified.  
3.2.2 The nature of ritual. Venturing a near consensus among anthropologists, Janzen 
(2004:23) identifies the key features to ritual‘s rhetorical power and its distinction from 
the everyday behaviors of the community—its ‗extreme formality‘ and repetition. These 
intrinsic characteristics effectively communicate several things.  Ritual‘s extreme 
formality cuts off completely any kind of dialogue. ‗Ritual communicates, but it never 
dialogues,‘ Janzen (2004:23) affirms.  The addition of repetition insures ‗adherence to a 
set pattern.‘   
The ritual act in and of itself serves the community in critical ways.  Primarily, it is an act 
of self-preservation.  It reiterates to the community the precarious nature of the 
community‘s survival.  ‗Societies need to reproduce themselves, to make certain that they 
Chapter 3 – Girard Within Late Modernity  90 
 
90 
 
do not die out and that they continue from one generation to the next,‘ Janzen (2004:17) 
says.
30
  It places the perpetuation of the group above all individuals.  Ritual‘s ability to 
cut off dialogue reinforces the priority of the group by alleviating conflict, especially 
from competing ‗world views‘ whether in or outside the group. As Janzen (2004:34) 
reiterates: ‗Ritual is a powerful social tool, and it is a powerful tool precisely because it is 
able to communicate without serious resistance.‘ 
3.2.3 Social context.  The social meaning of a particular ritual can only be discerned 
through ‗context.‘ ‗Context,‘ asserts Janzen (2004:73), ‗is of utmost importance if we are 
to understand the meaning of a ritual.‘  Since the ritual act intends to communicate a 
social reality to the participants, the ritual must in some way reflect the worldview of the 
social group promoting it.  The intended outcome of a ritual determines much of the way 
it is situated in the social behavioral patterns.   
There are several ‗contextual variables‘ one must discern in order to get at the meaning of 
the ritual.  The most critical factor has to do with understanding the particulars of the 
ritual itself: when is it performed?; who are the participants?; what is the order?; and 
what is its order and relationship with other rituals?  Because Janzen is mainly dealing 
with sacrifice in the Old Testament, he must also consider the literary context that the 
rituals are placed in.  Janzen (2004:18) discusses the problem of ancient contexts where 
there can be no direct third party observation.  Here he falls back on the conventional 
historical critical methods to extricate the necessary insight into the ritual. Discerning 
‗authorial intent‘ is also central since the worldview of the author has a direct effect on 
the ‗context‘ of the rituals described.31  Finally, the political, historical, and geographical 
variables are also part of context; however, Janzen does not give these variables as much 
weight in determining the significance of a ritual as the ritual particulars.   
It is, then, that the worldview of the social group determines the placement and enactment 
of the ritual within a social context.  Furthermore, the ritual, communicates a social 
                                                 
30
 In such an explanation is an example of Janzen‘s variation on the Durkhiem theme of social cohesion.  
31
 Watts (2007:31) is critical of Janzen precisely on this point.  ‗There is no a priori reason to think that a 
ritual‘s persuasive purpose would match the rhetorical intentions of authors who write about ritual.‘ 
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significance and morality—a social meaning—to the group which corresponds to both 
what the community perceives to be true about the world they live in and to their actual 
everyday life.  Hence the social meaning reinforces and enforces the worldview of the 
community.  There is a natural circularity to this operation (see figure 1), as Janzen 
(2004:40) states: ‗Ritual and social behavior exist in this circular relationship, each 
justifying the other.‘ Thus Janzen (2004:39) aligns his thinking with those who would say 
that all social coordinated behavior is ritualistic.  Ritual is a fundamental and integral 
element to socialization precisely because of its mimetic power. ‗Our experiences are 
continually harmonized and reinforced by the actions of those around us and their 
expressions of their experiences,‘ says Janzen (2004:39).32 
 
3.3       Problems with a Contextual Approach.   
There are several internal inconsistencies and broad assumptions that create difficulties in 
Janzen‘s framework that need be addressed.  
3.3.1  Distinction between ritual as medium and ritual as message.  Janzen makes a 
decisive distinction in his presentation of a contextual approach where, in my assessment, 
he appears unaware of making and even more so, unaware of the implications this 
distinction has on his own argument against ‗universal theories.‘   
Janzen (2004:19) speaks of a meaning (function) communicated through the ritual act.  
The media (ritual) conveys the message. This message is what Janzen addresses as the 
immediate social goods of the community.  There are countless varieties, depending on 
the immediate context and particular worldview of the community.  Ritual communicates 
a social reality that is as anthropologists insist content and context dependent.  It is also 
participant dependent; that is, what the participants say the ritual is communicating takes 
a prominent place.   
In this sense, there is no disagreement with anthropologists, nor Girard.  Any given social 
group can have its own take on the significance of a ritual act.  There is no single 
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 Here Janzen echoes the findings of ‗social cognition‘ scientists.   
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meaning of a ritual as far as what it is immediately communicating to the participants.  
And we must be reminded that even here, the meanings can change from person to person 
and over time.  There are a variety of meanings given to a similar kind of ritual in 
different social groups, and there are even a variety of meanings given to the same ritual 
act within one social group. 
In the effort to explain the power of ritual as a rhetorical devise, however, Janzen speaks 
of the message the ritual itself communicates.
33
  In other words, the medium has its own 
message.  Janzen explains the message of ritual itself in his discussion of the nature or 
fundamental characteristics of ritual.  Janzen, speaking for anthropologists, can 
apparently speak at length of  ‗the characteristics of‘ or the ‗features‘ of ritual and avoid 
being an imposing universalist by exchanging ‗meaning‘ terms for ‗nature‘ or 
‗characteristic‘ terms.  Janzen (2004:22) confidently speaks of the ubiquitous 
characteristics of ritual.  Ritual communicates this regardless of variables.  The media is 
the message.  It is universal, and has ‗canonical‘ qualities (Janzen 2004:22).  Here 
Janzen‘s and anthropologists‘ deductions sound remarkably like Durkheim and Girard. 
The most fundamental message of ritual is the preservation of the social group. ‗Societies 
need to reproduce themselves, to make certain that they do not die out and that they 
continue from one generation to the next‘ (Janzen, 2004:17).  That ritual communicates 
the priority of the community over its members is essentially Durkheim, whether we call 
it social unity, cohesion, preservation, survival or the like.  Whereas Durkheim called it a 
‗reaffirmation‘ of the social group, Janzen‘s ‗adherence‘ to a social worldview is hardly 
and substantially different.  They are essentially synonymous.  
A second ‗characteristic‘ of ritual explains how it is that ritual has such a cohesive force; 
it alleviates conflict.  Janzen (2004: 25) further assures us that:  
Ritual is a kind of rhetoric.  It acts [solely on its own, regardless of particulars and players] to 
persuade members of a social group to accept the society‘s worldview and moral code, but it is in 
competition for its member‘s loyalties.  As a result, one of the many rhetorical strategies rituals 
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 Here, it is important to reiterate a critical feature that Girard pursues while most others avoid—Why does 
ritual, or sacrifice, and not something else serves such a function? 
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can employ is to drive a wedge between the loyalty of the members of its social group and other 
societies.  
In other words, ritual eliminates rivalries.  It is a monologue not a dialogue.  Regardless 
of the particular meanings a given ritual may communicate, the ritual ultimately 
communicates the social good above all else.  
The message that the survival or perpetuation of the collective unit supersedes all else, is 
built in—it is structural. This ‗adherence to a pattern,‘ Janzen (2004:22-23) assures, is 
‗canonical‘ and ‗characteristic of all rituals.‘  It is universal.  It is in the pattern and 
repetition of ritual that conveys the basic message of order, continuity, and predictability.  
Ritual communicates the will of the community to survive at all costs and against 
threatening rivalries.  Janzen (2004:57) provides a universal function to ritual: ‗What is at 
stake…is the need to reproduce the social group, and thus to ensure its survival in the 
face of other groups that would steal the loyalty of those involved.‘ 
To reiterate, Janzen speaks of  ‗meanings‘ to ritual which are communicated through the 
ritual and are peculiar to different social groups depending on ‗context‘ and of a universal 
communication of ritual itself because of its function by nature.  This distinction is not 
problematic, unless one argues against ‗universal theories‘ on the bases of the former 
while simultaneously advocating a universal ‗character‘ for the later.  It becomes a 
contradiction especially when one fails to see the distinction one is making.    
There is an apparent contradiction in what Janzen proposes.  At one point Janzen 
(2004:31) assures us that ‗there is no universal structure‘ to initiation rites ‗because they 
are not trying to [immediately] do the same thing,‘ yet he confidently tells us that ritual is 
ultimately after the same end.  On the same page, Janzen (2004:33) speaks of the 
ubiquitous structure, goal, or function of ritual and then proceeds to tell us that there is no 
universal structure, goal or function: 
We have already seen that rituals are generally formal in structure, a construction that allows ritual 
rhetoric to proceed with assent from its participants…There is a real sense to this strict structuring, 
for it enforces subjugation to the social order and in fact enacts it.‘ 
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Because rituals do not all do the same thing, they do not all have these same goals nor the same 
structure nor the same order nor the same context.  The structures and symbols rituals imply 
depend on the social message that they are trying to convey.  All of these things affect the social 
meaning.  If anything can be said to be a near-universal feature of ritual, it is formality and 
repetition, for these greatly reduce the chance that an argument will be made against ritual 
rhetoric. 
Janzen is unaware of such an inconsistency because he has relegated the power of ritual 
to the characteristic or nature of ritual which is common to nearly all regardless of 
‗context.‘  The nature of ritual communicates something powerful to the social group, but 
apparently this communication is not in the realm of ‗meaning.‘ 
Janzen (2004:24) reiterates the consensus of anthropologists that this characteristic is 
proved out especially when the members of the community don‘t agree on the 
‗contextual‘ meaning of their own rituals.  In other words, when the context—clarity of 
worldview, morality, ideology, etc.—has lost all correspondence to everyday life of the 
participants, the community cleaves to ritual itself to convey order, preservation, and 
survival.
34
  Janzen 2004:24 ‗As members of the social group receive the same message 
about social worldview and morality over and over, they find their social and moral 
places in a body that appears never to change or die.‘  And now we have arrived full-
circle to Durkheim‘s godlike status of the society itself or as Girard would call it ‗crowd 
theology.‘  The structural characteristics of ritual take on a god-like quality to it, a sacred 
quality, especially when there are competing ‗desiderata,‘ competing desires.  
Here one must strain to find some monumental difference with what Girard is saying.  
Girard simply explores where others are not willing to venture, how and why ritual is able 
to function this way.  We can go a step further in wondering whether anthropology even 
avoids the question.  How is it that in every circumstance ritual accomplishes what it 
does—immediately enforcing and reinforcing the worldview and morality, and 
ultimately, preserving social cohesion. 
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 Watts (2007:31, 34) convincingly argues that only when a ritual is in disrepair or dispute is there any 
interest in its meaning.  This I agree with. 
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To remind, to speak of theory is to speak of the commonality to all, not regardless of 
multiple variables, but because of them.  Janzen does as all theorists do and should not 
object to Girard in this regard.  The contention is over what is characteristic to all ritual, 
not that there can be no common ground between rituals.  Janzen provides no compelling 
argument as to why anthropologists have the best perspective on this, especially since 
they are doing precisely what Girard is doing—interpreting data from outside the 
phenomena and boldly ascertaining conclusions.  Janzen (2004:76) reluctantly admits 
that most discussion of sacrifice, ritual, and religion is coming from outside the fields of 
social science.  This is because the search for meaning is much more pressing than mere 
description.  The immediate ‗meaning‘ of a ritual is determined by the particular context 
the ritual is found in, but investigation does not stop there, especially when compared 
with other rituals in other contexts.  What if ‗characteristic‘ features become apparent?  
Then what? 
In Janzen‘s (2004:19) discussion as to the effectiveness of ritual as a media he states: 
‗…ritual‘s extremely formal character show it to be a kind of communication that 
actively discourages dialogue not in agreement with the social goods it advances.‘  Also 
Janzen makes clear that one overall effect of ritual is to solicit allegiance to the social 
goods being promoted.  
Once again, this points to precisely what Girard is saying.  There are competing 
‗desiderata‘ in any social group, and it is sacrifice—among other rituals—that actively 
seeks to deal with potentially dangerous rivalries.  Thus rituals (leaving the question of 
how and why it is ritual and not something else that does this, and whether this is 
accomplished by design or haphazardly) come about in the hot house of rivalry just as 
theories do and as theology has always done.  
Janzen 2004:21 opts for anthropological theory as the bases for his inquiry and 
methodology—ritual means what ritual does.  It is defined by its function.  This vein of 
anthropology is well within the Durkheimian school, which views ritual, the sacred, and 
religion within the realm of social phenomena and as servicing the social good above all 
else—the preservation of the group.  Janzen merely varies in explanation on this general 
presumption.  Whereas Durkheim would say that the overall function of ritual/sacrifice is 
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to promote the unity of the community, Janzen (2004:21) agrees with cultural 
anthropologists that ritual not only communicates and clarifies social reality, it 
establishes it.  It means what it does, regardless of the particulars within the ritual.  
Girard, who could accurately be grouped with the Durkheimian school, also merely 
varies from Durkheim, Hubert and Maus, and Janzen over the precise nature of the 
function.  This is well within the confines of conventional theory engagement, applying 
the same theory with varying and oft contradictory conclusions.  
 
3.3.2 The problem of identifying context.  Let us return to a founding premise of 
anthropologists according to Janzen (2004:4): ‗Anthropologists who study rituals in 
various cultures point consistently to the contexts in which the rituals are performed and 
argue convincingly that if we are to interpret their social meanings we need to understand 
as much as possible about these contexts.‘ Here, we must notice a cascade of 
disconcerting problems.   
One difficulty to a ‗contextual‘ approach in understanding the meaning of a ritual is a 
clarity as to what is meant by context.  Here, I suggest, ‗the context‘ becomes more 
elusive than ‗meaning.‘  ‗Context‘ is so congealed with terms, like goal, point, 
significance, function, meaning,  social desires and ritual of the community that one is 
hard pressed to determine a clear distinction between these and what is determining what.  
And what is most significant and least noticed in Janzen‘s approach is that it is always the 
outside observer, the interpreter, who is the ultimate determiner of each, but especially of 
meaning. 
Conventionally in Old Testament higher criticism, a social context refers to the 
historical/political/geographical setting, and to some extent this is how Janzen 
(2004:4,14) refers to context. Hence, the over-all social setting is distinct from ritual and 
affects ritual.  The social setting determines the ritual. 
For the most part, however, it is the ritual itself, the particulars of the enactment, that is 
mostly being referred to by ‗context.‘ The above distinction—context is the overall social 
setting—is blurred when context is nearly equated with the ritual itself.  Janzen (2004:14) 
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in this sense, speaks of ‗ritual context‘: ‗…it is worth emphasizing that rituals are always 
conducted within the context of activities that precede and follow it, and we can only 
enhance our understanding of its significance and function when we can place it inside 
this context.‘ The most important contextual variable in examining the ritual is to 
determine the goal of the ritual.  It is in realizing the different goals of rituals that one can 
definitively lay to rest a ‗universal meaning‘ to all ritual. The goal of the ritual is best 
determined by examining the ‗structure,‘ ‗sequential order‘, and ‗function‘ of the ritual.35  
This again is the task of the outside observer. 
Janzen‘s (2004:14) examples provided to back up this notion are problematic, for it is the 
significance of the ritual, determined by the anthropologist, that one can discern the 
context.
36
  Here, not only is significance nearly equated with context, the role is reversed.  
Once one has interpreted the significance of the ritual, we can then discern the context, 
then the goal of the ritual, and finally the worldview being reinforced.  J. Z. Smith 
(1987:192) sees problems with this type of endeavor.  It is more likely to clarify why the 
anthropologist designates a social action as ritual than anything about the social gesture 
itself.  
Finally, at times Janzen (2004:73) nearly equates the social worldview with context. ‗To 
grasp social meaning, we are going to have to know something about the worldview of 
the writings in which we encounter sacrifice, and we‘re going to want know how various 
sacrifices fit together.  This is part of the context that we can glean from a study of P to 
help us determine the social meaning.‘  For Janzen (2004:74), worldview determines the 
context and context determines the ‗meaning‘ of the ritual.  But then, here is the key.  
Only by knowing the particulars of the ritual—how it was done and already 
understanding the symbolism in the gestures can we understand worldview.  
Furthermore, the goal of the ritual must already be determined.  The particulars of the 
ritual (contextual information), which is what we‘re trying to decipher the meaning of, 
are how we will determine what they mean. And to emphasize once again, it is the 
anthropologist who determines all of this. 
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 Janzen (2004:33) 
36
 J. Z. Smith (1987:192)  
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To summarize, in order to get at the particular ‗meaning‘ of a ritual, one must examine 
the ritual itself and take note of all the particulars within it.
37
  Since ritual is a mirrored 
image of the social group‘s worldview and of their everyday life, we can discern 
reflections of both within the ritual.  This then, helps us determine what the goal of the 
ritual is.  We can understand the goal of the ritual by looking at its effects, the interaction 
between the significance and function of the ritual within the community.  The 
significance of the ritual and its function is what the ritual means for the community, and 
this meaning is what informs the interpreter of ritual as to what social good or desire is 
being reinforced by the ritual.   
This then is the contextual approach.  It is entirely circular, each aspect dependent on the 
other for clarity.  Janzen (2004:37) admits as such and sees the task, again of the outside 
observer, to sort through these interdependent variables to arrive at the particular 
‗meaning.‘   Janzen‘s development of his method reveals something telling about quite a 
bit of inquiry into ritual and sacrifice in particular—the target of the inquiry is ill-defined, 
confusing the question with the answer, the affect and effect. 
3.3.3 Key assumptions problematic.  There are several key assumptions in the 
contextual approach that are highly problematic self-defeating and confusing.   
For one, the focus on the particulars of the ritual as the key to unlocking meaning 
assumes that the message of the ritual is direct and clear.  If this were the case, one 
wonders what all the bother over uncovering the meaning of sacrifice is all about.  If on 
the other hand, the message of a given ritual is implicit, which Janzen (2004:44) believes, 
then the details of the ritual would be the least important and helpful in getting at the 
over-all message. In fact, the details of the ritual can be misleading if we take them at 
face value and not all together. 
This is even more problematic since Janzen (2004:32) admits that particular gestures in a 
ritual are ‗polysemy‘—changing over time or not signifying anything.   This being the 
case, we must remind ourselves that social gestures are like sponges—they can absorb or 
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 J. Z. Smith (1987:194-195) sees that the only possibility for a ‗general theory of ritual‘ is its infinite and 
infinitesimal elaboration.‘ 
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mutate into all kinds of significance, even if certain gestures were haphazard to start 
with.
38
  This formidable ability for social gestures to readily take on representation is the 
thesis of Detienne and Vernant‘s (1989:20) contention that sacrifice is an artificial term 
made up by ‗historians and sociologists‘ still under the sway of Christianity.39  Girard, as 
well, is emphatic that sacrifice has an unceasing drive towards representation.  Once 
again, we must ask who is determining such significance.  Even more so, we must take 
note of the mimetic characteristic of social behavior.  Any socially coordinated behavior 
is preprogrammed to take on symbol, representation, and ‗meaning.‘ 
A focus on the particulars of the ritual also assumes that the ‗context‘ is relatively fixed 
and closed.  In other words, that the situation of the group is constant.  This makes sense 
when an ethnographer goes into a social group that is insulated and isolated from outside 
influence.  The assumption is workable the more isolated or secluded the group is, but as 
soon as a greater, more encompassing ‗context‘ intrudes, like the arrival of an 
ethnographer, all kinds of other variables come into play.  The more porous the 
communal boundaries are, the more elusive all the ‗contextual variables‘ become.  
This leads into another problematic assumption that there is an intentional design to 
ritual.  Janzen (2004:4) speaks consistently of the goal of the ritual, and at times even 
speaks of intentional design by someone within the social group itself.  Janzen leaves 
ambiguous any distinction between the intention or design of a ritual and the 
unintentional.  Overall, we a left with the impression that somehow the social group itself 
is designing the rituals in a similar way as advertisers design commercials.  It presumes 
some kind of clear grasp by the social group of its own world view and its own control of 
the ritual.  Since the world view ultimately is about desiderata—desire—of the 
community, we should not presume that any social group, let alone an individual, has 
such a systematic cognizance of its own desires.  
                                                 
38
 Watts (2007:9) speaks of ritual‘s ‗ambiguity‘ and ‗multivaliance.‘ In other words, ritual is highly 
addictive—we are naturally prone to corporate habits and patterns—and highly adaptive—taking on 
meanings to address immediate social ‗goods.‘  
39
 In an even more telling statement, Detienne and Vernant (1989:13) assert that his contextual approach is 
designed for the very reason to debunk the more ‗universalizing‘ theories of Hubert and Mauss.   Their 
approach is specifically designed to undo another approach.   
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Certainly, rituals funnel the desires of the community toward the overall message of 
social survival.  Both Girard and anthropologists agree on this. Rituals are most certainly 
about control of the social group as discussed above.  Of issue, then, is who or what is 
controlling the ritual?  Janzen (2004:14, 18, 48) provides numerous instances of designed 
ritual meant to overtake competing social desiderata already in place.  It fails because it is 
forced.  It does not correspond to ‗quotidian existence.‘  It was too removed from the 
values instilled in community.  We must certainly affirm, then, that intentional design 
alone is not the determining factor. 
Janzen fails to explore ritual, however, as having a mind of its own, and operating apart 
from any of its participants, precisely because the community en mass controls it.  The 
question as to the origin of ritual before interpretations of it leads us to one of the more 
fundamental objections to Girard.  Janzen (2004:79) directs us towards anthropologist‘s 
root criticism of Girard which is the supposed death knell to any real consideration of 
him.  Here again, context is everything.  For it is ‗culture‘ that creates ritual and not ritual 
that creates culture.  
It is here where the contextual argument falters on its own in addition to demonstrating a 
profound misread of Girard.  We have every reason to believe that ritual has its origins in 
spontaneous or serendipitous behavior of a group.  There are two examples from my own 
experience which can illustrate my point.
40
 
Having started my Christian experience in a Pentecostal church, I once heard a preacher 
mention a discussion he had with a Catholic priest.  The Pentecostal preacher offered a 
negative critique of the Catholic Church‘s ritual.  The response of the priest was that the 
Catholic Church has ritual but the Pentecostal church has rutual.  The preacher conceded 
to this truth. If any original intention there was in the Pentecostal movement it was that 
there should be no human control of the gathering.  Yet, the historical movement very 
quickly developed its own internal patterns that were quite inflexible.  In my local 
                                                 
40
 The choice of personal experience is deliberate and defendable.  It does not falsely assume that some 
uninvolved third party observer‘s assessment is more valid than those involved in the social behavior itself. 
The insight is even more clear because I understand the ‗meaning‘ as a participant and as an observer 
removed.  As is to be discussed more in this chapter, the detached viewpoint comes with its own set of 
problems. For one, it inevitably brings with it its own set of biases and ‗blind‘ spots, as Janzen (2004:58) so 
aptly describes. 
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church, the encouraged spontaneous behavior was predictable.  It followed a pattern 
assumed by all yet never articulated.  Manipulation by preachers certainly occurred but 
only by borrowing from what already existed from collective serendipitous behavior.  
Another example from an opposite point of view is when I joined an intentional Christian 
community for ten years.  This community had its origins in a small group who 
thoroughly thought out what it meant for Christians to be together and who intentionally 
sought to design community in a way to avoid many of the pitfalls that had ruined other 
intention Christian communities.  For one, as is well known among the plethora of 
Christians in the 70s and 80s who attempted intentional community, the failure rate is 
nearly 100 percent.  Ours certainly failed.  Two pertinent observations can be made.  One 
reason for its failure in my view is that the intentional but alternative quotidian life 
designed by the community succumbed to the greater day-to-day life of the society we 
lived in.  Society‘s values formed around jobs, family, politics, money, etc. constantly 
pressed in on the alternative values of the community.  The community could not hold its 
own amidst a greater social context.  In addition, the community internally and 
spontaneously developed a whole array of socially coordinated behaviors that not even 
the founding members could point to its origins and even less so to intentional design. 
When I first became a part of the community, I would frequently ask why we do this or 
that?  What was the design or intention?  Often the answer came as a shrug and a 
chuckle. It was done just because it was done, but God forbid that we should stop doing 
it.  Even in such an intentional environment, the group developed powerful social 
patterns to which no single person or subgroup designed or controlled.  In fact, part of the 
demise of the community was when a certain subgroup attempted to seize control of such 
elements.  
There are two important points. For one, not even one‘s involvement in the ritual, 
especially in its developing stages can explain how certain behavior developed, why it 
developed in a certain order, what it means (if anything).  There are countless gestures in 
a highly ritualized event that may have the most benign of reasons for them, but they take 
on significance later. Once a communal gesture has been established, it is easy for a 
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meaning, significance, or goal to latch on to it.
41
  It is equally hard for established 
gestures to be eliminated even when their importance is dubious.  We should take note 
here of the highly imitative quality of social behavior.  
We have good reason to believe that rituals—by their very nature formal and repetitive—
derive from spontaneous, repetitive collective behavior out of which emerges players 
who realize its powerful effects and manipulate it in certain directions.  
Janzen (2004:24) attests to rituals which function with precise formality and repetition 
even when the community cannot agree on any of its symbolic gestures.  In fact, the 
social group was in the process of splintering into many groups each with its own set of 
meanings to the ritual.  As mentioned in the last chapter, Watts (2007:31) attests more to 
this.  Ritual interpretation becomes more sophisticated as a result of the practice coming 
into disrepair, when the ‗social goods‘ are sorely in question. 
Understanding then that rituals originate in spontaneous collective behavior
42
 that 
synergistically gathers it structural shape and is not intentionally designed but only 
manipulated undermines much of the basis for this foundational argument against Girard.  
Janzen (2004:79) refers to the resounding critique by Valerio Valeri (1985:67-70) and 
Catherine Bell (1992:174-175) as negating Girard‘s theory completely.  Oddly, it is a 
‗theoretical‘ objection: 
Sacrifice…presupposes cultural order.  It does not exists outside of human culture because it is 
culture that gives meaning to human acts, bestowing a system of signification.  Girard and 
Burkert, however, presuppose a meaning for sacrifice that exists before culture does.  
Such theories [Girard] simply do not work…because they assume the existence of human 
meaning, intention, and significance before the social apparatus that supplies such things existed. 
Humans have simply never existed without culture, and so it cannot be the case that we created it 
by means of any sort of ritual.  Culture created humanity, and rituals do not exist outside of 
culture, for there could be no way for humans to give them meaning in such a situation.  
                                                 
41
 Watts (2007:7) affirms such a view. 
42
 Watts 2007:34 again reinforces that the crowd ultimately trumps all disputes over ritual. 
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The theoretical foundation is, of course, a contextual one.  So then, it is not a question of 
theory verses no theory, or ‗universal theory‘ verses contextual theory; it is a question of 
rival theories of the origins of ‗culture.‘ Ritual, it is argued by anthropologists, is fostered 
by culture.  Culture is the context; it comes first.  Here, the critique is problematic 
because it is not consistent with its own thinking, but also because it grossly misreads 
Girard. 
The assumption is two-fold here.  One, culture comes first and somehow develops 
independently from socially coordinated behavior.  The very act of gathering, however, is 
foundational to ritual.  To say that humans gathered together, developed all kinds of 
socially coordinated behaviors for survival and then started developing ritual goes against 
anthropologist‘s own reasoning that all socially coordinated behavior is ritualistic.  It is 
more reasonable to assume, as does Girard, that ritual develops simultaneously and 
serendipitously as a foundational aspect of  culture and the symbols or representations 
that become associated with it progress, regress, or transgress as the 
socio/historical/geographical/ or political context changes.  Second, and most telling here, 
is the assumption that the meaning of ritual is inflective rather than reflective. This again, 
goes against Janzen‘s own fundamental premise that ritual is a mirrored image of a 
community‘s worldview.  We must take note of the statements above: ‗it is culture that 
gives meaning to human acts.‘  This is very true, but do participants in ritual require a 
grasp of meaning before they participate in it?  Again, what is assumed here is a 
community‘s intentional design to communal acts.  Janzen never entertains such a 
distinction let alone attempts to explain it.   
There is then, great irony to this wholesale rejection of Girard. Anthropologists falsely 
presume of Girard that a well-established ritual of sacrifice existed along with the 
thoroughly understood meaning by the participants that it quells internal violence before 
humans gathered together.  This truly would be an absurd proposition if Girard were 
making  this!  Which he is not.  More accurately, Girard
43
 envisions that among 
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  In Muller‘s (1996:e) interview, Girard states: ‗To me there must be more than one originary scene. It is 
the originary scapegoating which prolongs itself in a process which can be infinitely long in moving from, 
how should I say, from instinctive ritualization, instinctive prohibition, instinctive separation of the 
antagonists, which you already find to a certain extent in animals, towards representation. How this process 
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prehistoric human gatherings (again, gathering is ritualistic) internal violence and 
communal tension naturally arose with it.  The mob like killing of one of its members 
behaves just as all rituals do—it is rutual before ritual.  There is a constant interplay 
between the intentional and the spontaneous because social behavior and human desire 
are highly imitative. As the social cognition scientists are discovering, humans‘ particular 
imitative quality greatly contributed to our brain development and hence our heightened 
abilities to communicate and think.
44
  A socially coordinated behavior is not directly 
intended or designed by anyone within the community; it requires no interpretation 
before, during, or after the performance, and the ‗bestowing of a system of signification,‘ 
the meaning attributed to such an act, develops slowly afterwards and especially when the 
prospect of internal violence again rears its ugly head. The irony comes in the assumption 
of anthropologists that Girard is as vague as they are when it comes to speaking of the 
intention or design of ritual and the meaning of it. One can detect the frustrated tone of 
Girard
45
 when seeking to make his case that the foundational structure of ritual—what 
Janzen repeatedly calls the nature or characteristic of ritual—is wholesale collective.  It 
only arises and ‗works‘ collectively, and the systems of interpretive meanings and 
representations, develop concurrently, but always as a product of ritual and especially in 
the face of recurrent potential internal violence.  Girard is in agreement with Janzen that 
there is a multiplicity of ‗meanings‘ given to ritual acts, depending on the ‗cultural 
context.‘  The more immediate meaning of a ritual is closely aligned with the immediate 
context.  He is in stark contrast to Janzen in that these multiple meanings only partially 
tell the truth, and this applies especially to the truth of the power of ritual, what is the 
‗canonical‘ characteristic of rituals—social preservation is above all else.  This even 
                                                                                                                                                 
of representation actually occurs, I do not know; I cannot define it… But what I would like to see is a more 
genetic engine of representation rather than a scene which to me is too philosophical, too conceptual to start 
with‘  
44
 Saxe (2006:e): ‗Why are many researchers looking at how apes and humans imitate actions? Well, when 
you compare humans to other animals, the thing that's most striking is what we humans can build and 
create as communities—the skills we can pass down from one person to another and from one group to 
another. If one individual figures out a new skill, and the next individual starts where that first person left 
off, then you can really speed up the process of building a culture. A lot of things are involved in humans 
being able to do that, but one little part of it, and one part that we can study in both humans and apes, is the 
process of imitation.‘ 
45
 Muller, 1996:e 
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Janzen admits is communicated by the ritual act itself regardless of the ‗context‘ or the 
‗worldview‘ of the particular community.  
This complex debate centers on human culture and signification. Central to a definition of 
human ‗culture‘ is that the development of representation or signification began.  From 
here, there is a wide range of views as to what constitutes the earliest form of 
representation.  Here Girard
46
 is clear that ‗unconscious scapegoating,‘ the real and truly 
effective scapegoating precedes its representation.  This is one reason why it takes on a 
sacred quality.  There is an invisible quality to the way the whole community acts in such 
unity (minus the one of course).  As will be pursued further below, representation is what 
we are addressing when we discuss ‗meaning‘ and ‗significance‘ of ritual.  It is about the 
interpretation of something in progress.  Any discussion of the meaning of something 
necessarily presumes some kind of distance from the thing observed, and it proceeds 
from the phenomena itself.  This is a fundamental presumption of scientific inquiry.  It is 
here where those who wish to understand Girard must be clear—it is the victim who 
provides the first objective outside perspective on the group.  
3.3.4  The meaning of meaning. This will lead us to a final and telling critique of the 
‗contextual‘ approach.  Put simply, what do anthropologists and Janzen (2004:3) mean by 
meaning?  In every way, they mean the interpretation of the ritual by someone removed 
from its context.  For the most part, it is the anthropologist who is looking for ‗the 
meaning‘ of a socially coordinated act and who determines the ‗meaning.‘ And for what 
reason is the anthropologist engaged in such an activity?  It is to place this ‗meaning‘ 
within a greater context of inquiry concerning human social interaction.   Furthermore, it 
is only the outside perspective that can best decide what it means.  This is the 
presumption throughout the contextual argument. As Janzen (2004:3) states: 
‗Anthropologists who study rituals in various cultures point consistently to the contexts in 
which the rituals are performed and argue convincingly that if we are to interpret the 
                                                 
46
 Muller‘s (1996:e)  interview in Anthropoetics II extensively deals with the issue of representation and the 
origins of culture.  Particular to this interview is the disagreement as to whether language or ritual 
development most contributes to the immergence of human culture.  It is also significant that Girard admits 
to the lack of a full development of this in his seminal works.  Thus, if criticisms of Girard that stop at the 
seminal works or rely on critiques of only those works are bound to miscomprehend the theory at critical 
points.  Bartlett (2009) provides an extensive critique of this ongoing debate within Girardian thinkers.  
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social meanings we need to understand as much as possible about these contexts‘ 
(emphasis mine).  Ritual, however, precedes an interpretation of it.  It does not require 
any participant to interpret it nor understand its structure beforehand.  In fact in many 
ways, ritual resists interpretation.  It drives towards representation (meaning) while 
simultaneously seeking to shut down rival interpretations. Furthermore, Girard
47
 argues 
that no ethnologist has ever witnessed a ritual in its more intensive generative stage.  
Rituals are in a degenerative stage by the time an observation is made.   
Janzen points clearly to what is the task of the social scientist—to interpret the meaning 
of the ritual—an ethnocentric task to begin with.  Honestly, it is not the context that leads 
to the ‗meaning‘ of ritual, but the interpreter. Janzen (2004:68) catalogues the variety of 
attempts within Old Testament studies to get at ‗the meaning‘ of sacrifice.  What is 
missing from Janzen‘s discussion is the whole question of why scholars would pursue 
such an inquiry.  Any search for meaning, I suggest, whether it be sacrifice or an 
unfamiliar word in a text, presumes a greater context and a removed perspective.  And 
this is precisely the stuff of theory-making—to make sense of the data around us.  Janzen 
(2004:4) equates ‗meaning‘ with ‗relevance‘ and here we are to assume this applies 
primarily to the people who perform it?  Or the scholar who interprets it?  Relevance 
assumes a relating of one thing to another, an application, and the transference or 
translation of signification in one context to the meaning in another context.  So, we are 
back to comparative methodology. 
Janzen (2004:3) appeals to a fundamental illogic of ‗universal theorists‘ by way of a 
contextual analogy in language.  It is ‗patently ridiculous,‘ he asserts, to determine the 
same meaning of a word used in different textual settings ‗because we know that to 
interpret what is said in any language we will have to understand the contexts…‘  This is 
very true.  After all, it is the use of the word that came before the dictionary.  But once 
again, it must be asked.  Who is after the meaning in the first place and why?  It is not 
those who use the word in their everyday affairs, for they know it implicitly.  It is either 
when one is unfamiliar with it and is separate from the context that wants to ‗define‘ its 
meaning or when there is an internal dispute over its meaning.  And for what purpose?  It 
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 Muller (1996:e) 
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is to transfer its meaning to another context, a context in fact, that is greater in scope than 
the original context. Hence a dictionary logs all the various meanings of a word and 
places them together in order to see the full scope of its meanings and to place all of those 
within an even greater interconnection of meanings. Furthermore, a lexicographer 
understands that even a word in context does not come out of the air.  It has its own 
history prior to it being found in a particular context, hence the study of etymology.  
Apparently, the lexicographer, like ‗universal theorists‘ have this illogical ‗universal 
urge.‘ 
It is then that the quest for ‗a‘ or ‗the‘ meaning of sacrifice, ritual, or religion, whether 
limited to a particular context or not, is an interpretative task.  It is a hermeneutical 
concern.  Certainly there are varying ways and degrees of interpretation.  Scientists 
attempt to interpret immediate and unmitigated data.  Cultural critics of art, literature, 
music, popular movements, etc. as well as philosophers interpret stimulus differently 
because they are essentially interpreting the product of another human‘s interpretation; in 
other words, they interpret removed and mitigated data.  The social sciences are 
uncomfortably somewhere in between.  Janzen (2004:77) laments that most of the current 
and dynamic discussions about sacrifice come from literary and cultural critics as well as 
theologians than by sociologists or anthropologists, and he is obviously driven by 
concern to put interpretation on more sure footing.  Structuralists as well, such as 
Detienne and Vernant (1989:20) echo such concerns to avoid the ‗arbitrary‘ nature of 
interpretation.
48
   
These concerns are legitimate, but increasing even scientific theory understands that there 
are no pristine privileged positions.  The observer is part of the thing observed.  This is 
no more telling than in the rigorous attempt to come up with a ‗natural‘ explanation of 
religion embarked upon in the early modern period as chronicled by Stenski. 
                                                 
48
 In his discussion of the current state ‗mass of ferment‘ over the exegetical task, Middleton (2005:37) 
concedes: ‗This aspiration [to have a perspective removed from subjectivity] though now widely 
recognized as unattainable (and illegitimate) still exercises a profoundly unsettling influence over the sense 
of epistemic security among many scholars across a wide spectrum of disciplines in the contemporary 
academy.  
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The current dynamics of the interpretive task will be elaborated on more in the 
conclusion of this section.  I need only point here that Janzen in particular and social 
sciences in general are reticent to admit that they too are engaged in that less than certain 
exercise of interpretation.  As Hauerwas (2007:56) has pointed out, this may have more 
to do with the crisis within the social sciences trying to justify their existence within the 
economic challenges facing the modern university.  
3.3.5  Meaning and crisis.  Finally we must note another powerful compulsion to seek 
out ‗meaning‘—when an internal conflict arises over it.  It is a communal crisis or 
competition over worldviews that the search for meaning comes to the fore. 
The whole basis of Janzen‘s (2004:4, 27) argument that ritual is a kind of rhetoric is 
based on the principle that social goods (again, this means social desires) are in conflict 
with one another.  There are ‗competing interpretations of reality and morality.‘  That is 
to say there are competing desires in a community.  Ritual is rhetoric precisely because 
there are rivalries, and the goal of ritual is to either cut off, ‗drive a wedge‘ (Janzen 
2004:25, 11) through the power, control, and influence of rival ‗desiderata‘ in the 
community or to ‗mask conflict.‘   
The attestation to the shaping of ritual interpretation in conflict is, dare I say, universal.  
And even more telling, theory-making about ritual, religion, and sacrifice is highly 
contentious.   It is, in fact, difficult to find a theorist on the subject who does not come 
around to this aspect.  The whole premise of Strenski‘s (2003:229) book, Theology and 
the First Theory of Sacrifice, is to explore the complex relationship.  ‗This book has tried 
to give an account of how the ―first theory‖ of sacrifice came into being within the 
context of an intellectual, institutional and religious rivalry.’  Strenski (2003:13-14) finds 
much of his impetus from Eagleton‘s (1990:27) notion of theory-making signaling 
‗something amiss.‘   
Rivalry appears to be the most important contextual variable to consider, and it is in this 
regard that an objective ‗outside‘ perspective and a third party arbitrator is what is most 
desperately needed.  Resolving an internal communal crisis, I suggest, is the compulsion 
behind ‗interpretation,‘ the quest for meaning, and the drive of theory-making whether 
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ancient or modern.  Brueggemann (1997:62-63) shapes his Old Testament theology on 
such a basis, reading into the Old Testament the same crisis of rival interpretations that is 
the crisis of post-modernity.  
The quandary of post-modern thinking is the realization that no objective third party 
exists.  As Eagelton (1990:27-28) postulates: ‗theorizing is itself an historical event,‘ and 
is subject to ‗joining the very history it ponders, altering it in the process.‘  Thus to 
understand a theory in history would require a ‗meta-theory‘ which as ‗an historical event 
will be absorbed into the history upon which it reflects, and will thus require yet another 
act of theory to show how all this comes about.  The only way out of this infinite regress 
is a ‗Theory of Theories‘ ‗the Grand Global Theory.‘  Even Janzen (2004:60) entertains a 
similar objection.  The labeling of one worldview as ideological presumes the superiority 
of an outside critique that has its own ‗worldview.‘    This is part of his argument that we 
must restrict our inquiry to the context.  Strenski (2006:337) as well, has convincingly 
demonstrated how closely bound the theory is bound to the theorist.   
Although this is admittedly so, Janzen (2004:3), and structuralists like Detienne and 
Vernant (1989:20) easily succumb to the temptation of theorists to negate an opposing 
theory, or category of theory, by identifying the underlying motivation of the theorist 
himself.  The prime suspect is the Christian view of sacrifice which for nearly two 
millennia located all inquiry into religion, sacrifice, and ritual in a dialogue around the 
Eucharist.  Sounding sympathetic, yet disapproving, Janzen speaks of theorists like 
Girard who are ‗driven‘ to the ‗appeal‘ of ‗monolithic‘ theories.  Janzen (2004:80), as the 
objective outside observer, apparently has the interpretive talent to determine that 
Girard‘s ultimate arrival at the Gospels was his underlying motivation all along.  
Strenski (2003:4) can also discern the ‗moralistic‘ underpinnings of Girard and therefore 
discounts much of his ideas: ‗But, what drives Girard, I would submit, is his deeply felt 
moral conviction roundly and loudly to denounce sacrificial victimization, whether it is 
functional or not.‘  Strenski (2003:205) admits that some of this is simply the ‗context‘ of 
our times: ‗For better or for ill, it is not our fashion to believe that the data speak for 
themselves.  Current-day post-positivist attitudes to reading data involve being critical of 
the reader as well as of what is read.‘  It is precarious, however, and disingenuous to 
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ignore ideas simply on the basis that we can detect the theorist most inner motivations. I 
know of nothing more anti-scientific than to denounce a theory based on the secret 
motivations or personal character of the theorist, especially in light of rigorous appeals by 
Girard that it is a mechanism at work. It has nothing to do with morals.  
Yet even Strenski 2006:337 stresses the ‗psychological and socio-cultural conditions that 
gave these theories their salience and life.‘  He concedes that theories should not be 
discounted because we see from hindsight what kind of influences where at play in the 
theorist.
49
  Strenski (2006:140) explores this dynamic in a considerable way and 
categorizes the theorists of religion by their motivation to be a ‗caretaker,‘ ‗undertaker,‘ 
‗critic,‘ or some combination thereof.  He concludes: ‗…the mere fact of their being 
motivated to study religion for one of these purposes can and ought to be separated from 
how they actually propose we study religion.‘  This criticism is true of almost anyone 
coming up with a ‗theory‘ of sacrifice.  There is a ‗sacrificial‘ nature in theory-making 
about sacrifice.  Strenski, (2006:3) speaks of ‗cutting up‘ theories:50 ‗Every course in 
methods and theories that I know seems to conclude by leaving a trail of wreckage—a 
littered scene of disabled or terminated theories breathing their last.‘  There is a real cat-
and-mouse game going on here, and we cannot be ignorant of the fact that egos are at 
stake. There are no stand out authorities, and thus there is only, as Hauerwas (2007:20) 
puts it: ‗I am talked about, therefore I am.‘ 
We can take off the veneer behind the ‗moralist‘ label given to Girard.  It is an attempt to 
exclude theological interpretations from the public dialogue about religion, ritual, and the 
like.
51
  It is certainly legitimate for Strenski to demonstrate Girard‘s connection with 
Hubert and Mauss and Durkhiem and to show the moral concerns that were working 
concurrently with such formulations.  But attempts to demoralize religion and ritual are 
equally problematic.  Following the line of many anthropologists, Janzen (2004:21) 
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 It would interesting to know from Strenski what he would say about Girard in light of his further inquiry 
into theories of religion.  As it stands, there is a glaring inconsistency between his earlier assessment of 
Girard as a moralist and his latter conclusion of theory-making in general. 
50
 In the proceeding chapters, it will be pointed out how prominent the notion of separating, dividing, and 
cutting are connected to mythological narratives of origins.  
51
 This assertion is part of Milbank‘s (1990:1) thesis in Theology and Social Theory: ‗…all the most 
important governing assumptions of such theory are bound up with the modification or the rejections of 
orthodox Christian positions.‘ 
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argues for the moral nature of ritual and insists that the expected moral behavior of 
community is part of what the ritual ‗means.‘  ‗Ritual demands moral response from its 
participants, and it places them fully into social roles which they must either fully accept 
or fully leave.‘  Morality simply cannot be filtered out of an inquiry into the nature or 
‗meaning‘ of ritual.  It is not only unavoidable, but completely necessary if ritual is to 
‗work.‘  Thus, issues of religion, ritual, sacrifice, social groups, and morality are 
inseparable.  
Nor for that matter can morality be hermetically filtered out of any pursuit of knowledge, 
even scientific inquiry. Hauerwas (2007:46) argues for the moral nature of all knowledge. 
The argument that Janzen gives above for the moral nature and function of ritual is 
strikingly similar to Hauerwas‘s (2007:46) argument for the inseparability of morality 
from knowledge:  
A focus on the virtues means you cannot easily separate what you know from how you come to 
know.  Any knowledge worth having cannot help but shape who we are and accordingly our 
understanding of the world.  Thus I use the description, ―moral formation,‖ rather than education, 
because I think all education, whether acknowledged or not, is moral formation. 
We must regard with some suspicion the dismissal of Girard on the basis of moral 
underpinnings.  This type of criticism provides a ready-made mask for one‘s own bias.  
What I have made reference in passing, I now confidently assert.  The moralism charge is 
a veiled attempt to keep theology out of the public arena under a less-than-convincing 
garb of objectivity.  The social sciences in particular enjoyed the privileged positions in 
the modern era as providing a more sure footing for public dialogue in a secular, 
democratic, pluralistic society.  This sure footing, however, has since evaporated, yet 
there is reticence toward allowing the theological task to be a part of the desire toward 
and task of truth formulation, even though theology has centuries of experience in the art 
of interpretation.  
Strenski has demonstrated well enough the modernist agenda around theory-making as 
the viable alternative to theology.  Yet even after demonstrating the problem of theory-
making in the modern era, Strenski (2003:232) still argues against theologians, such as 
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Milbank who advocate that since there are not privileged positions, theology should be a 
part of the post-modern dialogue.  
As already mentioned, the tide of negative feedback to Girard became suspiciously 
aggressive the more the Gospels became his favored subject.  Even though his earliest 
explorations into mimetic desire were hailed as championing anti-religious criticism, he 
later was viewed as an opsimath.   
In his recent book, The State of the University: Academic Knowledges and the Knowledge 
of God, Hauerwas (2007:18ff) thoroughly investigates the still antagonistic resistance 
toward the theological enterprise.  Echoing Strenski‘s conclusions, the theory-making 
flurry in the twentieth century was ‗chaotic.‘  What made the American university 
flourish was an immense ‗bureaucratic overlay‘ whose sole purpose was its serviceability 
to the state.  Knowledge must find its usefulness for society and in this regard found itself 
seriously challenged to justify itself.  One does not need a scholar, however, to identify 
the social purpose of the university at least in America.  It is all about getting a higher 
paying job, having a higher income, and bolstering a liberal democratic state.  One of the 
most common complaints of students is that of being required to take certain classes that 
don‘t readily transfer to usefulness, most of which has to do with the interpretive 
enterprise, but also includes such subjects as basic literacy and math skills.  The 
challenge to justify itself is especially acute, Hauerwas (2007:130) points out, in the 
humanities. Hauerwas (2007:21) demonstrates that the academic offerings in ethics and 
religion are especially ‗controverted.‘   
Be that as it may, it appears that even today the recalcitrance toward theological 
contributions to the pursuit of knowledge still stands, even more so since the financial 
pressures for self-preservation, and hence its usefulness to the state, have multiplied.  As 
Hauerwas (2007:19) observes, not even science is ‗pure‘ knowledge, dependent as it is on 
federal funding. 
Hauerwas (2007:20) further challenges the ‗secular‘ universities resistance toward 
theological dialogue: ‗One suspects such dismissals of theology have more to do with the 
politics of liberal social orders than whether theology passes muster as a knowledge of 
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the university.‘  This for Hauerwas is what is behind the drive to keep religion private.  It 
wants to avoid any subject too ‗controversial to secure cooperation between individuals 
in liberal societies.‘ 
Theology is certainly not without its responsibilities.  The bickering caused by 
theological entrenchment was a major impetus for the state to seek a saner path. Be that 
as it may, I need only point out here the readiness to dismiss Girard entirely on the 
grounds of ‗moralism‘ has its own dubious judgments lurking in the background.  We 
must also be reminded that Girard was reticent to even address the biblical implications 
of his ideas precisely to avoid such charges. He still claims that his ‗theory‘ is not 
particularly theological, and not even particularly ‗religious.‘  If anything, it is highly 
critical of ‗religion.‘  
It is readily apparent that there is an intensified element of conflict and rivalry inherent to 
the subject of sacrifice, whether it is the actual practice or the interpretation thereof.  
Strenski‘s (2003:10-20) emphasis on the moralistic predilections of Girard is two-fold.  
One, he wants to place Girard in the long line of thinkers of ritual and sacrifice that goes 
back to the intense political debate of Durkheim at the turn of the century.  He explores 
the powerful moral underpinnings to such ‗scientific‘ inquiry, not just for Girard, but 
even for those who presumed to be completely void of such starting points. From a 
historical perspective, Strenski explores the subject of theory-making around sacrifice to 
demonstrate what it says about the theorist and his time, more than about the theory itself. 
Second, Strenski points to one of the more enduring criticism‘s of Girard—his 
resounding negative view of sacrifice in all circumstances. This is what the ‗moralist‘ 
label usually refers to. Strenski argues for a positive value to ‗sacrifice‘ that not only 
Durkheim espoused, but most societies uphold.  More will discussed of this under the 
discussion of scientific theory and theology below. 
In this regard I will offer what I believe is most telling.  In our most long and consistently 
virulent history of violence toward one another, it truly is astounding that a theory which 
tries to explain such an ingrained social behavior is readily dismissed as being moralistic.  
It just may be as Girard has asserted—we humans find it near impossible to face up to 
our own violence.  In the age of state run militaries, professional police forces, 
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heightened techniques in crowd control, the ever increasing delusion of individuality 
amidst mega socio/economic and electronic systems, all of which the pursuit of 
‗knowledge‘ is in service of, it shouldn‘t surprise us that we can grossly underestimate 
the role of ritual in societies that had none of this to hold human violence in check.   
 
3.4   Girard and Theory in the Late Modern Context 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, examining the criticisms of Girard‘s 
theory jettisons us into an immense web of intertwined variables that is anything but easy 
to sort through.  Overall the goal was to place the whole discussion of theory within the 
‗context‘ of our current discussion for addressing the subject, and in this way, revealing 
the relevancy of his ‗theory‘ as well as to neutralize objections to it, especially since for 
the most part, much of the criticisms against Girard equally apply to all theory-making.  
Also, I wanted to demonstrate the amiability of Girard‘s ideas to the more established 
‗disciplines‘ as well as the elusiveness of it to be easily categorized.  This I believe is an 
advantage and explains Girard‘s own reluctance to even call it a ‗theory.‘ 
Before addressing the question of biblical theology in regards to Girard‘s theory, it would 
be will to state some conclusions that I will be operating with for the rest of this work.  
3.4.1. What is post-modern?  Upheaval certainly could be an appropriate designation of 
the modern period that hardly needs rehearsal.  Post-modern, if nothing else, simply 
signals an ending period for modernity.  It does not signal anything new.  In some ways it 
mirrors the beginnings of modernity, especially its aggressive pull to negate that which 
came before it in an effort to avoid the kind of exhaustion over competing theological 
dogmas at the beginning of the modernity and theoretical dogma, i.e. ideologies, at its 
end.  Some would say that we are actually beyond post-modernity, labeling it post-post-
modern.   
Walsh (1990:3) questions, however, whether we are really in a post-modern or even a  
post-post modern period in that: ‗…we have not comprehended the degree to which we 
have separated ourselves from the spirit of modernity itself; we do not recognize the 
Chapter 3 – Girard Within Late Modernity  115 
 
115 
 
extent to which we have become in the deepest sense postmodern.‘  Our ‗trading on the 
past‘, as Eagleton (2003:2) puts it, is still very much the operating procedure.  Surely, we 
have been in a stage of rejecting or repudiating much that has gone on in the last century, 
but this is a backward looking endeavor.  It is still grounded in rejection, still struggling 
to free itself from its nearly two millennial theological foundation, still struggling to 
distinguish itself from that which came before. Eagleton (2003:17) asserts that post-
modernism spends most of its time assailing a past as if it still had the same force as in 
modernity. 
In our examination of a ‗contextual‘ theory of Janzen, for instance, we must notice the 
repeated emphasis on difference, so much so that we should question whether ultimately 
difference is what is meant by context.  The emphasis is not so much on variables as on 
that no similarities may be entertained. As Janzen (2004:15) insists: ‗Different studies of 
the same ritual performed in different social settings indicates that it can express quite 
different social meanings.‘  
Eagleton (2003:46) identifies this obsession with difference to be an acute postmodern 
sentiment, but also finds it ironic: ‗Whatever linked us, whatever was the same—was 
noxious.  Difference was the new catch-cry…‘ ‗It was ironic that postmodern thought 
should make such a fetish of difference, given that its own impulse was to erase the 
distinctions between image and reality, truth and fiction, history and fable, ethics and 
aesthetics, culture and economics…‘ 
It appears then, that the ‗context‘ of avoiding ‗grand narratives,‘ ‗universal theories,‘ or 
‗trans-contextualization‘ is fostered in an ending period of modernity characterized by, 
dare I say, a sacrificial flurry.  It is an over-reaction to the comparative method at the 
heart of ‗theorizing.‘  And of course, from the perspective of Girard, the obsession of 
difference is the tell-tale sign of the lack thereof.  If he be right, we could anticipate that 
what will emerge is not an absolute respecting of infinite varieties of differences, but 
rather an insatiable drive toward the difference—the one distinguishing factor that can 
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make sense of a wide variety of variables.  This for Girard, is the perfect situation for a 
new scapegoat since the previous ones have lost their unifying effect.
52
 
Eagleton (2003:13) rightly observes that for many postmodernists, the quest of difference 
has lead to a preoccupation with: ‗…what stands askew to society as a whole—the 
marginal, mad, deviant, perverse, transgressive…And this, ironically, is just the kind of 
elitist, monolithic viewpoint which postmodernists find most disagreeable in their 
conservative opponents.‘53  Eagleton (2003:15) goes on to argue that: ‗The postmodern 
prejudice against norms, unities and consensuses is a politically catastrophic one.  It is 
also remarkably dim-witted.‘  In his article, ‗Why Johnny Can‘t Dissent‘, Thomas Frank 
(1997:8) convincingly agrees with Eagleton‘s assertion, arguing that the marriage of 
capitalism with consumerism has made it all but impossible to dissent ‗because hip is 
their official ideology.‘  We are all remarkably uniform in our infinite quest for 
difference.  
Eagleton (2003:58) astutely observes that the big difference in this period has become 
‗culture.‘  Culture is the bottom line of what context means for both Janzen (2004:79) and 
anthropologists.  Culture is not a kind of intellectual preference, but rather the latest in a 
list of possibilities for an authoritative basis for liberal societies.  Having already 
dethroned God from such a foundation, modernity entertained such candidates as society, 
progress, nature, class conflict, nationalism, desire, science, etc.  Culture it appears, is 
now the final arbitrator of order, morality, and the resolution of conflict because ‗culture‘ 
has an amazing self-preservation drive.  Hence cultural criticism takes priority over the 
criticisms of the past, especially historical criticism.   
Walsh (1990:258) similarly assesses the search for an ‗authoritative truth of reality‘ as 
central to ideology. The displacement of Christianity‘s role in that reached crisis pitch at 
the beginning of modernity.  Because of this, Walsh (1990:258) asserts, ideological 
thinkers were more profound in their recognition of the need for a new authoritative 
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 Girard (1999:164) predicts Christianity to become the scapegoat victim of last resort for the new 
millennia.  
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 Girard (1972:56-63) has amply pointed out that obsession with difference is reflected in a phobia around 
sameness.  For instance, many cultures express a deep-seated fear of twins or reflected images from a 
mirror or photograph.  
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reality.‘  ‗Culture‘ is the logical end of such a search because it speaks of ‗humanity‘s 
capacity to provide its own absolute reality.‘  Culture has become as Walsh (1990:262) 
puts it ‗the contemporaneous desire to found the new order of reality on the basis of the 
closed self.‘ 
Anchoring our orientation for reality and resolving conflict in culture is already proving 
inadequate.  ‗Culture‘ becomes as slippery a term as we discovered ‗context‘ to be.  
Culture can become, as Eagleton (2003:48) states, ‗trivial or momentous.‘ It becomes a 
circular justification that presents a series of ironic propositions.  There is, for instance, 
the dogmatic assertion that we should avoid all appearance of dogmatism.  Also, there is 
the twisted logic of individualism—the uniform look to our manic pursuit of difference.  
As Eagleton (2003:49) observes: ‗Everywhere you look, people are prepared to go to 
extraordinary lengths to be themselves.‘  For Eagleton (2003:101) the most devastating 
criticism that can be leveled against cultural theory is its ‗failure to deliver.‘  It has failed 
to grapple with fundamental issues of morality, love, religion, evil, and is ‗dogmatic 
about essence, universals and foundations…‘ 
He reiterates the dilemma ‗culture‘ creates for us, and it is precisely the same dilemma 
discussed with Janzen and ‗contextual‘ theory—no one is standing ‗outside looking in.‘54  
Eagleton (2003:55) vividly describes the dilemma of observing ourselves ‗Since our 
culture is what we are made out of, it would mean that we would have to leap out of our 
skins, see ourselves seeing something, reflect on the very forces which make us human 
subjects in the first place.‘ This is the assertion of anti-theorists.   
Eagleton (2003:73) points to ‗a much deeper irony:‘  ‗At just the point that we have 
begun to think small, history has begun to act big.‘  Capitalist globalization has once 
again brought ‗grand narrative‘ on the scene. 
It is here, where we once again encounter this unqualified, other than its rejection of 
similarities, preference for difference.  All cultures are different, yes, but all humans 
inevitably create culture.  Girard and others are after the question as to why that is so.  
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 The lyric by the 60s rock band Moody Blues discusses the psychotic drug cult figure Timothy Leary, the 
discoverer of LSD.  Certainly the experimentation with hallucinogenic drugs was an attempt to step outside 
of culture and the self to observe them.  
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Why do humans inherently move towards ‗culture‘?  Why do they develop along similar 
lines?  Why do they inevitably create ritual?  It appears that for Janzen and 
anthropologists these are not interesting questions or that the questions are outside the 
field of anthropology.  This may in fact be the case.  
 
3.4.2  What is ideology?  We would do well to clarify the use of the term ‗ideology‘ 
since it has been applied to Girard.  I assert that what makes for an ideology is simply the 
shutting down of self-reflection, the interpretive enterprise.  
Let us return for a moment to our analysis of Janzen.  Within his discussion of the 
rhetorical power of ritual, Janzen (2004:27) makes clear the ideological nature of ritual 
itself: 
Ritual is not a debate, for it does not generally allow discussion about competing pictures of 
cosmic and moral reality.  Its formal character excludes discussion almost entirely, and makes 
only assent to or absolute rebellion against its worldview the only choices participants can make. 
Ritual is naturally ideological, equating ideology with worldview and the collective 
desire of the community.  This description remarkably echoes Walsh‘s (1990:xii) 
definition of ideology which is the bane of post-modernism.  For in comparing the ‗great 
ideologies‘ of modernism with the ‗lesser ones‘ of today, he states: ‗What they often 
share with the great ideologies is a pattern of thinking or, of not thinking.  The 
ideological style is the refusal to entertain questions that might jeopardize one‘s 
convictions.‘  Put another way, ideology is where we maintain ‗parallel monologues.‘55  
My suggestion is that in the vastly diminishing ability of academic disciplines to maintain 
their own distinctive (and thus justify further funding) the entrenchment into every 
increasing specialization is just that kind of ‗parallel monologue.‘  Nobody, and 
especially not a literary critic or theologian, understands anthropology like an 
anthropologist does.  Let us have no illusions here; ‗universal theorists,‘ and theologians 
are not the sole proprietors of ideology and parallel monologues.  The drive for 
distinction gets ever more entrenched.   
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 A phrase coined by Richard Neuhaus (2002:e) in reference to Orthodox/Catholic dialogue.   
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There is, however, another ‗thought-stopping‘ endeavor that works from an opposite 
direction.  As Paul Ricouer (1986:2) has suggested, all one has to do is attach the label 
‗ideology‘ to someone to expel it from the public arena.  The sacrificer becomes the next 
sacrifice, and thereby a system for establishing difference and prohibitions is once more 
established.  This is especially acute in American politics, for accusations of  ‗ideological 
agendas‘ flourish the moment the attempt is made to take an idea, nurtured partly by 
systematic formulations of ideas (theory) and partly by haphazard formulations (political 
ritual), and apply it to real world situations. It is evident that the labeling of ‗ideological‘ 
is the attempt to differentiate by claiming to stand outside or above the fray.  
Hauerwas (2007:180) has addressed this in his discussion of the secular.  Hauerwas 
(2007:170) defines secular in terms of our view of time: ‗By secular I mean the name 
given to that time, and the correlative politics, in which time is no longer interwoven with 
higher time.‘  The social sciences, in their attempt to have the objective view point, have 
been ‗antihistorical‘ and reductionistic in outlook, replacing narrative with 
demonstration.  ‗The problem,‘ Hauerwas (2007:178) states: ‗…quite simply, is that 
secular time results in the attempt to secure peace without eschatology.‘ 
Hauerwas (2007:174) argues that the ‗secular‘ state attempts to create a scenario which 
contains the Christian narrative, and in effect ‗displaces‘ the Christian narrative.  Rather, 
Christians affirm all of humanity is part of a story that is already structured to go a certain 
way.  Christians structure time as narrative, and each Christian is to find oneself within 
that Great Narrative called the gospel.  At least from Hauerwas‘ point of view, we can 
better understand why the story elements in the Bible, more than ritual description, does 
and should preoccupy us more.  It speaks to our compulsion to place our immediate 
‗context‘ within a greater one, a universal one. 
Eagleton (2003:99) echoes such sentiment asserting that what still gives the Christian 
message such power is its ubiquitous scope, both in terms of its unifying element and its 
ability to encompass a vast away of culture particularities.  Eagleton speaks of the need 
for a ‗home of the human spirit.‘  For most of human history, that home was religion, but 
in the postmodern era, ‗culture‘ has been bequeathed with that responsibility.  Because of 
this Eagleton postulates: ‗it is no wonder, then, that culture has been in perpetual crisis 
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since the moment it was thrust into prominence.  For it has been called upon to take over 
the functions in a post-religious age.‘ 
For Eagleton (2003:99), the genius of religion was its ability ‗to link fact with value‘ for 
all of society.  Religion ‗could create a sense of common purpose far beyond the capacity 
of a minority culture.  It outlined the grandest narrative of all, known as eschatology.‘ 
‗Culture, however, divides these domains down the middle.‘ 
Christianity is powerfully self-reflective.  Indeed, in the doctrine of the incarnation it 
profoundly addresses the whole issue so perplexing in modernity.  It reflects and 
perceives from inside the community, as a part of the community.  It insists on 
transcendence by discovering the full depth of our shared humanity.  
Similarly, Eagleton (2003:155) grounds our universal or common perspective solidly on 
our biological, physical body.  ‗It is because of the body, not in the first place because of 
Enlightenment abstraction that we can speak of morality as universal.  The material body 
is what we share most significantly with the whole of the rest of our species, extended 
both in time and space.‘  It is our fundamental physical nature and likeness, which 
inherently draw us to be together.  Says Eagleton (2003:159): ‗Human bodies are of the 
kind that can survive and flourish only through culture.  Culture is what is natural to 
us…Because our bodies are materially geared to culture—because meaning, symbolism, 
interpretation and the like are essential to what we are—we can get on terms with other 
cultures…‘ 
Curiously, Strenski (2006:134) concludes something similar to Eagleton: ‗But the truth 
may be that religion is sublinguistic and prerational in its origins (Girard), and may just 
be the name of the ultimate shape people give to the way they live.  But so what?  As 
long as human beings are embodied beings, it would be odd indeed if our embodied 
nature should have nothing positive to do with being religious.  We can at least thank 
Robertson Smith for recognizing that human religiosity can be firmly embodied…‘ 
Within this context, we can interject something significant and unique about sacrifice that 
distinguishes it from other ritual.  As Jay (1992:4) observes: ‗…sacrifice…does not so 
divide meaning and matter.  Sacrificers act through and upon meaningful matter: the 
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living body.‘  Jay interjects this critical observation within the debate as to the 
‗instrumental‘ aspect of ritual—what I have discussed as the nature or characteristic of 
ritual that has a universal effect on those performing it and the immediate significance, 
what Jay calls the ‗expressive aspect,‘ the community gives to it.  It is actions on living 
flesh, and especially the human body, that most symbiotically connects utility with 
morality, design with spontaneity, and inflective social behavior with reflection on it.  
And it is the body that resolves the crisis of competing interpretations.  ‗Our bodies,‘ Jay 
(1992:11) asserts, ‗are not really the main obstacle to knowledge of the world; they are 
instead our access to the world, the fallible and mortal ways we have of being in the 
world. So also, it is membership in a social world…that makes ritual potentially 
intelligible for us to begin with.‘  It is a social act upon the body that profoundly binds 
social forces, both good and bad, together.  
It is on this base that Eagleton (2003:160) confronts the ‗orthodoxy‘ of post-modernity.   
With all of its fervor against universality and ideology, post-modernity has only 
duplicated another version: 
Compare, then, this materialist idea of universality, one based on our bodies, with the familiar 
bogyman of universality peddled by post modernists.  On this view, universality is a Western 
conspiracy which speciously projects our local values and beliefs on the entire globe…It is 
significant that when postmodernists turn their thoughts to universality, they see it first of all in 
terms of values and ideas…This is an idealist, not a material conception of universality. 
What is the true bane, then, of ideology is that even more than shutting out ideas, it shuts 
out others. For all of its exaltation of culture, it in reality destroys culture.   
3.4.3  Theory-making.  There is, I suggest, a common thread among many referred to 
in this work who attempt to address ‗ideology.‘  We can affirm with Strenki (2006:3) 
there is ‗no perfect Prince Charming of theories‘ awaiting us. But with those who have 
attempted to address postmodernism and ideology some suggestions are worth 
considering.  At some level, it is a matter of reaffirming and refining the theoretical 
enterprise rather than scrapping it.  
Central to Eagleton‘s thesis is a call to break out of a postmodern ‗spirit‘ that ever so 
quickly settled into its own ‗orthodoxy‘, its own dogmatic ways.  This being among other 
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things, its repudiating of commonality and its subsequent obsession with difference and 
its playing all the cards on culture as the authoritative basis. Eagleton envisions much of 
the move forward is a reinvigorating of the fundamental aspect of theory-making—self-
reflection, the interpretive endeavor, which is always an inside out enterprise.  It should 
not and indeed cannot be done by seeking the removed objective outside observer 
position. As the discussion of ideology brings to bear, this posture lends itself quite 
readily to shutting down or out of perceptions outside its purview.  Self-reflection is at 
the heart of theory-making and Eagleton insists that this must flourish.  Theory is simply 
for Eagleton (2003:2) ‗…a reasonably systematic reflection on our guiding assumptions.‘  
It is critical reflection on what we are doing as a culture.  Theory is ‗the taxing business 
of trying to grasp what is actually going on…‘ (Eagleton, 2003:223). 
Strenski (2006:2) defines theory as: ‗the object of a disciplined academic or systematic 
program of self-reflection.‘  He (2006:338) concludes something similar to Eagleton, 
reaffirming the need for self-reflection as essential to human existence.  ‗Theorizing is an 
often passionate, engaged activity driven by an intense desire to find meaning in what 
passes before us in the world...a fundamental human orientation to the world.‘  Certainly, 
theory-making had its hubris, and if anything, we can agree with Strenski that theory-
making has become a more humble affair. 
Walsh (1990:246) also sees critical self-reflection as essential and that it must be more 
intrinsically tied to our common humanity.  This is the failure of theory turned 
ideology—‗It must be admitted that the abrogation of all moral restraints occurred first in 
the realm of thought; the wholesale extermination of historically retrograde peoples was 
no more than an application of accepted intellectual principles.‘  Self-reflection is not the 
passing fancy of academics in ivory towers.  Walsh (1990:247) believes it is essential to 
our survival (and here I remind that it is in competition with mythology‘s, ritual‘s, 
religion‘s, ideology‘s and society‘s sense of social survival).  For Walsh, those who have 
mounted a ‗successful resistance to the ideological extreme of modernity succeed when 
they are willing to explore the full human experience to its depths, to contemplate 
‗humanity‘s true participation in divine being.‘  This contemplation must include the 
willingness to reflect on ‗how such unlimited cruelty and misery could have happened.‘  
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It must also include the reflection on the culpability of every human.  True critical self-
reflection—theory-making—shares Solzhenitsyn‘s conviction that ‗there are no 
loopholes for anybody who wants to be honest.‘  This, I suggest, is profoundly Girard. 
Among those mentioned above, all agree.  Theory-making is essential human work.  It is 
critical self-reflection from the inside out.  It doesn‘t abandon humanity for ideas, but 
seeks to explain and explore humanity in all of its depths. And it is a ‗messy‘ business 
fraught with difficulty and always, always, in the heat of conflict.  In fact, it is in the 
stress and duress of human conflict, as Strenski (2006:337) stresses, that gives a good 
theory its ‗salience and life.‘   
Simply put, the very impulse toward ‗meaning‘ or ‗truth‘ is a drive toward 
connectedness.  It is inherently comparative.  It is an inside (the community) endeavor, 
and it always moves outward, toward the greater ‗context.‘    
Perhaps we, the human community or at minimum the Western community, are facing 
the limits of limitlessness.  From strictly a human point of view, have we come to the 
limit of what we can appeal to as ‗authoritative‘—that is Culture?  All we have is us.   
3.4.4  Scientific or not? Having explored to a limited extent the context of ‗theory-
making‘ in a postmodern ideologically suspicious environment, it would be important to 
address the discussion of science and scientific theory, for some of the debate around 
Girard is in such a direction.  It is evidently part of Janzen‘s concern in his contextual 
approach to establish a surer more scientific foundation for inquiry rather than the more 
speculative enterprise of ‗theory.‘  Questions of verification arise with Girard.  If the 
sacrificial mechanism can‘t be seen, observed, measured, or tested by scientific method, 
how can it be considered scientific?  Then there is the question in an opposite direction—
what does it matter whether it is ‗scientific‘ or not?  Hasn‘t the whole positivist higher 
critical approach run into its own dead end?  Aren‘t we done with the ‗assured results of 
science‘?56 
                                                 
56
 See Brueggemann (1997:61-116) ‗Retrospect 2: The Contemporary Situation‘ for a summary of the 
negative evaluation of higher criticism from 1970 on.  North (1985:26) cautions against theology being too 
closely attached to a ‗falsifiable‘ proposition.  
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The question as to what extent mimetic theory should be considered a scientific 
hypothesis to be tested, or an hermeneutical insight to be explored is entertained not only 
by critics but also with those who consider Girard‘s ideas worthy of exploring.57  Certain 
‗Girardians‘ such as Williams (1991:14) speaks of a ‗social scientific model of 
explanation and argues that it ‗has great analytic power in interpretation of data.‘  The 
value in Girard‘s ‗model‘ is for Williams‘ (1991:4) its ability to engage a variety of 
traditional academic disciplines.  In other words, like scientific inquiry, it is broad in 
scope and moves toward explanation, not away from it.  I agree with Williams (1991:17); 
Girard is one of the few who ventures into why humans sacrifice.  The issue of the origin 
of culture discussed above is common among Girard‘s most aggressive critics, and 
fundamentally, this has to do with the lack of verifiability.  But this holds true of any 
inquiry into origins, including the origins of the universe.  The lack of verifiability does 
not alone exclude it from ‗science.‘ 
In the early Modern period, a good deal of scientific inquiry into social behavior dealt 
with shear observation and classification of newly available amounts of previously 
unavailable data.  It was highly descriptive.  Certainly, anyone who wants to appear 
scientific can safely remain in the descriptive realm, cataloging data and explaining 
processes.  This appears to be much of the current trend in social sciences. Strenski 
(2003:18) for instance, makes the distinction between theories of sacrifice and accounts 
of sacrifice, the former being explanations of the object while the latter merely 
descriptions.   
It is no secret that the discussion of the ‗scientific‘ centers around a claim to legitimacy.58  
This, of course, is greatly enforced by the utility of applied science, i.e. technological 
innovation and its useful partnership with the state. As Barrow (2007:244) states: 
‗Science is most at home attacking problems that require technique rather than insight.‘  
Girard and others have attempted to ground mimetic ideas as more scientific theory 
probably because a ‗scientific‘ theory is less inclined to suffer the ‗ideological‘ label.  
                                                 
57
 See Kirwin 2005:112-125 ―The Future of Mimetic Theory‖ 
58
 In his assessment of currents in sociology and religion, Kuenzlen (2007:187) states: ‗Sociology has 
become a hermeneutic authority, whose concepts and images concerning human existence and the world 
govern our understanding of the external and internal factors of human life.‘ 
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Bottum (1996: e), however, believes Girard to be evasive about such a label in order to 
avoid the pseudo-science malaise that Freud ended up in.  Nonetheless, Girard 
(1978:219) speaks of his model being scientific, not in the positivistic sense, but in an 
analytic one, and this position has attracted some of the sharpest attacks as well.  The 
labeling of Girard as a ‗moralist‘ attempts to undercut claims to objectivity. 
As I have already argued before, there is nothing that has more of a universal drive to it 
than science.  The very drive to explain is a comparative enterprise, and we should not be 
the slightest surprised that the early modern theorists of sociology and religion took their 
cues from the emerging evolutionary model.  Even to this day, biology textbooks for high 
school espouse the powerfully simplistic explanatory model of evolution.  It is the heart 
of scientific inquiry to reduce inexhaustible variation into its simplest form.  Scientific 
inquiry never leaves distinction, variation, or difference alone. It must find its connection 
to the total. Barrow (2007:227) asserts that universality is grounded in reality.  That there 
is a connection to things is fundamental to a true perception of the world: ‗…there must 
exist some invariances of the world as we change the locations in space and time of all its 
most elementary entities so that the most basic fabric of reality is universal rather than 
dependent upon parochial things.‘ 
Barrow (2007:8) rightly observes that the universal drive is not fundamentally a 
‗scientific‘ impulse, but a religious one: ‗The unity of the Universe is a deep-rooted 
expectation…we notice that this motivation is essentially religious. There is no logical 
reason why the Universe should not contain surds or arbitrary elements that do not relate 
to the rest.‘  Nevertheless, the unifying urge is inseparable from scientific inquiry as 
evidence by the very subject of Barrow‘s book, New Theories of Everything: The Quest 
for Ultimate Explanation. 
Strenski (2006:3) confirms that a theory is  universalistic by nature and further suggest 
that theology‘s explanatory power had diminished in the modern era partly due to its 
sectarian or sequestered thinking.  In other words, a Catholic or a Quaker had little 
compunction to explain things beyond the needs of its particular group.  The approach of 
studying religion from a standpoint that the Christian perspective was the central or 
pivotal standpoint to evaluate other religions—that is, the presupposition that the 
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Christian religion was unique or fundamentally different (and superior) in almost any 
aspect under consideration—also contributed to quarantining theology. This 
presupposition took theology out of the discussion of the universal, out of the realm of 
‗science,‘ and it was theory that could now best keep pace with scientific inquiry.  Theory 
replaced theology in the modern era because the fundamental demeanor and outlook of 
theory-making was universal whereas theology was increasingly limiting its outlook.
59
 
The need to speak of religion in scientific language came as the outlook on religion 
dramatically reversed.  Whereas before religion was a way to explain problems, later on 
religion was the problem to be explained.  Strenski (2006:3) explains how the scientific 
model of comparison took hold in the study of religion:  
But the theories provoked by the general problems of religion did need to speak across sectarian 
and religious lines.  These theories need to speak in the manner of ‗science‘ and try to appeal to 
the broadest consensus about the nature of facts, evidence, and such that they could.  The new 
scientific studies of religion had therefore to be comparative, and never allow one individual 
religious perspective to hold a privileged place. 
Theories in a sense are ‗scientific‘ especially and maybe only when they are universal in 
perspective—comparative.  For sure, one aspect of theorizing should not be squelched—
seeking to explain one of the most formidable and profound phenomenon of the human 
venture—human violence.  
 It can easily be deduced from here that part of the prominence of science in the 20
th
 
century is precisely its ‗grand narrative‘ appeal.  It is curious to see the ready recognition 
of Christianity‘s influence on the study of sacrifice, but the complete inability to see its 
influence on science‘s drive toward universal principles.  Up until the modern era, the 
drive for universals in faith and knowledge abided side-by-side.  Taking our cue from 
Strenski, it may have been the sectarian division of Christianity in Europe that drove 
many to solace in the sciences.  Due to the continued inability of Christianity to live up to 
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 Milbank (1990:1) reiterates this assertion: ‗The pathos of modern theology is its false humility.  For 
theology, this must be a fatal a disease, because once theology surrenders its claim to be a meta-discourse, 
it cannot any longer articulate the word of the creator God, but is bound to turn into the oracular voice of 
some finite idol, such as historical scholarship, humanist psychology, or transcendental philosophy.‘  
Hauerwas (2007:54-55) makes a similar assessment, saying theology‘s inability to engage secularism has 
created among other things a ‗fortress‘ mentality.   
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its ‗grand narrative,‘ science still to this day seems to provide a clearer vision of 
universality and is therefore, as Strenski
60
 is arguing, a more solid ground for a pluralistic 
society to count on.  It provides a surer forum for public dialogue.  The reticence to allow 
theological discussion back into the public square, although not really justifiable, is none-
the-less understandable.  Certainly some of the resistance to Girard is girded by such 
sentiment.
61
 
Odd as it is, theorizing has now suffered a similar fragmentation, and in this respect 
‗post-modernity‘ is bi-polar.  Like our early modern processors, we are disgusted and 
exhausted from the interminable bickering of theorizing, ‗parochializing‘ each other‘s 
theory with the ‗ideological‘ label.  Universalizing has its nasty side-effects, and post-
modernism, if in fact we are in a postmodern phase, has developed a profound distaste for 
it, insisting on the complexity of the world, in particular human complexity. All the 
while, we cling to the surety of science precisely because it still can and does reduce 
things to manageable, serviceable simplicity, in other words, to universal characteristics.  
And this is valuable because it seemingly goes hand-in-hand with our survival.
62
  Even 
more so, it as Eagleton (2003:72) points out: ‘There is, however, a much deeper irony.  
At just the point that we have begun to think small, history has begun to act big.‘  
Capitalist globalization has once again brought ‗grand narrative‘ on the scene. 
A universal perspective is not so easily evaded, and it seems science understands this 
well. Fundamental to science and math, Burrows (2007:11) asserts, is its compatibility 
with humans to ‗algorithmically compress‘63 data, in other words, to reduce vast amounts 
of variables into manageable portions, filtering out the rest.  It also has to do with the 
major question I have been addressing throughout this chapter—How do we observe the 
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 Strenski 2003:232 ‗Thus, all along, for the Durkheimians and for me, the critical perennial issue in this 
rivalry has been the question of whether theological discourse…can qualify as public discourse—especially 
in the domain of religion...The Durkheimiens represent the view that it cannot.‘ 
61
 Both Williams (1991:19) and Strenski (2003:21) object to De Heusch, Luc‘s (1983) ‗ludicrous‘ critique 
that Girard‘s theory is simply a disingenuous attempt to sneak Christianity back into the public dialogue.   
62
 This said, of course, with irony since our technology is also contributing to global disaster.  
63
 Barrow (2007:11):  ‗Any string of symbols that can be given an abbreviated representation is called 
algorithmically compressible.  On this view, we recognize science to be the search for algorithmic 
compressions.‘ 
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very thing that we are a part of?  The very act of our observation alters not only us, but, 
when it comes to human behavior, alters the object.  
Barrow (2007:231) advocates a kind of circularity to algorithmic compression.   Our own 
survivability requires an ability on our part to make sense of the world and adapt.  The 
more this is done through time the more we get hard wired to compress data. Barrow 
(2007:232) states:  
 But we recognize that the human mind plays a non-trivial role in this evaluation.  Inextricably linked to the 
apparent algorithmic compressibility of the world is the ability of the human mind to carry out 
compressions.  Our minds have evolved out of the elements of the physical world and have been honed, at 
least partially, towards their present state by the perpetual process of natural selection.  Their effectiveness 
as sensors of the environment, and their survival value, are obviously related to their abilities as algorithmic 
compressors. 
Again, scientific thinking is intrinsically universal in outlook, and fundamental to that 
outlook is the ability to describe the world around us with a compressed language of 
expediency. This, explains Barrow (2007:232), is why the ‗expedient language‘ of math 
works so well to describe the physical world.  
A critical common element in theology and theory (if they are not parochialized) and 
science is their universal scope of inquiry.  This is a bottom line conviction, perhaps even 
still influenced by theological paradigms.
64
  It is a conviction that a unity among humans, 
and indeed the cosmos, is desirable, obtainable, and perhaps even essential.
65
 
But there are varying aspects of what it means to think ‗scientifically.‘ Barrow 
(2007:243) suggests three levels primarily dependent on the subject matter.    
Science is at its best when its ‗compressions‘ are computational—there can be a ‗step-by-
step sequence of better and better approximations to the phenomenon under study.‘  In 
this respect, the best science is able to predict outcomes.  This prediction is less 
interpreter or author dependent.  Any trained scientist or mathematician can calculate the 
                                                 
64
 ‗This modern urge for completeness had developed hand-in-hand with the desire for a unified picture of 
the world…the legacy of the great monotheistic religions is the expectation of a single over-arching 
explanation for the Universe‘ (Barrow 2007:213).   
65
 The proceeding chapters also conclude a similar goal in mythological cosmogonies.  
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data.  In some respects, mimetic theory has such potential.  Thus the engagement of the 
Colloquium of Violence and Religion into contemporary affairs.  The human compulsion 
to ‗get rid‘ of a troublesome student, employee, neighbor, boss, child, or public official is 
highly predictable.  To some degree, Girard appeals to the predictability of humans to 
resort to scapegoating in a crisis.  
But when the representations (compressed model) of the subject are not consistent, 
making our approximations less verifiable, this is a linear or listable level of scientific 
inquiry. Barrow (2007:244) does not downplay this kind of science.  He simply concedes 
that: ‗These phenomena do not permit the effective use of the minds most successful 
device for making sense of complexity.‘  This may be simply because ‗our minds are not 
adapted for this kind of complexity.‘ It is in this second category that most social or 
cultural theory would fall.  Certainly, the sacrificial mechanism is a compressed model of 
diverse data even though it is not fully computable. 
Finally Barrow (2007:245) speaks of the prospective features of our world—‗those which 
we cannot recognize or generate by a series of sequence of logical steps…they cannot be 
encompassed by any finite collection of rules or laws…Beauty, simplicity, truth…There 
is no magic formula that can be called upon to generate all the possible varieties of these 
attributes.‘ 
Barrow concedes that there are certain irresolvable tensions within scientific theory that 
greatly impede arriving at a ‗theory of everything.‘  One dynamic is between the 
symmetry of the universe and its ‗broken symmetry.‘  Barrow (2007:138) reminds us that 
the ‗laws of Nature,‘ although few, are powerfully simple.  But no one can see a law in 
action.  One can only see the effects, and the effects can be extremely complex:  ‗Despite 
these ongoing tendencies, we are aware of the fact that no matter how often scientists tell 
us that the laws of Nature are simple, symmetrical, and elegant, the real world isn‘t.  It is 
messy and complicated…the reason is clear.  We do not observe the Laws of Nature; we 
observe their outcomes.‘  Girard (1972:309) makes a similar case.  We cannot see the 
mechanism in operation precisely because it would not work if we did.  We can recognize 
the scapegoat mechanism only by its effects.  It remains open as to whether Girard says 
this by way of analogy with science or whether he is making a case for its verifiability.  
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In an explanation such as this, I find a window of understanding in this tension between 
‗context-dependency‘ and Girard‘s reduction of a single operative mechanism.  For 
starters, both are an aspect of scientific thinking.  In an era where, science has 
preeminence, it is doubtful that anyone could be outside the realm of its contours.  As 
Strenski (2006:338) reminds, all the modern theorists of religion thought they were 
scientific.  The modern period, especially in the social sciences, was driven perhaps more 
by the latter, to find fundamental forces at work in human behavior and reduce things to 
certain ‗laws,‘ ‗functions‘ or ‗structures.‘  In reaction, the contextualists decried the 
bowling over of observable complexities.  This, I suggest, is an overreaction.  The over 
emphasis on complexity simply leads to the compulsion to micromanage it and leads to 
yet one more alternative universal theory in the guise of no theory.  As Eagleton says 
(2003:45): ‗Everyone was thinking small.  Micropolitics broke out on a global scale.  A 
new epic fable of the end of epic fables unfurled across the globe.‘ 
 Even in the frontiers of scientific thought, there may be limits to what we can know. 
Barrow (2007:239) sees that there are two streams of thought in science‘s view of the 
universe: symmetry or computation.  Is the Universe a cosmic kaleidoscope or a cosmic 
computer, a pattern or a program? Or either.  To choose is problematic, Barrow warns.  
‗Throughout the history of human thought, there have been dominant paradigms of the 
Universe.  These mental images often tell us little about the Universe, but much about the 
society that was engaged in its study.‘  We can follow a whole history of viewing the 
universe as an organism (the Greeks), as a Clock (Newtonian), a machine (industrial age), 
and Barrow casts doubt that science can answer this question.  Barrow reminds 
throughout his book that our ability to comprehend the world around us is symbiotically 
linked to our capacity to comprehend ourselves.  It is uniquely tied to who we are as 
humans, for we are not only able to think about the universe (computation), but even 
more so, we are able to think about how we think about it (interpretation).  
The objective of this discussion was simply to place some perimeters around this 
discussion of ‗universal,‘ ‗context,‘ and ‗science‘ in regards to certain objections to 
Girard.  It seems as though some in an effort to counter Girard stretch the limits of his 
theory far beyond its reasonable intention or design.  Being ‗universal‘ in outlook does 
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not mean it seeks to encompass ‗everything.‘  It does not mean that there is an avoidance 
of complexity or diversity simply because one perceives indelible patterns in human 
thought and behavior.  Indeed, the drive towards deciphering destructive human patterns, 
like in psychoanalysis, is accompanied by a desire to disrupt or abrogate it.  It does not 
mean that it is a closed system, limited only to data that will not challenge its premise; on 
the contrary, it opens up viable venues for further exploration.  For it is as Barrow 
(2007:143) reminds, not even a theory of everything can cover everything: ‗There is no 
formula that can deliver all truth, all harmony, all simplicity.  No Theory of Everything 
can ever provide total insight.  For to see through everything, would leave us seeing 
nothing at all‘ (2007:246).   
 There is a tremendous pliability to Girard‘s theory.  It is scientifically minding as well as 
hermeneutically sensitive.  As Kirwin states (2005:113): ‗Girard has managed, perhaps 
better than anyone, to hold these in tension without succumbing to any.‘  Kirwin 
(2005:1120) ironically remarks that if Girard‘s theory holds to be true, its verifiability 
will be in that there will be no one around to verify it.  
With this in mind, I turn attention to hermeneutical and theological critiques and 
considerations. 
 
3.5  Theological and Hermeneutical Concerns. 
The insights of Girard have caught the attention in some theological and biblical circles, 
especially in America.
66
  Often, one can find a passing reference to Girard, either 
positively or negatively.  Some, like John Milbank, Urs von Balthasar, Raymund 
Schwager, Williams, Hamerton-Kelly, and William Schweiker, have considered the work 
of Girard important enough to devote some interaction with him within their own 
theological projects.  The brief summary below in no way exhausts this interaction, but 
provides an adequate sampling of the kind of dialogue that is currently going on.  Here, 
we find both the admiration and critique to veer in alternate and competing directions 
with that which has been addressed so far.  
                                                 
66
 Agnew (1987),  Hunsinger (1998), McKenna (1985),  North (1985), Wallace (1989) 
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3.5.1 A theological critique.  In his work Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular 
Reason, John Milbank offers poignant critique of sociology and its engagement in 
theology and religion during the modern era.  Within this evaluation, we find a critique of 
Girard‘s work from a theological perspective.   
For one, Milbank (1990:397) finds an overall positive assessment to the insight Girard 
brings to biblical interpretation: ‗Now such an analysis is profoundly perceptive, and 
manifestly in accord with the Augustinian perspective which I am advocating.‘  His 
criticism, however, is two-fold.  First, in keeping with his overall thesis of the book, 
Milbank places Girard squarely within the positivist vein of sociology.  Sociology, 
Milbank contends, has attempted and failed to ‗encompass‘ or ‗police‘ religion by 
presuming to ‗explain‘ it.  Ultimately, sociology creates its own religion and its own 
faith. Milbank (1990:144) states: 
Sociology is doomed simply to rediscover, everywhere, the specifically modern confinement and 
protection of ‗the religious sphere.‘  The positivism which defines religion at , beyond, or across 
the boundaries of the ‗social fact,‘ is always subverted by a more radical positivism which 
recognized the peculiarity and specificity of religious practice and logic, and, in consequence, the 
impossibility of any serious attempt at either scientific explanation or humanist interpretation.    
Most critiques of Girard addressed so far in this chapter have been, as it where, an 
internal debate within the general contours of the ‗social sciences.‘ The above discussion 
as to how ‗scientific‘ a theory is, especially when clarifying religion, is doomed to failure 
in Milbank‘s view.  For Milbank, modernist attempts to get at the heart of religion 
inevitably project modern dilemmas and power struggles on to the ancient world. As 
already discussed with Strenski and Barrow above, theories tend to say more about the 
theorist and his times than anything else.  In essence, Girard and the sociological vein 
with all its variations has unsuccessfully tried to usurp philosophy, the true medium for 
theological formulation.  
For Milbank (1990:397) the whole sociological discussion of the origins of culture and 
religion is simply attempting to project the modern problem of hierarchal social 
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arrangements by imagining some natural more egalitarian and chaotic origin to society.
67
  
There is no reason to assume the priority of a society of rival equals over a hierarchical 
arrangement. If a hierarchal arrangement was already in place, then certain things could 
be valued objectively and not be dependent on another who ‗models‘ desire.  Arguing 
similar to Augustine, Milbank (1990:398) asserts that the whole myth of chaotic 
beginnings has more to do with a community‘s protection from an external threat rather 
than an internal one. Thus, internal debate about the origins or genesis of culture, and 
perhaps even the universe, is mythical.  Just like the ancient myths, the view is of violent 
beginnings.  The cosmos as well as the human society goes from chaos to order.  
There are a few things that are problematic with this evaluation.  For one, even though 
Milbank disapproves of the whole discussion of the origins of culture as a positivist 
construct, he employs the same reasoning, assuming the preexistence of culture before 
representation and ritual rather than as simultaneously and serendipitously emerging.  
Milbank, like the anthropologists discussed earlier, have misread Girard.  Also, Milbank 
appears unaware of Girard‘s distinction between external and internal mediation of 
desire. Hence, Girard affirms that there can be objective desires that do not lead to 
rivalry.  Finally, it must be said that the critical aspects of Girard‘s theory do not depend 
on an explanatory model of origins.
68
  Milbank (1990:398) is right to conclude that there 
are severe limitations to our conceptions of social origins, whether Girard or anyone else. 
No matter how rigorous our thinking may be, we can only imagine the dynamics 
involved in the emergence of human culture.  A valid critique of Girard depends much 
more on his evaluation of how human desire operates.  This aspect, I assert, is verifiable 
to some degree as the work of social cognitive science may reveal more.  
Milbank‘s (1990:398) second objection has to do with the outcomes on theology.  
Milbank objects to Girard‘s resoundingly negative view of human desire and thus 
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 As I proceed through this thesis, it will become clearer that narratives of origins have always been 
contentious and are attempts to legitimate the current social arrangement by projecting it back onto a 
distant past.  In a subtle way, this affirms Girard‘s thesis.  What is fundamentally at stake is rivalry over 
competing desires.  We argue over who possess the original desire.  
68
 This point is perhaps a bit tricky.  Certainly, Girard‘s seminal works are attempting to engage the 
ongoing discussion of the origins of culture so hotly pursued in modernity.  But at least as I understand 
Girard, the issue of the origins of culture is not the pivotal issue to which Girard‘s theory rests on.  That 
scapegoating is an intrinsic part of human social behavior seems obvious to me even if it developed from 
culture rather than developing culture. 
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echoing the moralism charge of Strenski.  Is it not possible for humans to positively 
desire an object, ultimately God, without any mediation?  In other words, can humans 
generate good desires that are separate from social awareness or dependency?  Girard 
only speaks of a negative assessment of humanity with no real positive alternative.  
Girard‘s Jesus can only resoundingly negate our violence.  We are offered no way out or 
forward, especially through a sacrificial paradigm. Essentially, there can be no positive 
mimesis that can be associated with sacrifice and no genuine alternative way of living.  
This creates Christological problems especially around the incarnation.  
Milbank‘s critique here, in my view, is more valid than what we have reviewed so far.  
For one, we should continue to question the extent sociological frameworks can or should 
replace philosophical ones for the work of theology. As Kuenzlen (2007:187) suggests, 
the ‗hypostatic‘ view of society, the boast of sociology, is on the decline.  Brueggemann 
(1997:52) also believes that Old Testament theology cannot be at the service of 
sociology.  Milbank (1990:112ff) is correct that social sciences are a-historical, and 
although Old Testament theology has run into its limitations with the historical-critical 
approaches, there is no compelling reason to abandon it altogether for a sociological 
model.  Ironically, this frees up mimetic theory.  Girard‘s attempt to engage social theory 
has too often been equated with social theory.  Mimetic theory is not social theory even 
though it actively engages social theory.  The same applies to psychology, philosophy 
and theology.  Its closest affinities are to literary criticism.  
Second, Girard has left the theological implications of his theory open-ended, 
unaddressed, or unresolved.  This criticism is a recurrent one among Christian thinkers.
69
  
I venture two explanations.  Girard has displayed much caution in venturing into the 
specialized disciplines of not just Biblical studies, but also theology and the social 
sciences.  He does not claim expertise in any of these areas and invites further inquiry.  
Also, Girard‘s evasiveness can be attributed to a French intellectual disposition that is 
long on analysis and short on prescription.
70
  It is quite evident that Girard‘s later works 
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 See ―René Girard for Holy Week‖ by Oaks (2007: electronic version), North (1985:26), Wallace 
(1989:318, 322).  
70
 Jacques Ellul, a popular French thinker in the 70s and 80s wrote prolifically in a dialectic style, and 
rarely offered a way forward.  In his book, The Technological Bluff , Ellul (1990:vii) speaks of his earlier 
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reflect serious consideration as to the positive aspects of mimetic desire and its relation to 
a positive view of sacrifice.
71
  The positive view of sacrifice is certainly explored in the 
Genesis story.  Milbank (1990:402) for instance, offers a solution to a Christological 
problem that Girard inadequately addresses.  The question remains quite open as to what 
extent an exegete should be guided by mimetic theory. 
The exegetical results of Genesis 1 and 2 in the proceeding chapters will contribute to 
this aspect of Girard‘s theory.  I speak of an ‗alternative sacrifice of Yahweh‘ that is a 
sacrificial paradigm but moves away from a scapegoating arrangement.  In The 
Scapegoat, Girard (1982) works out a clearer perspective on this than his previous 
formulations and his ideas have influenced the exegesis to follow.  
In his section on soteriology in Theo-Drama III, Hans Urs von Balthasar reiterates both 
the positive force Girard has been in engaging modern thinking with critical theological 
perspectives and the dissatisfaction with unresolved theological ramifications.  Balthasar 
(1988:297) credits Girard with significantly bridging the gap between the ancient ‗theory 
and practice‘ of sacrifice and the modern reader.  To this, Balthasar (1988:310) believes 
Girard has ‗rendered to us a service‘ by pressing in on the question as to the extent God 
takes pleasure or is pleased with the cross of Christ.  In other words, how necessary was 
the death of Christ from God’s perspective?  How is it that the Church offers something 
to God which he does not desire? 
Calling Girard‘s theory a ‗cosmo-analysis‘ as opposed to Freud‘s psychoanalysis, 
Balthasar (1988:298-99) views Girard‘s ‗system‘ as similar to those of Teilhard de 
Chardin and Karl Rahner in distilling ‗the basis of a total anthropology from an all-
embracing Christology; only in Girard, it is ‗marked by sharp antithesis.‘  He rightly 
views the interplay of human desire as the core interaction in Girard‘s work, and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
analysis of technique coming to fruition, and the remainder of the book only speaks a resounding ‗I told 
you so and its too late now.‘  His insightful writing rarely lays out possible solutions.  Bottum (1990) also 
attests to a French intellectual ‗tradition‘ going back to Descartes.  Mack (1985:136) speaks of the French 
way of doing things: ‗Thus his theory of religion and culture is comprehensive, his methodology axiomatic, 
and his reading of a text radical.‘   
71
 In a 1993  interview with Rebecca Adams, Girard significantly modifies statements made in earlier 
works (Williams ed. 1996:62-65).  This is a good example of why criticisms of Girard that only reference 
his seminal works can easily misread Girard.  
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dialogue with structuralism, Marxism, and ethnology as secondary.  Most significantly, 
Balthasar see Girard‘s work as primarily a theological work especially in tune with his 
own theo-drama perspective. 
That Girard has aggressively reopened central Christian issues in the post-modern 
dialogue without pressing towards the full ramifications of it creates two concerns for 
Balthasar.  
For one, Balthasar (1988:308) finds Girard insistence on being ‗purely scientific‘ 
problematic,  inevitably leading to a  ‗closed system.‘  Here he echoes Mibank‘s 
observation that the claim to ‗pure science‘ leaves Girard among the positivists.72  
Balthasar (1988:309) notes that not even Girard holds to a pure scientism, bringing in ‗a 
theological dimension that explodes his allegedly pure scientism; so introducing an 
ineradicable contradiction into his system.‘  In other words, one cannot claim to be 
‗purely scientific‘ while interjecting purely theological statements.73   Balthasar‘s 
assessment is what has given rise to the criticisms from anthropology or of Strenski that 
Girard is trying to smuggle theology in under the guise of ‗science,‘ a particular 
sensitivity of post-modernists.  As discussed above, science has perpetuated an 
unjustified over-confidence in the limits of its discipline, and Balthasar is correct to point 
out that a pure science or objectivity is unobtainable precisely where it meets up with 
human desire.   As per the discussion of scientific theory above, perhaps it is Balthasar‘s 
understanding of ‗science‘ that needs modification.  
 
At issue, for Balthasar (1988:310), is the question of God‘s transcendence.  Girard and 
Schwager
74
 concede that the methodology has its limits.  It cannot ultimately venture into 
the issue of true transcendence—that is, since the ‗sacred‘ is mostly a human concoction, 
then how is it that God can be viewed as transcending this besides just being 
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 Girard‘s latter works have engaged Shakespeare and philosophical works.  It does appear as though 
Girard has backed off advocating for this, perhaps solely out of exhaustion over the debate.  
73
 It should be reiterated that both Milbank and Balthasar have fairly refined perspectives on the theological 
endeavor whereas Girard does not and does not claim it.  
74
 Raymond Schwager (1978) Must There Be Scapegoats  
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antithetically opposed to all violence?  Girard is consistent in his reluctance to assert 
theological implications into his project.  He does not bridge the gap between a scientific 
approach and theological concerns.  He certainly implies them, but does not fully develop 
them theologically.  Balthasar questions Girard‘s lack of reference to God‘s justice.  
‗God‘ seemingly only comes into play in relationship to power.  Girard is too quick to 
dismiss Anselm‘s formulation of a judicial aspect to sacrifice, since for Girard, ‗law‘ is 
simply a more sophisticated sacrificial system.  Balthasar is right in asserting that any 
cooperation between two free agents intrinsically includes judicial arrangements.
75
  At 
bottom line here is Balthasar‘s question as whether under Girard‘s construct, the cross 
only addresses a reconciliation of humankind to itself.  Or is there a reconciliation that 
must take place between a truly transcendent reality (God) and humankind?  Is there a 
true sacred realm?
76
 
In the most crucial aspect of Balthasar‘s assessment, we find the most consistent 
Christian objection to Girard.  Girard, like Barth, leaves no room for any positive natural 
inclination towards the good or towards God.  In a sense, Girard leans too heavily 
towards ‗no one does good, not even one.‘  This perspective works against what 
Balthasar (1988:309) proposes in his theological treatise of divine-drama.  It leaves little 
room for a real engagement between two free entities: ‗The dramatic tension between the 
world and God is so overstretched that the link breaks, rendering impossible a drama that 
involves the two sides…the self-concealing mechanism eliminates all freedom on man‘s 
part.‘   
Balthasar (1988:309) finds man‘s sense of justice inadequately addressed by Girard: ‗We 
constantly meet with words ―power‖ and ―violence‖, never the word ―justice.‖  Can it be 
proved scientifically that the justice for which men long is nothing but power in 
disguise?‘  Girard (and Barth) view human desire as totally corrupt, and is in contrast to 
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 For Balthasar 1988:257, ‗…there is not opposition between the juridical and persona aspects of the God-
man relationship.  In view of the foregoing, all polemics against Anselm in this area should be dropped.‘  In 
a sense, a ‗relationship‘ between to free entities necessarily implies certain juridical arrangements.  
76
 In the proceeding chapters, I propose an alternative sacred realm.  
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Augustine (and C.S. Lewis) who view human desire as boundless and thus leading to 
God.
77
  
Balthasar (1988:311) questions Girard‘s rejection of a God of justice, of a God who 
requires something from the death of Christ,  but he is largely satisfied with the 
explanation provided by Schwager
78: ‗Thus Jesus takes sin and holds on to it, lest it 
should fall in vengeance on the heads of those who have committed it.  This is the 
conclusion of the largely convincing analysis of Old Testament texts in which god moves 
progressively from being a God of violence and wrath (ca. 1,000 instances) to being a 
god who does not himself wield power but only allows the power wielded by men to have 
its effect on them.‘  It is also conceded that the Old Testament never quite resolves this 
tension, wavering as it does back and forth.  
Thus Balthasar‘s critique approaches a part of my central inquiry, and again echoes that 
of Milbank in that Girard‘s work, never intending to be a theological treatise, has 
profoundly infused the implications of the cross into the modern situation, yet has left 
unfinished critical theological implications. Balthasar 1988:312 states: 
…it will not be enough to follow Girard and Schwager in demythologizing the Old Testament 
picture of God so that he changes from a violent, wrathful God and becomes a powerless God who 
does not engage in retribution.  What we have, in fact, is a new form of the problem latent in both 
Old and New Covenants: What is the relationship between God‘s love and his justice, particularly 
in the case of the Cross?  God‘s justice, which Girard never acknowledges as something primal, is 
evidently quite different from power.  If we recognize this, Anselm‘s presentation of the problem 
acquires a new significance.  So far the whole question of what Paul calls ‗judgment,‘  John calls 
‗crisis,‘ and the Book of Revelation calls ‗the wrath of God‘  has not been thoroughly explored. 
The inquiry here is compelled by the sense of ‗unexplored‘ ramifications of Girard‘s 
thinking.  What does it mean that God is angry and is presented in the Old Testament as 
compelled to do something about it?  Is this just the ‗theology of the crowd‘ coming 
through or is there a free transcendent being beyond that who seeks a reconciled 
relationship with humankind based on both the good and the right? 
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 I believe my reading of Genesis 2 offers a mediating position here.  
78
 Schwager (1978:214-15, 139) 
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3.5.2 Girard and the hermeneutical task.  Congruent with the maze of intersecting 
problems and concerns discussed so far, hermeneutics has also undergone a series of 
challenges and reformulations during the modern period.  If my evaluation of Girard‘s 
critics be valid, two things are evident.  There are those who have rejected Girard 
outright, and for the most part have moved on.  In the ‗post-modern‘ fashion, I find this 
wholesale rejection of Girard highly suspicious or at minimum, problematic.
79
 This 
rejection for the most part comes from within the social science quarters and is basically 
an internal discussion.  With those whose pursuits are more towards literary and biblical 
interpretation or theology and ethics, there are varying degrees of willingness to engage 
mimetic theory.  
Returning to the previous ‗contextual‘ discussion of Janzen‘s as opposed to ‗universal 
theories,‘ there are two general observations that can be made in considering current 
hermeneutical frameworks. First, Janzen (2004:61) expresses a legitimate concern that is 
not peculiar to post-modernists.  It has always been a fundamental concern in 
hermeneutics throughout the modern period that our interpretive grid doesn‘t overtake 
those who are more immediately related to the text.
80
  It cannot mean to us what it did not 
mean to the ‗original‘ hearers.  We must seek to understand a phenomenon from the 
perspective of those participating in it.  This is nothing new and certainly not limited to 
‗post-modern.‘  But after the above discussion, we may now have to realize that the 
original writers and hearers struggled with the same dynamics of ‗meaning‘ as we do.  
Second, fundamental to the task of interpretation is to somehow transfer that meaning to 
successive generations even to us today.  Again, this is a legitimate concern and has 
certainly become problematic especially in the heightened ideological frenzy of the late 
                                                 
79
 Wallace (1989:322) advocates an acceptance of Girard‘s hermeneutic as a positive ‗post-modern‘ 
contribution: ‗But if this model is biblicist insofar as it refuses to bar the biblical texts from the experience 
of truth, then in what sense is it postmodernist? Or is it? It is, I contend, if (1) the term 'postmodernism' can 
be recast to designate an intellectual habit that follows after, and resists, the theological modernist 
assumption (quintessentially embodied by Bultmann) that the exegetical task consists of purging the Bible 
of its controversial mythology and imagery; and it is postmodernist if (2) this term can stand for an 
exegetical practice that acknowledges, even celebrates, the zones of indeterminacy, fractured surfaces, and 
occult detours within the Bible that make the art of interpreting it both a trying and exhilirating endeavor. 
In other words, let deconstructive biblical exegesis stand for a way of reading that is serious about the 
Bible's intertextuality, not an ideology that dogmatically limits its message to a self-contained, self-
referential exercise in semantic complexity.‘ 
80
 This is the concern expressed by Levine (1985) 
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20
th
 century.  And it echoes the sentiment behind Janzen‘s and anthropologists‘ leery 
disposition towards ‗universal theories.‘  Certainly, theory runs the risk of running rough-
shod over particular contextual variables.   
But this concern has become over-blown in the other direction, and it is here where 
Janzen‘s argument becomes problematic on several fronts.  Janzen argues that our 
understanding of sacrifice becomes ‗damaged,‘ ‗imposing,‘ and ‗misconstrued‘ the 
moment the observer brings any of her own worldview into the observation.  This, I 
assert, is not scientific thinking at all.  The task of the scientist is to interpret the data, not 
just catalogue it.  In Janzen‘s thinking, if a lynch mob believes that the Jew is causing the 
plague, then it is left at that!  This is okay if one only wants to catalogue ritual.  He has a 
valid word if it is one of caution—the immediate context needs to be considered, and to 
whatever extent that can be determined, that must be a part of the ‗understanding.‘  But if 
we stop here, we have left the hermeneutical task undone.  We must still determine if 
and/or what the earlier meaning has for us.  Jay (1992:13) articulates it well:  
But what is this work of understanding? It cannot be to reach a meaning identical to that of the 
ritual actors themselves, because their meaning is an organization of their experience which is 
inaccessible to us.  There are two kinds of situations, that of the sacrificers and that of the 
interpreter.  The one is unattainable and the other is escapable.  The task is to build some kind of 
bridge between the two to hold the worlds together, not accurately to decode their meaning, but to 
make what they do and say intelligible to us.  
The task then, is not so much to get the original context but to understand how we are 
connected to it.  It is still, in a sense, the hermeneutics of the Church Fathers, that of 
analogy.  It is one that presumes a bigger context than all of us.  
The uncomfortable thing about mimetic theory is that it so equally critiques our modern 
politics and theory-making as it does the thing we are trying to observe or reflect upon.  
Jay (1992:145) objects to this: ‗Girard, who recognizes two societies, has two collective 
subjects: ―the primitive mind‖ and the ―modern mind.‖  This critique—Girard is more 
after a modern critique than addressing ancient ones—is pervasive through most of the 
writers mentioned so far, but it is not something that should be so aggressively resisted as 
is the case with Balthasar.  For one, it is simply impossible not to.  We simply cannot as 
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Eagleton says, jump out of our own skin to look at ourselves.  Second, it just may very 
well be that there are striking parallels with our more ancient past.
81
  The formation of the 
Old Testament and of Greek tragedies comes at a time when most human cultures were 
emerging from a worldview (mythological) that had dominated for several millennia. 
This is reflected in the Old Testament‘s struggle with idolatry and boastful use of power 
and the critique of mythology found in the Greek Tragedies. The affinity is clear enough.  
Like ‗post-modernism,‘ there was a great skepticism of a thoroughgoing worldview on 
the wane.  While at the same time, there was a great uncertainty of what was to replace it.  
At times like these, ‗ideological‘ clashes are inevitable and intense, and the stakes are 
high; hence, there is rivalry over who possess the original ‗sense‘ of things.  
There is a critical difference between modernity and the ‗axial age‘—the ancients did not 
have the same ‗techniques‘ for containing violence as we have today.  Legal systems 
were paltry and the ability to enforce law was virtually non-existent.  It is my contention 
that much of the criticism of Girard grossly underestimates the dynamics involved in 
containing violence and how threatening the ‗quotidian‘ existence really was.  This 
underestimation, in my view, is one of the biggest biases of modernity projected back 
onto ancient times.
82
 
In his book Mimetic Reflections: A Study in Hermeneutics, Theology, and Ethics, 
Schweiker interestingly explores mimesis as a way through the postmodern hermeneutic 
problem.  The Modern era, in Schweiker‘s (1990:30) view, has pushed us toward a ‗crisis 
of imitation‘ because: ‗the idea of God is dependent for its cogency and motive power on 
being an imitative, imaginative figuration of forms of the categorical imperative.‘ Thus, 
‗we are forced to consider again the hermeneutical and expressive dimensions of mimesis 
in our God-talk.‘  Schweiker (1990:35) revaluates the problems of pre-modern 
employment of symbol, representation, and text that moved toward idea and proposes not 
a rejection of mimesis but a restructuring of it.  He appreciates Derrida and Girard for 
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  Schweiker (1990:14) agrees: ‗Little wonder then that premodern interpretive practices, like allegory or 
narrative, have captured the postmodern deconstructionist mind.  We live in a free play of signs.‘ 
82
 As will be pursued further in the debate in the Old Testament of how much a ‗chaos‘ is envisioned at the 
start of creation, the current trend minimizes this element in mythological narrative, especially in the Bible.  
If anything is being projected back into the ancient world, it is our situation of having extensive technical, 
legal and police systems in place which inoculate us from direct and lethal exposure to violence.  
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bringing the issue of mimesis to the fore.  Schweiker provides a critique of Girard from 
the hermeneutical viewpoint.  In this brief review of his critique, we will find similar 
objections to ones covered earlier.  
For Schweiker (1990:25) Girard‘s view of Christian revelation is more about revealing 
the truth of human societies than anything about God.  Conceptions about God and Jesus 
are restricted to a kind of ultimate social critique, and thus, Girard never leaves the 
fundamental view of Durkheim that religion is best understood in terms of its social 
function.   This leads to a kind of Christian gnosticism, possessing an inside knowledge 
about violence and desire.  Schweiker (1990:25) also questions the resoundingly negative 
view of sacrifice that neither the Old nor New Testaments affirm.
83
 
Of particular interest in Schweiker‘s (1990:186) critique is the addressing of the 
fundamental aspects of Girard‘s theory: ‗At bottom the dispute is over the way mimesis is 
understood and what it is used to understand.‘  All cultural communication is figuratively 
mediated, even language.  We don‘t have direct access to the referent; it is mediated 
through an imitation of some kind.
84
   Because of this, Schweiker reminds us of a critical 
and fundamental maxim of getting at ‗meaning‘:  ‗What is closest to us is often most 
concealed.  The task of interpretation is to understand what lies hidden.‘  At issue is to 
what extent the figurations gravitate toward deception or distortion.  This, I would 
contend, is very much at stake in the Old Testament‘s battle with idols.  Schweiker 
(1990:187) appreciates Girard and Derrida for bringing the issue of mimesis to the fore.  
They have forced the issue which post-modernity must address and to which Schweiker‘s 
book offers a way forward: 
Derrida‘s and Girard‘s readings of mimesis raise profound problems for previous construals of 
understanding and its world, the character and status of texts, and the being of the self.  
Furthermore, because talk about the divine has been related to these topics, these criticisms of 
mimesis render problematic theological discourse.  
Schweiker‘s (1990:189) concludes two things about Girard which are valuable and 
curious.  Girard‘s perspective of the role of violence in the formation of religion and 
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 Since the writing of Schweiker‘s book, Girard has since modified his view of sacrifice. This work 
reflects Girard‘s modified view. 
84
 Schweiker (1990:26) has made note of how Platonian this is.  
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culture‘s development of representations is critically insightful.  Girard‘s thesis leaves us 
little room to avoid such considerations from here on.  Girard, however, reduces things 
too far, leaving little room for other variables to be considered.  Here Schweiker, like 
Janzen and the anthropologists, appeal to post-modernity‘s devotion to ‗difference.‘  
Religion and culture are far too complex to be reduced to one common mechanism.  
Difference and complexity trump commonality in our current sentiment, and thus 
Schweiker appeals to ambiguity and the circular reasoning which elevates culture as the 
ultimate authority.  Girard‘s reductionism is oddly not universal enough.  It ‗doesn‘t 
exhaust the meaning of religious traditions.‘  There is one universal truth that trumps all 
others—ambiguity.  Complexity always leads to uncertainty.   
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The main objective of this chapter was to locate Girard‘s thinking within the current 
context of dialogue or debate.  The examination here can hardly scratch the surface of the 
complexity and variety to which mimetic theory interfaces with a wide range of trends, 
inquiries and trajectories.  Within this objective, I assert overall that the verdict should 
remain out about Girard and his ‗theory.‘  It offers a valid and practical venue for 
pursuing the pressing challenges of late modern interpretation.  Contrary to the claim that 
mimetic theory is ideological, it is very open-ended and encourages inquiry rather than 
shuts it down.  The fact that criticisms have come from such a wide range of disciplines 
and perspectives is ample evidence to its boundary-crossing characteristics.  A legitimate 
view of Girard should question to what extent his thinking can properly or easily fit into 
the category of ‗theory‘, ‗approach‘ or ‗perspective.‘   
Moreover, a wholesale rejection of Girard is unwarranted on several grounds. The 
rejection of his thinking based on its universal or reductionist perspective has its own set 
of precarious assertions.  It won‘t be long until this repugnance for ‗meta-narratives‘ or 
‗trans-contextual‘ perspectives will be understood as untenable itself.  At least as Barrow 
has discussed, our human propensity to ‗compress‘ vast arrays of data and complexity 
may just be a critical component for human survival.  Theory-making in general is a 
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legitimate, needed, and unavoidable enterprise. It is ‗universal‘ in scope; it cannot be 
otherwise.  This does not mean, however, that it therefore must lead to ‗totalizing‘ claims 
and to closed ‗ideological‘ frameworks.  Theory-making does not necessarily lead to a 
bowling over of peculiarity, insensitivity to difference, ignoring of contextual variables, 
or avoidance of complexity.   
The affinities of mythological cosmogonies, theology, theory-making, and scientific 
inquiry should now become evident.  All are attempting to place a current situation into 
the large scheme of things.  They push toward the largest context of them all.  This noble 
and good pursuit is, unfortunately, where we as humans are most contentious.  Girard‘s 
ideas challenge us to seriously examine what desire is fundamentally behind the ‗sides‘ 
we take in this arena.  
One thing at issue is what and to what extent can we talk about that which is common to 
humanity?  It seems as though we are comfortable with positive assertions of our 
commonness, but when it comes to negative ones, well then, we are moralists or 
theologians. The problem is that Girard‘s theory applies equally to theory-making and 
institutions of higher learning as it does to ‗sacrifice.‘  In particular, theory-making is 
within the context of its own ‗sacrificial crisis‘ and displays strong sacrificial tendencies.  
We seem in a cycle in which our capacity to establish our own sense of belonging in the 
world is on the corpse of that which came before. This, I would say, offers a particular 
and extremely uncomfortable critique of academia that underscores many critiques.  
Girard critiques critique, and thus Girard is predictably unsettling in contemporary theory 
because it implicates all of us.  
Most rejection of Girard comes from the social sciences which are themselves in a crisis, 
one of which is its long standing antagonism toward theology.  After 200 hundred years 
of the discipline the social sciences can neither contain nor explain two of the most 
common elements of human social behavior—religion and violence.  The rejections are 
not based on a thorough understanding of Girard‘s development nor its foundation. 
Although the criticisms of Girard were primarily placed within an Old Testament 
exegetical model, the larger goal was to identify the fundamental objections to mimetic 
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theory.  By doing so, I can proceed without constant interjection to address ‗underlying‘ 
presuppositions, assumptions and objections.  As I proceed with exegeting the narratives 
of Israel‘s origins in Genesis 1 and 2 from a mimetic perspective, I can devote more to 
the interaction of Girard with Old Testament scholarship, especially the historical-critical 
paradigm that still holds prominence. 
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 4 OBJECT OF DESIRE—THE STRUCTURAL SHAPE OF THE PENTATEUCH 
 
The Pentateuch, and particularly the book of Genesis, shares a fundamental pursuit with Girard, 
that of origins.  Whereas Girard believes he has found the locus of religion and culture in 
humankind‘s peculiar imitative qualities that lead to rivalries and a crisis of communal violence, 
the first books of the Bible are after the origins of Israel.  When it comes to seeking origins, one 
can choose a variety of angles to start from, and what I‘m advocating below is that the two share 
a common basis or key in their investigation and presentation of origins.  Girard calls it mimetic 
desire, and the Pentateuch calls it barakhah, blessing.  
For Girard, when a model is seen desiring an object, the disciple also learns to desire the same 
object.  As in the archetypal discussion of fathers and sons (Oedipus, Freud), this shared desire 
for the same object is initially a good thing.  This is how the disciple will learn to get on in life. It 
is a fundamental function in parenthood.  But because of the proximity of the disciple to the 
model, the disciple begins to view the model as not only desiring the same object, but actually 
possessing it.  The model and the object become so fused that Girard insists that the object is lost 
completely.  The model, in a sense, incarnates the object.  The only way for the disciple to obtain 
the object is through the model.  The disciple must replace the model in all things.  There is a 
double-bind to imitative desire because the disciple is encouraged to imitate the model in his 
desires, but at some point, the model discourages the disciple from pursuing it because the 
disciple becomes a threat to the model‘s desires.  Even more so, the model has grown accustom 
to worshipful status due to the fusion of desire and object in himself.  The model has become an 
obstacle.  Desire becomes double-bound—desire what I desire, yet don‘t acquire the object of 
that desire.  The object meanwhile takes on enormous value the more it becomes elusive and 
seemingly allied with the model.  The more IT is linked with a model, the more it takes on a 
presence and power all its own.
1
  It is what everyone desires, and all presume that someone else 
is in control of IT.  This imitative desire is what fueled Girard‘s early work with the great 
novels.
2
  The central characters in the works of Shakespeare, Proust, or Dostoyevski seem in 
                                                          
1
 A distinctive feature of blessing Westermann (1968:54) observes is found in the fact that the father has only one 
blessing and once it is given, not even the father can revoke it.  It takes on a separate power from the father. 
2
 Girard 1961 Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure. 
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constant pursuit of what everyone else seems to have and the character feels completely devoid 
of.  The character in essence is in search of being. 
From his study of blessing in the Pentateuch, Westermann (1968:19) identifies a similar elusive 
object as blessing, defining it essentially as: ‗…having vital power in its deepest, most 
comprehensive sense.‘  ‗Blessing is vitality…this vital power, without which no living being can 
exist‘ (Westermann, 1968:18).  Blessing is equated with life and the power of life (Westermann, 
1968:20).  It is the ability to thrive.  By way of a starting point, it is critically important for our 
examination of Genesis 1 and 2 to realize two things about blessing.  First, there are close 
parallels with Girard‘s development of the object of desire being wrapped up with a model.  
Second, the interplay of desire for the object among humans structures the narrative.  It is 
especially this second similarity which is elaborated below because it lays a critical ground work 
for the exegesis of Israel‘s origins as having sacrificial underpinnings.   
If we are willing to follow Girard‘s thinking, there are two interpretive keys which must remain 
prominent.  One is the dynamic of mimetic desire among humans leading to a communal crisis 
and the second is the resolve of crisis through the expulsion of a scapegoat. To reiterate Girard 
(1972:288, 229):  
The translation of this violent process into terms of expulsion, evacuation, and surgical operations is made 
in the most diverse cultures. 
…we are not dealing here with a heterogeneous collection of references [to expulsion or purgation across 
the board in myth and ritual], but rather with a unified system, to which the surrogate victim holds the key.  
Whenever we describe the generative process or its products in terms of expulsion, purgation, or 
purification, we are attributing natural causes to phenomena that are not in the least natural because they 
derive from violence. 
Most junctures in the story of Israel‘s origins revolve around the going out or the leaving of 
someone.  Light comes out of darkness (Gen 1), the woman is taken out of man (Gen 2), Adam is 
expelled from the garden (Gen 3), Abel is killed and Cain is sent away (Gen 4), Noah enters the 
ark (Gen 6-9), Abram leaves Haran (Gen 12), Isaac flees to Egypt, Jacob flees the wrath of Esau, 
Joseph is taken to Egypt (Gen 37), the Hebrews are expelled from Egypt, David flees Saul, the 
Samarians are exiled, and finally the Jerusalemites are exiled.  Even more so, these expulsions 
are the repeated affirmation that God himself is in a peculiar way with the one going out. God‘s 
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presence is evident in such movement.  Expulsion is another word for sacrifice.
3
  And once this 
is accepted, one begins to see a structure to episodes all through Genesis and culminating in 
Exodus.  Indeed, we can see how this whole first part of the Pentateuch is structured by the 
theme of generative expulsion.  The ‗birthings‘ (toledoth) from the earth and Israel are 
sacrificially structured.
4
  
 
Van Seters (1992:200) confirms that the patriarchal narratives center on a pattern of wandering 
or journeying and the establishing of genealogies.  This genre is best located in a Greek or 
‗western antiquarian‘ tradition of the wandering hero.  He views this theme5 as etiological, 
primarily meant to explain how a certain city or region came to be settled.  From a mimetic 
perspective, however, Van Seters fails to notice the scapegoat feature of heroes and the nature of 
‗journeys‘ as an ordeal.  The hero is alone in his ordeal.  Common to such stories is the isolated 
nature of the founding father.  He had to have come from outside the community in order to 
establish it.  
 
The equation of Girard‘s sacrificial notion of expulsion with the Pentateuch‘s descriptions of 
‗going out‘ or ‗leaving‘ is bound to make some uncomfortable. Milbank (1990:394), for instance, 
objects to Girard‘s easy conflation of sacrifice and expulsion.  This cannot be fully addressed 
within the limits of this work precisely because some of the critical theoretical assumptions are 
either not fully understood or accepted.   Although the last chapter attempted to dissipate much 
of this, it is admitted that this is simply a juncture.  Those who know and incorporate Girard‘s 
thinking have little difficulty with this and seem to concede to the now conventional objections 
to his theory.  It is not that they agree with the objections as much as concede that for now, no 
response by Girard and others to such objections is able to dissipate such objections (Reineke 
                                                          
3
 In Westermann‘s (1968:9) argument against dividing ‗salvation history‘ and history, he affirms the notion that 
God‘s movement and his Presence are inseparable.  God is present in the goings and comings of the patriarchs.    
4
 Westermann (1974:16) asserts that toledoth always retains the sense of birth even in P‘s use in Genesis 1.  Even 
more so he adds: ‗P has expounded with extraordinary power the real meaning of the genealogy, namely the 
continuous event of generation following generation.‘ In this regard, Jay‘s (1992:xxv) ‗lens‘ into the connection 
between genealogy, male descent, sacrifice, and social cohesion is invaluable.  She clarifies what is critically at 
stake—the continuity between fathers and sons is established through the social act of sacrifice.  To say that Adam 
begat Seth is affirmed sacrificially.   
5
 Van Seters creates confusion when he speaks of ‗genre‘ and then ‗theme‘ as if they were synonymous.  A 
‗Girardian‘ reading, however, would carefully distinguish between them.  There can be an infinite variety of 
‗themes‘ and yet a single ‗structure.‘ 
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2009:16).  Common among conventional commentators is to view the leavings as simply the 
migratory patterns of sub-transient groups.
6
  I would suggest, however, that there is little that is 
‗normal‘ about migrations, then or now.  As the stories of Cain and Babel poignantly reflect, the 
ancients display a high degree of anxiety around wandering.
7
  We need only remind ourselves 
that the wandering of the Israelites in the wilderness was largely viewed as punitive. 
Brueggemann (1977:2) claims that the concern for ‗landedness‘—‗being displaced and yearning 
for place‘—is more central than past theological outlooks have considered.8  Furthermore, he 
connects that directly with the kind of anxiety over transiency created by the modern world.  
Homelessness, both then as now, is a fearful prospect and intensifies the imitative mechanism to 
possess, and as Girard (1968:91) reminds the desire for having are dependent on the desire for 
being.  What people, both then and now, accept due to circumstances, need not be confused with 
what they prefer or long for.  
 
Based on current archeological evidence, Finkelstein and Silberman (2001:89) have advocated 
that the period before the occupation of the early Israelites in the Levant indicates a widespread 
collapse and upheaval of the region at the close of the Late Bronze age, often for mystifying 
reasons.  In other words, the Israelites would have come upon a considerable amount of ‗ghost 
towns,‘ as well as ‗hordes of uprooted people roaming across the Mediterranean to find new 
homes and livelihoods‘ (Finkelstein and Silberman, 2001:89).  It was an especially nervous 
period.  Along with the consciousness of having been wanderers and sojourners in Egypt (and 
perhaps elsewhere), the desire for landedness must have been intense.  
 
The mysterious forces that procure possession are a major concern in the Pentateuch, and 
Genesis profoundly connects that with blessing—the power of life, ‗vital power.‘  Even more so, 
blessing is inextricably linked with ‗going out.‘  In fact, the proclamation of blessing is what 
                                                          
6
 McKeown (2008:78) speaks of the journey of Abraham.  Gunkel (1901:258) speaks of migrations and Westermann 
(1981:78) of ‗transmigration‘ and ‗transhumance.‘  Relying heavily on ethnographic studies of the Bedouin, 
Westermann (1981:148) argues against Gunkel and others that Abrams migration was out of the ordinary.  
7
 De Vaux 1965:14 
8
 Here Brueggemann (1977:6)  along with Westermann (1968:8) contests the preference for dynamic salvific actions 
of God over a more static view of Presence.  By constructing ‗polarities of time and space, history and nature‘, a 
central theology of land has been neglected.  Westermann (1968:15) contends the theological constructs around 
blessing have been similarly marginalized. 
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makes the ‗leaving‘ inevitable.9  A pattern around blessing is recurrent in Genesis.  First, there is 
a proclamation of blessing. Then there is a ‗going out‘ followed by a bestowal of blessing.  With 
Abram, the blessing proclamation is simultaneous with the command to leave.  Here in, we 
might have things in a nutshell. Westermann (1968:30) suggest that such a pattern shapes the 
Pentateuch itself.  Salvation—the act of divine intervention to deliver—is sandwiched in on both 
sides by the announcement of blessing (Genesis) and the enjoyment of blessing (Deuteronomy): 
‗The placing of the history of deliverance (Exodus to Numbers) in a framework of the two books 
where blessing is the dominant theme is important because it shows that the arrangement of the 
Pentateuch, the Torah, expressed the close relationship between God‘s saving activity and the 
blessing he bestows.  There is at least a hint of a wider framework.‘ 
Blessing, Westermann (1968:29) insists, plays a key role in the opening chapters of Genesis.  
With this in mind, insight into the reading of Genesis 1 and 2 to follow will be enhanced by a 
brief survey of some key passages.  By way of representative examples, Exodus 1 and the 
narratives of Abraham and Isaac‘s expulsions are elaborated on below.  Exodus, of course, is the 
most obvious of expulsions as our English title demonstrates, and the first chapter explicitly 
makes clear that the initial pronouncement of blessing in Genesis 1 has become the very source 
of the crisis in Exodus one, for the Hebrews were fruitful and multiplying.  It was blessing gone 
amuck.  The connection of Genesis 1 and the opening scenario in Exodus over the blessing 
proclamation is much too overt to be glossed over.  Furthermore, it is clear that in some ways, 
the leavings of the patriarchs are structured to justify the expulsion of the Israelites from Egypt.  
Similarly, the narratives around Abraham‘s and Isaac‘s expulsions from Egypt and Gerar,10 
explicitly center on blessing and expulsions.  
The survey seeks to establish several foundational points to the interpretation of Genesis 1 and 2.  
First, the opening chapters are aware of and indeed are reinforcing a common narrative structure.  
The structure itself demonstrates a unique perspective on the generative notions of sacrifice, 
namely God‘s propensity to instigate a sacrificial crisis for the express purpose of identifying 
with the sacrificial victim, the one thrust out.  Something of God‘s own identity, revelation, is 
                                                          
9
 Westermann (1968:24-27) argues that in the New Testament, blessing is part and parcel with the commission of 
the apostles.  This call to ‗go out into all of the world‘ has its locus in Genesis he argues.  
10
 As will be discussed below, the periscopes in Gen 12, 20, and 26 are considered by many as variations on the 
same story.  
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uniquely tied to the expelled one.  Second, Girard‘s triangular notion of mimetic desire operating 
with a desired object has strong correlations with the notion of blessing found in Genesis.  
Finally, the mythical structure of sacrifice is being uniquely addressed in these opening chapters; 
God is ‗creating‘ a sacrificial alternative, what I call ‗counter-sacrifice,‘ displacing the mythical 
sacrificial structure and transforming its sacred realm into a new sacred realm which does not 
rely on the regeneration of victims.   
 
4.1 Exodus 1 and the Crisis of Blessing 
 
There is little doubt that a continuity with Genesis is intended in Exodus 1, yet there is an 
intended discontinuity as well for ‗Joseph and all his brothers and all that generation died‘ (Ex 
1:6) and ‗the Egyptians did not know about Joseph‘ (Ex 1:8).  This is in keeping with Brodie‘s 
(2001:19) observation that Genesis is dyptically structured around near death encounters.
11
 
The fundamental issue of Exodus 1 is closely related to a recurring pattern in Genesis, and what 
we might conclude is one of the defining issues or themes in Genesis, that of blessing.  We can 
leave little doubt that the ‗problem‘ of the Israelites in Egypt echoes the blessing found 
throughout Genesis, beginning as it does in Genesis 1.  The proclamation of Genesis 1:28: ‗be 
fruitful and multiply; fill the earth and subdue it…‘ is virtually carried out to excess in Exodus 
1:7: ‗And the descendents of Israel grew fruitful and swarmed.  They exceedingly multiplied and 
the land was filled with them.‘  In Exodus 1:12, the ferocity of God‘s blessing pronouncement is 
compounded in that the more the Israelites were oppressed, the opposite of ‗subdue,‘ the more 
they increased.  The multiplication of a people also meant an increase in strength and hence a 
growing threat and a rival.  There is also a tinge of irony here, however, for the filling of the 
earth is in a contested space.  The blessing is closed in.  The issue, then, becomes a question as to 
whether both sides in a rivalry can thrive in the same space. 
                                                          
11
 For Brodie (2001:19) there are four ‗shifts‘ in the drama in Genesis (chapters 6, 18, 31, and 43).  ‗These four 
shifts have a certain continuity, and this continuity provides a glimpse into the larger kinds of continuities that exist 
between all four dramas.  In each case the shift involves some form of confrontation with death.‘  Brodie (2001:47) 
views this structure as ordering the whole primary history from Genesis to 2 Kings. 
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Strongly implied in the Israelite ‗problem‘ is the provocation of Yahweh.  The relentless march 
of volitional blessing aggravates the sacrificial arrangements of men.  This is something that we 
must reconcile in any recounting of Genesis and Exodus.  Yahweh is consistently and boldly 
presented as the One who initiates and even provokes the crisis, and presses it to the full extent.  
At first glance, this would seem standard mythical fare: some prohibition has been secretly 
transgressed; the gods are offended ushering in some disaster into the community; a sacrificial 
crisis intensifies into a swirl of reciprocity; a scapegoat emerges who then is expelled from the 
community and peace is restored.  This is all the doings of the gods.  But there are glaring 
fissures in the structure here.  For the most part, the crisis is completely stripped of sacred 
connotations.  In other words, the crisis is situated as a human to human dilemma.  In Exodus 1, 
as elsewhere, Yahweh is strangely uninvolved, letting the human players run their usual 
sacrificial course. The difference, I‘m suggesting, is that in the mythical structure humans 
provoke the gods, whereas in the biblical narratives, Yahweh provokes humans. The God of 
these stories is anything but benign.  To borrow from Exodus 15:3, God is a military genius, a 
fighter.  This God, it appears, aggressively addresses the sacrificial crisis; ironically at the same 
time, it is more by His absence and acquiescence than by intervention.  Always the proclamation 
of blessing agitates and aggravates the scapegoat mechanism. 
Another difference I see in the biblical narratives from Girard‘s mythical structure is its ability or 
compulsion to hold two perspectives simultaneously.  It does not opt for the persecutors 
perspective over the victim‘s nor visa versa. It refuses to make an absolute enemy out of either.  
In fact, a kind of sympathy prevails toward the expelling community.
12
   
4.1.1 The pseudo and the real sacrificial crisis in Egypt. Ex 1:10 also critically sets up the 
story, for it is a matter of the Egyptians not wanting them to ‗arise from the land.‘  We can in 
every way understand this as a civil, internal problem.  It is a problem of rivalry and wanting to 
ward off a crisis.  Although the phrase ‗arise from the land‘ is admittedly tricky, there is little to 
dissuade us from the narrative that the Egyptians benefitted from the Israelites remaining in the 
land.  The NIV simply translates it as: the Israelites will ‗leave the country‘, and it is made clear, 
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 This is a very uncomfortable thought today where the view of colonial domination crystallizes into absolute evil. 
Venard Eller (1987:73-102) provides an excellent article on our ability to turn our enemy into an absolute evil, while 
simultaneously absolutizing our own righteousness.  Girard also says this is a way for us to take on the veil of myth 
in modern garb (Golson, 2002:145).  
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that the exodus of the Israelites is most problematic, at least to Pharaoh.  The concern that the 
Israelites will fight against the Egyptians if a war breaks out, is a trivial secondary concern as the 
narrative presents it.  Not until verse twelve are we provided with a negative view of the 
Israelites by the Egyptians, and this only after they began to ‗oppress‘ them. Certainly, this sets 
up one of the more powerful themes in the story.  The one thing the Pharaoh does not want is for 
the Hebrews to leave, and this desire we should note is what Pharaoh must first convince the 
Egyptians of.   
The scenario of Exodus 1 places competing versions of the scapegoat mechanism before us.  The 
issue from the author‘s perspective is over the kind or nature of the sacrifice—Pharaoh wants 
infanticide, but Yahweh wants expulsion.  Both, however, agree on two factors: the method is 
that of passing through water and the victim revolves around first-born sons.  Pharaoh instigates 
the standard sacrificial solution, but Pharaoh‘s crisis in chapter 1 is presented as near folly.  It is 
made to appear ridiculously invented.  What Girard (1985b:111) says about the Joseph story as 
opposed to the myth of Oedipus equally applies here: ‗At every turn, the biblical story ridicules 
the nonsensical evidence against the scapegoat which we have in mythology and replaces it with 
arguments favorable to the victim.‘  But more importantly, Pharaoh‘s preferred sacrificial 
procedure, infanticide, is set up in competition with Yahweh‘s—expulsion of a ‗victim‘ chosen 
by Yahweh and choosing to obey Yahweh.  In this, the arbitrary ‗choice‘ of a victim by the 
‗crowd‘ is seriously challenged.  The deliberateness of Yahweh‘s command supersedes the 
arbitrariness of the gods‘ (read in crowd here) acquiescence.   As the exodus story repeatedly 
reminds us, Pharaoh tenaciously resists expelling the Israelites.  The story, moreover, presses in 
on this resistance with a kind of fierce interrogation, as if to meticulously breakdown a well 
rehearsed line of reasoning, pushing it to a breaking point.  Yahweh sets up the series of plagues 
in a scaffolding attempt to back Pharaoh, or the line of reasoning he is characterized by, into a 
corner.  
There is a circularity, or symmetry, to Pharaoh‘s accusation. The Israelites are desirable to the 
Egyptians in some way.  We could infer that they are already in some service or are a major 
contributor to the Egyptian culture, but the reason is strangely absent.  It may be that it is too 
obvious to be mentioned, but as we survey the similar pattern in the Abraham narratives, we will 
find this strange absence of reason a standard structural element.  Pharaoh and the Egyptians 
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need the Israelites in some critical way.  Simultaneously, however, the Israelites are undesirable, 
based on a perceived potential crisis and not an actual one.  Here, we have Girard‘s stereotypical 
model/obstacle and the classic double-mind of the crowd—I love you; I hate you.  Girard 
(1985a:11-18) poignantly narrows this down as the key issue between Job and his people.  The 
community desires the kind of ‗vital power‘ perceived to embody Job.   Girard (1985b:110) 
outlines the typical scapegoat in Oedipus—some prominent idiosyncrasy or deformity becomes 
‗the sign‘ that something is amiss.  Here the Israelites function similarly to the Joseph story 
which Girard insists strips away such pretense.  Joseph‘s brothers and the Pharaoh‘s wife seek 
Joseph‘s destruction out of shear jealousy. This very ‗destroying the credibility of mythology‘ is 
what Girard (1985b:11) declares is the ‗anthropological truth‘ which the Bible persistently 
presents.   
Oddly though, the mimesis seems to be reversed—it is the apparent model who desires 
something from its potential victim.
13
  We are not presented with reciprocity of violence at all.  
Strangely, the Israelites are never presented as desiring anything of what the Pharaoh or the 
Egyptians have.  But Pharaoh appears to desire what the Israelites have—blessing, that vital 
power, the capacity to thrive.  This, of course, is implied, but infertility of the Egyptians, or at 
least of the royal house, may in fact be the hidden crisis.
14
 
In Ex 1:11, the Egyptians (or vaguely ‗they‘) established taskmasters15 over them.  We can 
rightly assume that up until this point, the Israelites were quite autonomous from the Egyptians.  
It is not clear whether the Israelites were already serving the Egyptians in some capacity, but it is 
clear that a dramatic shift has occurred here.  As Finkelstein and Silberman (2001:117) note, 
immigrants in Egypt were a constant, and the benefit could easily turn into a liability, much like 
the similar tension of immigrants today.  There was a kind of etiquette for groups of people 
living among or near a nation‘s borders (Deut 20:11, Jud 1:30ff).  That they should be organized 
into work groups is specifically mentioned as a way to control them.  (The laying upon them 
‗their‘ heavy burdens is interesting.  But again, the Egyptians never view this as of benefit to 
                                                          
13
 Exodus 1 may give us an extraordinary glimpse into the absurdity of the voice of the crowd.  Peculiarly, 
Pharaoh‘s voice is isolated from the Egyptians. 
14
 Among other things like the plague, Girard (1965:43) views infertility as a classic sign of a sacrificial crisis.  
15
 The sere misim does not out of necessity require a negative connotation here.  It could simply suggest labor 
managers.  If we assume that the noun mas is related to the verb masah, we may find a more negative connotation.  
Masah, which essentially means to dissolve, liquefy, or dissipate, carries the idea of consuming or using up (BDB 
587).  Psalm 39:12 indicates a kind of complete consumption, causing to disappear completely. 
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them other than to be a prophylactic, a kind of preventative measure.)  Most importantly, the 
classic scapegoat scenario is radically laid bare or even reversed.  The Israelites are not viewed 
by the author or the characters within the drama as the cause of any plague, draught, or crisis.  As 
mentioned already, there is the possibility of a crisis of infertility, but even so, the text refuses to 
make this overt.  Pharaoh himself is manufacturing a crisis that the text meticulously debunks.  
The exodus story in fact, reverses the conventional structure—first a scapegoat is produced, then 
the plagues, and finally a sacrificial crisis.  The plagues are in response to a botched attempt to 
scapegoat. In essence the call for a scapegoat is the plague, and it is of the kind the God of the 
Israelites is particularly fond of instigating.  
Pharaoh‘s infanticide (Ex 1:15) apparently begins as a covert operation.  This again, signals the 
weakness of the mechanism.  If it were mythical, the Pharaoh would have appealed to the needs 
of the gods, and the obviousness of their ‗crime.‘  This is one of the more striking features of 
Pharaoh—he never makes an appeal to his god(s).  In fact, the whole story is strangely ‗secular,‘ 
a pattern we also discover in Genesis.
16
  The mechanism is so weak that Pharaoh does not 
initially call for the crowd to work this.  If it were a text of persecution, again, there would be a 
disaster of some kind to lay responsibility on the scapegoat.  But here, this can only be implied; 
nevertheless, the storyteller strips the ‗real‘ crisis (say, infertility) of any force.  That the target 
are boys clearly points to the bottom line issue—rivalry.  We could imply a crisis within the 
royal house which was not uncommon to Egyptian dynasties—a genetic weakness in the line.  
However, this is not the slightest indication that this was in view.   
The opening chapter of Exodus is calculated in its analysis of what is really going on.  The roles 
have been reversed.  The model (Egyptians, but particularly Pharaoh), should possess and 
embody IT, should be an obstacle to the disciple and should incite a rivalry, but there is not the 
slightest envy on the part of the Israelites.  Nor for that matter, do the Egyptians, apart from 
Pharaoh, appear envious of the Israelites.  There is nothing the Israelites desire of Pharaoh.  
Instead, it is the supposed model who believes the Israelites to be in possession of the object 
which Pharaoh desires. The Israelites should be viewing Pharaoh as their model, but they don‘t.  
                                                          
16
 That the Genesis narrative is nearly devoid of references to other gods is something of great interest, although it 
cannot be pursued here.  The absence alone may in fact be a polemic against the idols of the great powers.  What can 
clearly be deduced is that crisis of rivalries is reduced and limited to the realm of humans, and here it shares a 
foundational aspect to Girard‘s theory of generative violence—violence is particularly human.   
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Instead, they are driven by the irrevocable proclamation: ‗Be blessed.‘ There is no reason why 
Pharaoh should see Israel as having anything desirable, but he does.  But we have a critical 
juncture in the model/obstacle triangle.  It is when the model senses a disciple to be a threat who 
is attempting to dispossess the model of IT.  The model perceives that he no longer incarnates the 
object. A loss of or transference of ‗being‘ is perceived.  
 It is now the disciple who has what is desired—blessing, the ability to thrive.  The model 
perceives the disciple to be a rival who seeks the model‘s annihilation.  In contrast to Pharaoh, 
the midwives fear God over against the unwarranted ‗dread‘ of the Egyptians.  Reciprocal 
exchange is transcended; there is no retaliatory action by the Israelites.  We don‘t know whether 
the mid-wives are lying or not, but again the ‗blessing‘ is the problem. 
In the last verse of Exodus chapter 1, the absurdity of the accusation is taken to extremes.  The 
command to throw every new born male into the Nile is Pharaoh‘s second direct appeal to ‗the 
people.‘  Here in verse 22, the accusation is strangely (or intentionally?) absent.  Now the 
scapegoat action is overt, and Pharaoh calls on the crowd to action.  Drowning is a stereotypical 
scapegoat procedure.  It perfectly embodies the victim being totally enveloped by the crowd all 
the while appearing as if it was self-induced.
17
  The victim sinks and his voice silenced under the 
voluminous mass of the crowd‘s verdict.  The discrepancy in the text, whether it is ‗every boy‘ 
or ‗every boy born to the Hebrews,‘18 can be addressed from a structural instead of a textual 
problem.  For one, the command is presented as extreme.  No one ‗inside the text‘, that is the 
Egyptians, the Israelites or even Pharaoh for that matter seems terribly convinced of the 
accusation.  The Hebrew midwives easily manipulate the edict offering smug answers to those 
supposedly enforcing the edict.  Nevertheless, it does reveal what is perhaps, as Levinson 
(1993:ix) proposes, the ‗strangely persistent impulse‘ to sacrifice children.  Moses projects the 
same impulse in the avenging of the Midianites (Num 31:16-19) even extending the slaughter to 
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 Drownings  hangings, and stonings Girard (1982:133) believes, ‗suggest a natural mechanism of self-destruction 
rather than supernatural intervention.‘  In other words, the mob can avoid detection. 
18
 The Masoretic text simply reads, Nbh-lk ‗every son.‘  Samarian Pentateuch, Septuagint, and Targums add ‗born 
to the Hebrews.‘ 
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the mothers as well.  It is the vertical relationship, predominantly expressed in the father/son 
relationship that Pharaoh goes after.
19
 
The ‗sacrifice‘ is equally extreme even if it is limited to the Hebrew infants.  Girard (1982:131) 
makes note of such extremities as telltale signs of the ‗demented logic‘ of mimetic desire‘s 
search for an object.  In his commentary on the beheading of John the Baptist, he speaks of 
Solome‘s extreme request for the head of John the Baptist as a ‗revelation of imitation as pure 
essence of desire, for Solome is asking of her mother to ‗provide her with the desire she is 
lacking‘ (emphasis Girard‘s).  Pharaoh appears similarly as one with no object for his desire, and 
with this logic, Pharaoh‘s call to sacrifice his own son is easily comprehensible.20  When desire 
has no object, it is where, in Girard‘s (1982:144) view, ‗sacrificial intensity reigns supreme‘: 
Submerged in mimeticism the subject loses awareness of self and purpose.  Instead of rivaling the model he 
is transformed into a harmless marionette; all opposition is abolished and the contradiction of desire 
dissolves.  But where now is the obstacle that was barring the way and pinning him down?  The monster 
must be lurking somewhere; for the experience to be complete the monster must be found and destroyed.  
At this moment there is always an appetite for sacrifice that requires appeasement, a scapegoat to destroy, 
or a victim to behead. 
This drive toward a scapegoat is what Girard (1982:146) calls the ‗terrible paradox of human 
desire‘ that can only find reconciliation in the destruction of the object rather than its 
preservation, and this is critical to my exposition below.  For the agreement on a sacrificial 
victim in order for a rivalry to reconcile is ‗the sacrificial beginning of all such exchanges.‘ 
There are other telling absences as well.  There is no mention that the edict was ever carried out 
by the Egyptians.  Of all the moaning that the Israelites did, it is strangely silent about the loss of 
children, which one would think to be the most grievous.
21
  The groaning of the Israelites is 
always in reference to the labor. Also missing is any mention of any infant boys, Hebrew or 
otherwise, actually being lost to the Nile.  Nobody it seems including the Pharaoh‘s own 
household takes the accusation or the edict seriously.  
                                                          
19
 Levinson (1993:15) points to the example of the king of Moab who slaughters his own son on the wall to avert a 
slaughter of the whole city (2 Kings 3:26-27): ‗At the very least, this argues for more continuity between Israel and 
its neighbors to the east in the ninth century that the crude dichotomy of Israelite and ―pagan‖ would suggest.‘ 
20
 This is a good example of how a mimetic reading dispels some of the thorny moral issues in exegesis that has 
often artificially forced interpretation in certain directions, like calling for a textual problem. 
21
 The historical rehearsals such as Psalm 78 and 105 make no explicit mention of infanticide, but do of the hard 
labor.  
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By the end of Exodus 1, a great reversal is evident.  The chapter drives the compulsion for a 
victim to the river‘s edge.  What should be the end of the story in a mythical narrative is the 
beginning of the story, and this is what is accented in the exegesis of Genesis 1 and 2 to follow.  
Because of ‗blessing‘, not a ‗curse,‘ the Israelites are being persecuted. Instead of the good life 
being restored as the result of the victim‘s expulsion, it is presented here as the cause of another 
sacrificial crisis, but one that steadfastly moves away from the recycling of victims.  Ironically, 
the blessing is the plague to those caught up in the mythical cycle of mimesis.  
The radical notion insisted upon through our narrative is this—nobody possesses the vital force, 
the ‗object,‘ except Yahweh.  The ‗object‘—vital power—is inseparable from Yahweh.22  It is 
not a thing that Yahweh has apart from who he is.  Yahweh doesn‘t have life-giving force; he is 
life-giving force. The bestowal of blessing belongs to Yahweh and is inseparable from him.  
Furthermore, it appears that only by ‗leaving‘ can one discover this.  Only a survivor of 
expulsion can understand the true object of desire and its shared nature.  
4.1.2 Exodus 1 an accurate reflection of the ‘age-old rhythm’.  The threat of a sojourning 
family or people in a foreign country, especially Egypt, is a recurrent one not only in Exodus, but 
in all narratives of Israel‘s emergence, and upon closer examination, we find an established 
pattern.   
One thing is for certain.  The basic situation described in the Exodus saga—the phenomenon of 
immigrants coming down to Egypt from Canaan and settling in the eastern border regions of the 
delta—is abundantly verified in the archaeological finds and historical texts.  Finkelstein and 
Silberman (2001:52) assert that the pattern of the patriarchs and of the Israelites fits ‗the age-old 
rhythm in the region.‘   
From earliest recorded times throughout antiquity, Egypt beckoned as a place of shelter and 
security for the people of Canaan at times when drought, famine, or warfare made life 
unbearable or even difficult.  Finkelstein and Silberman (2001:53) remind us that: ‗The historical 
relationship is based on the basic environment and climatic contrasts between Egypt and 
Canaan.‘  Canaan is a typical Mediterranean climate.  It is dry in the summer, relying mainly on 
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 A point Westermann (1968:27-28) insists is central to the Biblical view in contrast to the common ‗magical‘ 
views of blessing shared among Israel‘s neighbors.  
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winter rains for water.  The unpredictability of these rains in turn makes for a general instable 
region.   Although Egypt has its fluctuations too, there is ‗rarely outright famine‘ due to the 
predictable spring flooding of the Nile.  Thus Finklestein and Silberman (2001:53) conclude: 
‗There is good reason to believe that in times of famine in Canaan—just as the biblical narrative 
describes—pastoralists and farmers alike would go to Egypt to settle n the eastern delta and 
enjoy its dependable fertility.‘  It is evidently clear why the Israelites would benefit from a life in 
Egypt.  
A variety of reciprocal relationships could develop from such a pattern, according to Finklestein 
and Silberman (2001:54).  Landless laborers could be employed for construction projects.  
Because of the more transient lifestyles of sojourners, they were readily adapted for trade.  And 
as the Bible provides ample examples, often times they were captives of war made into a slave 
labor force, some of which could rise to important positions managing royal estates.  The lines 
between such distinctions were anything but ‗official,‘ fluctuating depending on the situation.  
Much like today, issues around immigration and transient populations are strained and double-
minded. They make up a valuable, even necessary, part of the infrastructure of a society.  Yet, if 
they remain unassimilated, they can easily become a threat and a target.  But for all the historical, 
environmental and cultural considerations, we must also consider the structural need.  The 
Exodus narrative as well as the stories examined below speaks of the precarious nature of 
communal relationships.  The operative mechanism was a sacrificial system.  These biblical 
narratives accurately reflect the kind of conventional sacrificial arrangements of people trying to 
ward off volatile reciprocal exchanges of violence both from within a community and between 
communities. From this perspective, what Pharaoh needs is a stable sacrificial system to which 
immigrants can provide as long as they can be put in check.   
Girard (1982:175) speaks of ‗sacrificial arrangements‘ in the gospel story of the demoniacs at 
Geresa.  In addressing the seemingly odd request of the demons to go into the pigs, he writes: 
It is essential for them [the demons] not to be completely and definitively expelled. The reciprocal bond 
between the demons and the Gerasenes reproduces on a different level the relationship between the 
possessed and these same Gerasenes observed in our analysis. They cannot do without him or he without 
them.  The conjunction of both ritual and cyclical pathology is not peculiar.  As it degenerates ritual loses 
its precision.  The expulsion is not permanent or absolute, and the scapegoat—the possessed—returns to the 
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city between crises.  Everything blends, nothing ever ends…Physical violence gives way to the violence of 
psychopathological relationships that is not fatal but is never resolved or ended.  
This kind of sacrificial arrangement is similar to one more centered in a cult.
23
  It is a sacrificial 
system that ritually seeks to overt violence by, in a sense, keeping a quasi-permanent scapegoat 
on file.  Westermann (1968:57) similarly speaks of a near mimetic understanding of the 
‗magical‘ origins of the act of blessing: ‗…magic is placed on the same level as religion and 
even science, as one of the possible ways for man to control reality [and its violence], or to put it 
differently, one of the possible ways to encounter powers and forces that are superior to man and 
that can be at his disposal.‘ Girard (1982:175) continues: ‗There remains enough difference 
between the voluntary exile and the Gerasenes who refuse to expel him, enough real drama in 
each repetition to achieve a certain catharsis.‘  The kind of community reflected in the 
Gerasenes, Girard admits, is fragile and precarious, just as most migrating and semi-pastoral 
communities would have been in the Levant at the start of the Iron Age.
24
  Girard‘s insight here 
makes clear Pharaoh‘s need to retain the Hebrews; their relationship ironically provided stability 
to the community.  
These ‗sacrificial arrangements‘ vary depending on the equity of the parties involved.  For the 
most part, they are rarely symmetrical.  The narratives of Israel‘s emergence in Genesis and 
Exodus usually deal with how the lesser negotiates with the greater, but even here, everything is 
precariously balanced.  
4.2. Sacrificial Arrangements and the Expulsions of Abram  
The constraints of this thesis do not allow a full development of what I‘m advocating in this 
chapter—that the narrative of Israel‘s origins is structured around generative expulsions.  To 
reinforce what has already been discussed above, the stories of Abraham‘s expulsions from 
Egypt will further illustrate.  Narratives such as these are invaluable because they make explicit 
the ‗leaving‘ or the ‗going out‘ of the one heeding the blessing oracle as expulsion.  They clarify 
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 Westermann (1968:56) concludes that the account of blessing in Genesis 27 reflect a well-established ritual that 
must ‗precede both theological and cultic ritual.‘ 
24
 Here we can add the assertion of Finkelstein and Silberman (2001:86-87) that the Mediterranean region must have 
experienced a ‗great upheaval‘ where ‗problems would bring the whole economy and social structure of the Late 
Bronze Age crashing down.‘  The violent and overwhelming influx of ‗the Sea Peoples‘ was most likely the major 
cause.  
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what is dormant in other narratives such as man leaving his father and mother (Gen 2:24) or 
Abram ‗leaving‘ Haran.   
The opening scenario in Exodus reveals a reversal of what appears to be conventional sacrificial 
arrangements of the Ancient Near East.
25
  The counter pattern—proclamation of blessing, the 
going out, and then being blessed—is variously repeated in the patriarchal cycles.  The chapters 
leading up to the call of Abram are dominated by the proclamation of blessing in Genesis 1:28.
26
   
The proclamation in and of itself almost automatically jettisons the receiver into an ordeal, 
expulsion, leaving, or exodus.  It thrusts him toward dispossession and wandering.  A 
dispossession is evidently the prerequisite to possession, at least for the God of Israel.  
4.2.1 God irrevocably pronounces blessing.  By God‘s proclamation, life must come forth.  
Once blessing is pronounced, it cannot be retrieved.  This in and of itself busts up the scapegoat 
mechanism.  Choice defeats destiny.   An important aspect, however, must be clarified.  This 
irrevocability of blessing is most evident in the story of Jacob‘s theft of Esau‘s blessing (Gen 
27).  Westermann (1968:56) believes it reveals an early, non-theological, and magical view of 
blessing.  Blessing is an entity acting separately from the giver—not even the pronouncer of it 
can revoke it—and it is physically transferred.  Finally, there is no mention of God and there is 
only one to give upon the death of the father.  The power of life, it appears, eludes all.  Desired 
by all, precariously handled, and only transferred upon the death of the father.  Blessing is the 
elusive Object.  A fundamental truth is buried behind this primitive rite.  It is an entity all its 
own.  Even still, it is most aligned with the father.  Its precarious possession is acquired only by 
the father‘s absence.  Here we encounter a foundational aspect of mimetic theory—the object is 
completely consumed by Desire itself. Once one perceives that the Object resides in the desire of 
another, the true object vanishes.  Says Girard (1978:310):  
There is no longer any object.  Everything comes down to the relationship between the mimetic rivals, each 
of which is model and disciple to the other.  The fact that the object disappears must, I imagine be an aspect 
of desire‘s tendency to become a caricature of itself and proclaim in its own terms its own truth—the 
ascendancy of the mimetic model over the object. 
                                                          
25 Westermann (1968:42) identifies the locus of all religion: ‗We must therefore be aware that what both Testaments 
say about blessing preserve the memory of a procedure that was once central to religion.  It is then clear that what 
the Bible says about blessing involves not something that still survives somehow on the periphery of the biblical 
message by something that was once of all-encompassing significance for religion.‘ 
26
 Westermann (1968:15)  
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The perception of the autonomous and omnipotent power of life gains momentum the more a 
crisis of difference takes hold, the more it is perceived to be possessed by the other.  It may, then, 
appear as if this irrevocable aspect of blessing belongs to the realm of the ‗savage sacred‘ realm.  
It falls in line with the common theme of destiny or luck found in myth. Girard (1978:297, 310ff) 
thinks it of little coincidence that both gambling and madness have ancient origins.  They all take 
on a magical quality. 
 Westermann (1968:31) clarifies the critical distinction in the Bible as it places the power of 
blessing solely in the proclamation of God: ‗This says that Solomon will be blessed, and the 
contexts show that Yahweh acted with complete freedom in making him the bearer of blessing.‘  
For Westermann (1968:36): ‗The distinctiveness of Israelite worship consisted in the fact that for 
it, history—the history of God‘s dealings with his people—played a decisive role.  The center of 
Israel‘s worship was not some form of fertility cult that directly bestowed blessing; it was rather 
God‘s activity in history, the covenant, the commandments that grew out of the covenant, and the 
promises given with the covenant.‘  Blessing is consistently viewed in the Pentateuch as being 
the exclusive possession of God.  All mystery as to its origin and control are vanquished.  When 
it comes to transference of blessing in the patriarchal narratives, the critical factor for both father, 
who is threatened by the son, and the son, who can only gain IT by the death of his father or 
beguiling his brother is in trusting the choice.  It is in honoring the word of blessing.  
4.2.2 Parallel oracles and colliding flights.  It is then, the logos, the definitive word, that 
drive the narratives of origin.  Central to that logos is the object of desire—life. Similarly, in his 
reading of the Oedipus myth, Girard emphasizes the powerful role the oracle of Laius plays, for 
it is the undercurrent and center of the drama.  Although the oracle is rarely mentioned, the 
dialogues perpetually revolve around the prophecy: ‗the son will kill the father and marry the 
mother.‘  Life is not received, but seized.  The son seeks to dispossess the father of what he 
perceives he embodies.  The disciple at some point will seek to seize ‗being‘ that he perceives 
resides in the father and is absent in himself.  As Girard (1965:50) interprets this oracle in 
Oedipus, all the characters in the drama move toward its fulfillment even as they ironically flee 
from it.  Girard (1965:50) calls it the ‗truth of the oracle‘ precisely because it speaks to all of 
humanity and human history—you must kill to posses.  It is the truth of the Other.  Something of 
a similar oracle dominates the book of Genesis: ‗On the day you eat of the knowledge tree of 
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good and evil, you will be put to death‘ (Gen 2:17).27  Cain and his descendents flee from the 
oracle only to compulsively fulfill it. 
 
One thing that makes the Genesis narrative different from the Oedipus drama is that we 
encounter two ‗oracles‘ operating simultaneously.  The ‗counter-oracle‘ declares blessing: ‗be 
blessed, increase, subdue.‘  The other ‗oracle‘ of the elusive object predestines: ‗if you consume 
the fruit of the knowledge of good and evil, you will be put to death.‘  Up until the call (going 
out) of Abraham, the opening chapters of Genesis pit these two oracles against each other.  Cain 
and his descendants act similarly to those in the Oedipus drama.  All are fleeing from the oracle 
that:  ‗you will be killed.‘  They build cities and practice reciprocal violence in an effort to keep 
the oracle at bay (Gen 4).  And they seek at all costs to avoid being a wanderer, being scattered.  
This is amply put in the voice of the people of Babel: ‗lest we be scattered over all the earth‘ 
(Gen. 11:4).
28
  The irony, Girard (1965:50) argues, is that in the Oedipus myth, the flight from 
the oracle only means that everyone is moving toward it.  This is equally true in Genesis.  The 
narrative moves with lighting speed and brevity from Cain‘s mark to Lamech‘s boast of 
excessive vengeance and the nihilistic lament of God in Genesis 6. 
 
Seth and his descendants also experience flight on account of the counter-oracle exemplified 
with Noah (Gen. 7:1).  Noah‘s abandonment begins with and indeed is constituted by the 
proclamation: ‗I will establish My covenant with you, and you shall enter the ark…‘ Noah‘s self-
imposed expulsion
29
 in response to the promise leads him through the ordeal toward the 
reception of blessing, for God ‗blessed Noah‘ (Gen. 9:1).  In the Oedipus and Cain myths, the 
characters desperately flee from the oracle only to return to it.  In fact, the Noah narrative 
exposes the logical end of this kind of flight.  It leads to a complete submergence in 
undifferentiated violence.  Noah also flees in response to the ‗counter-oracle,‘ but he willingly 
moves toward the promise by volitionally entering ordeal as a righteous person. Again, both 
                                                          
27
 The force of the verb twm is more on ‗put to death‘ than dying of natural causes.  This will be discussed more 
thoroughly in chapter 6. 
28
 The uses of the word Uwp have predominantly negative connotations: scattering of an army in defeat (2 Kings 
25:4), of a flock (Jer 10:21), and of a community falling apart (Deut. 4:27).  In the hiphil, it has the added force of 
being driven out (BDB 806). 
29
 Girard (1978:143) makes the case that Noah is a victim of expulsion similar to Adam and Eve and Abel: ‗…a sole 
survivor in a world where all others perish can, thematically, amount to the same thing as a single victim extracted 
from a group in which no one, save the victim, perishes.‘ 
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oracles are irrevocable.  Oedipus and Cain involuntarily drive toward the fulfillment of the 
prophecy.  Even more so, Cain‘s descendents must willingly refuse the counter oracle to head 
down such a path.  With the proclamation of blessing, however, the volition of both the one 
issuing the proclamation and the recipient is repeatedly emphasized.  For one, God always waits 
on the recipient for willing response. This is most evident in the clumsy happenstances of the 
patriarchs, discussed below, and in the Hebrews reticence to leave Egypt.  It is also evident in the 
curse of Cain where God immediately modifies the curse in response to Cain‘s objection. God 
intervenes to retard the force of the other oracle: ‗you will be killed.‘  As Westermann (1968:48-
49) points out, the curse in Genesis does not have the same force as blessing.  It can be revoked. 
Westermann (1968:23) concludes that in the Old Testament, the curse was never ‗theologized‘ as 
was blessing.
30
  Especially in Deuteronomy, the volitional aspect of blessing is inextricably 
linked with the covenant. 
 
Girard (1978:142-143) points to the structural similarity in the oracle in Oedipus and the 
proclamation of blessing in Genesis and Exodus:  
If we turn to the Old Testament, and particularly to the books that come first or those that may contain the 
oldest material, we find ourselves immediately in familiar territory.  Immediately we come upon the three 
great moments we have defined: 
1. Dissolution in conflict, removal of the differences and hierarchies which constitute the community in 
its wholeness. 
2. The all against one of collective violence 
3. The development of interdictions and rituals 
Girard (1978:143) runs through the list of the narratives in Genesis and Exodus and summarizes: 
‗In every one of the great scenes of Genesis and Exodus there exists a theme or quasi-theme of 
the founding murder of expulsion.‘ 
In conjunction with the proclamation of blessing, however, the father voluntary flees.  There is a 
volitional self-expulsion and willingness to go through ordeal.  God commands to leave and to 
enter ordeal.  Had this been interjected into the Oedipus myth, we would have seen Laius flee 
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 This is critical, for the curse very much functions like the logic of the crowd, like sacred logic.  
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with his family, but in response to an oracle counter to the closed oracle: ‗the son will kill the 
father and marry the mother.‘  
From the opening lines in Genesis, the book is characterized by movement.  From Adam and 
Eve, to Noah, to Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, Moses, and finally the Israelites, the apex of the 
narratives center on a volitional expulsion in the midst of a sacrificial crisis.
31
  The voluntary 
expulsion completely undermines the mythical structure.  God is present with those who are 
moving toward the fulfillment of blessing.
32
   
This self-expulsion has two goals in mind.  One, it seeks to defuse or dissipate the anger of the 
rival, or the rivalry itself.  It says, I don‘t have IT, at least not of my own power, my own will, or 
by having killed the rival for it.  Its outcome is similar to mythical sacrificial arrangements; it 
dissipates the rivalry.  But where as in the conventional sacrificial arrangement where the effect 
fades, the one‘s heeding the ‗counter-oracle‘ leave the sacrificial arrangement behind.  Their 
flight is toward something and not a return to something.  The Object, IT, is forever in the hands 
of One who gives it out as He wills.  Second, it seriously calls into question the need for a 
scapegoat.  The sacrificing community is also caused to question the compulsion for sacrifice.  
4.2.3 Desire driven narrative and the father/son relationship We need not mistake anything 
here; the movement in the narratives leading up to the great exodus (Ex 14) are driven by the 
model/disciple relationship where the desire for ‗being‘ as Girard calls it, or ‗vital force‘ as 
Westermann calls it, is centrally at stake.
33
  This contention, ‗the tremendous struggle‘ as 
Westermann (1968:46) calls it, is most exemplified by the potentially lethal relationship between 
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 At first glance, Abram‘s exodus from Haran does not seem to allude to a crisis, but it is the whole pre-history of 
Cain and his flight from the oracle that finds its apex in the closing lines of Genesis 11: ‗The Lord confounded the 
speech of the whole earth; and from there the Lord scattered them over the face of the whole earth.‘  Abram leaves 
Haran and his father, who is also in flight, when the ‗whole world‘ is in a crisis of undifferentiation.  
32
 Westermann (1968:51) clarifies how the ancient magical origins of blessing transform into the Biblical notion of 
blessing as promise. ‗Blessing was related to them in that they arose out of the power of the divine in blessing.  The 
continuity of the effect of blessing is shown by the genealogies, the outlines of family history.  The Yahwist then 
combined this prehistoric view of blessing with history by connecting blessing to God‘s promise, and thereby 
blessing became a component of history.‘  This transformation, I assert, come about through the volitional act of 
both God and human agent.  
33
 Zornberg (1995:xv) grounds his commentary on Genesis squarely on the ‗tension‘ or ‗cycle‘ of desire that ‗is 
present in all dimensions of life, intellectual, interpretive, as well as overtly emotional.  He further describes the 
impetus behind Genesis as ‗the animation of desire, which is generated, paradoxically by the experience of ―not to 
have.  This ―what it has is what is not‖ dynamic, Zomberg curiously labels ―the economics of desire.‖ 
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father and son.
34
  Life is transferred sacrificially.  In other words, it requires the giving up of a 
life.
35
  Fundamental to this requirement is where the object of desire has disappeared, or more 
accurately, who has incarnated the object.  
To possess the father is a basic structure of all myth according to Girard (1965:28): ‗Desiring 
what the latter desires, soon to possess what he possesses, always and everywhere , the son wants 
to conquer the father‘s being.‘ ‗Every man, when he leaves his father and mother, goes towards 
his father whom he will kill and towards his mother whom he will marry‘ (Girard, 1965:30). 
‗The structure reverses itself at the moment the son flees.  The circularity of myth turns on 
perpetual reversals‘ (Girard, 1965:31).   
In his provocative thesis, Levinson (1993:55) argues that the ‗impulse to sacrifice the first-born 
son never died in ancient Israel…‘36  Even though child sacrifices in antiquity included both 
males and females, Levinson argues that the primary concern in child sacrifice, at least in the 
Middle East, is the father/son relationship.  Levinson (1993:55) proposes that the theological 
notion of the firstborn belonging to God is only a ‗transformed‘ version of child sacrifice, a 
practice, Levinson argues, that had a long and accepted history in Israel. In this regard, Levinson 
(1993:26-27) ventures into the same territory Girard has, following the hunch that sacrifice is 
fundamentally grounded in sacrifice of a human, especially to ward off a ‗great crisis of danger.‘ 
The ‗danger‘ included a mob style killing of a father, a king, or a potential massacre of 
inhabitants.
37
  At issue, is appeasement which inevitably is projected onto the sacred level.  The 
gods themselves understand the fundamental requirement of sacrifice (Levinson, 1993:26-27).  
In his recalling of a story from the king of Moab (2 Kings 3:26-27), Levinson (1993:15) reminds 
that the Israelites scattered in flight because they saw, ‗Mesha‘s sacrifice of the first-born son 
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 Although Jay (1992:97) proposes a very different direction than here, she still points to the issue of male 
descendents as a ‗continuing tension‘ in the patriarchal narratives.  Westermann (1968:30) adds: ‗The promise of 
blessing is a motif that permeates these narratives, and the bestowal of blessing, often by a father blessing his child, 
occurs frequently…Blessing is realized in the succession of generations.‘ 
35
 I will leave unaddressed for now the bottom-line issue as to whom is requiring it. From Girard‘s perspective, it is 
ultimately the community who calls for the surrogate scapegoat.  
36
 The premise of Miller‘s (2003:3-5) book is that the sacrifice of a son is prevalent all through history.  
37
 Levinson (1993:27) makes a critical point here that cannot be overlooked, for he notes that the sacrifice of a son is 
a substitution for fathers and kings.   
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having a profound effect upon the deity to whom it was offered.‘38  The outcome of a rivalry 
over ‗being‘ resulted in a mob-style death of either the father/ruler/model or the son/heir/disciple.  
The father offers ‗as a gift‘ his most prized object, his son.39  The original sacrifice was human 
(Levinson, 1993:21).  Its cause was the envious rivalry that threatened to engulf the whole 
community in a frenzy of desire.  The effect of the collective slaughter of the one was miraculous 
unity, peace, and the reestablishment of difference.  
There is, then, the proclamation followed by an expulsion, flight, a leaving.  This is the case for 
both myth and the biblical ‗prehistory‘ of Genesis.  Similarly, peace is restored, but the biblical 
narrative dramatically shifts here.  The victim is saved, not just as some narrow escape from 
death, but with lavish results.
40
  He prospered even more!  Even more so, it was the expelling 
community who directly provides such prosperity.  There is profound conversion here, for both 
the victim and his community experience deliverance. The expulsion is the saving act both in the 
sacrificial mechanism and in the ‗counter-sacrifice.‘  The difference lies in the long-term result.  
For the first, the community is saved minus one, and the mechanism is concealed from the view 
of all.  In the biblical narrative, it is the victim who is saved and in the sight of all.  The delivered 
victim leads the sacrificing community first by revealing the mechanism and then by moving 
away from the compulsion for sacrifice.  In all of this, Yahweh claims victory over all his 
enemies.
41
 
For Girard (1978:149) the biblical accounts constantly exonerate and exhume the victims, 
insisting on their innocence.  Girard calls this the inversion of the mechanism. Herein lays 
perhaps some difficulty with Girard as I am presenting it.  Girard has a hard time saying that 
these acts of God are still sacrificial.  Perhaps it is just a matter of wording, but what I‘m 
advocating is that God is still moving towards and operating within the framework of sacrifice.  
                                                          
38
 The weakness of Levinson is, as so many who delve into the topic, that he does not pursue the whole question as 
to why such an act appeases.  The sacrifice of the king‘s son makes explicit the loci of such sacrificial 
requirements—the crowd.  It is the one sacrifice that dissipates the rage of all.  
39
 The offering of the son from a mimetic perspective is effective precisely because it realistically or symbolically 
functions as the death of the rivalry itself.  With the termination of the apparent rival, the tensions are dissipated.  
40
 An important distinction needs noting here.  The interplay of feast and fast is common in ritual and Girard 
(1972:96)  explains out both play their part in ritual reenactment of the original murder.  Some sacrificial victims are 
know n to be treated like royalty right up until execution.  The paradigmic scapegoat story of Jonah also amply 
demonstrates how extravagant measures are connected to the victim.  The sailors tossed over most of the cargo 
along with the victim.  The difference with Jonah , Abraham, and the Hebrews leaving Egypt is that the expelled one 
lives.  
41
 Westermann (1968:46ff ) connects the blessing, kingship, and themes of Yahweh‘s victory ‗over all the earth.‘  
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It is an ante-sacrifice, like an antedote.  It is a counter-sacrifice, which completely undermines 
the sacrificial system based on the scapegoat mechanism, but it is still a sacrifice.  It is an 
offering made by God.
42
  
4.3 Sacrificial Protocol and the Counter-sacrifice in the expulsions of Abram.   
The episodes of Abram‘s sojourn in Egypt reinforce what was been proposed so far.  All this to 
reiterate several key ‗assumptions‘ going into the exegesis of Genesis 1 and 2.  First, the 
narratives in Genesis are keenly aware of sacrificial arrangements which accurately reflect a 
longstanding protocol of the age and region. The sacrificial protocol finds its fundamental 
impetus in a desire for being that is connected to rivalries of father/son, brother/brother or 
community/community relationships.  Last, the theological outlook of Genesis finds in the God 
of Israel a ‗counter sacrificial mechanism.‘ If properly responded to, it leads one completely 
aware from the compulsion for sacrifice.  
4.3.1 The clash of cultures. Westermann (1968:59) emphasized the critical juncture in 
greeting the stranger in the conceptual development of blessing.
43
  It is perhaps underestimated 
just how volatile a transient entourage would be in Canaan.  The encounter of David and Nabal 
(1 Sam 25) amply demonstrates the volatility of wandering groups. The encroachment of a 
transient group upon a sedentary community is bound to exacerbate a ‗sacrificial crisis.‘  The 
sojourner is close enough to be a part of a community, but different enough to become a rival. 
The sojourner is perfect sacrificial material.  They automatically bring a crisis of difference.  
Hence, the greeting is as critical as anything could be.  It is an extremely tense moment where 
the slightest gesture could turn things toward disaster.  Nabal‘s near fatal encounter with David 
was luckily countered by the wisdom of Abigail.  
The opening scenario of Genesis 12 reiterates the pattern of blessing.  First, there is the ‗oracle‘ 
the proclamation of blessing.  In this instance, the promise fully lays out the pattern and 
immediately emphasizes the irrevocable step toward the true object—Abram must first ‗surely 
go out from your kindred and your father’s house’ (Gen. 12:1).  That the proclamation explicitly 
                                                          
42
 Girard, I believe, would have a hard time saying that this is sacrificial.  
43
 In a discussion of the institution of the priestly blessing (Num 6:22-27), Westermann (1968:43) recognizes a 
theologized version in the ‗approach‘ of potential hostile parties.  The blessing of the priest to the people ‗involves 
God‘s friendly approach to those who will receive him.‘ 
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requires a leaving from both the father and the community is worthy of notice. It is only through 
the experience of expulsion, of being singled out for exclusion, that Abram will be blessed.  A 
true father is one who has left his father.  Furthermore, it is only through this ‗leaving one‘ that a 
true transference of vital power, the IT which all seek but harmfully attach to the imitation of 
another, is realized. Probably most important, it is a voluntary expulsion.  And to some this 
would seem not to make it an expulsion at all, and they are right.  The force of expulsion is 
dissipated by the awareness of the victim, especially by the community expelling him.   
 
In order to understand the unique difference in the structure here, the similarity between the 
Abram narrative and that of Oedipus or Cain should be reiterated.  Both have an oracle laid 
before them and enter into flight.  But significant differences are evident.  The first difference is 
the oracle itself.   The oracle in Oedipus/Cain echoes a truth of who we all are—we presume that 
the very basis of being is acquired through imitation of the Other. The Self will seek to possess 
the Other‘s being.  ‗You will kill the father and marry the mother‘ or in the case of Cain: ‗if you 
eat the fruit of the knowledge tree, you will be put to death.‘  This is the fundamental truth of all 
myth according to Girard (1965:48-50): ‗The original oracle is truth, even for us.  It is the 
expression of the totality, the authentic enunciation of human relations.  And that indeed is what 
explains history.‘ It is the truth that the culprit that Oedipus so earnestly sought to find in the 
Other was in fact himself.  Unfortunately, the myth succumbs to the sacrificial mechanism once 
more, for where the realization of culpability should be a realization for all simply becomes a 
transference from one potential victim to another.  Each character in Oedipus scrambles in a 
frenetic attempt to keep the omnipotent choice of a victim at bay.  
 
And this brings us to the second key difference.  For in the Oedipus/Cain drama, all are fleeing 
away from the truth that we will sacrifice someone in order to procure our own being. The ability 
to thrive requires the destruction of someone else. Everyone seeks to avoid the essential truth of 
myth—all are the culprits.   All hide their culpability in the one whom is expelled from the 
community, the one whom the community has pinned all their culpability on.  ‗Sophocles‘ 
conclusion opens onto the truth of the Self and the Other, meaning their identity in a common 
non-transcendence:‘ reiterates Girard (1965:49).   This very truth is explicit in the oracle of 
Yahweh: ‗On the day you eat of the knowledge tree of good and evil you will be put to death.‘  
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Hence, just like all of those in the Oedipus myth, so too are generations of Cain.  In their effort to 
avoid the curse, they run headlong into it.  
 
Herein lies the significant difference in the flight of Abram.  For one, it is based on a counter-
oracle.  Rather than ‗if you consume the fruit, you will be put to death,‘ it boldly pronounces that 
you will find life if you go this way.  Rather than madly scrambling to avoid the oracle only to 
move closer to its realization, the proclamation of Yahweh says, heed the oracle and you shall 
live. Rather than all fleeing to avoid death at the cost of one, the flight of the one ushers in life 
for all.    
 
There is one other key difference between the Oedipus myth and narratives in Genesis/Exodus.  
In the Oedipus myth—and it is myth because the crisis ultimately finds its resolve in the 
expulsion of a victim—there is only one oracle that dominates the scene.  In the narrative of 
Israel‘s origins, there are two.44  These two oracles are not parallel, however, for they are 
constantly colliding.  At each juncture, the scenario repeats: the collision is implicitly instigated 
by Yahweh; there is a sacrificial crisis where the two sides set up a typical sacrificial 
arrangement; Yahweh directly intervenes to debunk the sacrificial solution by in essence creating 
another sacrificial crisis.  Finally, Yahweh offers a counter-sacrificial arrangement that not only 
spares the victim, but spares the scapegoating community as well. 
 
Yahweh‘s ‗solution‘ is sacrificial; it will also require expulsion, but of a different nature.  It is 
not based on an apparently transcendent and miraculously spontaneous destiny, which in reality 
is the non-transcendent crowd hiding behind the mask of deity.  The sacrificial solution of 
Yahweh is based on the profoundly volitional choice of the Other who truly and exclusively 
transcends the violence of the community.  There are other divergences as well.  God is with the 
expelled one.  He favors him and he moves with him.  What is strongly implicit in the Genesis 
narratives and parts of the Exodus narrative becomes profoundly manifest in the standing pillar 
at the Reed Sea. God is both present and moving out with the one who is moved out.
45
  Last, and 
                                                          
44
 The story of Israel is the story of two kingdoms.  This will discussed in more detail in the concluding chapter of 
this work.  
45
 The paradoxical idea of presence and movement are beautifully held in tension with the pillar at the Reed Sea.  It 
is a ‗standing thing‘ (dwme) while simultaneously being a ‗guiding thing‘ (hxn).  
Chapter 4 – Object of Desire  170 
 
170 
 
perhaps most important, the victim not only survives expulsion, he thrives and does not return to 
the previous sacrificial arrangement.
46
 He moves steadfastly toward that fundamental desire of 
all humans for ‗being‘ without sacrifice.  Equally important, but perhaps even less noticed is that 
the sacrificial community is left to contemplate such mighty wonders. 
 
The tremors from this sequence are ubiquitous, for in it, something profound will be revealed. In 
Abram‘s exodus from ‗his father‘s house,‘ God promises: ‗I will show you‘ where you are going 
(Gen. 12:1).   Furthermore and ironically, this land of blessedness will be revealed to ‗all the 
families of the earth.‘  This will spare even the sacrificial community even as they too abandon 
the veil and ‗leave‘ behind the mythical system. In the end, the God of Israel, the One, has 
sacrificed the sacrificial system itself.  The ‗diffuse haziness‘ of the mythical system is the 
ultimate victim of Yahweh‘s sacrificial intervention.  
 
4.3.2 Abram in Egypt: Gen 12:10-20.  A brief rehearsal of Abrams encounters in Egypt helps 
accentuate what is proposed above.   
 
After the pronouncement of blessing in Genesis 12:1-4, Abram obeys the command.  He leaves 
his father‘s house in Haran and enters the land of Canaan where he builds an altar at Bethel.47  
But when famine hits, Abram moves away from the land of blessing and opts for Egypt.  When 
faced with a sacrificial crisis,
48
 Abram opts for the conventional system.  He moves away from 
the command and returns to a more stable situation.
49
  
 
                                                          
46
 As this scenario is rehearsed below, we will see that this transpires in spite of God‘s people who constantly 
relapse into the mythical structure.  God bars them from returning. 
47
 The absence of Abram‘s father, Terah, should not escape our attention.  The voice of God is heard simultaneously 
with the death of Terah.  Interestingly, in the story of Cain and Abel, the knowledge of God‘s desires, pleasure in a 
sacrifice, becomes evident precisely at the moment when the father is conspicuously absent.  Although this cannot 
be explored at length here, it can be conjectured that something of the will of the father is transferred to God.  If this 
be the case, there may be something to the voluntary giving up of the son by the father asking for a voluntary 
expulsion from his son.  
48
 We need not concern ourselves with hidden or figurative meanings.  Famines can obviously exacerbate a human 
crisis and it is a perfect reflection of a human crisis. As far as the narrative here, the famine and the perceived threat 
to Abraham‘s life are the same.   
49
 The going back and forth between Canaan and Egypt in the patriarchal cycles indicates a relapse into the mythical 
structure, regardless of the obvious natural explanations.  Girard (1965:31) comments on a similar pattern in 
Oedipus: ‗The double movement from Thebes to Corinth and from Corinth to Thebes suggests a double reciprocity 
in which identities are confused. In the midst of this confusion which needs to be rendered systematic, certain 
distinctions remain and even become sharper, but they are always relative and reversible.‘ 
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As mentioned before, everything hinges on the greeting.  A sacrificial arrangement must be 
forged in order to ward off an all-against-all outbreak of violent reciprocity.  Abram offers a 
surrogate victim, his wife.  The handing over of a woman is easily attested to in the Old 
Testament as a ‗diplomatic‘ arrangement.50 The beauty of the woman is inevitably central and 
signals the potential volatility of the crisis. One would think that the narrative would focus on 
rising tensions over the scarcity of resources; instead, the crisis is squarely focused on mimetic 
rivalry. 
 
Sarai‘s beauty indicates two things.  She is a sign, par excellence, of a blessed state (Job 42:15, 
Amos 8:13, Esther), especially if accompanied by wisdom (Prov. 31:10ff, 1 Sam. 25:3). They are 
seen as enhancing the vigor (blessed state) of the ruler (1 Kings 1:3).  Second, a beautiful woman 
can be an extremely volatile entity that can potentially set off a flood of unrestrained violence. 
Helena of Troy readily comes to mind, but the Old Testament bears witness as well: the 
daughters of men and the Nephilim (Gen 6), Dinah (Gen 34), Tamar (2 Sam 13), Abigail (1 Sam 
25).  It is not out of an unwarranted fear that Abram acts in such a matter. He well knew that 
some had no qualms about over-stepping such a boundary (Gen 19, Judges 20).  Girard 
(1972:220) also argues that marriage arrangements as well as the universal taboo of incest are by 
nature sacrificial arrangements primarily designed to dissipate the potential lethal threat of 
warring males over a desired female.
51
  
 
The ‗taking‘ of Sarai into Pharaoh‘s house (Gen 12:15) seems to intimate an accepted ritual 
practice.  Westermann (1981:161-162) makes the case that these narratives of encounters are 
dependent on an ancient structure that must reflect well-established patterns around greeting 
(1981:274-276).   Abram understood that he would need to offer ‗a sacrifice.‘  And we must 
understand, as perhaps we haven‘t in past readings, that an offering of a woman is a peace-
offering.  It is a gesture that can signal release of rivalry.  Pharaoh, in a sense, asks the stranger 
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 De Vaux 1965:116 
51
 De Vaux (1965:33) reminds that there were hardly any religious overtones to ancient marriage arrangements.  It 
was strictly a ‗civil‘ arrangement, but Girard would add that it serves the utilitarian need to police violence.  
Chapter 4 – Object of Desire  172 
 
172 
 
and possible rival to give him a part of his ‗vital force.‘  This may in fact be a way to weaken 
Abram as a rival.
52
   
The immediate consequence falls in line with benevolent aspects of sacrifice—peace and 
prosperity, for Abram declares that the ‗taking‘ of Sarai will result in a good situation for him 
(Gen 12:13).  In several ways, the language here indicates a surrogate offering, for Abram insists 
it is ‗on account of you‘ his life has been spared.  This word is a noun cognate form of rbe 
which carries vestigial connections with scapegoat sacrifice. Its most basic sense is to cross-over 
or pass over.  It is a possible eponym for Hebrew, which may in fact be a derisive term for 
immigrant or ‗border-crosser‘.53  Interestingly, certain noun forms denote excessive or extreme 
outbursts of rage, to infuriate.  The idea suggests anger that overflows the boundaries that 
normally contain it.
54
  Oddly, another form denotes generation, growth, or production.
55
  The 
generative cognate form is used here with the prepositional use of ‗for the sake‘ or ‗on the 
account of.‘ It is used to affix blame (Gen 3:17), and significantly to spare one from destruction, 
especially from interminable rage (Gen 18:26, 29).  It also speaks of showing favor based on the 
selection of another (Gen 26:18).  The idea of surrogacy is further reiterated with another word 
in the phrase, llg, which means again ‗on account of‘ or ‗for the sake‘, but also carries more a 
volitional force; hence, someone might be spared based on the good actions of another (Gen 
39:5) or be punished based on evil actions of another (Deut 15:10, 18:2).
56
  The latter part of 
verse 13 is chiastically arranged placing special emphasis on Abram‘s life: 
 Krwbeb – because of you 
   htyx – that it lives  
   yspn – my life 
 Kllgb – on account of you 
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 The verb for take xql equally denotes to give, go out or to take, seize, and even steal. Laqach holds a wide array 
of both positive and negative denotations (TWOT, 482).  And as we will probe more in the next chapter, this duality 
to words may in fact be a vestigial remain of the polarity found in the original scapegoat victim.  The victim holds 
omnipotent benediction and malediction nearly simultaneously.  As the victim is seized and her life taken, the 
community receives its life. 
53
 BDB 720 
54
 BDB 720 
55
 BDB 721 Again, benevolent and malevolent ideas coincidently sharing the same root.  
56
 BDB 164 
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Sarai was ‗taken,‘ xql, into Pharaoh‘s house, and this ‗caused Abram to be treated well.‘  The 
hiphil indicates that the source of Abram‘s prosperity was due to the newly established peace 
arrangement brought on by the exchange of a woman.  It could quite possibly have been a token 
of loyalty of one under subjection.
57
  Westermann (1968:29) correctly makes clear lines of 
distinction between blessing and peace: ‗berakhah, is the power of growth vertically, from 
generation to generation…; shalom is the well-being of a community horizontally.‘  The ability 
to thrive, blessing, appeared to have been procured just as easily under the conventional 
sacrificial method. Simply put, this ‗angle‘ made Abram wealthy, so it is made to appear as if 
blessing can be obtained via the conventional sacrificial arrangement.
58
  It effectively brought 
peace, but it endangered the ‗vertical‘ relationship. It effectively derails the destiny of the one 
whom God has called to heed the oracle and to pass on from ‗generation to generation‘.  
The conventional sacrificial arrangement is rudely interrupted by Yahweh, for He ‗afflicted 
Pharaoh and his house with great plagues on account of Sarai, Abram‘s wife‘ (Gen 12:17).  
Several key elements of the narrative require attention.   
First, up until this verse, the story proceeds along human-to-human lines.  Yahweh is silently 
acquiescent.  Abram proceeds to carry on with his life negotiating the usual hazards of human 
existence.  But this particular human has a problem because his life has been disrupted by the 
counter-oracle, a proclamation of blessing.  The oracle is irrevocable and unavoidable.  Herein 
lies a key which must be grasped simply because of its repetition in nearly every ‗leaving‘ in 
Genesis—strongly implied is the provocation of Yahweh toward the sacrificial mechanism.  This 
is a covert operation, not for public scrutiny.  It is critically implemented at the moment of 
proclamation and with the one who in heeding the oracle ‗leaves his father‘s house.‘59   
Second, Yahweh‘s intervention implicates everyone, indeed the whole situation.  It is a judgment 
on both Abram and Pharaoh.   For one, Abram did what he ought not to have done.  He offered a 
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 De Vaux 1965:116 
58
 Westermann (1968:46) identifies here as elsewhere a three-fold fertility—body, field, cattle—that sums up the 
very essence of blessing: ‗Blessing is the power of growth—of fertility, of prosperity as that power expresses itself 
in a healthy people in a fertile land.‘  
59
 This point is expounded upon more thoroughly in the next chapters, but by way of cursory examples, we can 
recall the Exodus 1 discussed above.  There is also Genesis 3 where Yahweh is nowhere in the picture, but suddenly 
appears ‗walking in the garden.‘  Yahweh is apparently absent in the flight of Jonah as well.  Finally, we can note 
that in the story of Esther, there is no mention of an overt action on the part of God, yet the whole story reads of 
perpetual provocations to conventional scapegoating mechanisms.  
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married woman.  He intentionally put Pharaoh and Egypt in a dangerous situation. Abram 
dangerously manipulated the sacred boundaries that keep the floods of chaos from encroaching.
60
  
In the complaint of Pharaoh (Gen 12:18), the narrative takes pains to exonerate Pharaoh in this 
regard.  Even so, the plagues particularly single out Pharaoh‘s house.  The flippant assumption to 
seize a sacrificial token is aggressively cut down.    The requirement for sacrifice is roundly 
judged as human concoction and profoundly flawed.  There is one notable exception to the 
culpability of the community—the surrogate victim.  And in this regard, the plagues particularly 
function to rescue Sarai while simultaneously deconstructing the sacrificial system.  The very re-
ception of Sarai by Abram is a profound rebuke, for the call to ‗go out‘ was given to Abram in 
particular.  The acquisition of being, blessing, is only realized when the son leaves and does not 
return to possess all that his father is.  
At this point, the story reads in mythical fashion (Gen 12:17-20): there‘s a violation of sacred 
prohibitions, a god is incensed and instigates a plague.
61
  The frenetic search for a culprit ensues, 
and a victim is cast out.  The problem is fixed by expulsion.  First, Abram is to take, xql, his 
wife back and commanded to go.  In Pharaoh‘s command, I find a double-play which is unique 
to these narratives.  Even as the community expels the involuntary scapegoat,
62
  Pharaoh, 
perhaps mercifully, calls on both Abram and Sarai to ‗go‘ (Klh), requiring a volitional act.  
Pharaoh commands them to go, and yet sends them out.  This is different than Gen 12:4 where 
Abram left in response to Yahweh‘s command. We must retain this distinction as the Bible does.  
There is a voluntary leaving, for Pharaoh‘s command to go (Gen 12:19) echoes that of Yahweh 
(12:1).  But in the case of Pharaoh‘s command there is also an involuntary expulsion.  From 
Pharaoh‘s point of view, the sacrificial mechanism proves effective, for the plague ceased.  But 
from the narrator‘s point of view (and ours), a marvelous irony has emerged.  The expelled one, 
now both Sarai and Abram, not only survives, but thrives (Gen 13:2).  If we imply here what is 
overtly expressed in the exodus narrative, then it was Pharaoh who lavished riches on Abram 
                                                          
60
 This may be of some divergence here, but I‘m reminded of the great civil war in America.  Surely, the tension 
over slavery was a sacrificial crisis, but the war that finally broke out was far more devastating than anyone had 
imagined.  The deep national wounds from that war are problematic to this day.  Lincoln had always felt that slavery 
would slowly die out.  The modern era clearly demonstrates the problem of violent, over-powering, ‗shock and awe‘ 
solutions to our own violence.  
61
 We may well read that the incensed god is really the threat of mob violence.  The relationship between Abram and 
Lot clearly indicates that internal rivalries were equally volatile (Gen 13:5ff).   
62
 In the piel, being sent away, xls, clearly involves expulsion, death, or divorce.  It carries a clear sense of 
abandonment (TWOT: 929). 
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even as he was casting him out.  In this act, Pharaoh acknowledges a certain dismemberment of 
the sacrificial system even in the very act of upholding it. Something has affected the victimizer.  
There is a blessing in the expulsion.  Abram comes through it and is even more blessed. 
Most importantly, Abram continues on in his steadfast march away from his father‘s house, 
always with the irrevocable oracle as his impetus.  There is an implied blessing throughout.  One 
that Abram does not see himself.  Abram is protected and rescued even from his own botched 
sacrifice.  Furthermore, it is a saving act for both Abram and Pharaoh; both are spared.  Finally, 
it is Yahweh‘s pronounced and irrevocable blessing on Abram that guides the whole story.  The 
main attribute of blessing at this point is protection. 
 
There is something else which we cannot fail to notice—Sarai is rescued as well.  Abram sought 
to avoid becoming a victim by seeking a surrogate in his wife.  Abram, moves away from the 
counter-oracle to leave the father, to volitionally leave the desire to possess the father.  He 
retreats into conventional ‗safe‘ patterns.  He gives up his wife.  He chooses to sacrifice rather 
than to be a sacrifice. This narrative will have none of that.  Time and again, Abraham and his 
sons seek to return to ‗the father whom he will kill and his mother whom he will marry.‘ But 
even more so, time and again Yahweh intervenes to thwart the pattern.  Repeatedly, the 
efficacious conventional sacrifice is denied.   It matters little whether the surrogate is a woman or 
a son, Yahweh repeatedly refutes surrogate sacrifice.  The onus is exclusively on the father—
leave your father and don‘t turn back.  
As for comparison with Oedipus, the whole story revolves around the hunt for a culprit, who 
ends up being the scapegoat victim.  As in Oedipus‘ case, by the end, it matters little whether 
Oedipus is actually the cause.  That he is effectively the cause is all that matters.  Abram may 
perhaps have done nothing wrong, but he is effectively the cause.  He is expelled.  He is the 
scapegoat. 
4.3.3 Abraham and Abimelech.  This narrative follows an established pattern, one which is 
repeated with slight variations in the story of Abraham and Abimelech (Gen 20) and of Isaac and 
Abimelech (Gen 26:1-16).
63
  Westermann (1981:161) considers it a settled matter that these three 
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 The symbolic nature of the ruler‘s name, ‗Abimelech‘ (my father is king), should not escape us.  
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narratives are variations of the same story with Gen 12 being the earliest.  Even more so, 
Westermann (1981:162) argues that this pattern is not just a textual similarity.  It must accurately 
reflect a common reality among semi-nomadic communities.
64
    
 
‗The structure of the narrative is particularly neat and clear,‘ Westermann (1981:161) asserts.  It 
is all set in motion by upheaval. The plight of famine is not mentioned here; instead, the story 
comes on the heels of the annihilation of Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen 19).
65
  Here, we must 
recognize that movement, especially flight, dominates the whole structure (Gen 19:17).  A 
sacrificial crisis sets the stage.  There is a premeditated sacrificial arrangement in anticipation of 
encountering the major obstacle to one‘s desires (Gen 20:2).  There is only room for one to pass 
on the narrow road.
66
  Someone‘s life must be relinquished (Gen 20:2).  The reasoning is 
provided for such sacrifices to be offered—it is to spare the life of the one in flight.  The one 
who by oracle was called to voluntarily leave the father, now seeks to renege, acquiescing to 
conventional protocol.  The one who should have chosen a volitional expulsion—the very act of 
voluntary expulsion radically undercuts the involuntary nature of scapegoat victims—opts to 
offer an involuntary replacement.
67
  The sacrificial arrangement backfires, creating an 
exacerbated crisis, for now there is a plague (Gen 20:3).  This crisis is viewed as the deliberate 
intervention of Yahweh.  The variations in the story make clear that it matters little whether there 
was an actual plague (Gen 12:17) or a potential one (In Gen 20, Abimelech finds out in a dream 
and in Gen 26 he finds out by seeing Isaac and his wife together).   The critical factor is that a 
major prohibition has been breached, and this is by far and away the most dangerous of 
situations.  The breach of this prohibition threatens to set off a plague of reciprocal violence 
where ‗everybody wants to make the Other the scapegoat whose death or banishment will save 
the collectivity‘ (Girard, 1965:53).  Furthermore, the contagion of violence is left vague as to its 
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 We can further add the affirmation of Finkelstein and Silberman (2001:115) that this pattern spans several 
millennia. It is deeply embedded in the socio/psychological patterns of the region.   
65
 Here is a case in point.  Like parables, variation in details should not distract.  Famine has the same potential to 
annihilate a city as does a rain of fire.  Speaking of the famine of Athens, the priest says in Oedipus Rex: ‗Keep the 
State from going down in the storm!‘  A crisis of undifferentiation, whether by nature or human invention, is always 
the precursor to sacrificial demand.  
66
 ‗Father and son meet on the same road, and this road is too narrow for the both of them.  One must yield his place 
to the other.  At no time can the city have more than one king, at no time can Jocasta have more than one husband.  
To want to be Oedipus is to desire what Laius desires, it is to imitate Laius at the fundamental level of desire, it is to 
desire to be Laius.  Driven by the same desire, the two men are constantly headed towards the same violence.‘ 
(Girard, 1965:28, emphasis Girard‘s). 
67
 As is equally the case with Isaac (Gen 22), the story is deaf as to the thoughts, feelings, or volition of the victim. 
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target.  For it could just as easily refer to a threat of death from within one‘s own community or 
between communities.  This is where the attempt to exonerate Abraham‘s rival comes into play, 
for ultimately it is the community who is demanding sacrifice.  
 
The crisis is resolved by the expulsion of a victim, but as mentioned above, this is where the 
story takes a decidedly different shape.  In this version, the innocence of Abimelech is especially 
accented (Gen 20:4-6).  At first glance, this appears like the classic mentality of persecutors who 
see their actions as completely right and the victim as completely guilty.
68
  Abraham, however, is 
an equal partner to the sacrificial arrangement.  With the insistence on Abimelech‘s innocence,69  
Abraham‘s guilty is strongly suggested.  Of course, Abimelech knows no other protocol, but 
Abraham must learn an entirely foreign approach.  The narrative is interrupted with clear 
commentary—Abraham should know better because he has been given a counter-oracle. The 
insistence on Abimelech‘s innocence provides reasoning for the ironic lavishing on the victim.  
This too is common practice,
70
 but again, the glaring difference that the victim not only survives, 
but thrives and God is with the one going out.     
 
First, Abram must take back his wife just as he must take back his son in a later more infamous 
story.  Yahweh, it appears, is not interested in fathers sacrificing their women and children in 
their stead.  Next, Abram‘s counterpart enacts this double-play expulsion—he forcibly expels 
him even while simultaneously and ironically beseeching him to leave (Gen 20:15).  Ironically, 
we have a sacrificial victim being blessed even in his expulsion.  He is rewarded for leaving on 
his own volition.  The victims not only survive, they thrive.  They receive IT, the object of their 
desire without possessing another, without seizing it from another. They are caused to see that 
the object of their desire resides outside the imitation of another human.   
 
Again, the later stories make clear what was implicit in the first; the very source of Abram‘s 
blessing is the community who is expelling him. The sacrificing community survives as well 
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 Girard (1982:6) 
69
 In the ‗integrity of heart‘ (Gen 20:5) phrase, the word Mt carries a strong sense of completeness, suggesting a 
kind of thoroughness as to proper protocol (BDB 1070).  Abimelech soundly reasoned from the logic of the mythical 
structure.  The parallel phrase ‗cleanness of hands‘ reinforces the idea of completely free from guilt.  Abimelech acts 
completely within the framework of conventional practice.   Violence can be avoided if sacrifice is made.  
70
 Girard (1972:96 ) 
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albeit still through the conventional scapegoat mechanism.  But in their lavishing the victim with 
gifts something of a revelation has occurred.  Through the voluntary sacrifice of Abram, the 
community is caused to question the source of such sacrificial demands.  They see their ‗victim‘ 
as human.  In an act of newly realized humility, they lavish gifts on their victim and effectively 
acknowledge that ‗vital power‘ does not reside in them.  The Object has been separated and 
distanced from the model.  In the account of Abimelech and Abraham, the picture of a redeemed 
community is accented.   Abimelech ‗restored his wife to Abraham.‘  The victim returns alive to 
the community that expelled her.  This return, meant restoration for the sacrificial communities, 
resulting in the blessing for all.  By returning the victim (and we should notice that it is the 
sacrificial community who does this), the rivals are reconciled and thrive.  Abraham reciprocates 
in a ‗turn around‘ as well.  Abraham intercedes for the expelling community.  Again, this is 
exactly how the mythical structure works; the victim becomes the source of blessing as it takes 
on a sacred character.  In this case, however, a huge exception must be noticed—the victim is 
alive, thriving, and viewed as fully human.  
 
A further irony occurs, for a certain fear or sacred aura overtakes the community (Gen 20:8).  
Visitors often did take on such an aura, as the story of the visitors at Mamre (Gen 18:1-16) 
reveal.  But the healthy fear of strangers diminishes the more settled and fortified a settlement 
is.
71
  In Girard‘s mythic structure, the victim also takes on a sacred character. This in fact is how 
Girard envisions the origins of divinities.  Victims are dead kings, heroes, ancestors, sons, or 
strangers who because of the scapegoat style death resulted in peace for the community.
72
  The 
critical difference is that now the sacrificing community sees the expelled one as the product of 
their violence. The veil has been torn into.  
 
4.4  Conclusion   
                                                          
71
 Yes, there was an interdependence between settled and semi-nomadic communities, but the vulnerability still 
resides mostly with the ger.  Westermann (1981: 276-77) explains the sacred character of the visitor expressed in the 
reception of the three visitors at Mamre (Gen 18:1-16).  But Westermann explains this sacredness strictly from the 
point of view of a Bedouin culture.  In other words, a semi-nomadic people simply encircled offer precious little 
protection.  An encampment of such a nature has much to fear at the approach of a coming entourage.  And as 
always, everything depends on the initial encounter, the greeting. The situation is most dangerous and can easily 
result in an outburst of violent reciprocity. 
72
 Baile (1997:97ff ) offers an detailed example of this in the case of the Aztecs and the myth of Quetzalcoatl.  
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When one thinks about the narratives of the patriarchs, we can understand why the stories of the 
patriarchs are called cycles because it recycles the same narrative structure.  The stories of 
Abraham almost all center on these dangerous encounters of negotiating the potential sacrificial 
crisis.  There is Abram‘s encounter with Melchizedek (Gen 14), the visitors at Mamre (Gen 18), 
and Lot in Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen 19).  Also, there are the cycles of Abram‘s relapses into 
the old sacrificial system: twice offering Sarai, the aqedah of Isaac (Gen 22), and the expulsions 
of Hagar and Ishmael (Gen 21). There are the leavings of Jacob (Gen 27:28) and of course 
Joseph as well.
73
   In particular, the primeval history sets up parallel tracks based on the 
expulsions Cain (Gen 4) and Adam/Abel/Seth (Gen 3). 
 
Girard equates sacrifice as primarily an all-against-one expulsion of a victim which resolves the 
crisis and ushers in a return to prosperity.  The Genesis/Exodus narratives are structured around a 
series of ‗leavings,‘ while simultaneously offering a peculiar bent to the typical sacrificial 
resolve.  For one, the narrative doesn‘t challenge the primary and necessary premise that an 
expulsion of a victim is the definitive act of generation.  From the expulsion of light from the 
desolation of primordial earth (Gen.1:2, 3) to the extraction of a women from the side of Adam, 
from the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden to the pronouncement of Cain‘s restless 
wandering, from the destruction by the flood and Noah‘s preservation to the scattering of people 
at Babel and to the leavings of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Joseph, God is shown to be the 
driving force behind all these expulsions.  Along with the structuralists, Girard‘s (1978:108) 
fundamental assertion that myth is a movement from undifferentiation to differentiation 
collaborates with the Bible‘s narratives of origin.  The stories in Genesis and Exodus are 
mythical in the sense that communal vitality, life, and productivity—blessing—are generated 
from a particular and crucial moment when the crossover from crisis to clarity happens.  It is the 
decisive moment when something is jettisoned or emerges from undifferentiation to 
differentiation.  This notion is ubiquitous in myth.  
Two things, however, emerge from the expulsions, ‗leavings‘ or ‗departures‘ of the patriarchs: 
first, the conventional sacrificial arrangement is proven defective; second a new ‗sacred‘ sense 
                                                          
73
 Girard (1985b:107ff) delineates the similar scapegoat characteristics of Joseph and Oedipus.  
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emerges. There is a potential threat of mimetic rivalry over the primary issue of blessing, 
botched attempts at a sacrificial resolve, and a resolve in the expulsion of a victim.  There are 
also, however, some odd glitches or hiccups in the usual mythical arrangement that bear 
examination.  The sacrificer, the Egyptian ruler who ultimately expels the sojourner displays a 
consistent reluctance to expel.  Even more so, the expeller is shown to be relatively innocent of 
his actions, or to be at least tricked or manipulated into a forced removal of the sojourner.  There 
is a driving reason why expulsion is resisted that needs examination.  Within these curious 
stories of Abram in Egypt, we have one of the curious interplays so prominent in Exodus—
Pharaoh must ‗drive you out‘ and ‗let go‘; simultaneously, Yahweh will ‗bring you out‘.  
Immediately, it must appear as an expulsion, but overall, it is Yahweh who brought about His 
plan in, through, and around the conventional sacrificial mechanism. Yahweh is viewed as a 
sacrificer, but of a unique kind.  For one, God chooses the victim in stark contrast to the arbitrary 
selection that the crowd produces.  In a powerful dynamic, He calls or asks his ‗victim‘ to 
voluntarily undergo expulsion.  Even more so, He compels his chosen one to trust in Him that he 
will survive the sacrificial experience.  The sacrifice is a voluntary expulsion.  The powerful 
theme is that God is on the side of the victim and the victim can survive being sacrificed.  Here, 
the biblical narrative appears to radically diverge from the conventional scapegoat mechanism.  
The victims not only survive, he and she thrive.  But perhaps even less noticed is that the 
expelling community is spared and also thrives.  The reciprocal rivalry leading to the threat of 
all-against-all is dismantled in a way that spared all.  
In the next two chapters, we will see how Israel‘s versions of origins, chapters 1 and 2 of Genesis 
frame the generative activity of God similarly to what has been discussed above with the 
patriarchs, extending the unique sacrificial intervention of God to ‗the heavens and earth.‘ 
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5  The Sacrificial Structure of Israel’s Cosmogony: Genesis 1 
 
In the proceeding chapters, the exegesis of the Bible‘s most familiar creation passages 
will yield priority to the assumptions and approach of mimetic theory.  This is not to 
ignore the more conventional methods of criticism established over the last two centuries 
in biblical studies.  But whereas the usual concerns of authorship, historical development 
of the text, and the historicity of the content are addressed first, here we will explore how 
or to what extent the narrative is operating by the structure of mimetic rivalry and its 
resolve in the scapegoat.  Furthermore, we will interrogate the extent to which the author 
is aware of such a structure and addresses it in some way, either by reinforcing, 
reinterpreting, or perhaps dismantling it.  The conclusions arrived at from this perspective 
will then be incorporated into reevaluating some of the current issues in Old Testament 
studies of Genesis and the Pentateuch. 
Hopefully, enough explanation of Girard‘s perspective and the criticisms of it have been 
supplied that will allow us to proceed without a constant apologetic regression.  With this 
in mind, a reiteration of some basic mimetic concerns bears repeating.  The dynamic of 
imitative desire playing out in rival doubles is, of course, critically important.  In this 
regard, the elusive IT, the object of desire that the model appears to posses and even 
embody, is explored.  Genesis has given it an identity and elaborates extensively on it.  It 
is called blessing, that vital force that everyone in the narratives appears occupied with. 
The other key component will be to locate the sacrifice of the victim or the vestigial 
traces of a scapegoat sacrifice in the text.  The victim is the central locator for the 
sacrificial crisis and its resolve for the community.   
 
5.1 Forcing a Sacrificial Reading on the Text? 
Immediately, there is a striking difference with Genesis 1 as compared to the narratives 
of the rest of Genesis as well as mythological accounts such as Enuma Elish. Genesis 1 
has only one animated character—God.  Thus at a cursory glance, a ‗sacrificial‘ reading 
of Genesis seems more like eisegesis rather than exegesis. How can one speak of rival 
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desires, of violent resolve in an all-against-one expulsion and a restoration of peace by 
the establishing of prohibitions?  Sacrifice is a communal affair, and hardly any 
‗community‘ is in view.  We are investigating, however, a sacrificial structure, and this 
does not out of necessity require ‗characters.‘ Nevertheless, Westermann ( 1974:80) 
affirms its narrative structure; it is a story.
1
  Albeit stripped of narrative elaboration, the 
structure can be elicited as follows: 
1) There is symmetry, parallel parts which exacerbates a loss of difference. 
2) An entity emerges, goes out, or is expelled from this symmetry. 
3) The exiting entity is the focal point that reestablishes difference. 
The anomaly of Genesis 1 is that the ‗dramatic‘ element is compacted into the first three 
verses.  ‗If one were to look for any tension in 1:1-2a,‘ Westermann (1974:80) observes, 
‗it would be in 1:2 and its link with the preceding and following verses.‘   
 
 
    Conventional narrative 
 
 
 
 
    Narrative in Genesis 1 
Figure 1.  
                                                 
1
 With this we can also be aware of Watts‘ (2007:178) insight that the more violent aspects of sacrifice are 
more apparent in narrative than in prescription.  
climax 
outcome struggle 
crisis
s 
scenario 
Scenario God Created 
Crisis – earth formless and void 
Struggle darkness against deep 
Climax light comes 
forth 
Outcome 3 days separation, 3 days filling 
Resolution - sabbath 
resolution 
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In essence then, Genesis 1:1-3a densely compacts the key structural elements of a 
narrative, what Westermann (1974:xii) calls Geshehensbogen,
2
 and then extensively 
elaborates on the final elements—resolution and outcome.  Viewing the movement of the 
narrative as arch, Genesis 1 differs from a more conventional narrative structure (see 
figure 1). 
It may seem striking at first to those with little exposure to René Girard‘s anthropological 
theory of violence and the sacred.  For Girard and adherents of his theory of generative 
violence, evidence of a sacrificial paradigm and a scapegoating mechanism appear 
everywhere in literary texts throughout history, both ancient and modern.  Thus, Girard 
stands in contrast with a strand of Old Testament scholarship which has marginalized the 
sacrificial strands of the Old Testament to the fastidious concerns of an emerging priestly 
class during the exile.  The ethical dimension of Yahwism exemplified by the prophets is 
viewed as the dominant and driving concern of Israel‘s religion and for the most part, 
sacrifice was frowned upon by prophets and modern interpreters alike. 
If Girard is to be seriously considered, then we should accept his assertion to test the 
validity of his case on ancient texts.  Girard (1972:309) expresses confidence that we can 
‗gain access to the generative event through constant reference to these enigmatic sources 
[ancient sources].‘  After rehearsing the exegetical discussion generated by Gunkel, 
Westermann (1974:62-64, 80) concludes something similar to Girard and what is being 
advocated here.  There is a broad reliance on a basic worldview.  It isn‘t direct 
borrowing.  In essence, the reliance is structural.  In my view, Westermann comes very 
close to recognizing what Girard has.
3
  
5.1.1.  The Direction of the projection.  There are several points of interest in applying 
Girard‘s point of view to the picture of primordial creation presented in Genesis 1. One of 
the more challenging perspectives to be worked through because of our scientific 
perspective is the congealing of natural forces with cosmological and theological 
                                                 
2
 In the preface to Westermann‘s (1974:xii) commentary, the translator John Scullion relates Westermann‘s 
explanation of Gesechehensbogen in a letter: ‗…ein Geshehensbogen is like the arch of a bridge which 
spans the whole from beginning to end.  Likewise the narrative arch spans an event from beginning to end.‘ 
3
 In his discussion of the ‗mythologization‘ of history Van Seters (1992:25) makes similar conclusions from 
a different approach.  The blending of history and myth that is part of the ancient historiographic literature 
is an attempt to give an historical account a universal and paradigmic appeal.  
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paradigms so common to ‗mythological narrative.‘  It is clear enough for a reader of such 
texts that the interchange between natural and supernatural forces was, at times, almost 
indistinguishable, even though the biblical texts are to a lesser degree.  Debates over the 
‗anthropomorphic‘ views of God have been a preoccupation for centuries.  From our 
modern perspective, we can reason how natural it would have been in pre-scientific times 
to project the behavior of nature onto social structures.  From the pattern of planting and 
harvest come notions of dying and rebirth of kings and kingdoms.
4
  
Girard, however, insists that the reverse is true.
5
  From the earliest of times, humanity has 
projected and infused one of its fundament notions of communal existence onto the 
cosmological world.  Humanity‘s unique mechanism for dealing with its own escalation 
of rival desires leading to an outbreak of uncontrollable violence through the scapegoat is 
seen as functioning on every level of the natural world.  Thus the turbulent
6
 crisis brought 
on by a draught, plague, flood, or storm is viewed as acting under the same ‗rules‘ as a 
communal crisis—sacrificially. Girard (1972:31) insists: 
The very weapons used to combat violence are turned against their users.  Violence is like a raging 
fire that feeds on the very objects intended to smother its flames.  The metaphor of fire could well 
give way to metaphors of tempest, flood, earthquake.  Like the plague, the resemblance violence 
bears to these natural cataclysms is not limited to the realm of poetic imagery.  In the 
acknowledging that fact, however, we do not mean to endorse the theory that sees in the sacred a 
simple transfiguration of natural phenomena.  The sacred consists of all those forces whose 
dominance over man increases or seems to increase in proportion to man‘s effort to master 
them…We have yet to learn how man succeeds in positing his own violence as an independent 
being (emphasis mine). 
In the examination of the Bible‘s narratives of origins (Gen 1 and 2), the question is 
straightforward—just how much of Israel‘s most comprehensive account of God‘s 
creative involvement in the natural world is viewed from a sacrificial dimension?  Is the 
account structured by a scapegoat mechanism? 
                                                 
4
 Anderson (1967:11-40) provides an eloquent formation of this kind of thinking brought on by the 
discovery of the library of Ashurbanipal and Herman Gunkel‘s seminal works with it.   
5
 Girard 1972: 31ff, 96ff, 182, 255, 282ff 
6
 We can take note that turbulence derives from the Latin turba, essentially meaning disturbed crowd, i.e. 
mob.  
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Genesis 1 does not stray very far from the Girard‘s notion that generative acts are 
founded upon and come out of life-threatening crisis, what he calls a sacrificial crisis.
7
  
The Bible wastes no time getting to the fundamental starting point of generation—the 
crisis of creation, the undifferentiated state of the world.   
5.1.2. Much ado about nothing. The crisis of creation as described below has affinities 
with the doctrinal formulation of ex nihilo.  Out of nothing, God created.  One does not 
need to delve too far into the discussion of origins, either ancient or modern, to discover 
the oft contentious discussion over the fundamental substance(s) involved in generating 
‗the world.‘  The nature of ‗nothing‘ is far from settled.  As McKim (1984:283) reminds 
in his historical rehearsal of the doctrine, there is something profound and essential at 
stake, especially in formulating ‗our most basic conception of God.‘8   Both Watts 
(2007:206) and Westermann (1974:43) observe that the discussion of origins both ancient 
and modern is highly polemical, especially where issues of authority are at stake.
9
 
Bartlett (2009:90) even takes the discussion of origins one step further, claiming the very 
reflection of origins is a part of the ‗originary event.‘  In other words, reflections on ‗the 
beginning‘ is an inextricable part of representation which moves humans toward 
culturization.
10
 
The impetus for the doctrine is polarized with ‗dualistic systems.‘  McKim‘s (1984:281) 
description of such ‗systems‘ is certainly grounded in mythological cosmogonies as well 
as Aristotle and Plato, and it sounds similar to Girard‘s picture of a sacrificial crisis: 
‗positing two equal and primary principles in the universe. In some of these, ―creation‖ 
occurs when two complementary principles unite in some way to produce a new ―form‖ 
                                                 
7
 Girard provides numerous and extensive explanations of what this entails.  His chapter in Violence and 
the Sacred is very thorough.  For now we may choose the following description especially since Girard 
(1977:51) expressly connects it with our Genesis passage: ‗As in Greek tragedy and primitive religion, it is 
not the differences but the loss of them that gives rise to violence and chaos…This loss forces men into a 
perpetual confrontation…the undifferentiated state of the world‘ (emphasis mine). 
8
 A Google search on the word ‗genesis‘ generates over 53 million hits.  
9
 Van Seters (1992:25, 31-32) does not overtly mention  the polemical nature, but sees the concern for unity 
to be central in historiographic literature. Thus, ‗classical‘ historiography of Mesopotamian region infuses 
mythological elements into chronological narrative to establish the beginnings of culture in the origins of 
the sacred and the cult (Van Seters, 1992:71) 
10
 The statement is in the context of a compare and contrast between Eric Gans‘s ‗generative anthropology‘ 
and Girard.  Both hold to a notion of cultural formation based on a deferral of internal violence.  Gans 
asserts that the first deferral was through representation (language) whereas Girard holds that it was in the 
first victim.  
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out of the already existing, independent ―matter or principle.‖ According to McKim 
(1984:282), combating a ‗moral dualism‘ is equally at stake and perhaps primarily so.  
The debate over the substance of the world‘s origins heightened with Darwin‘s famous 
publication, but the lesser known discovery and publication of the Babylonian account of 
the primeval flood by George Smith in 1875
11
 had probably a greater impact on Old 
Testament studies.  As will be discussed in more detail below, Gunkel‘s positing of 
Genesis 1 as dependent on a broader Mesopotamian cosmogony put new strains on the 
doctrine of ex nihilo.  Westermann (1974:43) forcefully concludes that issues of belief in 
a creator God are nowhere in purview for the ancients.  
The issue, then, is what is the nature of ‗nothing‘?  Is it a dark, foreboding picture of 
colliding forces in a swirl of contention, a cataclysmic battle, or is the description simply 
the ancient‘s way of giving a time reference to the distant past, a way to say, ‗not yet‘?  
For Westermann (1974:43), the universal concern of beginnings reflects a deep-seated 
longing yet to be realized. Images of origins are infused with the unease of the present.  It 
has everything to do with conflict-resolution.  
In the first verses of Genesis, however, the Bible addresses more acutely the annihilation 
and regeneration or reconstitution of the heavens and earth.   The opening pages of the 
Bible do not stray far from the common ‗mythological‘ understanding of the ancient 
world that generative acts naturally, indeed necessarily, proceed from tumultuous 
conditions .
12
  Birch et al (1999:48) and Westermann (1974:46) affirm that one will have 
to look elsewhere for affirmation of ex nihilo. Girard‘s perspective would compel us, 
however, to reverse the idea that the ancient near eastern world was mostly perplexed by 
nature‘s recurring cycles of chaotic intrusion.  The ancients were certainly perplexed by 
the ever encroaching specter of chaos, not produced by nature however, but by human 
community.  For ancient peoples without the protection of a legal system and police 
force, the ominous threat of annihilation either externally by massacre or internally by 
                                                 
11
 George Smith, 1875 The Chaldean Account of Genesis. 
12
 Birch et al (1999:47) is but one example of downplaying the negative connotations of Gen 1:2, yet even 
they cannot avoid descriptions like: ‗negative backdrop,‘ ‗desolate,‘ ‗undifferentiated‘ or ‗chaotic 
situation.‘  Pointedly, however, they describe the most critical negative factor: ‗a state of affairs prior to 
God‘s ordering, a state that is not yet consonant with the divine purposes.‘  Certainly the context of Gen 1:2  
subordinates this negative feature; nevertheless, the author is compelled to address it and immediately so.  
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implosion or communal disintegration was, as it still is today, a real and ever present 
threat.  The threat of a city, village, or even a nomadic encampment being reduced to 
‗nothing‘ is the repeated concern of the prophet‘s laments.  Humankind‘s astounding 
veracity left unbridled is truly a frightful specter.  As argued in the previous chapter, the 
presence of or stories of ghost towns was ever present.  
Foremost for the concerns laid out above is a clear notion that the goodness of the earth, 
ha’eretz, and the uniqueness of humankind, ha’adam, is portrayed as emerging out of a 
state of indifference.
13
  The good thing comes out from something else. This is a 
fundamental sacrificial notion that is not relinquished in this text.  The question becomes: 
is this state of indifference one of crisis and confrontation or ambiguous time?  Does the 
emergence of light usher in the progression toward peace or the beginnings of history?   
Commentators are correct when they notice how devoid of mythical elements this 
account of earth‘s beginning is.  When compared alongside mythical stories such as 
Enuma Elish or the Osiris myth, the absence of a crisis among the gods leading to an 
execution of a scapegoated victim and the excarnation of the corpse becoming the raw 
material for the fundamental elements of the world is obvious. There is still, however, a 
fundamental and vestigial remain of this sacrificial view of the world‘s origins.  The 
significant building blocks of the world come out of something.  They emerge from a 
peculiar situation or happenstance.  That situation, from a mimetic perspective would be, 
of course, a sacrificial crisis, a situation where all difference is lost in an escalation of 
mimetic desire.  What emerges or is expelled from a dangerous crisis is a sacrifice that 
becomes the source of benevolence.   
The affinity of Genesis 1 with other ancient myths cannot be ignored completely.
14
  The 
notion that the world originated from a kind of chaos, a Chaoschompf where a theogenic 
                                                 
13
 I want to avoid for now the use of the word ‗creation‘ for two reasons: For one, ‗creation‘ carries a 
formidable amount of theologically and politically loaded connotations that can readily distract us from 
recognizing the mimetic elements; second, the word ‗creation‘ (especially in terms of cosmos or universe) 
is not in the text or in the purview of the author at all.  It is the earth, ha’eretz, and humanity, ha’adam, that 
are the dominant concerns.  The word itself, however, attests to precisely what is being discussed here.  The 
English word shares its root with the word crescent, crescere.  Its first reference was that of the emergence 
of the moon from a darkened or undeveloped state to its fullest.  
14
 This is the premise to Westermann‘s  (1974:4) introduction to his commentary on Genesis. 
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war among the gods ensued, was brought to the fore by Gunkel‘s15 seminal work at the 
turn of the twentieth century on the heels of significant archeological discoveries.  The 
similarities between Enuma Elish and Genesis 1 seemed obvious.  By the end of the 
twentieth century, however, this idea has been cast in serious doubt.  Perry (1993:4), for 
instance, concludes: ‗The older, mythological view is now largely discredited but has left 
its impact on our current interpretation.‘16  He concludes that it had more to do with the 
imagination of scholars than what the text brought forth.  In a similar vein, Tsumara 
(1989:34) accentuates the type of creation story categorized by Westermann (1974:43) as 
the ‗when there was not yet…‘ strategy for describing creation.  Of the seven 
categories,
17
 this one has the potential to be interpreted as the most passive.  It is more 
descriptive than narrative.   Genesis 1:2 has no chaotic pre-creation or anti-creation view 
in mind.  Instead, it is a rather benign affirmation simply to affirm that the earth as we 
know it had not come about yet. Westermann (1974:44), however, argues against such an 
understanding of this category: ‗This way of speaking is of great significance because it 
is the place where talk about creation becomes narrative in the strict sense.  It brings a 
flash point into the creation event.‘  It signals a unique transformative event has occurred.  
Tsumara‘s view is equally forced.  Even the most casual of readings would conjure up a 
foreboding and fearful sense from Genesis 1:2.
18
  Jaki‘s19 presentation of the history of 
exegesis of Genesis 1 amply demonstrates that cosmological and theological concerns 
                                                 
15
 Gunkel, Hermann 1895  Creation and Chaos in the Primeval Era and the Eschaton.  Gunkel, Hermann  
1901 Genesis. 
16
 Perry is correct to down play a picture of a cosmic battle being portrayed in Genesis 1:2., i.e. God as 
storm god defeats Tiamat, but a theogenic crisis among the gods is but a mythical (meaning something is 
being concealed and simultaneously revealed) overlay of a real communal crisis.  Mimetic theory offers a 
way through the impasse in this debate.  
17
 Westermann‘s (1974:26-47) categories of mythological texts of origins are creation: (1) by birth, (2) as 
result of struggle or victory, (3) by an action or activity, (4) by word (5) as involving the rest of the creator,  
(6) as ‗when the world was not yet,‘  and  (7) as praise to god.  As we proceed, it is evident that a more 
mimetic interpretation finds affinities with all the categories as does Genesis 1 and 2. 
18
 Westermann (1974:103)  concludes that the  tohuwabohu of Gen 1:2 must certainly conjure up an 
‗ominous‘ situation: ‗It would be nearer to the sense if the nothingness, the non-existence, were understood 
as something gruesome.‘ 
19
 Jaki (1998:32 ) ‗A detailed and carefully documented survey of those commentaries is necessary to 
achieve the task of these lectures which is to put Genesis 1, once and for all, at a safe remove from its 
greatest peril.  The latter is the ever recurring temptation to make that magnificent chapter appear 
concordant with the science of the day in order to assure it cultural respectability.  Since the lure in this age, 
when all science has become cosmology to a stifling degree, is more seductive than ever, and even greater 
has grown the contrast between the biblical cosmogenesis and scientific cosmogony.‘ 
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have overwhelmingly clouded the picture here.  The case is made here that the basic 
contours of a sacrificial event are evident and this has been clouded over by weighted 
theological and cosmological concerns.  The exegesis below explores the possibility of a 
more ‗down to earth‘ reading.20 
The first verses of the Bible realistically addresses this, but immediately derails the 
standard mythological outcome as if the author sees through the ‗diffuse haziness‘21 that 
requires the perpetual recycling of the story—that is to once again establish communal 
life via a scapegoat-style sacrifice.  Out of earth‘s sacred and violent realm, God forges a 
new sacredness, one that leads to a new creation, a new way to order communal life and 
invites it into a domain of wholeness and harmony.  From such a perspective, it is 
apparent that the infusion of Israel‘s crisis, the exile,22 into that of the created order was 
intended to encourage those who feared a complete annihilation of their existence as 
God‘s people.  Perhaps even more feared, however, may have been the total absence of 
God‘s Presence among his people.  A mimetic perspective, however, would question the 
necessity of an exilic perspective.  We can equally assume that the specter of communal 
disintegration was an ever present reality for millennia, and not limited to the ancient 
Near East.  On this assumption, there is nothing that requires the exile as the paradigm for 
such pictures of origins.  Communal breakdown, whether by socioeconomic, geographic, 
or human conflict run all the way through human history and certainly through Israel‘s 
checkered story.  Certainly the language of the prophets used to depict the exile is evident 
in Genesis 1.  It would only be natural for an exilic or post-exilic writer to incorporate 
such language.  This does not require, however, that such language of annihilation 
originates with the prophets.  Ghost towns were an ever present reminder of this reality 
for millennia.  
                                                 
20
 The caution of many (Birch et al, 1999:46; Middleton , 2005:235ff ) of not reading too much of a ‗war‘ 
in Gen 1:2 is healthy.  Nevertheless, there is an equal propensity to so disassociate this passage with 
anything worldly that it clouds the picture.  For sure, Genesis 1 is heavily theologized, but no biblical 
theology has ever attempted to disassociate itself from the ‗real‘ world.  Here, we must insist on the 
‗incarnational‘ view of theology as does Westermann (1974:44).  Creation stories are destined to 
demonstrate something of the world people live in and hope to live in.  
21
 Jaki (1998:259) coins this term as characteristic of myth.  
22
 Brueggemann (1982:29) postulates, ‗If our text is linked to the exile, then the historical experience of 
exile may be the ―formless and void‖ about which this verse speaks and from which god works his creative 
purpose.‘   
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5.1.3 Hermeneutical considerations.  Two hermeneutical considerations induced by 
mimetic theory need be mentioned here that influence our inquiry. 
First, an intriguing aspect of Girard‘s perspective is how the sacral victim holds together 
extreme opposites in a ‗terrible equilibrium.‘  Unlike the structuralists and Freud, who 
would relegate these opposites to unexplained anomalies, Girard finds an internal logic to 
it when viewed in sacrificial terms.  Binary opposites are a fundamental aspect of the 
sacred, and the failure to recognize this by scholars has oft times resulted in contorted 
readings of the text.  
Girard sees this even in the way lexicographers have failed to connect the duality and 
sacrificial element inherent in the words themselves.  As Girard (1972:262) states: 
Many languages, most notably Greek, contain terms that reveal the non-difference between 
violence and the sacred.  And it is easily demonstrable that cultural evolutions in general, and 
lexicographers in particular, have a tendency to put asunder that which primitive language has 
joined; that it, to suppress the scandalous conjunction of violence to the sacred. 
Hence, even words can leave a vestigial record of the crisis that lead to the original mob 
murder.
23
  Girard (1972:256ff) has questioned persistent resistance or ignorance of 
lexicographer‘s to connect the use of a word to a meaning referencing some part of the 
original murder, choosing to ignore clear references to violence and opting for more 
benign references to a conceptual idea.
24
  There, a primordial event among a collective of 
humans began in a whirlwind of escalating reciprocal and symmetric exchanges of 
violence and the rapid degeneration of the loss of difference.  The crisis which loomed 
over the collective threatened to annihilate everything until an instantaneous and 
spontaneous all-against-one killing took place that had a miraculous and positive effect 
on the community—peace was restored.  Whatever the reason why lexicographers have 
failed to examine the connection, it is one more demonstration, for Girard, of how words 
and text function sacrificially
25—they restore peace to the community while 
                                                 
23
 Baile (1997:100) provides a prime example in the word myth: ‗In order to fully appreciate the relevance 
of this mythology, we must be willing to read it as a distorted misrecognition of real events…myth, from 
the root mu, always involves a mutation or mutilation of the memory of an actual event.  
24
 The word sacred falls under such a category for Girard (1972:65). 
25
 For Girard (1972:256-262), the text doesn‘t just testify to the sacrificial system it acts as part of it.  The 
language itself functions sacrificially, displacing and hiding (as does the sacrificial victim) our violence.  
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simultaneously concealing the mechanism that makes it happen.  In the case of word 
studies, we often come up with theological notions removed from its sacrificial origins, 
but the words themselves betray remnants or traces of the original murder.  The 
connection between the meaning and its origins may have all but faded; nonetheless, we 
should pay attention to such connections, especially where a word appears to have 
radically opposite or disjointed denotations. Westermann (1974:33-35) comes close to 
recognizing this aspect in words, but does not pursue the ramifications, noting the nearly 
ubiquitous notion of separation, cutting, or slashing in creation accounts.  What 
Westermann wonders about, Girard explains. 
 
In a similar vein then, this inquiry below admittedly questions some conventional ground 
rules of etymology. The kinds of theological and political concerns have often guided 
word studies into certain conclusions. This no more evident than the discussion of God‘s 
first act in the Bible, arb, which in the past has derived a sense of non-existence from it.  
In his discussion of ‗image‘ and ‗likeness‘ of Gen 1:26, Middleton (2005:44) reminds 
that word studies alone do not settle hermeneutical issues.  The thrust of word studies 
here is to rethink the peculiar binary opposites that are particular to notions of the sacred.  
As has already been discussed in chapter 3, however, the argument for ‗context‘ can have 
its own conundrums. The discussion of root meanings to follow seeks to demonstrate 
how a sacrificial understanding of origins is more grounded in mythological accounts of 
origins than has been perceived in the past.  This, to remind, not only applies to 
commentators but to the author(s) of the text itself.  The approach here echoes that of 
Middleton (2005:45):  
 
This interpretive movement, from textual details to broad patterns within the text and ultimately to 
a shared intertextual symbolic world, is rooted in the conviction that no text (idea) is an island.  
Rather, every text is informed by—even constituted by—other texts and ultimately by a network 
of ideas, many of them tacit, that are shared by the culture of the text.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Girard (1972:263) in particular points to a duality of words that lexicographers neglect to take ample notice 
of. 
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The second consideration has been elaborated more fully in the previous chapters, but 
needs reiteration here.  For Girard, sacrifice, execution, purgation, or expulsion are 
synonymous with sacral violence. In this regard, it is argued below that the infusion of 
‗the spirit of God‘ into the undifferentiated state of the heaven and earth (Gen. 1:2) and 
subsequent coming forth of light is the sacrificial and generative force for all of creation.  
This sacrificially structured version, however, steadily and even stealthily unfolds in a 
different direction than a mythical structure.
26
  Although operating within the realm of 
sacred violence, there are substantial differences.  From the very opening words, God is 
established as mastering the crisis with lightning brevity and deliberation.  God is viewed 
as actually bringing on the crisis of indifference (Gen 1:1) for the express purpose of 
calling forth light from it. God himself generates the crisis, involves himself in it 
(entrance of ‗the breath of God‘), and thrusts his own unique sacrificial offering (the 
emergence of light), and thus marshals in an irreversible, rival and superior sacredness.  
Against the backdrop of myth‘s recycling savage sacredness, described in Genesis 1:2, is 
a view of Sabbath sacredness—one of wholeness, goodness, rest, and blessing. It is an 
offering to humankind‘s destructive and uncontrollable force that can reverse its elusive 
but ever present mechanism.  
  
5.2 Genesis 1:1 - Mymsh ta Myhla arb tysarb 
 
Genesis 1 is among the most exegeted portions of scripture throughout history.
27
  There is 
a considerable amount of variations concerning how it is structured.  The understanding 
here, agrees with Westermann (1974:94) that these opening verses are not parenthetical 
but integral to the whole pericope.  The pronouncement of the completion of heaven and 
earth (Gen 2:1) and the subsequent explanation of the Sabbath (Gen 2:2-3) appear in 
synonymous parallel to Gen 1:1-3a.   This means, for one, that Genesis 1:1-2 structures 
the whole periscope in some way.  It also means that Genesis 2:1-4 reiterates that 
structure.   In a similar fashion to Isa. 46:10, the end or completion (Gen 2:1), is already 
                                                 
26
 Middleton (2005:264-266) also holds that an alternative narrative of origins, especially to the 
Mesopotamian view of royalty, is intended in Genesis 1. 
27
 See Jaki 1998 Genesis 1 Throughout the Ages. Arnold, 2009:29. 
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in sight from the start.  In a lengthier discussion of the relationship between Babylonian 
creation myths and the development of Jewish apocalyptic literature, Gunkel 
(1895:233ff) notes the ‗common idea which lies at the base of these particular pieces, i.e., 
that the things of the end time will be similar to those of primal time.‘  Hence, creation 
accounts are eschatological in the sense that what happens at the end (endzeit) 
corresponds to how things began (urzeit). 
 
The first lines of the Bible are retrospective and purpose driven.  This does not only apply 
to this pericope; it also reflects or projects a perspective running throughout the 
Pentateuch.
28
  The sense of moving toward or emerging out of something is present 
throughout the Old Testament.  That ‗something‘ I don‘t think the Hebrew scriptures ever 
quite get a hold of.   
 
5.2.1 In the beginning.  The grammatical anomaly of beresheth, tysarb, has 
generated much contention since it leaves quite vague the object it is modifying.  Jaki 
(1998:2-3,45) suggests that traditional translations have been overly constrained by 
concerns to jibe with contemporary cosmologies.  Arnold (2009:35) concedes that 
entrenched theological perspectives have impinged on interpretation.  In this sense, the 
concern to counter myth with an immediate sense of ‗history‘ is induced.  Thus, 
Anderson (1967:111) sides with Eichrodt‘s ‗absolute temporal beginning‘ in order to 
insist that history, as opposed to mythology or cosmology, is in view here.  It is the start 
of human history, indeed Israel‘s history, that this verse is concerned with.  Anderson 
(1967:111), however, qualifyingly accepts Gunkel‘s belief that the beginning (urzeit) and 
the end (endzeit) are both in view: 
In the Bible, creation opens toward the horizon of the future…Creation and consummation, first 
things and last things, are inseparably joined together, like Siamese twins.  The first words of the 
bible, ―in the beginning,‖ have as their counterpart the prophetic expectation, ―in the 
end.‖…creation is an eschatological belief. 
The beginning and the end are structured symmetrically, like twins.  ‗In the beginning 
God created‘ corresponds to, ‗on the day’ God finished.  Bereshith emphasizes the setting 
                                                 
28
 Arnold, 2009:29-32 
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in motion of an unrelenting march towards the goal or end.  In a sense, what God does ‗in 
the beginning‘ must happen because of where it must end.  There is a necessity to the first 
action of God induced by the desired end.  The question to start with is not so much when 
did God create everything or what, if anything, was before this start?  Rather, the concern 
of this pericope is what out of necessity must proceed in order for all things to reach their 
‗end,‘ ‗fulfillment,‘ and ‗rest‘?  Bereshith retains here its most common reference to first 
in a series or process.
29
  Another primary denotation of both tysar and archē is that of 
first importance and a priority of order.  
Thus, an accent on a foundational and necessary condition is shared with the concern to 
establish an absolute historical beginning.
30
    The first word of the Bible sets up two 
critical factors for Genesis 1.  It emphasizes the utter necessity, the unquestioned 
precondition and sequence of what is to follow, and God‘s unqualified prerogative over 
all of it.  Westermann (1974:94, 96) is insistent that the first statement in the Bible is 
unparalleled in its all-encompassing praise of God.  It is as Brueggemann (1982:29) 
affirms, ‗a primal assertion of God‘s rule.‘31  It is a word of destiny which drives toward 
‗completion‘ (Gen 2:1). 
There is perhaps another consideration.  The previous chapter examined common 
structural elements in expulsion stories of Abraham and the Hebrews in Egypt.  In a 
peculiar, less overt way, God actually ‗brings on‘ the sacrificial crisis for the express 
purpose of confronting the sacrificial mechanism of the community.  As in Exodus 1, the 
sacrificial crisis is covertly exasperated by the Israelites amazing ability to ‗increase‘ 
                                                 
29
 BDB 912 states: ‗first phase, step, or element in the course of events.‘  In his lengthy discussion of 
bereshith, Westerman (1974: 98) echoes F. Delitzsch: ‗His [P] point is not that heaven and earth had a 
beginning, but that the creation of heaven and earth was the beginning of all history.‘ 
30
 In his discussion of archē, Coenen (1982:165) argues that: ‗The meaning of foremost or highest rank is 
found alongside the temporal meaning.  This comes from its rendering of Heb. rosh, head, with its wide 
range of nuances…[closely related to protos-first] ―The connotations of beginning and of the highest rank 
come together in certain passages, e.g. Ps 111:10, where the fear of the Lord is the archē  tēs sopias 
(beginning of wisdom).  Here archē is the principle which governs the components of beginning, progress 
and result of the whole.‘ See also TWOT 2098. 
31
 Perhaps the interpretations of jazz musicians does not belong here, but in Duke Ellington‘s sacred work, 
‗In the Beginning God,‘ the phrase ‗in the beginning, God‘ is intentionally repeated several times to 
emphasis the presence of the subject above all else.  Arnold (2009:36) asserts: ‗…the text announces with 
the utmost simplicity that it was God—and God alone—who created the cosmos.‘ 
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under the worst conditions.  Strongly suggested throughout that story is the command of 
God over the situation.  Perhaps the author here makes explicit what is implicit in the 
other stories.  If Genesis 1 is written from the perspective of the exile, the author may 
well wish to emphatically assert God‘s command of a communal crisis.  
5.2.2  The initial act of God.  We should thus understand the initial action of God, 
arb, as encompassing all of God‘s activity throughout the first chapter and culminating 
in completion.
32
 It is in this first act of God where we encounter a peculiar duality to its 
meaning of which Girard mentions.  It is also where we should question the entrenched 
notion that this word exclusively belongs to the ‗divine fiat‘ of God (Jer 31:22, Deut. 
4:32).  Although bara is found in late works, Gunkel (1901:104) argues for an ancient 
origin for it, albeit having heavy theologized overtones here.  If this be the case, we could 
envision the very thing Girard speaks of where the connotations associated with a 
sacrificial act—mainly its beneficial result—gradually eclipse a direct referent to the 
original scapegoat.  Hence, Jaki (1998:6) challenges the propensity of theological 
lexicons to completely theologize a word with no referent to a human act.  Only God, it is 
repeatedly affirmed, can bara. Hence, there has been a whole theological category—
creation theology—spawned by this assumption.  Jaki (1998:3-6), who is not influenced 
by mimetic considerations, also calls for a reevaluation of the word ‗created.‘   
Bara has connections with an Aramaic usage ‗to fashion by cutting‘ or ‗to pare a reed for 
writing or a stick for an arrow.‘33 A parallel is found in Phoenician with an ‗allusion to a 
trade involving cutting.‘34  Von Rad (1972:40) connects this with artistic creations,35 but 
we should not neglect to notice that cutting is the primary act in sacrifice.
36
  Indeed, the 
connection with the carving of images and the excarnation of a victim may have more 
                                                 
32
 Von Rad (1972:49). Arnold (2009:37) 
33
 BDB 135.  Westermann (1974:98-100).  Arnold (2009:37)  
34
 BDB 135 
35
 Middleton (2005:74-77) connect the word bara to artistry and views the whole chapter in terms of God 
as artist.  That God‘s creative act is artistry is not in opposition to sacrificial notions.  All kinds of primal 
art centers around the sacrificial victim, including using parts of the victim.  
36
 Recent discoveries of the Moche sites in Peru provide graphic reminders of this.  During a period of 
extreme changes in climatic conditions where the Moche experience first deluging rain, then severe and 
extended draught, archeologists discovered large amounts of sacrificed human remains.  Of particular and 
gruesome interest, the markings on the victims‘ remains showed not only that they were sacrificed, but that 
their flesh was meticulously peeled of the bones in an apparent effort to extend the efficacy of each 
sacrifice, epitomized by the remaining skeleton (Popson 2002: electronic version). 
Chapter 5 – Sacrificial Structure, Genesis 1 196 
 
196 
 
than analogous connections.  The act of carving images out of wood resembles that of 
excarnating a victim.  There is an initial ‗cutting down‘ followed by a stripping away that 
gradually produces a representation.
37
  
The term is prominent in exilic works, especially Second Isaiah, Ezekiel and P, to 
accentuate the emergence of something new or extraordinary.
38
  Bara is the driving force 
behind something completely different.  It bears the force of something coming about that 
was not conceived before or was not considered possible. It is a miracle verb, one of 
radical reversal.  Middleton (2005:73) defines it as ‗acts of radical reversal.‘  
Interestingly, the new thing in these verses is that of Yahweh redeeming his people from 
exile, i.e. a victim who returns, reversing the scapegoat mechanism via the sacrificial 
system.  The emphasis lies in a contrast with that which preceded it.  The old situation 
pales in comparison to a situation brought about by God: 
You have but to inquire about bygone ages that came before you, ever since God created man on 
earth, from one end of heaven to the other: has anything as grand as this ever happened, or has 
anything  like this ever been known?  Has any people heard the voice of a god speaking out of a 
fire, as you have, and survived.  Or has any god ventured to go and take for himself one nation 
from the midst of another by prodigious acts, by signs and wonders, by war, by a mighty hand and 
an outstretched arm and awesome power, as the Lord your God did for you in Egypt before your 
very eyes (Deut 4:32-35). 
Of particular note, the action of God bringing forth a people from a communal crisis in 
Egypt is singled out as the action which sets the god of Israel apart from other gods.  It is 
the act of a god who willfully engineers an expulsion for the express purpose of 
identifying with the one expelled and in the process dismantling the sacrificial structure.  
This is the singular (mono) feature of this god (theism).  Bara is an action of extreme 
contrast; hence, the final outcome totally eclipses the process.  This is exactly how 
Genesis 1 unfolds.    
Bara connotes the sense of transformation more than formation.  It is through a reversal 
of a dismal situation that the new thing comes forth.  We may even go so far as to say 
                                                 
37
 Westermann (1974:35) notes that along with mud or clay, woodshavings are sometimes seen as the 
substance of humans.  Westermann reminds that this notion is nearly universal.  
38
 Again, if we avoid the loaded ‗creation‘ word, we must fall back on words such as ‗emerge.‘   
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that the building material of the new thing
39
 is the dismal situation itself.  In David‘s 
famous prayer of repentance (Ps 51:12), he beseeches God to create in him a ‗clean 
heart.‘  As a matter of first importance, God must annihilate and purge his sin, his sinful 
heart being the raw material for the new heart.  Isaiah speaks of a new thing as an 
astounding, indeed impossible, reversal (Isa 40:17ff)—streams from bare hills, a desert 
into pools of water, cedars in the wilderness, cypresses in the desert.
40
  Bara is the action 
of God bringing forth some astounding, never heard of thing of either unspeakable 
judgment (Num 16:30) or extraordinary rescue, like Yahweh creating a covenant with a 
people (Ex 34:10) or creating a people from scratch (Ezek. 28:13).  Regardless, it is 
always from one thing to another, and usually, as in the above examples, it is from a 
desperate, bleak situation to one of rejuvenation.  
In this first act of God, we encounter a duality of meaning that has been overlooked.  
Approaching meanings near to its etymology
41
 are occasional uses in connection with 
‗cutting.‘ Joshua instructs his countrymen to cut down trees in order to clear a dwelling 
space in a forest (Josh 17:15, 18).
42
  In Ezekiel‘s allegory of the wantonness of Jerusalem, 
the sinful woman is to be stoned and ‗cut down‘ (bara, Ez 23:47) with the sword by the 
assembly (Babylon).  This is a clear reference to both a scapegoat style execution—a 
women caught in adultery—and the kind of purging massacre associated with the sacking 
                                                 
39
 The use of ‗creation‘ has been so theologized that it has lost the primary sense of something new coming 
about, as the Latin root, creare or crescens, indicates. 
40
 Of this we should take note that the new thing is derived from a desert-like condition.  Tsumura 
(1989:34) builds his understanding of tohu wabohu in verse two on such an understanding, as discussed 
below. 
41
 Agreeing with Tsumura (1989:47) that discussions of etymology create ‗confusion,‘ I hope here to 
proceed with caution.  My argument does not rely on which sense of the word came first; instead, I seek to 
demonstrate only the connection theologized or sacralized words have with real human actions, many of 
which retain good and bad connotations.   Westermann (1974:100 )  notes that attempts to disassociate bara 
from ‗cutting‘ is a recent development which perhaps has its own predilections behind it.  It does seem a 
more natural assumption, especially in ancient times, that the verb‘s association with a human action 
probably reveals a fundamental understanding.   Westermann (1974:99) concludes that bara must be based 
on a ‗concrete‘ idea, similar to ruy, to form or fashion out of clay.  
42
 McKeown (2008:20) asserts that any time there is a human action attributed to bara it is ‗another Hebrew 
word spelled the same as the verb.‘  BDB (135) makes no such distinction nor does Westermann (1974:99).  
Arnold (2009:37) explains that the supposedly different roots are based on a weak differentiation of 
Hebrew verb stems.  Clearly there is an association between these two meanings, so for one, this is not an 
issue of etymology per se.  The act of separation clearly dominates in Genesis 1.  The issue is more what is 
the connection, and why is it avoided?  Here is a case in point of how Girard can go against the grain of 
established disciplines, claiming to understand something that remains an anomaly for those who should be 
able to figure it out.  
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of a city (probably referencing the Babylonians who plundered the temple). Ezekiel also 
uses the word bara in reference to the king of Babylon selecting a spot ‗on which the 
sword of the king of Babylon may advance‘ (Ezek. 21:24), hence denoting a decisive act 
as well as the instrument used for cutting.
43
  In these instances, the action of a new thing 
coming about is directly connected with a clearing out or making a way, especially 
through a cutting action.  This clearing or purging is the precondition or foundation for 
the new thing coming about.  One might think of a new development having to excavate 
or break ground as the necessary precursor to the project. 
Botterweck and Ringgren (1975:245) say of bara: ‗It can be regarded as certain that bara 
was introduced in the Old Testament literature as a theological idea for the first time in 
the exilic period.  Its prior history is unknown.  The exilic authors who introduced it into 
the Old Testament may have taken up an old word and given it a new character.‘  
However heavily theologized bara became in Old Testament usage, it is readily apparent 
that its primary referent is the befalling of something.  This is precisely Botterweck and 
Ringgren‘s conclusion: ‗…probably a radical of br…The Hebrew root br’ probably had 
an original meaning of separate or divide.‘   The same notion of cutting down or splitting 
is further reinforced when we examine the Greek words associated with creation.  Esser 
(1975:376) states: ‗the verb katabollo (Homer) derives its basic meaning from its two 
roots kata, down, and ballin, to throw.  It thus means, to bring from an upright into a 
horizontal position (e.g. to throw down, fell to the ground, kill, throw away; in fig. sense, 
to put sown, disparage, reject, and also pay down).   Esser (1975:378) says of the more 
common word in Greek for create is ktisis, which ‗expresses the decisive, basic act of 
will behind the bringing into being, foundation or institution of something.‘  Jaki 
(1998:7) is able to clearly see the connection between cutting down and the connotation 
of decisiveness:  ‗the verb bara means basically ―to split‖ and ―to slash‖ or an action 
which conveys that something is divided and that the action is done swiftly.‘    
                                                 
43
 This may also have a reference to the large scale felling of trees around a city as part of a siege (Deut 
29:19) 
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Gunkel‘s association of biblical creation texts with the conflict narrative in Enuma Elish 
is not all together erroneous.
44
  Even though there are significant difference between 
them, it appears that the writer of Genesis 1 has still retained at least the language and 
underlying premise for something ‗new‘ coming about.  In Enuma Elish, the language is 
stark and clear as to what ‗cut down‘ refers to.  It is a sacrificial victim.  Jaki‘s (1998:16) 
vivid description of the myth is poignant: 
Marduk has to shoot an arrow into the raging Tiamat‘s belly before he can ‗cut through her inward 
parts‘ and ‗split her heart‘…Marduk can very well be imagined as one who tries to catch his 
breath as he has to wield a huge club in order to perform the task of producing the universe from 
Tiamat‘s slain body:  
 ‗The lord trod upon the hinder part of Tiamat, and with his unsparing club he split her skull.  He 
cut the arteries of her blood and caused the north wind to carry it to out-of-the-way places….The 
lord rested, examining her dead body, to divide the abortion and to create ingenious things 
(therewith).  He split her open like a mussel into two.‘45  
The cutting action is two-fold.  It refers to killing Tiamat and to her dismemberment.  
Westermann (1974:34) observes the frequency to which the ‗splitting‘ of the heavens and 
earth signals the beginning of a new creation: ‗…the separation of heaven and earth must 
have been an early and widespread tradition.  The dividing of heaven and earth not only 
signals the initial act, but also characterizes the whole creative process according to 
Westermann (1974:34).  It is not a borrowing of a word or concept, whether directly or 
indirectly, that we need to be concerned with.  It is much more engrained than that.  The 
idea that human creation and new things come from an act of cutting down, splitting or 
dividing has its genesis in the original victim, and this appears to be ubiquitous across 
ancient cultures. As ‗demythologized‘ as Genesis 1 is, it still steadfastly retains this 
                                                 
44
 Middleton (2005:185ff)  makes a strong case for Enuma Elish being the primary literary source that 
Genesis 1 is playing off of.  If this is so, which I believe it is, it compels interpreters to account for the 
grotesque (by our standards) depictions of execution and dismemberment in that account with Genesis 1.  
The Orthodox Divine Liturgy speaks of the ‗unbloody sacrifice‘ (which is also referred to as a ‗reasonable 
sacrifice‘).  Perhaps the author of Genesis 1 has something like that in mind, to paradoxically envision a 
‗sacrifice‘ that is not violent. 
45
 In Moche (Popson, 2002:e) iconography, the decisive act of killing the victim was with a club to the 
skull.  This required severe and repeated action.  We may well assume that before swords, blows to the 
head would be more readily used and would retain the more spontaneous element of the original scapegoat 
murder.  Crushed skulls are a common find in sacrificial burial sites. 
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notion of beginnings.
46
  The symmetrical pair of heaven and earth is still viewed as 
initially one thing that required splitting in order to generate new life, ‗like a mussel into 
two.‘ 
The benefits of such an act also seem to be linked to sacrifice.  An obscure and seemingly 
disconnected use of bara from those mentioned above is found only in the reflexive form.  
Eli‘s scandalous sons are making themselves fat by gorging on the choice portions of 
meat from the sacrifices (1 Sam 2:29).  A parallel Arabic word connects this with being 
‗free from disease, or debt‘ and is probably a derivative from the Assyrian word meaning 
‗well fed, fat, or digestible‘ and hence agreeable.47  The noun form, ayrm, refers 
exclusively to the fattened animals used for sacrifice.
48
  Hence it connotes the choicest or 
finest that life, via the corpse of the victim, has to offer.  In the adjectival form, ayrb, fat 
is a symbol of health, prosperity, and blessing.
49
  These derivatives, then, point to the end 
result of cutting down, befalling, or cutting up—life, blessing, goodness.  It speaks of the 
benevolent effects of the sacrifice.   
This connection between an action creating a completely new situation, cutting down, 
and fat as a symbol of abundance could be dismissed as odd or as an uncertain meaning.  
Yet, from the point of view of generative violence, the connection is logical.  The action 
of cutting down the scapegoat in a collective killing, and dismembering it, especially the 
fatty portions being offered to the gods and of the ensuing benefits of the collective 
murder coming on the community would easily be associated with a new ‗creation.‘ 
Girard (1972:277) explains the logic of eating the victim: ‗The victim is not killed to be 
eaten, but eaten because it has been killed.‘ The act serves a dual function for the 
community.  It relieves the model/obstacle tension.  By consuming the victim, the 
disciple ‗possess all that the father has‘ all the while emulating the model‘s desires 
(Girard 1972:266).  Girard (1972:265-266) explains the connection between sacrifice as 
appeasement and food for the god.  Because violence has transcended the community and 
is held within the realm of a god, it is easy to make the connection that a sacrifice is a 
                                                 
46
 Girard (1972:84ff) understands the prophets as well as the Greek tragedies as attempts to interpret myth 
and not so much to demythologize them. This was an attempt to ‗dismantle‘ them. 
47
 BDB 135 
48
 BDB 537 Isa1:11, 11:6, Ez 39:18, Amos 5:22 
49
 Ez 34:3, Ps 73:4, Gen 41 
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part of the divinity‘s very substance.  ‗Every time the sacrifice accompanies its desired 
effect, and bad violence is converted into good stability, the god is said to have accepted 
the offering of violence and consumed it.‘ 
If we accept that bara contains vestigial traces of sacrifice, then we can conclude that in 
the first instance, Elohim is viewed as the sacrificer, the executioner of the sacrifice. 
That God must first wipe away that which came before is, of course, nothing new to the 
prophets.  It is given cosmic dimensions, for it includes the ‗heavens and the earth.‘  This 
word pair is common in a variety of texts and is a way to refer to the ubiquitous scope of 
such actions; it will affect everything.  But if we read Gen. 1:1 in a straight forward 
manner, then it is this pair that is the object of bara.  If we grant that bara may have 
strong sacrificial connotations, can we assume that symmetrical pair is a sacrificial 
victim? 
In the book of Isaiah, the connection between the leveling of the heavens and earth and 
that of both Israel and the nations is variously repeated.
50
   
See, the day of the Lord is coming—a cruel day, with wrath and fierce anger—to make the land 
desolate and destroy sinners within it.  The stars of heaven and their constellations will not show 
their light.  The rising sun will be darkened and the moon will not give its light.  I will punish the 
world for its evil, the wicked for their sins…Therefore I will make the heavens tremble and the 
earth will shake from its place in the day of his burning anger‘ (Isa 13:9-13).   
In a prophecy against Edom, Isaiah 34 abounds in sacrificial language congealing the 
very real specter of Assyrian annihilation with the Lord sacrificing Edom and the leveling 
of the heavens and the earth.  
Come near, you nations, and listen pay attention, you peoples!  Let the earth hear, and all that is in 
it, the world, and all that comes out of it!  The Lord is angry with all nations; his wrath is upon all 
their armies.  He will totally destroy them, he will give them over to slaughter…All the stars of the 
heavens will be dissolved and the sky rolled up like a scroll; all the starry host will fall like 
withered leaves from the vine, like shriveled figs from the fig tree…The sword of the Lord is 
bathed in blood, it is covered with fat—the blood of lambs and goats, fat from the kidneys of 
rams.  
                                                 
50
 Isaiah 41, 42:14-17, 51:6-10, 54,  
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For the Lord has a sacrifice in Bozrah and a great slaughter in Edom (Isa 34:2-7). 
Of particular note in the above passage is the declaration of total annihilation of Edom 
where the language of Gen 1:2 is the same: ‗God will stretch out over Edom the 
measuring line of chaos (tohu) and the plumb line of desolation (bohu).   
The language of God sacrificing Israel and the nations (heaven and earth) is so integrated 
into the polemic against idols (Isa 44) that one wonders if the writer of Genesis 1 has the 
making of an idol as the chief metaphor for God cutting down the heavens and earth, 
splitting it, and chiseling away until it comes to ‗all its glory‘ (Isa 44:13).  The nations 
may cut down trees to make their gods, but Yahweh does this with the heavens and the 
earth. 
Genesis 1:1 does not abandon the mythical structure that generative acts require a 
severing.  To structure generative narrative such was as conventional to the author as 
speaking of evolutionary mutation and adaption today.  It was an operating and ritualistic 
assumption and required no direct borrowing. The author may be attempting to distance 
his version of the earth‘s genesis from his Mesopotamian counterparts, but he still 
structures the narrative sacrificially.  It is in the act of ‗cutting down‘ the heaven and 
earth that light can come forth.   
But the appeal of this pericope, as well as in the prophets, is that the God of Israel is a 
master of a sacrificial crisis, and not just a player in it.  Over against those who are 
hesitant to say that God created the situation of verse 2, we should view God‘s first and 
essential act of generation sacrificially.  As a matter of first importance, God leveled (cut 
down) the (old?) heavens and the earth, and thus making the nothingness of verse two.  
Perry (1993:9) is so inclined to view it such: ‗…the God who creates out of nothing 
becomes the God who creates—nothing; the one who ‗forms light‘ (Isa. 45:7) thereby 
creates the very possibility of its absence.‘  Bara is not only the act that encompasses all 
of Genesis 1, but also in particular the creative act before the six days of creation.  The 
precursor to generation is annihilation.  Hence, in similar fashion to God provoking a 
sacrificial crisis with Abraham and Abimelech or with Pharaoh and the Israelites, so he 
does here.  God ‗cut through‘ the sacrificial arrangements of humans with his own.  
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I agree with von Rad and Gunkel.  Von Rad (1972:48) rejects a strict chronological 
reading in the first three verses.  Gunkel (1901:107) goes so far as to declare that God did 
not create darkness, but rather, ‗God takes possession of darkness although it is not his 
creation and includes it in the order of his creation.‘  There is not a sequence from verse 
one to two, but rather scenario.
51
  The force is then that the state of the heavens and the 
earth in verse two is simply the state in which God finds it in at the time of ‗creating‘.  
This view is consistent with the posture of God in the expulsion narratives explained in 
the previous chapter.  The waw may have a causal emphasis.
52
  Accepting Westermann‘s 
(1974:96) caution that the matter cannot be settled semantically, but also questioning the 
powerful overly of theological/polemic concerns that have influenced translations, one 
might wonder how our understanding of this passage might alter if it read: ‗At the (right) 
moment, God cut down, severed, or split the heavens and the earth since the earth….‘  
The emphasis then is on God‘s perfect timing and action.  The right conditions prevailed 
for God to decisively act.  That act comes in the decisive moment when light comes forth.  
 
5.3   Genesis 1:2 – the undifferentiated crisis of the world 
 
From Girard‘s (1989:30-31) point of view, we must also take note of the symmetry of the 
‗heavens and earth‘ that has been ‗reduced to a single characteristic,‘ of which verse two 
describes.  The ‗heavens and earth‘ are given synonymous descriptions in verse two.53  
They are symbiotically linked.  As goes the heavens, so goes the earth, just as the 
beginning is similar to the end.  They are mirrored images of each other.  Tsumura 
(1989:74) believes a hyponymous relationship is in view here where all that is of the 
earth is included under that of the heavens.  But this distinction is reduced to nothing in 
verse two.  All hierarchal distinctions have been obliterated to the level of a 
‗conglomeration of difference‘ (Girard, 1977:252).   That the beginning of this story has 
                                                 
51
 Westermann‘s (1974:102) summation, then, follows the structure I laid out in the previous chapter.  God 
intervenes at the height of a sacrificial crisis, when the rivalry has exhausted itself.  
52
 There is a ‗circumstantial‘ use of the waw that: ‗introduces a statement of the concomitant conditions 
under which the action denoted by the principal verb take place‘ (BDB, 252).   
53
 Perry (1993:4) finds a chiastic arrangement between verse 1 and 2 of the same kind as Gen 2:4.  Thus, 
the ‗deep‘ of verse 2 is a referent to the heavens, while the ‗waters‘ is viewed as belonging to the earth.   
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been ‗reduced to a single characteristic…in an extremely stylized and transfigured form, 
reduced to its simplest expression‘ is a telltale sign of myth for Girard (1982:30). 
In this chaotic
54
 description of the earth‘s primal state, the author lays out a fundamental 
assumption about generative acts—they come out of crisis.  The author never ponders the 
ultimate question—why is it necessary for all of the goodness of creation to come out of 
such a gloomy milieu?   Why, within God‘s creative activity, was the world found in a 
‗terrible equilibrium‘?  The author, on the contrary, proceeds immediately to tell the story 
of earth from what Girard (1972:87) calls a ‗structural mold of all mythology‘—
generative acts come out of chaos, crisis, and a terrible circumstance.
55
  It is primarily a 
communal crisis, one that Girard calls a sacrificial crisis.  In these opening verses of the 
Bible, the writer can only imagine that the earth began in such a crisis as is common to 
the human social endeavor.
56
 
5.3.1 whbw wht htyh Urahw.  In every way, verse two sets up a series of symmetrical 
contrasts.
57
  There is conflict here, but not as Gunkel imagined.  The earth is in conflict 
with itself and so are the heavens. The heavens and the earth are up against each other, 
and the ‗spirit of God‘ is facing the ‗deep,‘ that is opposing the whole situation.  Surely a 
contradiction in terms and precisely what Girard means by a sacrificial crisis, a 
monstrous double and a paroxysm.
58
   
                                                 
54
 Gunkel (1895:5-12) was correct to connect the conflict with Babylonian myths.  But the primary rivalry 
of verse two is between the heaven and the earth.  Yahweh does stand in opposition to this ‗monstrous 
double‘ (Girard 1972:72), but as one standing outside the rivalry and in ultimate mastery of it.  
55
 In his summary of multiple creative narratives of the ancient world, Gunkel (1901:105-106) reiterates 
this point.  Still to be addressed, however, is the extent to which descriptions such as here are simply 
benign pictorial expressions to say: ‗not yet.‘ 
56
 A word of caution is necessary here.  The exegesis here agrees with Westermann (1974:108) and 
Anderson (2009:29-30) that direct borrowing from other texts is doubtful: ‗…one cannot derive Gen 1:2 
one-sidedly from the Mesopotamian descriptions.  Its prehistory is so broad and far-reaching that a direct 
derivation is not required.‘  I suggest that the writer of Genesis 1 simply has no other way of viewing the 
beginning of the world apart from this ubiquitous framework. Going back to a more deconstructionist 
hermeneutic, the writer is not necessarily aware of ‗what‘s behind‘ this framework.  This equally applies to 
the authors of Mesopotamian text. 
57
 Westermann (1974:43, 102-103) asserts that the three lines of verse two synonymously describe a 
‗condition.‘ As we will examine, however, there are contrasts or tensions within this.  
58
 ‗All the mock battles that genuinely take place prior to sacrificial ceremonies and all the ritual dances 
whose formal symmetry is reflected in a perpetual confrontation between the performers lend themselves to 
an interpretation in which the performers are seen as imitative responses to a sacrificial crisis‘ (Girard, 
1972:98).  In his discussion of the ‗not yet‘ notion that he believes is prominent in Gen 1:2, Westermann 
(1974:43) speaks of the central theme of separation in cosmogonies. The critical connection is that ‗not yet‘ 
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In one rhythmic phrase of verse 2, the picture is masterfully painted.  The earth was tohu 
wabohu.  The original situation of the earth is condensed into this terse phrase of 
synonymous and ambiguously abrupt terms.
59
  
Several words in the generative story of earth indicate an approximate basis in a 
communal and sacrificial murder, more accurately, in the kind of communal crisis in 
which the scapegoat emerges. Following Albright‘s conclusion, BDB60 locates tohu as a 
masculine singular form of a word tahah, hht.  It possibly originates from the Aramaic 
aht meaning ‗rage, roar,‘ or ‗bluster.‘ Again we must note the connection between 
virulent winds and man‘s anger.  This connection, so easily recognizable from a mimetic 
perspective, unanimously escapes exegetes.  Predominantly the word denotes utter 
desolation especially from a terrifying and destructive act, usually of the violent 
destruction of a village (Isa 24:10).
61
  Jeremiah (4:19-41) makes this connection 
profoundly clear. Strikingly, the very elements of nature—earth, sky, light, mountains, 
hills, animals—are reduced to the same condition as the desolate town (Jer 4:23-26).  It is 
precisely what Girard (1972:30) believes is the pinnacle of a sacrificial crisis that goes 
unchecked. It is a severe and sudden escalation of violent reciprocity.  It is a communal 
swirl of escalating and symmetrical rivalries.  It is a much feared end result unless some 
communal mechanism is not found to break up the ‗terrible equilibrium.‘ A communal 
concern is never out of the purview as Westermann (1974:104) reminds: ‗Creation and 
the world are to be understood always from the viewpoint of or in the context of human 
existence.‘  As argued earlier, a communal crisis is projected back on to the origins of the 
world itself.  And to remind, this condition of the world‘s beginnings is broadly shared 
throughout mythology.  The author is tapping in on a conventional sense of origins.  
Neither he nor any other author of a mythological text needs necessarily to be aware of 
such sacrificial underpinnings anymore than a presider of ritual would understand the 
                                                                                                                                                 
statements are designed to ‗set up a contrast to the present state of things.‘  In ritual, the contrast is the 
crisis leading to the resolution in the expulsion of a victim.   
59
 Middleton (2005:75) suggests an ‗onomatopoeic‘ feel to the phrase similar to ‗helter skelter‘ or ‗hurly 
burly.‘ 
60
 BDB 1062.  The other key use of tohu is used in polemics against idols (1Sam 12:21, Isa 41:29). 
61
 In both cases outside of Gen. 1:2 where tohu wabohu is found ‗tohu here is almost equivalent to 
sammah‘—destruction (Tsumura 1989:32). 
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origins of a given ritual.  The author of Genesis 1, often designated as simply ‗P‘, 
intentionally pushes the conventional cosmogonic framework in a different direction.  
Tsumura (1989:17) views the referent in Deut 32:10 ‗desolation‘ as the primary meaning 
of both tohu and bohu and says it simply refers to a dry barren land.
62
  His argument 
seeks to negate the connotations brought on by the chaoskampf  interpretation, saying that 
Gen. 1:2 is simply saying the earth was ‗not yet‘; it hadn‘t come about.  Tsumura‘s 
presentation is meticulous and convincing. I would argue, however, that he does not pay 
close enough attention to the cause of the barrenness in biblical reference, nor does he 
notice the primary referent—the fearful prospect of any place devoid of human 
habitation.   It is a city, now destroyed and/or abandoned, that once again returns to the 
desert.  When a community disintegrates either by natural or social causes, its remnants 
remain in its state of undifferentiation—the desert.  Dust it came from and dust it returns. 
We should also not fail to notice the cutting down of trees in association with a siege 
which would have real and direct connotations of not only the city, but also the earth 
being raped and left barren.
63
   Also, the kinds of desert animals that inhabit such 
abandoned places always have demonic-type connotations.
64
  Tsumura also minimizes 
the fearful connotations of the sea and the desert in both the Psalms and prophetic verse.  
In Tsumura‘s (1989:30) catalogue of uses of tohu in the Old Testament, there is always a 
fearful, terrifying connotation with it; indeed, the fearful connotation is the primary 
reason for reference to the desert.  The attempt to insulate any negative connotations in 
Gen. 1:2 is weak.  The archetypal concern in Babel reverberates through the ages of 
antiquity: ‗lest we be scattered.‘ 
 
Bohu appears to mean ‗empty,‘ but Tsumura (1989:21) stresses that bohu always has a 
concrete reference—an empty house or tent—and not some abstract concept of 
‗nothingness.‘  Bohu does not have a referent in the Old Testament outside of its 
synonymous connection with tohu.  
                                                 
62
 He argues against Albright‘s assertion, saying instead: ‗…it is probable that the Ugaritic thw is a cognate 
of Hebrew tohu and that both have the common meaning of  ―desert‖ (Tsumura, 1989:19).   
63
 The prohibition against cutting down of trees in Deut 29:19 references this kind of desolation. 
64
 Following the tohu wabohu of verse 11 in Isa. 34 is a list of such creations among such is the desert night 
hag lilith. 
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Of particular interest are the two passages from the prophets Isaiah and Jeremiah where 
the two words, tohu and bohu, are found in parallel.
65
    Comparing Ugaritic references 
primarily to the womb, Tsumura (1989:28) ventures that the phrase connotes the idea of 
disfunction or barrenness, as in being unproductive or ‗out of order.‘66   But here again, 
Tsumura‘s neutral view of Gen 1:2 ignores the persistent reference tohu wabohu has to 
‗meaningful human existence.‘  It is as Levinson (1994:12,24) states: ‗Throughout the 
ancient Near Eastern world, including Israel, the point of creation is not the production of 
matter out of nothing, but rather the emergence of a stable community in a benevolent 
and life sustaining order.‘ 
Together they form an umbrella statement speaking of the total annihilation of a city.  It‘s 
a perfect picture of a settlement that has been ‗reduced to dust.‘  It speaks of the horrible 
and indiscriminant massacre and abandonment of a once vibrant place.  Hence, tohu is 
also used as a reference to the lifelessness and desolation of the desert (Deut 32:10).  
These two terms together signal one thing, the lethal volatility of mimetic rivalry.  It is a 
hendiadys meant to conjure up something frightening (Westermann, 1974:103).  Girard 
(1982:31) is able to piece together what Tsumura struggles to hold apart:  
 
Lack of differentiation in myth sometimes has idyllic connotations…Usually its character is 
catastrophic…Myths that are thought to ‗invent death‘ in reality invent nothing but rather 
distinguish it from life when ‗in the beginning‘ both are confused.  I believe this to mean that it is 
impossible to live without dying or, once again, that existence is unbearable.  ‗Primordial‘ lack of 
differentiation and the ‗original‘ chaos conflict strongly in character.  Those elements that are 
indistinguishable often have conflictual connotations. 
 
The first chapter of Genesis has conventionally been viewed as a Priestly document that 
has been strategically placed at the beginning of Israel‘s history to set the stage for the 
telling of Israel‘s origins.  The text is powerfully influenced by the devastation of Israel‘s 
                                                 
65
 Only Jer 4:23 uses the exact expression.  Isa 34:11 has the two in parallel without the waw.   
66
 Tsumara (1989:40) concludes that the Isaiah and Jeremiah passages where the phrase tohu wabohu is 
found is not a direct borrowing from Genesis 1:2.  Instead, he suggests they ‗share a common literary 
tradition in their use of tohu wabohu, which, according to Jeremiah context, refers to a ―desert-like state of 
the ―earth.‖  As has been discussed above, however, there is no compelling necessity for a literary 
borrowing.  It is simply part of the general ‗worldview‘ in the ancient world.  
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greatest loss—Zion. There is a surprising similarity in language and topoi in Genesis 1 
and the prophets who were most closely associated with Israel‘s most profound crisis.  
Hence, notions of a primordial chaos come from the real life experience of people 
ravaged by a devastating ruthlessness, perpetually recycling itself in communal life.
67
  
Gauging from the well-known ruthlessness of the Assyrians, Israel spoke often of the 
horror of such events.
68
  At least in Israel, it would be easy to draw an analogy between 
their own experience as surviving victims of such violence and the total breakdown of 
nature itself (Jer 4:23-26).  Indeed, for the Israelites, it was not analogous at all.  The 
degeneration of the communal situation had wide-ranging ripple effects.  Violence is a 
contagion that if left unabated will ‗overflow its confines and flood the surrounding area‘ 
(Girard, 1977:10). Human violence easily oversteps its boundaries into the natural and 
heavenly realms.
69
 
 
I look at the earth.  It is unformed [tohu] and void [bohu]; at the skies, and their light is gone.  I 
look at the mountains, they are quaking; and all the hills are rocking.  I look: no man is left, and all 
the birds of the sky have fled.  I look: the farm land is desert, and all its towns are in ruin—
Because of the Lord, Because of His blazing anger.  For thus says the Lord: The whole land shall 
be desolate (NJPS: Jer 4:23-27).
70
 
 
In Isaiah‘s prophecy of doom upon Edom, there are unmistakable references to the 
sacrificial element in Yahweh‘s fierce judgment: 
 
For My sword shall be drunk in the sky; Lo, it shall come down upon Edom, upon the people I 
have doomed.  To wreak judgment.  The Lord has a sword; it is sated with blood.  It is gorged 
with fat—the blood of lambs and he-goats, the kidney fat of rams.  For the Lord holds a sacrifice 
in Bozrah, a great slaughter in the land of Edom…Jackdaws and owls shall possess it; Great owls 
                                                 
67
 Tsumura‘s neutral view of Gen. 1:2 still affirms a foundational view that meaningful life first and of 
necessity comes out of an undifferentiated state. 
68
 Habakkuk‘s prophecy profoundly addresses such terror.  See also, Finkelstein and Silberman‘s 
(2001:217-229, 245) vivid description of the destruction of Lachish and of Samaria.  
69
 My basic argument is that the returning to the desert is simply ‗the age old rhythm‘ of the region.  Hence 
a view of the exile is not as pressing for a reading of Genesis 1.  Annihilation and/or desolation of an 
inhabited place were common knowledge. 
70
 Tsumura surgically removes tohu wabohu from its broader context.  Tohu is a dry, barren waste 
primarily brought on by the destruction of the city.  His is a telling example of how the concern to be 
‗context dependent‘ and ‗culturally embedded‘ can lead to a constricted, myopic reading.  
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and ravens shall dwell there.  He shall measure it with a line of chaos (tohu) and with weights of 
emptiness (bohu) (Isa 34:5-11).  
 
This last phrase is most telling.  With impeccable irony Yahweh promises to demolish 
with an instrument used for construction, a plumb line, and to devalue with a devise used 
to measure worth, a scale.   
 
5.3.2 Darkness up against the deep.  The second line of Gen 1:2 finishes out the 
description of complete indifferentiation.  The attempts to distance the text from a 
‗mythical‘ struggle between animated/personified gods is justified,71 yet tehom, typically 
translated as ‗deep‘ or ‗abyss,‘ is also a cognate of tahah mentioned above.72  Tsumura 
(1989:65) challenges Gunkel‘s influential notion that tehom is derived from the 
Babylonian goddess of the sea, Tiamat, saying instead that it simply means ‗ocean.‘  
Again, Tsumura‘s attempt to distance the text from mythological reference has neglected 
the connection between the ocean, the apparent root idea of rage or bluster, and a stormy 
tempestuous goddess of the sea whose sacrifice establishes a new creation.  One need 
only be on a ship in a stormy sea to know the sense of dreadful fright.  Westermann 
(1974:106) argues that the root goes back to a very common ancient notion of a watery 
beginning.   
 
A mimetic perspective, however, would also not fail to notice the emphasis in tehom on 
‗flood of water.‘73  Thus, an overpowering, overwhelming body of water is a perfect 
description of the ‗crowd‘ as it swallows its victim. Again, drowning a victim was a 
preferred method of scapegoat murders. ‗What is the sign of Jonah?‘ Girard (1982:117) 
asks…‘The sign of Jonah is yet another sign of the collective victim.‘ 
 
Following Perry‘s (1993:3-4) analysis, the deep, tehom, is chiastically a reference to the 
heavens of verse 1.  Perry points to the curious relationship of the deep to darkness.  It 
                                                 
71
 Westermann (1974:106) convincingly argues against a literary dependence on Enuma Elish, yet still uses 
words like ‗opposition,‘ ‗struggle,‘ ‗chaos‘ and  ‗contrast‘ when describing this sentence.  
72
 BDB 1062 
73
 ‗Mwht occurs 35 times in the Old Testament...Mwht always means a flood of water or the deep,‘ says 
Westermann (1974:105, 106), ‗the most notable characteristic of the Egyptian cosmogonies.‘ 
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should be better understood as over against, ynp-le, darkness than upon it.74  He speaks 
of a complete breakdown of vertical (darkness upon the deep) and horizontal (earth as 
tohu wabohu) distinctions.  This condition is well known to skiers when skiing above 
timberline in a snowstorm.  The distinction between the ground and the sky has all but 
disappeared.  Called a ‗whiteout,‘ this condition renders vision useless.  When the word 
darkness, hoshek, is added to the abyss, the sense of engulfment in a realm of utter 
disarray or disorientation can easily be conjured. It is a ‗blackout.‘  When the elements in 
a symmetry of rivals is so intensely ‗up against‘ each other, the absence of difference is 
total.  Darkness and the deep are perfectly symmetrical in their opposition.
75
  
 
5.3.3 tpxrm Myhla xwrw.  The final phrase of verse 2 addresses the symmetry of 
undifferentation by introducting a counter symmetry to the previous statements.  Perry 
(1993:5) observes the ‗clumsily‘ repetition of the al pene (upon the face) phrase of the 
preceding line as if synonymously parallel with ‗the deep,‘ yet ‗the waters‘ (hamiyem) do 
not belong so much to ‗the deep‘ as it does to the earth.  Again, interpretations abound,76  
but a chiastic arrangement is evident.  Thus Perry views Gen 1:2 as a kind of chiastic play 
on the first verse as well as within the verse 2:
77
 
 A - God created the heavens and the earth,   
      B -the earth  
C - tohu wabohu 
    C - darkness was up against 
B  the deep  
A - Spirit of God up against the waters. 
                                                 
74
 Literally, it is on/upon the face.  Hence, if someone is ‗in your face,‘ it is confrontational.  Westermann 
(1974:104) understand darkness as a fundamental expression of opposition to creation.  
75
 In America, conservatives and liberals have been going at each for so long now that all they can do is 
make sure they cancel the opponent out, always making sure 1- 1= 0. 
76
 Westermann (1974:106) disagrees, saying that  Mymh is synonymously parallel to Mwht on the basis of 
the repetition of ynp-le. 
77
 ‗The chiastic figure is in fact operative here as well, though as a habit or trope of thinking rather than 
explicitly, and it is precisely the anticipated chiasm that can lead our attention to the underlying meaning. 
Let us see, then, how ‗darkness‘ can be glossed or read, projectively, as ‗the heavens‘ (Perry 1993:4). 
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Critically then, the last statement of verse 2 is a comprehensive statement similar to verse 
1, and it is set in contrast to the 2 preceding lines.  If we ventured a reading of these 
verses without the two middle statements, it would read: 
 God    created (cut)  the heavens and the earth… 
 The spirit of God  was moving against  the waters  
There is a consistency here with the general structure of the expulsion narrative examined 
in the previous chapter.  As in the case of Pharaoh and the Israelites for instance (Ex 1), 
Yahweh‘s presence is profoundly implied in the escalation of the crisis.  Humans 
perpetually drive toward reciprocal rivalries, and Yahweh uses that to provoke a 
‗sacrificial crisis‘ where then He can interject his own sacrificial alternative.  The 
‗creative act‘ of verse 1 is being set in motion.  
Perry may be correct to dispel the perhaps overly imaginative connections with Enuma 
Elish; however, that a confrontational view is being depicted here is consistent in 
comparison to biblical use, especially the exilic and post-exilic prophets.  Vestigial 
remains of a rivalry are still present, but not between Yahweh and gods or goddesses in 
verse 2.  A startlingly clear picture of Girard‘s (1972:49) rival doubles is retained 
between the heavens and the earth for they are completely symmetrical and up against 
each other: 
A single principle is at work in primitive religion and classical tragedy alike, a principle implicit 
but fundamental.  Order, peace, and fecundity depend on cultural distinctions; it is not these 
distinctions but the loss of them that gives birth to fierce rivalries and sets members of the same 
family or social group at one another‘s throats. 
Rivalries that become so intense and symmetrical in the imitation of the other are what 
Girard (1972:252) calls a ‗monstrous double.‘  The rivalry itself is a single monster that 
must be dealt with lest it destroys all.   It is this ‗monster‘ that Yahweh is ‗cutting down‘ 
and in a most peculiar maneuver.  
5.3.4 God’s intervention with the ‘monstrous double.’ A war of ‗mythical‘ 
proportions may not be envisioned, but what seems to be overlooked is the interjection of 
an active Presence of God in the very midst of this crisis of creation.  The active 
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participial form of the verb Pxr, has few biblical references.78  Deuteronomy 32:11 
speaks of finding Israel in the desert and watching over him ‗like an eagle who rouses the 
nestlings gliding down on her young.‘  It seems to connote a nurturing type activity.  A 
vague use of it is found in Jeremiah 23:9 where it may reference the ‗shivering of bones‘ 
from fear.  Rachaph in either instance probably conjures up a stirring about in nervous 
anticipation of a good or a terrible thing.  Von Rad (1972:49) even goes so far as to 
suggest that it should be understood as an agitation creating a ‗terrible storm.‘  This 
depiction would place it along similar lines to Ezekiel‘s (Ez 1) storm cloud of Yahweh‘s 
intervening Presence.  Similarly, Yahweh‘s intervention with Abraham and Abimelech or 
Pharaoh and the Israelites is an intentional aggravation or agitation of a certain situation.  
Yahweh has a liking to compounding a crisis.  
The stirring anticipation especially makes sense as an action of xwr, the wind or spirit.  
With the introduction of God‘s spirit into the generative event, we once more are made 
aware of its sacrificial allusions.  
There is a diverse range of meaning around ruach, but again, we come across a word that 
holds a benevolent and malevolent duality to it.  Since its most basic understanding has to 
do with moving air: breath, wind, or spirit, it can have a wide array of benevolent and 
malevolent denotations.  Malevolently, ruach speaks of the weak and often empty or 
shallow aspects of human life—man‘s life is but a breath.  Of note also, is its connection 
with the snorting kind of hard breathing associated with raging anger of both God
79
 and 
man.  Ruach is used to speak of the disposition of a person that can be moved positively, 
towards courage or vitality, but also negatively, towards bitterness, volatility, impatience 
or seemingly uncontrollable impulses.  
Ruach is of course used to speak of the natural forces of wind with all of its positive and 
negative aspects. From Girard‘s perspective, this connection is not coincidence or mere 
analogy.
80
  From the mythic perspective, natural forces behave in the same way that 
                                                 
78
 BDB 934 
79
 Jb 4:9, Ps 18:6 
80
 Speaking of the Greek pharmakos ritual, Girard (1972:96) states: ‗The sole possible model remains the 
sacrificial crisis and its resolution.  Nature enters the picture later, when the ritualistic mind succeeds in 
detecting certain similarities between nature‘s rhythms and the community‘s alternating pattern of order 
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human violence does.  The same particular natural forces are usually called to mind: 
wind, fire, draught, plague, thunderstorm, earthquake, or volcanic eruption.  These all 
characterize the dual nature of the sacred.  They, like reciprocal violence, are potentially 
dangerous and volatile, requiring a meticulous and careful approach to them.  The 
community must keep a calculated distance from them. Like human rage, it must remain 
outside the perimeters of the community, but not so far that the community cannot glean 
its therapeutic and benevolent forces.  Most of all, these forces are unwieldy, outside the 
manageability of human effort, just as outbursts of violence appear to be.  
Of particular note here is its immediate association with the deep or waters and with God. 
It is the spirit/wind/breath of God that is anxiously stirring against the waters.
81
  When 
the ruach is found in construct with Yahweh or Elohim, it is most often in connection 
with prophetic activity.  Hearkening back to the earliest expressions of prophetic activity, 
the spirit would come upon a person or group in some kind of visible display of agitated 
frenzy.
82
 Of particular note are several episodes of this around the story of Saul and 
David (1 Sam 16: 15, 18:10, 19:9).  Yahweh would even bring an evil spirit to Saul with 
obvious and disturbing effects. This coming upon a person by a spirit has a likely origin 
with pre-war ritual.
83
 The intense anxiety and nervous anticipation of either horrific 
failure or ecstatic victory is localized in an individual who can rally the troops into a 
spirited charge.  The force of the spirit in regards to this prophetic activity is viewed as 
irresistible and irrevocable in anticipation of a mighty act of God that has been decreed 
by Him.
84
  
The spirit or wind of Yahweh is closely tied to Israel‘s great deliverance from the 
Egyptians at the Reed Sea.  Here the closest possible connection is made with natural 
forces (wind and water, Ex 14:21), Yahweh‘s ruach (Ex 15:10), and a redemptive, 
sacrificial act.  When the moving of Yahweh‘s ruach is found in proximity to Yahweh‘s 
                                                                                                                                                 
and disorder.  The modus operandi of violence—sometimes reciprocal and pernicious, sometimes 
unanimous and beneficial—is then taken as the model for the entire universe.‘ 
81
 Perry (1993:5) argues for that curiously repeated phrase al peni, should be understood in its ‗primary 
meaning‘ as ‗opposite, over against…not on the face of , but rather facing.‘ 
82
 Num 11:17,25,26,  
83
 Jud. 3:10, 6: 34, 11:29, 13:25; 1 Sam 11:6 
84
 Gunkel (1901:123) finds parallels with God‘s victory of the seas in Ps 104:5-9.  ‗…a battle between 
Yahweh and the deep took place before creation.  The sea stormed and tossed and held possession of the 
earth.  But Yahweh intervened frightfully so that the waters fled.‘ 
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presence, referenced in the exodus story as the pillar of fire, it signals a drawing near or 
approaching for action. Yahweh‘s presence in spirit signals again an irresistible and vital 
life force.  ‗Where can I escape from Your spirit?  Where can I flee from Your presence?‘ 
(Ps 139:6).  All of this imagery of wind, fire, and water is repeatedly conjured up from 
the exilic period, wherein the near total loss of ‗life‘ will be miraculously reversed.85   
Oddly, the power and might of Yahweh‘s wind defeats all human violence while not 
resorting to it.  ‗Not by might, nor by power, but by My Spirit, said the Lord of Hosts‘ 
(Zech 4:6).  Repeatedly, those who envisioned a miraculous rebirth of Israel, relied on the 
same imagery as the first verses of Genesis.
86
  As of human designs, especially of the 
usual means of human violence, Israel was helpless and hopeless.  Only Yahweh alone 
could reverse the situation. 
 
In this regard, the Spirit of God is closely associated with blessing and generative acts.  
‗Thus says the Lord, your Maker, Your Creator who has helped you since birth…Even as 
I pour water on thirsty soil, and rain upon dry ground, so will I pour My spirit on your 
offspring, and my blessing upon your posterity‘ (Isa 44:3). Yahweh is called ‗your 
Creator,‘ ruy, or the one who formed/fashion/shaped you (Gen 2:7).  As with many other 
prophets of the exile, the ruach of God which so powerfully moved at the Reed Sea is 
recalled.  But rather than splitting the waters, the Spirit is viewed as water itself that is 
poured out from above. Whereas in one form water is foreboding, dark, and abysmal, in 
another form, it is redemptive and life giving. 
The spirit is viewed often in connection with a movement on the part of God that must 
precede a mighty act.  Its application towards creation comes from an already established 
notion of the spirit‘s involvement in Israel‘s acts of deliverance. This application must 
apply here also, being as it is a direct response to the crisis of creation—the loss of 
differentiation.  The spirit‘s agitation is viewed as the essential precursor for God‘s 
response to the ‗savage sacredness‘—a term used by Girard (1972:266) to describe the 
sacrificial crisis. It is: 
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 Ezek 39:29, Isa 44:3, 63:10ff, Hag 2:5, Zech 4 
86
 Gunkel (1901:122) posits a strong case for the material of Genesis to be very ancient.   
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…the domain of the savage sacredness, which recognizes neither boundaries nor limits.  This is 
the realm not only of gods and supernatural creatures, of monsters and the dead, but also of nature 
itself…of the cosmos and of all the rest of humanity. 
On a more theological note, Yahweh is both master of and responder to the savage 
sacred.  Above all, the first two verses of the Bible establish that all of God‘s creative 
activity is most profoundly counteracting the crisis of creation—the empty, decimated, 
dark, confused, and ruinous condition.  
Two critical points are being made in the first verses of the Bible that masterfully set up 
the rest of chapter one, the book of Genesis, and perhaps the Torah.  First, the 
precondition for generative acts is assumed to be annihilation.  This we can say, at least 
from Girard‘s view of scapegoat violence, is assumed without question.  The earth‘s 
creation is imagined from a common sacrificial basis.  More significant, though, is the 
Israelite‘s view of their God in this situation, for the crisis of primordial creation is 
subordinated and ruled by a God who decisively yet mysteriously moves in and through 
the crisis of creation, even, in fact, provoking it.  It is a response where God mysteriously 
engages heaven and earth‘s ‗terrible equilibrium‘ through spirit and light all the while 
remaining above and in control of it.  
 
5.4  Genesis 1:3 – Light—the intervention, the offering, the reversal  
 
The answer to the crisis of creation is boldly set forth in the precursor to the first day of 
creation, and it is sacrificial.  Light comes forth or arises even from within earth‘s crisis, 
but even more so it is directly from the voice of God.  rwa-yhyw rwa yhy Myhla rmayw.  
There are good reasons to consider that the nature of this light is associated not only with 
God‘s action, but also His Presence.87  In the coming forth of light, God initiates a 
                                                 
87
 The discussion here is in keeping with a long-standing Old Testament dialogue over the nature of God‘s 
Presence as viewed by the Israelites.  A review of this dialogue has been addressed in my dissertation, An 
Evaluation of the Nature of the Glory of the Lord in Ezekiel 1-2 (Ruckhaus, 2005).  J.T Strong (2000:73) 
has also highlighted some of the current discussion about notions of deified presence, suggesting the idea of 
a hypostasis, ‗…abstract aspects of Yahweh that were personified and given substance.‘  Sarna (1989:7) 
reminds that the association of light with God‘s presence is firmly established in rabbinic tradition.  There 
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sacrificial offering, and in a peculiar way, God is present in that offering to the earth‘s 
crisis.
88
 
5.4.1 The structural features of the emerging light for Genesis 1.  First, since the 
great lights are not made until the fourth day, it is readily apparent that the light 
preceding the first day must be considered in some different way.  We need not assume 
complete cosmological ignorance on the part of the ancients.  They knew the sun was the 
source of daylight, but they also affirmed that the lights in the sky relied on an even more 
fundamental light. ‗The Oriental…did not think of light and darkness exclusively in 
connection with the heavenly bodies‘ (Von Rad 1972:51).  The great lights rule by 
representation (Gen 1:14-16).  They lead, guide and mark off the days by imitation.  Just 
as a statement of wisdom cannot be fully expressed until it is placed alongside (lsm) 
another, so it is with the great lights.  Their light is a likeness of a more essential nature. 
Also, there are several structural features within Genesis 1 that indicate viewing the light 
of verse three as significant and unique.
89
 
Within the verse, light is not said to be made or fashioned by God
90
  but simply called 
forth: ‗Let there be light‘ (rwa yhy).  Only here, Arnold (2009:39) asserts, is divine fiat.  
The verb ‗let there be‘ (yhy) is a jussive and expresses God‘s volition.  
                                                                                                                                                 
can be no uncertainty here; P is fully aware of such associations.  See also Samuel Terrien‘s book Elusive 
Presence (1983). 
88
 The doctrine of ex nihilo sought to correct Gnostic and other heretical ideas of creation being constituted 
by emanations from a deity.  Nothing of what follows wishes to modify or challenge that.  Of course, the 
text has no explicit concerns with such notions.  The Priestly tradition, on the other hand, is very concerned 
with the meaning of God‘s Presence in the visible world, especially with the loss of the Temple.  Gunkel 
(1901:127) points out that in the ancient world light is often deified—given a separate identity—especially 
in connection with battling chaos or darkness.  Strong (2000:73) reiterates that this identity is a hypostasis 
of the greater deity, and is not to be understood as ‗other gods in a polytheistic pantheon.‘ 
89
 Arnold (2009:39) warns against the propensity to overly philosophize or theologize light to which my 
reading might be objectionable.  He does, however, reiterate an important point being made here that the 
introduction of light structures the whole pericope.  It is a precursor to all six days leading to rest on the 
seventh.  
90
 There are similar statements in Genesis 1 which begin with the mild command yhy (Gen 1:4, 14), yet in 
each of these a subsequent verse states that God proceeded to make them.  This is a subtle nuance, but it 
seems intentionally so.  Unlike the other days of separation, it is not clear that light comes about via the 
separation.  The first separation is not to bring forth light, but day.  Ultimately we cannot say from whence 
does light come, other than emerging from darkness.  We can only affirm with verse three that it came upon 
darkness or in the midst of darkness.  Curiously, Gunkel (1901:121) leaves verse 3 out of his discussion of 
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Another structural feature is the placement of light in relationship to the tov formula.  As 
nowhere else in the sequence of creation, once light has come about, it is immediately 
proceeded by the formulaic ‗and God saw that the light was good.‘  There is little 
apparent pattern to this formula other than its correspondence to the seven days.  It is not 
spoken of on day two and is twice mentioned on day three.  Statements that precede it 
vary as do those that follow.  There are seven proclamations of goodness which 
intentionally give a sense of wholeness and completion.  The significance of the 
statement especially becomes evident in verse thirty-one.  There, God‘s reflection on all 
creation as ‗exceeding good‘ is reiterated and elaborated on in the seventh day.  Each 
time God affirms the good; He stops, ceases, or rests.  The proclamation signals an 
interval or break in the sequence.  Hence the statements of ‗good‘ are closely allied with 
‗day.‘  Indeed, light is the necessary precondition for all of creation.  Light sets up the 
constitutional element of all creation—day.  It is comprehensive of all the days of 
creation.  Light, as the most substantial element of ‗day,‘ signals that space, interval, or 
domain of God‘s overpowering benevolence.  The light of verse three symbiotically and 
inseparably links both cosmological and theological, the physical to the spiritual.   
Furthermore, we should not fail to notice that the goodness of light is constituted solely in 
God being able to see it.  We may not be comfortable with such an anthropomorphic 
view of God—that He needs to turn a light on in order to see—but this should not distract 
us from what is important.  Light was necessary for God to ‗see‘ goodness and that this 
‗seeing‘ by God precedes all that comes of creation.  This has a purely theological 
perspective to it.  Goodness belongs to the visible,
91
 and it belongs to God.
92
   Strong 
(2000:76) discusses the notion of the Israelites rebelling against the ‗eyes of Glory‘ (Isa 
3:8). 
                                                                                                                                                 
the structure of the verbs made and create.  For a writer such as P whom Gunkel (1901:118) insists is 
scientific in his meticulous presentation, we should not consider the absence of ‗made‘ here as haphazard.  
91
 Oddly, Von Rad (1972:52) talks of a ‗declaration of value,‘ but the text consistently speaks only of God 
seeing, not declaring, the goodness.  He is correct in connecting the good with ‗purpose and 
correspondence‘ and not so much with aesthetic judgment.  One must be able to see in order to know where 
one is headed. 
92
 A notion surviving even to the time of Jesus (Luke 18:19). 
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Although the verb, har, is the common word for seeing, it is also a highly charged word 
referring to prophets and prophecy.  Before they were called prophets, nabi, they were 
called seers, ro’eh (1 Sam 9:9).  Visions (marah) were part and parcel with revelation, 
perception, and clarity (Num 12:8).  They became the source of intense controversy in 
and around the exile as a frenzied pitch of rival visions barraged the situation in both 
Jerusalem and Babylon.  So, the prophet Ezekiel echoes Yahweh‘s disgust for most of his 
contemporary prophets as ‗seeing nothing‘ (Ez 13:3).   This is further exasperated by the 
complaint of Jerusalemites under siege that ‗Yahweh doesn‘t see; he has abandoned us‘ 
(Ez 8:12).
93
  Thus, a ‗seeing God‘ is one who intervenes in a crisis.  It is a god who both 
delivers and brings blessing.  In a crisis of differentiation—sacrificial crisis—vision, the 
ability to see beyond the symmetry of reciprocal violence, to forge a path out of eminent 
and total disaster is the valued commodity.
94
   
Girard (1972:267) states: ‗The birth of the community is first and foremost an act of 
separation.  That is why metaphors of severance permeate the generative act…Whether 
we refer to catharsis or purification, purgation or exorcism, it is actually the idea of 
evacuation and separation that is foremost.‘   Here we have a definitive connection 
between Girard and the biblical notion of holy.  This generative act of separation is a 
constant theme in Genesis.
95
 The placement of the light proclamation holds a strategic 
place in the text.  It is interventional, standing between the crisis of creation and the six 
days of creation.  Light arises out of darkness and then God pauses to perceive its 
goodness.  Then, God proceeds with a reversal of earth‘s chaotic situation, first by 
separation, then by filling.  The two sets of three days address the crisis in full.  The first 
three days reverse the world‘s foreboding characteristics. It is completely indifferentiated.  
It is dark and decimated.  Through a series of separations God provides distinctions, 
structure, order, and form. What Girard (1972:284) would call, ‗a rebirth of difference‘ 
the writer identifies as the separation of light from darkness.  The next three conquer 
earth‘s deep emptiness (tohu wabohu) by flurries of generative activity.  We must 
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 In this verse of Ezekiel, we should further take not of the connection of seeing with Presence. 
94
 Girard (1965:37-42) 
95
 See Chapter 4 above.  
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reiterate that it is the expulsion of light from darkness that is seen as the necessary 
precursor and precondition to all that is to follow.
96
 
5.4.2 Theological characteristics of the emerging light.  The theological character of 
this light is further accentuated in that it comes about in darkness.  The first three days, 
which are made by separation, find their constitutional element from the crisis of heaven 
and earth—darkness and the deep (Gen 1:2).  But unlike the coming about of sky and 
earth that are ‗made‘ as a result of a separation, light precedes separation. It is the entity 
that constitutes all separations.  It is day that comes about via the separation of light from 
darkness.  Before that, there is a mysterious congealing of light and darkness.  
This notion is perhaps unacceptable to our more scientific sensibilities, but the Israelites 
had little problem with viewing the sacred in terms of both light and darkness.  Prayers of 
Yahweh who dwells in darkness flourish at the Temple (1 Kings 8:12).  The Psalms 
speak of God‘s mastery of darkness as especially related to Yahweh‘s ability to redeem 
his people and king: ‗He made darkness His screen; dark thunderheads, dense clouds of 
the sky were His pavilion round about Him‘(Ps 18:12).  The prophet Ezekiel in his vision 
of Yahweh in a storm cloud intensifies this view (Ez 1 and 8).  Ezekiel envisions the light 
emanating from God to be of such a brilliant and intense a nature that darkness was a 
necessary shield lest all would perish.  The juxtaposition of light and darkness here is 
similarly intended to accentuate God‘s mastery of the savage sacred realm of verse two.  
Of curious interest, Psalm 139 masterfully proclaims Yahweh‘s inescapable Presence in 
key terms discussed so far.  When Yahweh‘s Presence approaches, the devotee prays:  
Where can I escape your spirit?  Where can I flee from Your presence?…If I say, ―Surely darkness 
will conceal me, night will provide me with cover.‖  Darkness is not dark for You; night is as light 
as day; darkness and light are the same.  It was you who created my conscience; You fashioned 
                                                 
96
 Perry (1993:2) views the description of darkness upon the deep as ‗…occupying the place from where 
the new light of the next verse will shine forth.‘  He takes this a different direction than I do here, yet still 
reads that light emerges from the situation described—and created by God—in verse 2.  My suggestion is 
that light is emerging from the annihilation of verse two.  It is precisely when the scapegoat is revealed that 
an astounding clarity returns to the community. 
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me in my mother‘s womb…Your eyes saw my unformed limbs; They were all recorded in Your 
book.    
As Girard (1965:40) understands the scapegoat mechanism, ‗Nothing…97 is more 
significant than the interplay between images of light and darkness, vision and blindness.‘   
The congealing of light with darkness is the realm of the sacred, precisely where 
malevolent violence and benevolent violence meet.  It is the heart of the mythic structure.  
It is a sacred realm
98
 because inevitably and mysteriously the scapegoat will be revealed. 
In his discussion of God‘s Presence as the ‗glory,‘ Strong (2000:73) also discusses a 
sacred realm where God enters to do battle with chaos: 
 
The domain of Yahweh‘s hypostasis was the unclean regions of the earth…The duty of this 
hypostasis was to fight the enthroned king‘s battles against Chaos…The kabod would fight Chaos, 
pushing it back to reveal fertile land and reclaiming the temple as the portal to Yahweh‘s throne 
room. 
Speaking of Isaiah‘s Temple vision (Isa 6), Strong (2000:770 further describes this 
peculiar construct of Zion theology in terms that resonate with the picture presented in 
Gen 1:1-5: 
 
In Isaiah 6:3, the seraphim are describing the realm of Yahweh‘s kabod.  This bicolon presents the 
complete domain of god through a merismus.  The first line focuses upon Yahweh Sabaoth, who is 
holy, heavenly, and other.  The parallel line sets his Glory in the domain of the unclean regions of 
the cosmos, which is the view of Zion theology in the earth.  Moreover, the distinction made 
between Yahweh and his kabod in this verse creates a theological construct that gives a great 
amount of flexibility and strength to Zion theology.  Yahweh Sabaoth remains enthroned, yet 
through his hypostasis he still roams the unclean regions of the cosmos.   
Strong‘s description of ‗the unclean region of the cosmos‘ is yet another way to speak of 
Girard‘s sacrificial crisis.  It is the crisis of Gen 1:2.  We should then begin to understand 
                                                 
97
 Girard is speaking of the dialogue between Tiresias, the blind prophet, and Oedipus, the lame, but within 
that context, he clarifies much of his ideas about the scapegoat mechanism. 
98
 Realm is the word of choice here because it includes both the physical and metaphysical world.  More 
importantly it includes areas of  both space and time, concepts often pitted against each other in discussions 
of  Presence.  Terrien (1983:138ff) for instance, argues for a priority of Name over that of Glory. 
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that from a Biblical point of view, the author is making a concerted attempt to distance 
the God of Israel from the conventional view of the mythical realm of the sacred.  When 
light comes out of the confluence of difference described in verse two, the stirrings of 
opposition to that realm decisively separate or cut away from that realm.   
The theological character of light in Genesis 1:3 is reinforced when compared with 
prophetic and priestly material traditionally held to be exilic.  It then becomes readily 
apparent that the loss of Zion propelled many to ponder the meaning of Yahweh‘s 
Presence.   
5.4.3 Light as salvific action.  Isaiah 60 sheds a particular understanding of light. Light 
is equated with ‗the Presence of the Lord‘ hwhy dwbk (Isa 60:1-2).99   This verse has a 
similar construction to Gen 1:1.  Light is called forth, and then it is put in contrast to 
darkness.  The light (glory) of Israel will cause a great pilgrimage, a gathering, to occur at 
the temple.  A notion such as this is derived from the liturgical tradition of Zion.  Hence 
Psalms 89:16 speaks ‗of walking in the light of your presence,‘ a clear reference to being 
at the Temple.  Furthermore, it speaks of Yahweh‘s anointed who will have victory over 
his adversaries, one who will survive being a sacrificial victim.  Also of great interest is 
Yahweh‘s unwavering love for David, ‗his son.‘  He promises never to betray him.  
Yahweh will not succumb to ‗sacrificing‘ his son.  He will never see him as a rival. 
The nations, who tormented Israel—that is, the nations who made Israel the scapegoat—
will come to a great revelation of their deed and will repent. ‗Bowing before you, shall 
come the children of those who tormented you; prostrate at the soles of your feet shall be 
all those who reviled you…the cry ―Violence!‖ shall no more be heard in the Land‘ (Isa 
60:14ff).  Interestingly, Isaiah 60:19ff clearly equates Yahweh himself with a light that 
does not require sun or moon.  ‗The Lord shall be your light everlasting‘ (Mlwe rwa).  
Here, we revisit the odd reversal in the narrative found in the expulsions of Abraham and 
in Exodus where the victim is lavished upon by the one who is expelling him. 
                                                 
99
 The connections of Genesis one with other exilic works, especially Ezekiel, has been amply noted by 
Zimmerli (1979:124): Allen (1994:36) Terrien (1983:205), and Albertz (2003:336).  J.T Strong (2000:69-
71) explains Yahweh‘s glory as a hypostasis of Yahweh especially in the contested realm of chaos. 
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Thus the light of Yahweh is equated with a mighty redeeming act, one even greater than 
the exodus.  This is all the more extraordinary because it is spoken in the midst of 
darkness and emptiness—the exile. Even more significant, it is the rescuing of the 
scapegoat victim in which this new creation will come forth. 
Even among Israel‘s earlier prophets, light is connected with the redeeming, intervening 
and sacrificial presence of Yahweh.  Used in a passage referring to a punishment for sin 
by foreign invasion, Micah provides a catalogue description of a sacrificial crisis that has 
brought on the calamity (Mic 7).  As with the prophets, they view it as something brought 
on by the Lord.  Yes, Israel is a victim – ‗Do not rejoice over me, Oh my enemy…He 
will champion my cause, uphold my claim.  He will let me out into the light; I will enjoy 
vindication by Him‘ (Mic 7:9).  Here, being brought out into the light means a rescue 
from victimization and forgiveness.  To be liberated from death is light indeed.   
Micah‘s prophecy finds its basis in the liturgical tradition at the Temple.  All references 
to Yahweh as light refer to being led into the Presence of God, especially at Mount Zion.  
They also reference a sacrificial crisis in which they have been victimized.  The light 
leads them through the ‗death‘ the writer is experiencing.  Schwager (1978:92) states:  
 
The genuine locus of Old Testament revelation is the experience of the one individual being beset 
by the many.  The expulsion of a victim, instinctively experienced as a positive event by the many, 
is gradually unmasked in the light of revelation as a banding together of violent evildoers.  
Especially clear texts about this collective persecution of an individual are found in the Psalms.  
 
In these cases, they do not necessarily view themselves as innocent.  Light is associated 
with God‘s just ways of dealing with humanity. 
 
Several Psalms (Ps 27:1, 43:3) speak of Yahweh as ‗my light‘ echoing Micah.  Yahweh 
rescues from a sacrificial crisis and from becoming victim to a mob—‗evil men assail me 
to devour my flesh.‘  This is unlike Girard‘s scapegoat, who is innocent, the penitent of 
this prayer connects his sin to his trouble.  Nevertheless, he expects Yahweh‘s light to 
lead ‗out of darkness‘ and towards ‗your dwelling place.‘  
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Isaiah and traditions associated with him seem to have especially enunciated a theology 
of light.
100
   That light is connected directly to acts of creation appears to have been 
heightened in and around Israel‘s exile.  Isaiah 45:7, for example, connects Yahweh‘s 
creative acts to the theological statement: ‗There is none but Me, I am the Lord and there 
is none else.‘  Yahweh ‗fashioned the light and created darkness.‘  Also of interest is the 
next phrase, ‗I make weal and create woe.‘  Once again, light is directly related to 
Yahweh stepping into human crisis.  We may be disturbed by such a statement, for it 
indicates that God designs the sacrificial crisis.  When read in the context of Isaiah 45 
and the calling out of Cyrus, this has a clear message that God makes the very situation—
sacrificial crisis—in which the sacrificial victim will emerge for the sole purpose of 
rescuing him and thereby demonstrating a mastery superior to savage sacred realm of 
other gods.  This is what is behind the word: ‗I am the Lord and there is none beside me.‘ 
Isaiah 45 makes evidently analogous the creation of heaven and earth and the ‗birthing‘ 
of Israel with that of the exile, coming forth from a sacrificial crisis.  It is clearly 
polemical.  It is as if to say Yahweh intentionally employs the crisis in order to 
convincingly demonstrate his mastery of it.  Ps 89:9 declares Yahweh‘s mastery of chaos 
(the ocean, and sea monsters) as analogous to his mastery of human crisis.  Always there 
is this parallel between conquering the forces of nature and ‗scattering the enemy.‘    
The light of Gen 1:3 should be understood as an encroachment of God into the very heart 
of the crisis of creation.  God is mysteriously present in the most definitive act of 
creation.   We can affirm with Westermann (1968:8) that: ‗In the Old Testament, what is 
said of God‘s coming and of his presence belong together. Neither is absorbed by the 
other; neither negates the other.‘  With the emergence of light from darkness, God is 
made known, and it is sacrificial.  In other words, God enters into and opposes the crisis 
of the world as spirit, and it is light that is expelled.  This light mediates between and 
mysteriously reverses the crisis of creation and its generative acts. It ‗fixes‘ the crisis 
along humankind‘s sacrificial methods, but also reveals the mechanism for what it is.  Its 
connection with glory demonstrates that light is that aspect of God that allows itself to 
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 Isa 2:5, 9:1, 10;17, 42:6, 49:6, 51:4 
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contact the ‗unclean regions of the cosmos,‘ especially in confronting its terrible 
equilibium.   
 
5.5 The Sacrificial Role of Light in Genesis 1 
Westermann (1974:112) speaks of light‘s defining role in the generative act:  ‗…the 
creation of light is more than just the ―condition of all order‖ in the cosmological sense; it 
makes the order possible and determines it.‘ 
Girard (1974:64) speaks of the expulsion of the scapegoat victim: ‗Thus the 
representation of nondifference ultimately becomes the very exemplar of difference.‘ 
The sacrificial role of light is further accentuated in view of the structure of Genesis 1.  
The six days of creation are divided into three days of separation—counteracting the 
world‘s dark and unformed situation—and three days of filling—counteracting the 
world‘s empty and abysmal situation.  It is of particular interest that generative activity—
the filling out of heaven and earth in the latter three days—necessarily proceeds from acts 
of extrusion, expulsion, separation, or division.  Westermann (1974:129) repeatedly 
affirms how the act of separation permeates the whole process in Genesis 1: ‗The echo of 
v. 4 in v. 18 is intentional; separation colors the whole of God‘s work of creation.‘ This, 
for Girard (1972:267), originates from a primordial sense of an archetypal victim.  Any 
notion of separation, division, expulsion, purging, extraction, or purification comes from 
this notion: 
The birth of the community is first and foremost an act of separation.  That is why metaphors of 
severance permeate the generative act…Whether we refer to catharsis or purification, purgation or 
exorcism it is actually the idea of evacuation and separation that is foremost. 
 The first generate act is the reestablishment of difference which for Girard is the 
reestablishment of prohibitions, the reestablishment of boundaries.  Westermann 
(1974:33, 113) has made note of how universal the notion of separation is in connection 
with origins.  In the first act of separation, day from night, we return to the cutting action 
suggested by bara.  
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5.5.1 The emergence of light and the first three days.  The annihilation of the 
heavens and the earth first finds its salvation through a process of severing. The 
separation of light from darkness is presented as God‘s first fundamental and active role 
in the crisis of the heaven and the earth, and it is imitative.  It imitates the prime 
generative act of light coming out of darkness.  God separates (ldb) light from darkness 
(Gen 1:4).   Noun forms of hibdil refer to the thing taken out of the whole:  a severed 
piece (Amos 3:12, badal) or a set aside place (Josh 16:9, mibdalah).  Bedilah has 
metallurgical references in which it refers to an alloy, usually tin (Num 31:22), extracted 
from ore. Conversely, it also refers to the dross or slag which has been separated out to 
make a purer metal (Ez 22:18).  The prophets Isaiah (Isa 1:25) and Ezekiel (Ez 22:18) 
metaphorically speak of the bedilah as the evil to be removed from Jerusalem.  Again we 
find a sacrificial duality—what Girard calls a symmetry—in the word itself, carrying 
both destructive and constructive meanings.  In the sacrificial victim, the malevolent 
forces stored up in the community are expelled, but from that act, a new sense of clarity 
and peace comes to the community.  
We must also note that the expulsion of light from darkness creates a gap, chasm, or 
wedge between darkness.  The repetition of Nyb, ‗God separated between the light and 
between the darkness‘ is incorporated when, according to BDB (1980:107), ‗the space 
separating two distinct objects is to be indicated.‘  That a unique space is created with 
light‘s departure from darkness is more apparent on the second day where the expanse is 
in the midst of the water, separating water from water (Gen 1:7).  Thus the expanse, 
which becomes the space to be filled on day five, becomes a new sacred space where 
God continues and fulfills His generative activity.  This gap or sacred interval is called 
Day.  It is the wedge between darkness and darkness.  There are three realms of God‘s 
generative activity presented in the first chapter of Genesis.  Each comes into being via a 
severing or going out from the crisis of creation—Day (separated from darkness) and sky 
and land (separated from the deep).   
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5.5.2 Evening and Morning.  Each word, evening and morning, have sacrificial 
overtones
101. The formula ‗evening and morning,‘ however, refers primarily to the 
appointed burnt offerings of the temple. Since the reverse formula, morning and evening, 
is also used, I suggest that the priority of evening holds a particular meaning. The various 
connotations around evening especially deal with darkness.  The evening sacrifice is 
viewed as a gateway or entrance into darkness.  In this case, it is closely tied to the 
paschal sacrifice which is to be offered ‗between the evenings‘ (twilight), and Israel‘s 
experience of the fiery pillar that kept watch during the night between the two armies.  
The phrase ‗evening and morning‘ especially signals the passage of night.  The sacred 
assembly around the evening and morning offerings cordon off night.
102
  We should view 
this similarly to the way the waters of day three are ‗gathered into one place.‘  Most 
importantly, day becomes the interval between night and night, and the sacrificial crisis is 
contained. 
It is this fundamental separation of light from darkness that structures all of God‘s 
bringing the world into being.  Every ‗day‘ of the creative activity of God is structured by 
‗evening and morning.‘  All the days imitate the first day in ushering in distinctions. This 
is more obvious in the first three days which whittles the elements down to the peculiar 
focus of God‘s activity—Urah.  The latter three days are concerned with filling that 
which was separated, but here too, concerns for separation are evident.  On day four, the 
lights fill the expanse above.  In imitation (mashal) of the original light of Gen 1:3, they 
also separate (bedil) day from night and establish a sense of time.
103
    The making of 
lights in the firmament reveals the role of created objects that fill in the spaces made by 
                                                 
101
 Morning, rqb, can mean to inquire, split, divide, discern, rip.  Eze 34:11ff , Lev 13:36, Lev 27:33 
speak of the sacrificial animal – dividing/separating good from bad.  Boqar is used of Yahweh‘s decisive 
action (1 Kings 16:15).  It makes sense that morning has clearer connotations of separation since it is the 
ushering in of the morning sun.  Evening, bre, has a diverse set of meanings.  Primarily, it has to do with 
mixing together.  Since evening is the ushering in of darkness, it makes sense that it is seen more as a 
mixture of light and dark.  It signals a retreat of light and the blurring of difference.  It is related to the 
acceptability of sacrifice, being sweet or pleasant Prov 3:24 (as opposite of fear or terror); Jer.6:20, Hos 9:3 
of sacrifice (not pleasing to Yahweh), of prayer Ps 104:34. 
102
 Num 9:15, 21, Isa 17:14, Zeph 3:3, Ez 24:18, 33:22, Ps 30:6, Ps 90:5,6.  The mythological idea of the 
celestial lights as gates is common (Westermann, 1974:133). 
103
 Here in my view is a much clearer reference to God‘s setting ‗history‘ in motion than Gen 1:1. 
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separation—they maintain the separations.  On the fourth day, for instance, the lights 
separate and mark all the calendric distinctions and in this way they govern or preside 
over them.  The lights separate, mark, and rule.   
Distinctions other than calendric are evident on day four, and may, in fact, be a more 
critical concern.  Westermann (1974:127) and Arnold (2009:42) view the curious 
elaboration, repetition, and allusions to Gen 1:3 on day four as a polemic against the 
pantheon of gods in mythology.   Celestial bodies are readily associated with divinities 
because they are light bearing. They too share in the essential nature of light—its 
emergence, expulsion, or severing from darkness—and in the essential function of 
light—to establish difference.  They too have passed through the mysterious realm of 
congealed difference.  The de-deifying of these lights is a theological assertion that 
Israel‘s God is distinct and unique from the gods.  Unlike the gods who readily move in 
and out of darkness, the lights are set (Gen. 1:17). 
From a mimetic perspective another distinction is being made which perhaps even the 
author is not fully cognizant of. The drama between the gods that sets up a scapegoat 
murder, such as in the Enuma Elish or the Osiris myth, reveals the crowd-like nature of 
the gods.  The logic of the crowd is the ultimate realm of the sacred.  Girard (1972:266) 
statement bears repeating: 
…the domain of the savage sacredness, which recognizes neither boundaries nor limits.  This is 
the realm not only of gods and supernatural creatures, of monsters and the dead, but also of nature 
itself…of the cosmos and of all the rest of humanity. 
In a subtle yet profound way, the author of Genesis 1 distances the true God from that of 
the mob.  When the light was expelled from darkness it takes the most critical attributes 
of divinity, the ability to reestablish difference.  The very notion of light as a fundamental 
nature of divinity is not abandoned here.
104
  The critical distinction in Genesis 1 is that 
this light never returns to darkness.  It never cycles back to the place of undifferentiation, 
so it cannot be deified.   It does not join the ranks of the sacred.  The God of Israel is not 
the god of the crowd.  
                                                 
104
 ‗We can be certain that the description in v. 16 and 17 belong to an older stage in the tradition,‘ says 
Westermann (1974:128)  
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5.5.3. The filling of the world and God’s act of blessing.  The fifth and sixth days also 
indicate a primary concern for the maintenance of distinctions, for they fill in the ‗in-
between‘ space with creatures ‗according to their kinds,‘  a phrase repeated seven times 
within these two days.  The author take pains to correlate the ‗bursting forth‘ of ‗living,‘ 
‗teeming,‘ ‗life-consuming‘105 beings (Gen 1:20) with keeping distinctions.  Vibrant life 
flourishes in diversity or maintenance of distinctions.  It is in fact, this symbiosis of 
taking in life and maintaining distinctions that jettisons the pronouncement of blessing by 
God.   On the heels of the statement ‗according to their kinds,‘106 ‗God saw that it was 
good and God blessed them saying be fruitful and multiply and fill…(Gen 1:21).‘  All of 
the world should drive toward overflowing abundance (hbr), the satiation of desire 
within the context of clear distinctions.  To remind, the impetus for all distinctions was 
the initial ‗coming forth‘ of light from an arena of annihilation.   
The unique pronouncement of adam’s creation is placed within this cycle of separation, 
demarcation, and flourishing of life (Gen 1:26-27).  Adam is made in a sense ‗according 
to his kind‘ and that ‗kind‘ is the image and likeness of God.  In verse 26, the strongest 
possible connection between maintenance of distinctions and ‗dominion‘ are reinforced.  
‗Let us make‘ is parallel with ‗let them dominate.‘  Adam is a distinction keeper par 
excellence.
107
   
That God created (arb) adam is thrice repeated in Gen 1:27.  Traces of ‗cutting‘ or 
severing are retained.  Image/ likeness both carry allusions to cutting and to sacrifice as 
will be discussed below.  
Bara is curiously thrice repeated in Genesis 1.  First, God split the heavens and earth in 
Gen 1:1.  Then, God distinguishes the ‗great sea monster‘ from all the ‗swarming living 
things‘ in both sea and air.  Even though all the swarming living things in the sea and air 
are included in the act of creating in verse 21, the tannim appear to represent all of them 
and in a sense rule them, especially in being singled out.  The pattern of day five goes as 
                                                 
105
 As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, the word spn is closely related to desire or satiation.  
‗Soul‘ beings are ‗open-throated,‘ open to taking in life.  
106
 Yet another word which fundamentally means to divide or separate, Nym, BDB 568. 
107
 That the image/likeness is related to adam’s function to share in God‘s rule over creation is a major 
assertion of Middleton (2005:54-55). 
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such: God made the ‗swarming living things‘ of sea and air; God ‗creates‘ the tannim and 
consequently the ‗swarming living things‘ ‗according to their kinds‘; then, God blesses 
with the command to be fruitful and multiply.  The tannin is strategically placed in 
between the creatures of sea and air and the blessing of them.  God blesses, which is 
always corporate—God blessed them—only after the one has been singled out.  This one 
rules the many by virtue of being singled out from the rest.  God‘s creative act, bara, is 
particularly focused on the one.  Westermann (1974:22) surveys the interplay of the one 
and many in creation accounts of the ancient mythologies and concludes: ‗…the theme of 
the creature of a particular object is older than that of the general creation, and in 
particular the creation of humans is older than that of the creation of the world.‘   To be 
discussed more below, it is the one singled out that represents the whole and procures the 
cohesion of the whole.   
The same pattern is repeated on the sixth day; first, the land creatures are made; then God 
creates adam; then God pronounces blessing.  Here, God ‗creates‘ adam, and thus singles 
him out or separates him from all the living creatures and especially those who dwell 
‗upon the earth‘ (Gen 1:25).  
The most prominent ‗severing‘ is in Gen 1:27 where adam is split into male and female.  
The curious chiastic arrangement itself emphasizes the split: 
wta  arb     created him      
rkz male 
   hbqnw and female 
  Mta  arb    created them 
Again, only after this ‗creative‘ act by God is blessing pronounced.  Gen 1:28 combines 
all aspects discussed above under the act of blessing. For now, the bifurcated adam can 
be fruitful, increase, fill, subdue and have dominion.   
5.5.4 The sacrificial origins of image. The discussion of the imago dei is vast indeed.  
Of the limited biblical references to it (Gen 1:26, 27, 5:1-3, Gen 9:6) the reference here is 
primary.   
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Again, the doctrinal concerns around imago dei can easily overshadow as in the case of 
ex nihilo.  The call to ‗context‘ is always present and most everyone claims to be true to 
it.
108
  As discussed in chapter 3, ‗context‘ has its own set of problems. Westermann 
(1974:144-161) arrives at several interrelated conclusions concerning Gen 1:26-28.  By 
way of approaching this topic, these conclusions will be discussed in conjunction with 
mimetic theory.  
The emphasis lies in an event, a process rather than a statement of substance or nature.  
Westermann (1974:155) relies on an understanding of the theological outlook of the 
author.  P is concerned with an encounter with the holy.  Humans cannot reveal God; 
God reveals himself through an encounter with the kabod of Yahweh.  Westermann 
(1974:158): ‗…in the theology of P, it is humanity as a whole that is created as the 
counterpart of God; the intention is to render possible a happening between creator and 
creature.  And this for P is directed toward the holy event in which history reaches its 
goal as indicated by Gen 2:1-3.‘   
This sacred event is dominated by God‘s action of arb, repeated three times in verse 27.  
As proposed earlier, if we venture to retain some of the more banal action of ‗to cut‘ or 
‗cut down,‘ the sacrificial connotations are clearer.  
Image, comes from the verb Mlu with clear root associations with cut, cut off, or cut 
out.
109
  The verb form is not found in biblical reference, causing some, like Westermann 
(1974:146) to doubt the associations of cutting with this verse. Something ‗concrete‘ like 
a statue or sculpture, however, is strongly denoted.  Westermann (1974:146) opts for a 
general meaning of reflection or representation which eliminates the need for 
etymological dependency.  This may be another example of how the significance of 
something like a word, a ritual, or symbol loses its more direct associations with a 
concrete event.
110
 We embrace the significance of a word while simultaneously severing 
the connection to its primary referent.  The word for likeness, twmd, may equally have a 
                                                 
108
 Middleton (2005:13-42) aptly clarifies the current issues involved and his approach is balanced. 
109
 BDB 853.  Middleton (2005:47). 
110
 In speaking of Gans‘s Generative Anthropology, Bartlett (2009:91) reminds that the very act of 
formulating language, giving an object a designation, is the very act of deference, making it one step 
removed from the referent.  
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vestigial connection to cutting.  A peripheral survey of words derived from md reveal 
intriguing associations with the death of a victim.  Md of course is blood, but more 
importantly, it mostly references blood made visible, that is shed blood.
111
  This 
association is most specific in Gen 9:4-6 where ‗life,‘ ‗soul,‘ ‗shedding of blood,‘ 
‗recompense,‘ and ‗image‘ are inextricably linked.112  Mostly, twmd is viewed as 
deriving from the verb hmd with a basic meaning of ‗to pay a price.‘113  Westermann 
(1974:146) ascribes the meaning of comparison without associating it with paying a 
price, but there is more than a casual connection when seeking recompense for the 
shedding of blood.  The comparison of equal value is easily associated in the phrase ‗a 
life for a life.‘ Kutsko (2000:70-76) provides an extended discussion of the link between 
idolatry and shedding blood, linking it with the Priestly tradition of the imago dei: ‗The 
frequent charge against Israel shedding blood generally occurs in the same context as the 
charge against Israel worshipping gillulim.‘  The mixing of blood with mud and wood 
shavings is a common reference in mythological accounts of the formation of humans.
114
  
The most telling example is in Enuma Elish: 
It was Kinu who contrived the uprising, and made Tiamat rebel, and joined the battle.  They bound 
him, holding him before Ea.  They imposed on his guilt and severed his blood.  Out of his blood 
they fashioned mankind.
115
 
Also of interest, is another grouping of words derived from Md.  Mwd, hmd, ymd, and 
Mmd all relate to silence or making silent or dumb.  Once again the associations of 
cutting, or cutting down are evident.  hmd means to cutoff, destroy, bring to an end (Jer 
6:2, Hos 4:5).
116
  Thus, the cutting down of the victim silences the voice.  There is a 
                                                 
111
 BDB 196.  Middleton (2005:47) explains that damut is merely assonantly related to dam and the 
inclusion of tselem is intentionally placed alongside damut to disassociate it from any notions of blood 
connected with the origins of humanity.  
112
 Surprisingly, the discussion of imago dei often overlooks this verse. Westermann‘s (1974:144-161) does 
not mention it.  
113
 BDB 197.   
114
 Westermann (1974:35): ‗The formation of humans from mud or clay is probably the most common and 
most widespread creation motif.‘  Curiously, in a bilingual Assyrian account of creation, the blood of the 
gods produced different kinds of technological skill (Van Seters, 1992:59).  Genesis 4 and 10 also directly 
connect bloodshed with technological advance.  
115
 ANET (1958:35) 
116
 BDB 198, 189. 
Chapter 5 – Sacrificial Structure, Genesis 1 232 
 
232 
 
possible association of this word group with Mda which has the obvious connections of 
humanity coming from red soil.
117
 
Jay (1992:xiii) ventures in territory perhaps too uncomfortable for male exegetes.  
Depictions of origins of both humans and gods via vaginal birth pale in comparison to 
humans coming forth via dismemberment or extrusion.  A man‘s claim to descendents, is 
not through relation to the mother giving birth, Jay (1992:xxiii) hypothesizes, but rather 
from participation in the cult. The origins of the community are most often viewed as 
dismemberment.
118
   
Since a father is not involved in the birthing process, he begets the child via a communal 
act of severance.  The act of patrilineal descent must be decisive, clear, and obvious.  Jay 
(1992:36) asserts:  
When the crucial intergenerational link is between the father and the son, for which birth by itself 
cannot provide sure evidence, sacrificing may be considered essential for the continuity of the 
social order.  What is needed to provide clear evidence of social and religious paternity is an act as 
definitive and available to the senses as is birth.  When membership in patrilineal descent groups 
is identified by rights of participation in blood sacrifice, evidence of paternity is created which is 
as certain as evidence of maternity but far more flexible.  
A critical aspect of establishing the man‘s paternity with his children is the need to create 
a ‗resemblance with the father.‘119   A likeness to the father does not carry the ‗natural 
certainty‘ as in childbirth especially without the technical apparatus of today.  Quite 
realistically, there was no way to socially establish the paternal link.  In a sense, without 
some social action, all the children in a community are illegitimate.  There would be no 
fathers.
120
  Only sacrifice, Jay (1992:36) asserts, establishes essential continuity for social 
order.  
                                                 
117
 In Akkadian, adamatu is ‗dark red soil‘ and adamu is ‗red blood.‘  In Aramaic ‗adam is as blood‘ 
(TWOT:11). 
118
 Dismemberment best connotes the duality inherent in sacrifice.  As will be discussed more thoroughly in 
the next chapter, rites of passage are closely linked to sacrifice.  The initiate must undergo a dis-
memberment, some kind of isolation, before re-membering his place in the community.  Malachi 2:10-12 
bolsters Jay‘s view where fatherhood, covenant, fidelity, idolatry and lineage are intertwined.  
119
 Here Jay (1992:30) relies on the assessment of Vernant‘s (1980:136) evaluation of Ancient Greek 
sacrificial functions. 
120
 Jay 1992:36 
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This aspect certainly is encompassed in a core concern of P for intergenerational 
continuity, especially in his use of the toledoth formula.  The creation (cutting) of adam‘s 
image in the likeness of God establishes a legitimate lineage going back to the origins of 
the community. In form criticism, P goes from Gen 2:4a to Gen 5 without a hitch.  But 
we must not neglect the connection it has to Gen 2-3.  All birthings proceed from 
expulsions. Adam and Eve are expelled from the garden and then Eve conceives and then 
Cain is ‗brought forth.‘121  Significantly, it is Eve who names.  In other words, she can 
make the clearest claim to the child via natural childbirth and so can ‗name‘ the child.  
Again she ‗bears‘ and ‗names‘ with Adam nowhere in sight.  Bartlett (2009:91) reminds 
that naming, the first formulations of language and/or signification, is of itself an act of 
deferring violence, especially in connecting the disenfranchised male to the child.  
A highly significant pattern plays out in Genesis 4.  Cain is expelled, and then he has sex 
with a woman who conceives and ‗bears‘ (dly) a child. The child is given a name.  
Culture flourishes with technological advancement and in reciprocal violence. By the end 
of the chapter, the pattern is repeated with Adam, Eve, and Seth.  Eve names her son 
Seth.  But Genesis 5 intervenes.  In a deliberate attempt to reiterate the connection with 
origins (Gen 5:1-2), P now has Adam beget Seth.  Others had begot their sons (Gen 4:18-
20) and yet reciprocal violence escalates to the point where ‗men began to call on 
Yahweh‘ (Gen 4:26).  But Adam, begets (dly) Seth who is ‗cut‘ (Mlu) in a blood-
likeness (twmd ), and Adam names him Seth, one who has been constituted  in 
likeness.
122
  The issue of social cohesion and membership of males are especially acute in 
the themes of blessing, lineage, image, representation, and sacrifice.
123
 
This leads us into another conclusion of Westermann (1974:158).  It is the origins of 
humanity in view here, not individual humans. This, also, is in keeping with P‘s 
theological outlook where the encounter with the Presence is only conceived of 
                                                 
121
 The fundamental idea of dly is to bring forth especially after an extended struggle or an utter expending 
of energy. Its primary reference is, of course child birth, but its figurative uses accentuate the notion of 
logical or natural consequence of the struggle (Job 38;28, Isa 55:10), BDB 408.   
122
 BDB 1011 finds a transformative denotation of likeness or comparison, to make someone or something 
‗like‘ something else (Hos 2:5, Isa 16:3). 
123
 Again, Jay presents valuable insights, but misjudges the impetus for such notions in a desire among 
males to get back to a Greek notion of a ‗Golden Age‘ of immortality, rather than in a more utilitarian need 
to divert social disaster.  
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corporately. It is the community, the sacred assembly that is in view.  Mda must be 
viewed in a communal sense. When speaking of community, we are not talking about the 
vague whimsical notion tossed around in our disintegrated modern society where sharing 
a general interest or the same cyberspace is spoken of in some sense of a community at 
large.  It is must have closer correspondence to tribal or village groups who truly must 
survive in a cooperative effort.   
When humans live in a real, down to earth communal setting, a powerful dynamic is at 
work.  We moderns like to speak of ‗community‘ and long for it, but ironically, we know 
all too well its ‗dangers.‘  People like to ‗have their space‘ because they know that to live 
in close proximity means the enmeshment of desires.  They know it means real conflict.   
The origin of communal life is the driving force behind cosmogonic narratives, 
Westermann attests (1974:160).  Thus, the dynamics of human interaction is projected 
onto the natural world. All of the above leads Westermann (1974:151) to the fundamental 
concern of the ‗image of God‘ in the context of Genesis 1.  Agreeing with Barth,124 the 
image of God has to do with ‗correspondence,‘ the ability or capacity to correlate.  The 
community,  Mda, is God‘s counterpart, a conspirator125 in life.  This makes the most 
sense out of the plurality in the declaration, ‗let us make.‘ Westermann (1974:151, 152, 
157, 158) subordinates the royal allusions in reference to the dominion emphasis under 
this notion, especially recognizing the father/child (son) relationship.  The relationship of 
father and son is only conceived in terms of the original communal event.  Jay‘s 
(1992:xxiii) remarkable insight misses the mark when she asserts that sacrifice is 
primarily concerned with ‗a remedy for having been born of woman.‘ No, the primary 
concern is the volatility of males in a confined community. Many rites and mythological 
narratives deal with the formation of community and entail the emergence of a 
representative patriarchal figure, a king. Behind every hero, monster, or royal figure is a 
victim Girard (1972:258) maintains.  Royalty is the incarnation of the sacred.  Behind 
every living king is a victim in waiting and behind every god is a dead king.  
                                                 
124
 Middleton (2005:21-25) provides a detailed correlation between Barth‘s exposition in Church 
Dogmatics and Westermann. 
125
 Conspire in its basic sense comes from the Latin spirare, to breath.  It is breathing together.  
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Isolation is the critical concern; thus P addresses the problem of ‗being alone in his 
isolation‘ in a similar fashion to Gen 2:18. This is the primary reason for the sexes, but 
Westermann (1974:160), misses the logic of his own reasoning when he places the total 
emphasis on the isolated individual from the community.  The isolation of the 
disconnected father from a child is certainly volatile, but even more at stake is the 
volatility inherent in an isolated community. Without an outlet, it will implode on itself.  
Unlike many in our culture today who constantly push the volatility of sex to the 
background, the ancients knew better.  They did not have the technical apparatus to 
conveniently discard the lethal consequences involved.  
The correspondence of Westermann‘s conclusions with mimetic theory is clear.  Girard 
repeatedly asserts that the sacrificial crisis is always an internal crisis.  A contagion of 
desire is sure to cultivate in the confinement of a Petri dish.  When the disciple is too 
close to the model (internal mediation) without enough distance to diffuse desire 
elsewhere (external mediation), a conflagration of rivalry ensues.  Girard (1972:279) 
explains how seemingly separate social rituals such as rites of passage, war, and marriage 
arrangements, are vehicles to dissipate internal communal tension.  
The conclusions here lend themselves most readily to a fundamental seemingly radical 
assertion of Girard that a scapegoat mechanism is the pivotal process in the birth of 
human culture.  The victim is the first and most powerful signifier or sign that births 
representation.   Girard (1972:235) insists: ‗The origin of symbolic thought lies in the 
mechanism of the surrogate victim.‘ The proximity of representation—the transference of 
the real object to a signifier of it—to the emergence of human culture has been the 
subject of an extensive and ongoing dialogue between Girard and Eric Gans who has 
advocated Generative Anthropology, which according to Muller (1996: e) is ‗the deferral 
of violence through representation.‘  Both Girard and Gans agree that representation 
defers communal violence, but whereas Gans envisions an original scene where language 
emerges as the first movement toward the deferral of desire for an object, Girard sees a 
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process in which the scapegoat victim emerges as the prime representation of corporate 
desire.
126
  Girard (Muller, 1996:e) states: 
Moving towards representation would be an extremely slow process and one cannot say anything 
about it in a concrete historical way, to be sure. It would be a long series of ‗scenes.‘ 
Gans‘s view tends to see representation in a more positive role.  Representation through 
word is a way to delay gratification of desire.  It mediates between the object of desire 
and its appropriation.
127
 Girard, on the contrary, views the first representation as 
essentially false because of its proximity to the scapegoat mechanism.  It sacralizes the 
victim and therefore misrepresents the role of the whole community.  Says Girard 
(Muller, 1996:e): 
The first representations to me would be false representations of scapegoating, which are the 
sacred… The sacred is right there as a powerful experience that precedes representation but 
constantly moves towards representation. And at a certain stage which of course cannot be defined 
it must become a kind of representation.  
Indeed, it is the ritual enactment of the process of scapegoating that distances the victim 
from the community.  Thus the victim moves more and more towards representation and 
towards separation from the community.  That is, the victim becomes sacred object. 
Girard views the ritualizing of the scapegoat mechanism
128
 as the ‗genetic engine of 
representation‘ and shies away from envisioning an originary scene.  Whereas Gans 
would emphasizes the form that the transference of object to representation takes, Girard 
would emphasize the content of the representation.
129
   
It is at this convergence of scapegoat victim and representation where the notion of 
royalty emerges.  Arnold (2009:45) echoes the prominent view that the image of god is 
best understood in the context of Ancient Near Eastern royalty.  Indeed the immediate 
                                                 
126
 Bartlett (2009:90-165) provides a thorough evaluation of the discussion between mimetic theory and 
generative anthropology.  Both theories agree that representation is fundamentally connected to the deferral 
of communal violence.   
127
 Bartlett (2009:94) describes it as ‗the gesture of appropriation that names the central object of appetite 
and desire in the absence of the object. 
128
 Here, Girard (Muller, 1996:e) reminds as discussed in Chapter 3 of this work that ritual does not require 
signification ahead of time.  Ritual can precede representation.  
129
 Bartlett (2009:92). 
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context in Genesis 1 with its repeated emphasis on dominion and rule are undeniably 
connected with the image.
130
  But the question remains as to where the idea of king 
originates.  It is directly related to original communal murder who was most likely a 
prominent male.  The all-against-one event is what creates that ‗one‘ who is separate 
from the community, but who can now arbitrate difference for the community. ‗Every 
god, hero, and mythic creature so far encountered, from the sacred African king to Chief 
Pestilence of the Tsimshians, embodies the interplay of violence projected by an act of 
generative unanimity (Girard, 1972:250).  In the royal figure, theogonies and 
cosmogonies come together.  
Taking Westermann‘s conclusions in conjunction with Girard, it becomes clearer how 
notions of dismemberment, separation, cutting or dividing in relationship to the birth and 
perpetuity of communal life are connected to ideas of representation and image.  Human 
community must cultivate a notion outside itself, a notion of something separate and 
distinct from itself in order to have communal life.  That notion is the sacred, and its 
‗genetic engine‘ is the scapegoat mechanism.  
Again, Genesis 1 speaks of origins with the same context and images as its neighbors, so 
what, if anything, is different about the image of God here?  
The likeness of man to God has several reference points within the first chapter, all which 
speak of a ‗counter sacrifice‘ to the conventional sacrificial arrangements.  Three swaths 
cut through God‘s relentless march from annihilation to Shabbat.  The emergence of light 
from darkness is the primary referent.  The ‗great lights and the ‗great sea monsters,‘ 
imitate the original light especially in maintaining distinctions.   Finally, God ‗cuts‘ a 
unique being who corresponds and conspires with him in bringing about a new heaven 
and earth.  Through a sacrificial sequence this bifurcated creature is recognized as 
‗belonging to the father.‘  The likeness of man to God then, corresponds to ‗blessing,‘ 
and blessing has to do with the ability to flourish, not just in terms of reproduction but 
also in terms of the ability to e-valuate it, that is, to instill it with ‗the good.‘  Gen 1:29 
also comments on the peculiar rulership of adam over living creatures.  It cannot escape 
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 Middleton (2005) provides the most thorough case for this.  
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us that the food supplied for man is different than from the rest and that this has to do 
with desire.  It is ‗seed-bearing‘ plants and trees that is adam‘s food while the animals 
should eat ‗green plants.‘  Chapter 2, as we shall see, more explicitly connects fruit with 
open expressions of fulfilling desire.  Here the connection is more subtle; nevertheless, 
food is one of the fundamental aspects and metaphors of human desire.  Here as well as 
in the chapter 2, desire is viewed positively as good and godlike.  God, it appears, not 
only makes the goodness of life obtainable, He makes it desirable. Indeed we may also 
affirm that man reflects God‘s likeness when he desires life.   
5.5.5 The seventh day – Sabbath Gen 1:31-2:4a.  The reconstitution of the heavens 
and earth find the completion upon God‘s final proclamation of goodness at the end of 
the sixth day.  As mentioned already, the old heavens and earth of Genesis 1:1 were ‗cut 
down‘, and in the process of separation and filling this action finds its completion after 
the sixth day.  The necessity of a ‗clean slate‘ finds its completion then, and because of 
this, God can cease from work and rest.  The symmetry of a previous world (heaven and 
earth) which inevitably produces the ‗monstrous double‘ of indifference, a sacred space 
of congealed barrenness and darkness finds its ‗end‘ with the ushering in of a new 
symmetry of holiness (separation) and blessing (filling). 
God ‗blesses (Krb) and separates (sdq)‘ the seventh day, and here as well, it is a 
symmetrical product of completion and rest.  God blesses the day, instilling and 
invigorating the ‗day‘ with ever increasing and flourishing life, and He ‗separated‘ it, 
making it that ‗between‘ time and space even among the six days.   
In the picture of completion and rest we find a symmetrical restitution, but not of 
indifference.  There is a picture of symmetry without rivalry, without violence or 
degeneration. There is heaven and earth, completion and rest, blessing and hallowed area. 
God‘s initial act in Genesis 1:1 has cut clean through to completion.  God has cut a new 
heaven and earth.  
In Gen 2:4, we have the first of the toledoth formulas.  Although much has been debated 
about the structural role of this formula, we should not neglect the obvious.  Coming 
from the verb yalad, to give birth, this verse sets up not necessarily the structure of the 
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book, but the structure of the narratives.  Just as God ‗birthed‘ the world, so he birthed, or 
perhaps rebirthed Israel.   God ‗cut down‘ the old rival symmetry, entering a crisis of 
indifference and then emerged from it.  By being both the sacrificer and in some sense 
the sacrificed, God marshaled in a series of sacrificial acts that irreversibly destroy the 
old symmetry of rivalry which inevitably leads to a recycling of victims.   
5.6 Elohim’s Creation – a new Sacral Realm 
When viewed through the lens of Girard‘s mythical structure, Genesis one can readily be 
viewed as having been structured through a sacrificial lens.  For Girard (1972:8, 306), 
this would be a given since all ancient cultures are structured thus.   
There is no aspect of human existence foreign to the subject. 
All religious rituals spring from the surrogate victim, and all the great institutions of mankind, 
both secular and religious, spring form ritual.  Such is the case…with political power, legal 
institutions, medicine, the theater, philosophy and anthropology. 
Amazingly, even within the Bible‘s opening lines, a terse and tightly compacted 
theological summary of a sacrificial paradigm is laid out.  In the opening lines of the 
Bible, God proceeds through a sacrificial sequence.  We have the executor of sacrifice 
who never ignores the crisis of undifferentiation (our sacred realm), but also mysteriously 
engages it by identifying with the focal point in the crisis, the entity coming forth from it. 
This sequence becomes clearer in the way Girard (1978:56) especially links the sacrificial 
sequence with kingship.  ‗Ultimately there is not even a myth of the origin independent of 
the inauguration of the monarch.  Royalty is a mythology in action.‘  He (1978:57) 
further explains: 
…kingship and divinity…constitute two somewhat different responses to the basic question of 
ritual.  How should the violent resolution to the crisis be reproduced?  In kingship the dominant 
element is what happens before the sacrifice, in divinity it is what comes after the 
sacrifice…Everyone repeats that the king is a kind of ‗living god‘ but no one says that the divinity 
is a kind of dead king, or at any rate an ‗absent‘ king, which would be just as accurate. 
A sacrificial crisis is described, one which Girard takes volumes to unpack but here 
unfolds with an uncanny theological brevity.  The symmetrical tohu wabohu falls in line 
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with Girard‘s multiple descriptions of a sacrificial crisis and conjointly with what Girard 
believes to be the sacred.   
The sacred is that realm where the symmetry of reciprocity spirals ever more tightly into 
a paroxysm where ‗opposition is most radical and difference non-existence‘ (1972:40).  
As Girard (1972:39) understands myth, this symmetry of reciprocal violence is always 
reversing what it first undoes.  Thus reciprocity spins tighter towards a ‗reduction,‘ 
‗condensation,‘ ‗abbreviation,‘ or ‗foreshortening‘ of reciprocity (1968:80).  This 
centrifugal ‗simplification‘ of reciprocity brings to light the scapegoat with an 
impeccable internal logic.  This is what Girard has variously labeled the coherence of 
myth or the mythical structure.  It is ‗the unanimous polarization of hostility [toward a 
single victim] that produces the reconciliation‘ (1972:287).  The state of annihilation of 
Genesis 1:2 precisely describes the ‗derisory‘ or ‗savage‘ realm of man‘s sacredness.  
That sacred realm is the place of ‗dazzling ambiguity‘ (tohu) and an ‗anarchy of value‘ 
(bohu).  The ‗evanescent difference,‘ the ‗circularity of myth,‘ the ‗duality of myth,‘ the 
realm of ‗perpetual reversals‘ is the sacredness of myth and the scapegoat mechanism.131  
Only in this realm does the scapegoat come to light.  Indeed, the appearance of the 
scapegoat is light itself, so it is, of course, good as Elohim declares. It is here where the 
expulsion of the one will relieve the crisis.  Out of the one, the many are blessed.  Man‘s 
sacred realm is the land of annihilation.  
The separation of light from darkness marches steadfastly through Girard‘s stages of the 
scapegoat mechanism.  The expulsion of a scapegoat, light, relieves the crisis.  But it is in 
the separation of light from darkness where the author of Genesis makes a radical shift, 
one which redefines the sacred along different lines.   
 
If the Genesis passage where to follow the pattern of the mythic structure, the narrative 
would proceed differently once light was extruded (bedil) from darkness.  Light would, 
for one, be deified.  It would become a god because it had passed through the sacred 
realm.  Through the expulsion, the victim has taken on first the malevolent forces of the 
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 Girard has compiled an extensive list of terms referring to violence, the sacred, sacrifice, and the 
sacrificial crisis.  See (1972:250-273) and  (1978:29-47, 58-87)  
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community and then the benevolent.  The sacrificer becomes the sacrifice and the 
sacrificed becomes deified.  But myth always returns to itself, so the light of Genesis 1:3 
would return to the realm of deities—chaos, the realm of undifferentiation, of scrambled 
categories.  The god of light, whatever form or name it took on, would of necessity return 
to the congealing of light and darkness.  The mythic compulsion is to undo the resolve it 
moves toward, for it cannot conceive of an answer to our violence apart from the violence 
of the scapegoat.  The scapegoat opens a window to resolve our violence only to quickly 
close in on itself once again. 
Israel‘s creation story goes beyond the sacrificial structure, and in so doing, it more fully 
reveals the sacrificial system.  Greek tragedy also reveals the sacrificial system, but it is 
unwilling, says Girard (1965:40), to fully unpack the ramifications of such a revelation.  
Thus Oedipus the King entertains that ‗myth is not a totality‘ and a ‗pre-existing wisdom 
external to the hostile dialogue‘ exists, but tragedy is repeatedly ‗drawn [back] into the 
vortex against his will.‘132   
The sacral beings (the sacrificed) do not operate outside of the crisis.  Their passage 
through it only means they are masters of it, and they return to the realm of the sacred as 
players who aid in perpetuating the sacred realm.  They remain commingled with 
darkness.  Without that, they could not remain sacred.      
In the Oedipus myth, Girard (1965:39) says, ‗The truth [all men are violent], a product of 
the myth itself, emerges [with the expulsion]…and the lie also emerges…the effort of all 
men to shunt their truth onto the Other.‘  Myth, religion, and tragedy both reveal and 
hide.  It reveals the violence of the Other all the while: ‗It conceals from us essential 
aspects of the structure, the role that we personally play in it.‘   This sacred realm thrives 
off of the reversal of symbols where ‗light is a lie, and the darkness is light.‘ But then, 
through the expulsion of the victim, the truth of myth restores the original order Girard 
(1965:43) asserts:   
                                                 
132
 Here Girard (1965:40) is speaking of Tiresias   Oedipus appeals to Tiresias‘ prophetic profession as a 
way out of the sacrificial crisis, but Tiresias claims that not even he can resist the forces of the sacrificial 
crisis. Hence, the sacrificial system always leans toward a closed system. 
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The overall structure which assures the full dialectic of symbols is, in a sense, a restoration of the 
original order.  Light is light once more, darkness no longer anything but darkness.  But light and 
darkness are no longer the object of an exclusive and definitive division [as is not the case in 
Genesis].  All light in this world ‗supposes a mournful shadow half.‘  The more intense this light 
is, the more the darkness accompanying it thickens. 
 
The picture in Genesis diverges precisely at this point.  The light is separated from 
darkness and never returns to the savage sacred.  Furthermore, darkness is cordoned off 
into night while light has forged a new sacred realm, Day.  This sacredness is the realm in 
between the water‘s deep foreboding presence both above and below.  It has extruded 
from the earth‘s abyss the dry ground, a new earth where life flourishes and God‘s image 
is revealed.  And all of this is marching steadfastly to the fullness of days, the day of 
days, the day of rest—Sabbath Day.  It is a realm of never ending light where light never 
returns to darkness.  It is a Sabbath sacredness, a Paradise. 
 
We must remind ourselves that this other sacredness forged its divergent path only by 
light‘s encroachment into the crisis of creation and its subsequent expulsion.  Sabbath 
sacredness could be forged only by passing through savage sacredness.  The Genesis 
passage never even questions the necessity of that.  It understands all too well that it is we 
who require death for life.  But Israel‘s vision of God is one where mastery over this 
other sacredness is demonstrated by a shear act of volition over it and through it.  God 
has, most of all, demonstrated His mastery over the savage sacredness by ‗cutting it 
down,‘ engaging it, passing through it, and forging a new creation, one that does not 
require another sacrifice.  It is the sacrifice provided by God, and of God, that generates a 
sacredness of a different kind.  
This vision, in my view, only reiterates the song of God‘s victory first sung at the Reed 
Sea and relived with the songs of Zion at the Temple.  It is for all who find themselves in 
a formless and meaningless whirl that the God of Israel prevails most profoundly.  
      
 
Chapter 6 – Crisis and Resolve in Genesis 2 243 
 
243 
 
6 THE SACRIFICIAL CRISIS AND ITS RESOLVE IN GENESIS 2 
The literary structure of Genesis 2 and its relationship to Genesis 1 and 3 has been 
rigorously debated.  Even though the scope of this work can only briefly address this, it is 
nonetheless important to establish some interpretive perimeters as they guide 
interpretation here to some degree.  
The ‗author‘ has been broadly associated with a ‗J‘ or Yahwist source who is 
significantly different in style and theological perspective from ‗P‘ of Genesis 1. Gunkel 
(1901:xlviii, lxix) asserted that  J was mainly a compiler or redactor, relying on a vast 
array of images, ideas, cultic contexts, narratives, oral traditions and possibly even texts 
common to the Ancient Near Eastern world in the Iron Age.  For Gunkel (1901:lxxix), 
the writer mainly ‗preserved‘ as much of Israel‘s legends into a ‗good unit‘ of confluent 
sources.  In the case of Gen 2-3, Gunkel (1901:2) concludes that a comprehensible 
structure for Gen 2-3 is not discernable; the chapters cannot be viewed as a unit.   
Furthering this notion, Westermann (1974:190) asserts that Gen 2-3‘s multiple anomalies 
do not allow it to be understood as a literary unit.
1
  It is best to understood it as a 
‗composite‘ of multiple influences that have been crafted, forcefully, into a workable 
geschehensbogan, a narrative centered on an over-arching event.  Westermann 
(1974:193-195) categorizes the over-arching event under a common crime and 
punishment  mythological motif, but here too, J is more a literary craftsman than an 
author.  Campbell and O‘Brian (2005:1-5) modify this view espousing that all the authors 
of the Pentateuch had a considerable storage of storytelling devises in which to craft a 
different spin on a story depending on the circumstances.  Westermann (1974:191-192) 
understood that many of the features of Gen 2, like the prohibition of the knowledge tree 
of good and evil, are merely setting up the critical climactic event in Gen 3, the crime.  
The reading below, agrees with Westermann on several points but for different reasons 
and with different conclusions.   There is a ‗tremendous tension‘ in the narrative as 
Westermann observes, but this, according to a mimetic read, is conventional for a mythic 
structure.   
                                                 
1
 Mimetic theory views ‗glitches‘ in the narrative as an integral aspect of the structure, and hence it does 
not necessitate viewing the text in such a disjointed fashion.  
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From this kind of inquiry, a confident consensus has established that little if any of the 
images, features, or themes of the paradise story are unique to the biblical narrative.  This 
does not require viewing the text in a fractured way.  There is simply ‗a shared 
intertextual symbolic world‘ as Middleton (2005:45) explains, and this leads back to 
Girard‘s proposition—there is a reason, more accurately a common experience, behind 
these amazingly universal features.  Even more so, the unique feature of Israel‘s ‗myth‘ 
of origins is its struggle to come out from or emerge from the grips of the mythological 
structure.
2
  It senses something out of place and views the God of Israel as addressing the 
mythological operation in a unique way.   
The garden narrative can be viewed as not only a literary unit, but a narrative one as well 
with a distinctive ‗authorial‘ stamp.  Van Seters (1992:328) proposes that ‗J‘ is more a 
historiographic author/researcher than a mere compiler with a clear theological outlook to 
present. He is cognizant of both Mesopotamian and Greek primeval traditions and has 
structured the narrative similarly. Thus there are numerous rhetorical features in Genesis 
2 unique to the author who is shaping the dramatic tension of the story in a certain 
direction contrary to the conventional mythological views.  In this regard, Van Seters 
(1992:5) views Genesis as a unified literary whole in which the primeval account (Gen 1-
11) provides a ‗prologue‘ to Israel‘s emerging history.  Van Seters (1992:4-5) holds to a 
unity of composition to Gen 2-3 and this unit is part of a greater literary unity.  
Significantly, Van Seters (1992:29) confers with Westermann that the crime and 
punishment theme is the major thrust of the passage, but connects it much more closely to 
the Deuteronomistic agenda.  Van Seter‘s (1992:126-129) argues against the notion that 
Gen 2-3 is simply a disjointed conflation of sources; rather, it is a literary unit where the 
author has creatively employed the conventional mythological features.  This is similar to 
Girard‘s parabolic understanding of myth.  The features can and are being manipulated 
for rhetorical effect.  
Brodie (2001:12-16) explores even further the literary unity of Genesis.  He asserts a 
three-fold unifying structure in the book of Genesis.  First, it is ‗binary‘ or ‗diptych.‘  It is 
‗balanced between pairs,‘ and in this regard, Brodie speaks similarly to what Girard 
                                                 
2
 Girard (1972:66 ) 
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would call symmetry.
3
  From this, Brodie views the second ‗frame‘ as ‗spiraling toward 
greater complexity.‘  It is also chiastic, in which the second frame reverses what had 
come before.  We can see something of this in the first two chapters of Genesis.   The 
garden story is both parallel and sequential to the account of Genesis 1. For one, the 
scenario beginning in Genesis 2:4 shares the same features as Genesis 1:1.
4
  It functions 
as an overarching comment on all that is to follow as well as a segue to what immediately 
follows in 2:5.  Brodie (2001:16) asserts that this parallel accounting, what he calls 
diptych, structures the whole book of Genesis.  The author, then, is structuring things 
symmetrically.  The emphasis in Genesis 2, however, is exclusively on the earth, 
ha’eretz, and this suggests that the symmetry between the first two chapters is 
hyponymous
5
 rather than synonymous.  In other words, the heavens and earth are not 
symmetric of equal weight, each being a mirrored image of the other.  Instead, the 
Sabbath pericope with the first toledoth formula serves more as an introductory statement 
than conclusion.  The garden story is more the outcome of the Sabbath day than a 
conclusion Genesis 1, as Middleton (2005:294) advocates.  Brodie (2001:12) views 
something similar in that the second ‗panel‘ ‗spirals in complexity.‘  It elaborates and 
comments on the first. As I proceed, reversals are also apparent.  In Genesis 1, the 
emergence of light reverses the state of annihilation. Something similar also occurs in 
Genesis 2.  
 
6.1 Earth’s Crisis and the Emergence of Ha’adam: Gen 2:5-7 
 
                                                 
3
 Van Seters (1992:107) points to the ‗problem‘ of doublets as one of the major points of contention over 
literary unity among Old Testament scholars.  Again, what mimetic theory has to offer is being able to see 
how fundamental symmetry is to mythological structure and what that structure could mean.  
4
 Middleton (2005:291-293) believes the consensus has moved away from the earlier view that Gen 2:4a 
was a part of Gen 1.  Coupled with Perry‘s (1993:4) discussion in chapter 5, it is much more possible to see 
a deliberate correlation between Gen 1 and 2.   
5
 Tsumara (1989:67-74) agues for a kind of parallelism found in Genesis 1:2 that is found in poetic verse.  
He variously calls it hyponymous or inclusio where the subject in one line is said to be subsumed by the 
other.  In the case of the ‗heavens and the earth,‘ all that is of the earth is included in the heavens, but the 
heavens are more than the earth.  This ‗hyponymous‘ symmetry may be a peculiar way in which the author 
diffuses the sense of a symmetry of equals that leads to rivalry and a loss of difference.  
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In his introduction to Genesis 2:4b-3:24, Gunkel (1901:4) asserts the near complete 
difference with that of Genesis 1, but when looked at it from a mimetic structure striking 
similarities abound.  The structure of origins as outlined in the last chapter is evident and 
adhered to here as well: 
1) There is a symmetry, parallel parts which exacerbates a loss of difference. 
2) An entity emerges, goes out, or is expelled from this symmetry. 
3) The exiting entity is the focal point that reestablishes difference. 
In the precondition for ha’adam’s emergence, earth is depicted in terms of a congealed 
loss of difference similar to Gen 1:2.  Most notably are the absence statements: ‗there was 
not yet shrubs of the field‘, ‗no herbs of the field‘, the Lord God had not caused it to rain, 
and most critically, ‗there was no man to serve the ground.‘  In light of the sequence of ‗it 
is good‘ statements of Genesis 1, these negations should not be minimized.  In other 
words, rather than saying ‗it is bad,‘ it appears preferable to say ‗it was not.‘ 
Westermann (1974:43-47) as well as Tsumara (1989:34) have variously explored these 
statements of negation, classifying them in a ‗not yet‘ formula that is widespread in 
mythology.  Both deduce that a less chaotic depiction is intended.  It is a typical narrative 
devise to signal a beginning to a narrative of origins.  Since this diverges significantly 
from what is proposed here, it is important to address this.  
6.1.1  Genesis 2:5-7, a description of an indifferentiated state.  Modern interpreters
6
 
lean toward an ‗etiological‘ concern of the author here as well as in mythological 
accounts of origins.  Thus in our passage here, the tendency is to believe the author was 
primarily concerned with explaining things like how rain or food came about. 
Westermann (1974:216) reasons that an explanation of water must be supplied before 
plants can be cultivated.  As already argued in the last chapter, mimetic theory challenges 
just how etiological the concern really was in comparison to the concern for reciprocal 
violence.  Even if one must strain too hard to read such sacrificial undertones as being 
presented here, one should wonder at the amazing way most modern interpreters fail to 
                                                 
6
 Gunkel (1901:5), Westermann (1974:216), Van Seters (1992:42) 
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notice the concern for difference and distinctions and believe the ancient thinkers to be 
consumed with the kind of scientific inquiry of nature just like modernity is.    
The peculiar syntax of Gen 2:5 bears notice and adds force to the sense of annihilation 
similar to Genesis 1:2.  Gunkel (1901:5) reminds that the depiction is overwhelmingly 
negative ‗as is common.‘7  The every ‗plant‘ or ‗vegetation‘ of the field was ‗not yet.‘  
The word for plant, xys, is rare in use, and its primary reference is to wild plants.8  It is 
doubtful that it has any reference to cultivated vegetation.  The phrase, ‗every herb of the 
field‘ which can have a reference to edible food such as in Gen 1:11 is a symmetrical 
addition to emphasize the utter desolation of ha’eretz.  The line perhaps should be read 
as: ‗there were not even wild plants let alone cultivated vegetation.‘9   
The string of negatives continues in the next symmetrical pair: ‗The Lord God did not 
cause it to rain upon the earth and there was no adam to till the soil.‘  Most certainly the 
depiction is of an uncultivated place, but Westermann (1974:20) notes, ‗Creation and the 
world are to be understood always from the viewpoint of or in the context of human 
existence.‘10  This depiction is meant to portray the opposite of meaningful existence. 
Tsumara (1989:34) tries to minimize the significance to mere inhabitation, but the 
emphasis is stronger than that.  The primary emphasis is on a complete undifferentiated 
state.  In a discussion of Sodom and Gomorrah, Van Seters (1992:203) confirms that 
                                                 
7
 Arnold (2009:57) minimizes the negative connotations of the verse by noting that the syntax is merely 
signaling background information; nevertheless, he still describes this scene as ‗uninhabitable‘ and ‗the 
problem with the earth.‘ Here again, the etiological concerns around where basic human resources come 
from pale in comparison to the etiological concern as to where desire comes from and what one will do 
with it.  
8
 Oddly, xys has an idea of muse or complain (BDB 967).  It is hard to see a connection here, other than 
perhaps the notion of wild bushes as something unkempt, twisted, or meandering.  The two other references 
in the Old Testament have such a view in mind.  In Gen 21:15, Hagar leaves her child under a ‗bush‘ in the 
wilderness.  In Job 30:7 it also speaks of wild bushes and is in parallel with nettles.  Cassuto (1978:102) 
connects xys with the ‗thorns and thistles‘ of Adam‘s curse (3:18), as opposed to the cultivated plants bse 
of wheat and barley. 
9
 Westermann (1974:199) concludes similarly.  
10
 In a different context, Girard (1972:220ff ) argues extensively against the structuralism of Levi-Strauss, 
and in that, affirms something similar to Westermann—the structuring of human society, especially of 
obligation and prohibition was not derived primarily from biological operations.  On the contrary, it was 
social operations, particularly around a community‘s ability to deal with its own violence, that sets in place 
essential social structures.  Again, it is the social operations in which analogies with biological and 
environment functions are made.  
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places of utter desolation are more commonly associated with annihilation, where ‗the 
existence of utterly barren and desolate regions is based upon an event in primeval 
times.‘ This is a common ‗mythical story.‘  Places are desolate because something 
terrible happened there.  Significantly, this place of annihilation is the precise opposite of 
‗the garden of the Lord‘ (Gen 13:10). 
In this regard, we must return to two significant references to vegetation in Genesis 1.  
The first reference comes at the end of the 3rd day (Gen 1:11).  It appears as an 
appendage to the three preceding days of separation.  But indeed, the emphasis is still on 
separations, distinctions being drawn, and on vital life emerging from the necessity of 
divisions.  The ‗spouting plants‘ ‗spout‘—both the object and the verb are derived from 
avd—but only after all things are properly distinguished.  Even here, though, the 
potential for life is necessitated by a concern for separation, for each plant and its seed 
must be ‗according to its kind.‘  The term, whnyml,  is found exclusively in P especially 
dealing with purity issues.  Here we definitely have the concern for purity or distinctions.  
Westermann (1974:125) agrees that the term is exclusive to P, but insists here that P is 
taking on a pre-scientific interest for classification.  The term is devoid of purity concerns 
here.  Even so, Westermann (1974:125) still insists that the author is concerned about 
vegetation being an ‗unorganized mass.‘  In the holiness codes, all distinctions are a 
sacred matter.   The emphatic negation of any plant life in Gen 2:5, then, indicates the 
complete absence of distinctions deemed as the critical condition for human life.  But yet 
again, it is also assumed as the unqualified precondition. 
The second reference to edible plants is of course found on the heels of man being 
fashioned and made in the image of God (Gen 1:28ff).  More importantly, vegetation for 
both man and beast proceed from man fulfilling God‘s blessing to fill and rule the earth.  
The emphasis on seed in Gen 1:29 is on edible produce.  Something similar is in view in 
Genesis 2 with the need for man to serve the ground.  Oddly, ‗serving the ground‘ 
corresponds to his calling to rule and subdue it.  The picture of man is priestly in the 
sense that he would be able to maintain the distinctions of plant life.  That ha’adam 
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should till the ground is in imitation of God‘s meticulous care of the world, especially 
that of keeping distinctions.
11
 
Significantly, Middleton (2005:89) concludes that the imago dei in Genesis 1 has both a 
royal and a priestly function especially in continuing God‘s work of separating and 
filling: 
The meaning of ‗rule‘ goes well beyond our contemporary hermeneutical preconceptions.  The 
royal metaphor (and thus the imago Dei as rule) does not exclude—but integrally includes—
wisdom and artful construction…This portrayal of God as artisan might suggest that God‘s 
twofold creative activity of separation and filling (represented by the two panels of creative days 
in Genesis 1) is replicated in the twofold task assigned to humanity in 1:28…But the imago Dei 
also includes a priestly or cultic dimension.  In the cosmic sanctuary of God‘s world, humans have 
pride of place and supreme responsibility, not just as royal stewards and cultural shapers of the 
environment, but as priests of creation, actively mediating divine blessing…The human vocation 
as imago Dei in God‘s world thus corresponds in important respects to Israel‘s vocation as a ‗royal 
priesthood‘ among the nations. 
This same connection is asserted here as well. Middleton‘s conclusion also significantly 
connects to a mimetic point of view in connecting representation with the genesis of 
culture and imitation of God‘s desires and actions.   
The fact that the waters covered the whole earth (Gen 2:6) also speaks of a loss of 
difference similar to Gen1:2.
12
  The source of the water that gushes from the earth is a bit 
obscure, but it is perhaps less benign than as often translated as ‗mist.‘  Van Seters 
(1992:133) suggest that da is associated with the Akkadian edu, the cosmic underground 
waters.  Gunkel (1901:5) insists that ‗flood is more preferable.‘ Dahood (1981:532) 
purports:  
The definition ‗rain cloud‘ or ‗mass of clouds‘ admirably suits all four texts, and the etymology 
most frequently cited by the léxica, Arabic Däda (‘wd) to bend, burden, weigh down, and Dawda, 
burden, load,  can easily be reconciled with the proposed definition of  ëd as ‗rain cloud‘ or ‗mass 
of clouds,‘ which give the impression of an overhanging burden. 
                                                 
11
 Arnold (2009:58) 
12
 Arnold (2009:59) notes the syntactical similarity with Gen 1:1-3. 
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 Be that as it may, the covering of the whole earth with da necessitates the dividing of 
the river into four in the following verses.
13
  Again, a picture of water congealed with sky 
and ground without boundaries is similar to that of Gen 1:2.   
The description of ha’adam14  being formed from the ‗dust‘ also seems calculated to 
emphasize an undifferentiated state that is the precondition to the emergence of life.  The 
reader is a bit hard-pressed to make the connection between water-soaked ground and 
God forming adam from dry dust.  After all, the fine powdery dirt is the preferred kind 
for making clay, and God is ‗shaping‘ (ruy) adam as a potter would work with clay.  
Contra to Cassuto‘s (1978:105) interpretation, Westermann (1974:205) argues against the 
understanding of ‗mud‘ here and insists that there is another strategic reason for insisting 
on dust as man‘s essential substance.  Within our texts examined here, there are several 
synonymous or overlapping terms, such as earth, field, land, dirt, and ground.  rpe, 
however, best references surface dirt or the ground.
15
  It is the primary reference to the 
substance of the earth and the material of the human body.  Apar is the earth‘s covering 
in a similar way as skin is the covering of the body.  The dust of the earth has a double 
sense to it in that it covers the ground (adam) yet it points to the earth being exposed and 
open to erosion and decay.  The skin from which the Hebrew derives nakedness retains 
this same notion.  This will be elaborated more as I proceed.  
Westermann (1974:205-206) insists on the dry nature of apar and its disconnect with 
moist clay used by potters.  The use of apar is deliberately calculated to emphasis the 
unique never-to-be-repeated feat.  
                                                 
13
 The geographic and geological information in Gen 2:10-11 has caused some to believe that these verses 
are a parenthetic insertion, but Westermann (1974:199) and Van Seters (1992:110) view the verses as 
necessarily proceeding from verse 6.  All of the separations in Genesis 2 proceed from the undifferentiated 
state described in Gen 2:5-6, just as they do in Genesis 1.  Brueggemann (1982:51) insists that ‗boundary 
keeping‘ is one of the major concerns of the Genesis 2-3. 
14
 Goodhart (2007:62) sees great significance in that the first human is called ha’adam, ‗the adam‘ up until 
the creation of woman.  I agree, but conclude something different than Goodhart.  I am using ha’ adam 
throughout the commentary to be consistent with the text to emphasize the significance of change from 
ha’adam to ish and iyshah.  Perhaps a better English equivalent is ‗the earthling,‘ in keeping with his 
obvious connection with the ground.  
15
 BDB 779.   
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A number of negative connotations of apar reference destruction, death, and 
annihilation.
16
 In Job 4:19, apar is in parallel with clay in reference to human life being 
like a clay house with a common origin in dust.  Psalm18:43 speaks of pulverized dirt, 
mostly in reference to ‗crushing‘ human life.  Apar refers to the debris of a city (of  Zion, 
Ps102:15, 2 Kings 23:6,12, 15), of utter and complete destruction (1 Kings 20:10, Ez 
26:4,12), of the earth as the grave, (Job 7:21, 20:11, 21:26, Ps 22:30, Isa 26:19), and even 
the ‗dirt of death‘ (Dan. 12:2).  Two important things converge in the use of apar.  Dust 
is preferred to emphasize the substance of both earth and man, and dust, like the phrase 
tohu wabohu of Gen. 1:2, is a perfect picture of an utterly undifferentiated state, i.e. 
annihilation. That fine dust is easily lost to the wind and cannot be contained in the hand 
best illustrates an elusive notion of utter loss.  Finally, it is the condition that humans 
return to upon their death (Gen 3:19).     
Genesis 2:5-6 begins the account of adam’s formation similarly to Genesis 1:2.  It is a 
total undifferentiated situation, and it is overwhelming negative.  In his thorough 
investigation into the ‗not yet‘ statements found throughout mythological narratives, 
Westermann (1974:46) steers the emphasis away from such associations in order to be 
more compatible with his form-critical assumptions of J,
17
 saying: ‗The formula ―when 
there was not yet‖ makes it possible for the old creation narratives to describe creation as 
an event or as an act…The purpose of the formula is to give creation the character of an 
event.‘  Westermann (1974:199) and Tsumura (1989:34) minimize the negative 
connotations of these verses.  In my estimation however, Westermann is inconsistent with 
his own presentation.  First, Westermann (1974:46) affirms that Gen 1:2 corresponds to 
the ‗not yet‘ formula as it does in Gen 2:5-6.18  Furthermore, when Westermann 
(1974:46-47) discusses the ‗not yet‘ motif in conjunction with ‗praise of the creator‘ texts 
he once more moves to more explicit negative associations: ‗The most obvious point of 
contact between the saving act as a turning point in distress and the activity of the creator 
                                                 
16
 BDB 779 
17
 These assumptions is part of Van Seters (1992:330-332 ) rigorous objection to Westermann.  Instead of 
viewing J as more of collector and redactor of older traditions, Van Seters views J as a creator and 
innovator of traditions.  
18
 On a similar note Van Seters (1992:112 ) sees a loose chiastic arrangement with Adam‘s expulsion in 
Gen 3:17-18, 23-24). 
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in creation is seen as a turning of chaos-nothingness into the ordered world of 
humankind.‘  
Westermann (1974:47) admits that the ‗drama of creation‘ is ‗expressed and experienced 
much more strongly in the more ancient accounts.‘  Here we should revisit Girard‘s 
(1982:78-79) assertion that the more a text or ritual moves away from its original event, 
the less dramatic and overtly violent it becomes.  Westermann (1974:47) also affirms that 
the ‗not yet‘ motif ultimately performs the same function as does ritual, to ensure the 
stability and survivability of the community.  
Finally, Westermann (1974:46) confirms what is being advocated here.  Even though he 
minimizes the ‗intent‘ to describe a state that precedes the event, he emphatically 
confirms the ‗negative‘ state as the essential precursor to a ‗dramatic event‘ that begets 
human culture.  That dramatic event ushers in a birth of humanity, of culture, of growth, 
and of distinction.  It births the community and ensures its stability.  And it radically 
reverses what was ubiquitously recognized as prior to it—desolation, emptiness, 
undifferentiation, and annihilation.  Furthermore the pre-event is not only described in 
negative terms, it is a situation that involves all, the heavens and the earth, the ‗whole 
earth.‘   
6.1.2 Gen 2:7, God’s intervention in the earth’s crisis.  God‘s decisive and forceful19  
action to form a ‗living being‘, echoes the ‗stirring of God‘s spirit‘ at the end of Gen 
1:2.
20
  A ‗living being‘ emerges as God converges in the desolation of ha’eretz.  This 
‗being‘ is designated by the author as ‗the adam,‘ Mdah.  Unlike the first chapter of 
Genesis, God provides no designations here; only the author and ha’adam give names.   
In mimetic terms, this is a decisive shift away from an emphasis in Genesis 1.  Here, 
naming has everything to do with setting up model/disciple relationships which means 
the potential for acquiring desire.  In the view presented below, it becomes evident that 
                                                 
19
 The verb xpn exclusively denotes a forceful, direct, and concentrated blowing as on to a fire to incite or 
kindle its flame. It is also used negatively as the expression of anger as in Ez 22:20-21 ―blow upon with the 
fire of my wrath.‖ (BDB 655)  There is a forceful, deliberate, confrontational aspect here similar to ‗the 
spirit of God over against the waters.  
20
 Interestingly, in Isa 45:7, ‗light‘ is also said to be ‗fashioned‘ (apar) by God. 
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this kind of relationship is addressed, but only in apparent, but deliberate circumlocution.  
As I proceed, I will avoid using the conventional English word, man, because it may not 
lead to the best understanding of the passage.  The repeated use of the definite article 
before adam does not lend itself to a formal name, as is so often read that way.  
Furthermore, the use of ha’adam is intentionally and strategically employed to emphasize 
a unique quality which is not easily translatable.  As will become evident, ha’adam’s 
uniqueness is centered in a composite or corporate sense, like speaking of ‗humanity‘ or 
in a Girardian sense of the ‗crowd‘ or the ‗community.‘  Westermann (1974:202) confers 
similarly.  It is also centered in a ‗hermaphroditic‘21 as well as a royal sense.22  Finally, a 
significant narrative shift occurs upon the emergence of ishah, woman, for ha’adam 
perhaps mistakenly declares that ishah has come from iysh, man.  These reasons will 
become more evident in the exposition below.  
Ha’adam emerges from a congealed state by two decisive actions of God.  He is 
separated and formed from an undifferentiated state, and he is invigorated, or more 
accurately inspirated, by the breath of God.  It is in this dual act of separation (holy) and 
invigoration (blessing) that man becomes a hyx spn, a living soul.  Although the 
denotations of nephesh vary, this verse is often pointed to as primary.  It is closely 
associated with breath, and its fundamental reference is more than likely the throat.
23
   
The open-throat becomes a primary connotation for that vital conduit for the sustenance 
and maintenance of animal life for obvious reasons.  It allows for the inhaling and 
exhaling of air as well as the systolic and diastolic flow of blood through the jugular vein 
(i.e. the synonymy of ‗life (nephesh) of the flesh is in the blood‘: Lev 17:11).  But in one 
critical way the open throat is only a vessel for satiation—the intake of food.  And it is 
the satisfying of hunger that the nephesh is the dominant metaphor to convey the satiation 
of all human desire.  Thus nephesh can be translated ‗desire,‘ ‗appetite,‘ ‗passion,‘ ‗lust‘ 
                                                 
21
 Goodhart (2007:67) outlines such a view from Midrashic interpretation.   
22
 Echoing many scholars, Brueggemann (1982:45) understands the tree of life as a possible reference to a 
royal figure.  He also asserts that the emphasis is on wisdom and knowledge of good and evil; therefore, it 
could be an apologetic against the royal abuse of wisdom.  This royal sense is definitively expressed in the 
‗crowning‘ sacrament of marriage in Orthodox churches. Middleton (2005:185ff) provides a thorough 
examination into the royal motif.  
23
 TWOT 569 – ‗The case for an original, concrete meaning of  ―breath‖ is also suggested by the use of 
nephesh to denote ―throat‖ in Akkadian, Ugaritic, and Hebrew: e.g., ―therefore Sheol had enlarged its 
throat and opened its mouth without measure‘ (Isa 5:14; cf. Hab 2:5)  
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(Jer 2:24), ‗longing‘ (Ps 107:9), or ‗craving‘ (Ecc 2:24).24  In the Shema of Deut 6:4, 
nephesh is conjoined with heart and strength to convey the all out, singular direction of 
desire toward God.  Everything that follows Gen. 2:7 strongly points to ha‘adam as a life 
swallower. Oughourlian (2010:34), a psychologist who was a major contributor to 
Girard‘s earlier work Things Hidden from the Foundations of the World, describes the 
essence of humanity:  ‗. . . there is no self apart from desire, that it is desire that animates 
the self, and that the self is a ―self-of-desire‖ or ―desire-self.‖ 
It is in ha’adam’s capacity to take in life that the author of Genesis 2 is offering his own 
commentary on the ‗image of God,‘  for God appears to be the primary model for this 
desire.  Ha’adam is to desire life as God does.  The paradigmic triangular structure of 
desire is established.  By the model (God) pointing to an object (the desirable trees), the 
disciple (adam) acquires his desire for life.
25
  Brueggemann (1982:42) argues that the text 
is overwhelming concerned with anthropology and not theology, and hence God is not a 
primary player in the drama.  God is admittedly ‗elusive‘ in the narrative, but not for the 
reasons set forth by Brueggemann.  The choice laid before ‗the adam‘ in this narrative 
has everything to do with what kind of God the human will be perceived.  
The emergence of ha’adam from dust is laden with sacrificial overtones.  A crisis of 
undifferentiation is alleviated by expulsion.  The victim now stands outside the 
community as an ‗objective‘ perspective. This sacred being also now arbitrates for the 
community, making and maintaining distinctions.  In other words, it now informs the 
community on how to avoid a return to a sacrificial crisis.  The emergence of ha’adam 
sets in motion a series of separations as the emergence of light does in Genesis 1:3.  
Ha’adam saves the earth and allows for distinctions and boundaries.   
 
6.2 Ha’adam, the impetus for divisions – Genesis 2:8-17 
   
                                                 
24
 BDB 659 
25
 Interestingly, many of the early Church fathers understood both the life tree and the knowledge tree as 
something God intended on Adam partaking of (Louth et al 2001:61:62). 
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‗The problems of earth at its inception have been met with the creation of the human and 
the garden‘ (Arnold, 2009:59).  Of first order, the formation of adam sets in motion 
differentiation.
26
  Three separations immediately occur all of which are of God‘s doing, 
but only by reason of the emergence of ha’adam. There are three important structural 
notes to these separations.  For one, they are parallel to the undifferentiated state of Gen 
2:5.  The absence of vegetation is reversed with the planting of a garden.  The mist is 
reversed by a river, and ha’adam is settled in the garden to till it.  Second, the divisions 
come from a common hub or source: the garden is divided into ‗kinds of trees,‘ the river 
splits off into four branches, and ha’adam divides into animals of all kinds.  Finally, 
separation creates an in-between space which is the particular focal point of God‘s ability 
to bless.   
6.2.1 First two acts of separation Gen 2:8-14.  In the first separation, God plants a 
garden. The verb for plant, ejn, mainly refers to planting olives trees, vineyards (Deut 
6:11), and people (2 Sam 17:20) in the Hebrew bible.
27
  It should not escape us that Ng is 
derived from the verb Nng meaning to surround or defend.28  Gardens in the semi-arid 
Lavant fundamentally refer to orchards which serve to not only provide fruit in due 
season, but also buffer against the encroachment of the desert both in terms of a refuge 
from heat and infiltration by animals and humans.
29
  ‗Like birds that fly, even so will the 
Lord of Hosts shield (Nng) Jerusalem, shielding and saving, protecting and rescuing‘ (Isa 
31:5).  The garden here functions similarly to the cordoning off of darkness on day one of 
Gen. 1:3 and the collecting of the waters to form dry ground (Gen 1:9). Like evening and 
morning, it is in between desolation and life and it is the critical setting for community 
confirms Brueggemann (1982:45): ‗The garden exists for community.‘    
                                                 
26
  I am asserting here a similar structure to the ‗coming forth‘ of light in Genesis 1.  In both cases, there is 
a presence of God, especially in the sense of a movement by God.  
27
 BDB 642  
28
 BDB 170 Gunkel (1901:7) 
29
 Finklestein and Silberman (2001:337) state that the Iron Age 1 witnessed technical innovations that 
allowed for the terracing of steep hillsides. This lead to a considerable extension of the city beyond its 
fortified walls as well as a growth from a simple village life to a more complex political and economic 
society.   The main ‗trees‘ planted were olive trees and vineyards.  With both the expansion of planted trees 
and the community, it is easy to see how the vineyard was a ready-made metaphor for a God ‗planting his 
people‘ (Jer 2:21, Ps 80: 9,16, Isa 5).   
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Once again, we encounter this in-between space which is the critical focus of God‘s 
activity.  Brodie (2001:45) considers this perspective as a critical structural and 
theological perspective in Genesis.  Commenting on the two sacred mountains of the 
book, he states: 
The result of having two sacred mountains is not to contradict but to create a sense of space and 
depth—a variation on the approach that uses diptychs in Genesis. In Mayan tradition…the primary 
emphasis is on the space between sacred buildings.  Likewise with words; the spaces between the 
words often communicate more that the words themselves. 
Brodie (2001:47) also connects this in-between perspective to the chiastic parallelism so 
common to ancient Near Eastern poetry in which the center is as important as the end.  
This between space is also the realm of choice.  Specifically, it is place of covenantal 
decision as to the proper direction of desire.   
Once the garden has been planted, there is a sprouting of trees into three kinds (Gen. 2:9).  
But before this division occurs, God ‗sets‘ ha’adam there (Gen. 2:8). Here the peculiar 
and primary interest of this pericope unfolds, for ha’adam is separated from all else by 
his capacity to desire.  In fact, all other distinctions to follow have their source from this 
characteristic.  Adam’s placement—Mws carries strong connotations of designation or 
appointment—in the garden necessarily precedes all separations, and the basis for this 
task is in direct imitation of God‘s willful intentions in forming him.  Before any other 
distinctions occur, God must establish the necessary correspondent to desire—an object.  
Thus even though the trees were planted, it is only after ha’adam has been appointed for 
the garden that they are ‗caused to grow.‘  The element of desire is critically accented.  
As the name Eden suggests, it is a ‗land of desire.‘30   The critical concern for desire 
becomes more evident when he is ‗settled‘ (Gen. 2:15) in the garden.   
A second separation occurs with the dividing of the river that flows from the garden.
31
  
The undifferentiated ‗mist‘ of earth‘s crisis is reversed.  The waters are channeled into a 
river.  That the river is quartered most probably signals the boundaries of the whole earth 
and corrects the previous undifferentiated state in Gen. 2:5.  The naming of each river 
                                                 
30
 Westermann (1974:210) Arnold (2009:58) 
31
 To remind, Gen 2:10-14 are intricately connected with 2:6 and should not be viewed as an odd insertion 
into the text (Westermann 1974:199). 
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corresponds to its separation, and here as well are strong echoes from the first chapter.  
Only after a proper separation can designations such as ‗day and night,‘ ‗sky and oceans,‘ 
or ‗sea and land‘ be made. Here, the cordoning off of water‘s limits is done by naming 
them, and interestingly, none of the characters in the story name the rivers, only the 
author. It is as if to say that the splitting of water alone constitutes a name.  Naming 
signals the establishment of difference.  
Structurally, the dividing of the river may serve as a model for ha’adam among the 
trees.
32
  The river, like ha’adam, is a primary signifier because it has emerged from a 
congealed state.  Of natural consequence, it now becomes the source for further 
boundary-setting which extends to the four corners.  The source of symbolic thought, i.e. 
making designations, is for Girard (1972:235) the surrogate victim: ‗The origin of 
symbolic thought lies in the mechanism of the surrogate victim.‘  Girard‘s discussion of 
this entails an in-depth analysis of Freud and Levi-Strauss, and is not easily condensable.  
For Girard (1972:236) all processes of discrimination, exclusion, classification, 
conjunction, or prohibition, whether of primitive kinship systems or what we call 
‗scientific observation,‘ are ‗products of the same generative process.‘ Again, Girard 
(1972:221) casts doubt on the ‗etiological‘ concerns of ancients.  The fear of reoccurring 
violence is behind prohibitions and the setting of boundaries: 
Prohibitions serve a basic function.  They maintain a sort of sanctuary at the heart of the 
community, an area where that minimum of nonviolence essential to the survival of the children 
and the community‘s cultural heritage—essential to everything that sustains man‘s humanity—is 
jealously guarded. 
Curiously, Girard speaks of prohibitions in a similar way as the garden is described 
above, a buffer or safe zone.  It is in this regard that we might find the royal correlation 
with the garden, since the king was to act as protector and defender of the community.  
Brueggemann (1982:45) makes the connection clear: ‗The tree of life is a motif which 
may once have belonged to a royal ideology in which the task assigned the king by gods 
is to guard and nurture the mystery of life.‘  Even more telling, Brueggemann (1982:46) 
asserts that the prohibition of Gen 2:15 is more central to the narrative than any of the 
                                                 
32
 Here, we could also revisit what was said in chapter 5 (5.5.3) concerning the creation of the great sea 
monsters.  
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trees.   Ha’adam, as one also expelled from a crisis, should follow a similar pattern.  He 
too must direct desire towards its proper object in order to maintain distinctions.
33
  
 
6.3 Third act of separation, the proper object of desire.   
The eating command is significantly set up by a second placing of ha’adam in the garden 
(Gen. 2:15).  Although ha’adam was appointed or designated for the garden (Gen. 2:8), 
he is now settled or situated in it.
34
  There are three sequential separations or divisions 
that occur after ha‘adam’s emergence (Gen. 2:7), each has to do with the emergence of 
kinds from a common source and the naming of the separated things.  First, trees are 
caused to come forth from the garden (Gen. 2:9).  The second was the splitting off of 
rivers from a river in Eden (Gen. 2:10-14).  These first two separations serve as a model 
of what is to follow with ha’adam’s more permanent settling in the garden.   
6.3.1 Ha’adam’s cooperation with God in the garden.  The last separation signals 
cooperation by God and ha‘adam (Gen. 2:19ff).  First, God takes from a common source 
and fashions a new thing—animals from the ground and woman from man.  Then 
ha’adam names the separated thing.   This naming of living creatures corresponds to the 
command in Genesis 1 for man to be blessed and rule over living creatures.  It also 
corresponds to ha’adam’s calling to ‗serve‘ the garden. Importantly, it is God who 
separates, but it is ha’adam who names.  In Genesis 1, God does both.35  In Genesis 2, it 
is only ha’adam who names.  He is ‗like god‘ in this respect.  Still, ha’adam never 
separates; he only names what God has separated.  In this subtle difference is perhaps 
                                                 
33
 Several of the early Church Father‘s understood the ‗serving‘ dbe in the garden as one of ‗guarding‘ 
(Louth 2001:60).  This would, in fact, be the primary task of one keeping an orchard or vineyard.  
34
 xwn carries the strong sense of pasturing or rest.  The basic sense is of an extended or protracted stay 
(BDB 628) Ex 20:11.  
35
 The significance of these different perspectives is open for debate.  From the approach taken here, 
however, I would venture that in Genesis 1, the sense of prohibitions is placed more in the exclusive 
jurisdiction of God.  The sense in Genesis 2 is that humanity is involved in the creation and maintenance of 
prohibitions.  
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more than a subtle theological perspective of the author—true sacrifice is neither 
generated nor controlled by ha’adam; he only maintains it.36  
This distinction of actions, I suggest, critically sets up the proceeding actions in Genesis 
2, for it is the kind of rulership that ha’adam is to exercise that is at stake.37  To repeat, it 
is God who takes from an undifferentiated state and fashions it—light from dark/empty 
and man from dust.  God exercises His exclusive prerogative in this.  Only God has the 
wisdom to separate.  Only God knows how to distinguish between a life-giving sacrifice 
and a death-producing sacrifice.  In the vision of Genesis 1 and 2, man is not shown to 
have such capacity, and this is precisely what is at issue with ha’adam’s choice over the 
knowledge tree.
38
 
6.3.2 The triangular shape of the object of desire.  A triangular (or at least a three-
fold) structure of the objects of desire is intentionally set before ha’adam, for God causes 
to grow the ‗lusty‘39 trees, the life tree, and the knowledge tree of good and evil (Gen. 
2:9).  As to the significance of the trees, Westermann (1974:211) humorously concedes 
that the trees in the garden ‗have produced not only beautiful fruit but a vast assortment 
of literature.‘  Brueggemann (1982:47) asserts that the trees are merely props for the 
drama which centers on the command.  The cautions are granted. The discussion below, 
however, is focused not so much on the meaning or symbolism but on the function in the 
narrative. By way of reminder from the introduction, I consider the author to be more 
than just an archivist or a good storyteller.  He has theological concerns as well.  So, 
God‘s elusiveness in the story does not necessitate the conclusion that the author is only 
interested in making assertions about humanity.  
                                                 
36
 This also speaks of a fundamental aspect of ritual and mythology.  The origin of the ritual is generated in 
the realm of deities.  It, like the collective violence toward the one, has its birth in something seemingly 
outside of the community.  
37
 Brueggemann (1982:40) asserts that responsibility is a key concern of the text.  
38
 The idea that the gods control or will sacrifice is common to the sacrificial mechanism.  It is ultimately 
the gods who require or call for sacrifice. The call for sacrifice from the gods is a veiled reference to the 
communities call for it.  In one sense, then, this story here is no different.  The emphasis here, however, 
carefully minimizes and subordinates ha’adam’s involvement.  The distinguishing factor in this story is 
consistent with my thesis—the uniqueness lies in the peculiar ‗twists‘ in the sacrifice.  Yahweh‘s sacrifice 
undoes the sacrificial mechanism as it proceeds through it.    
39
 Chamad carries fully the notion of an object being desirable, coveted, valued, pleasurable, and even lusty 
(BDB 326).   
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The author is not haphazard in the peculiar use of the ‗props.‘ The ambiguity concerning 
what exactly is in the middle of the garden and where should the ‗open-throated‘ being 
direct his desires drives the narrative.  The syntax here creates some difficulty, for it is 
not easily discernible whether the two particular trees should also be included in the 
description of ‗every tree‘ that is desirable to the sight and good to eat.40  We can assume 
from the woman‘s response to the snake (Gen. 3:6) that at least the knowledge tree of 
good and evil was equally desirable. Caution must be exercised here, however, because 
the desirability of the knowledge tree is directly pitted in mimetic tension by the snake 
(Gen. 3:1-3).  Only after the snake suggests that God covets the tree does it then appear 
as desirable.  Nothing else in the narrative explicitly sets the knowledge tree among the 
passion trees.  Equally unclear is whether there is a triangular relationship to the objects, 
for only the life tree is explicitly designated as in the midst of the trees.  It is possible to 
understand this placement as in between; the life tree mediates between the lusty trees 
and the knowledge tree of good and evil.
41
  Perhaps even more significant, however, is 
Westermann‘s (1974:213) assertion that the ‗tree of knowledge‘ is an imitation of the 
formula ‗tree of life.‘ 
Of curious question at this point, but one which will become more crucial is: where is 
ha’adam ‗situated‘ in the garden (Gen. 2:15)?  This is ambivalent, yet as I proceed it 
remains plausible that ha’adam is in the middle of the garden as well.42  In other words, 
ha’adam, like the life tree is in between the ‗lusty trees‘ and the knowledge tree.  He 
stands in that critical space that is the focal point of God‘s activity.43  As I proceed, 
                                                 
40
 Both trees are set off by consecutive waws and with the definite article placed before life and knowledge 
for emphasis (BDB 208).   Thus it is primarily or definitively: and the life tree and the knowledge tree of 
good and evil. Brueggemann (1982:45) among others has questioned the significance of both trees and 
speculate that perhaps earlier ‗traditions‘ of the story had only one tree.  I assert that the ambivalence is 
deliberate as it is part of the decision of ha’adam.  Is the object of desire ‗life‘ or ‗knowledge‘ or both? 
41
 BDB 1063 
42
 Curiously, iysh and ishah hide from God in the midst of the garden, Ngh-Kwtb.  Furthermore, a central 
aspect of ishah’s dialogue with the serpent centers around what exactly is in the middle of the garden.   
43
 Oughourlian (2010:34) explains the significance of this in psychological terms of the self: ‗We have 
abaondoned the ―classical‖ psychology. . . the true psychological reality is not situated within the 
individual but lies in the mysterious transparency of the relation between two persons . . . Our desire, and 
thus our self, forms in the ―between,‖ in that relation; the self is not something hidden away, sheltered, and 
fortified within itself, but the product of a continuous process of creation taking place at the crossroads of 
our encounters.‘ 
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ha’adam’s choice as to the direction of his desires, that is the object of desire, becomes 
more evident.  One object leads to life, the other to death.   
6.3.3 The desirable trees and the life tree.  Strategically, it is the life tree which goes 
unmentioned until the end of the story (Gen. 3:22).  This observation is the impetus 
behind a flurry of debate as to the literary unity of Genesis 2-3.
44
  But here again, perhaps 
our author is more deliberate than given credit.   There is a strategic reason for the 
apparent cloaking of the life tree.  Our author is perhaps more keenly aware than we 
moderns of the precarious imitative nature of desire.  There is, as C.S. Lewis (1955:e) 
rightly observes an ‗inherent dialectic of desire.‘ Truly, God‘s desires are expressed, but 
only periphrastically.  God loves life, and he wants ha’adam to share that.  He wants 
ha’adam to imitate Him and to acquire a desire for life.  If, however, ha’adam sees God 
desiring the object, then he will want to ‗posses all that the father has.‘45  Ha’adam will 
assume that he must consume the possessor of the object of desire.
46
  There is no explicit, 
direct call or command to partake of the life tree, yet it holds a central place in the garden 
as well as in the story.  In a sense, it is made more powerfully present by its conspicuous 
absence, as does an object mimetically desired.  
The desirable trees, which ha’adam is commanded to consume, are included or subsumed 
in the life tree.  Partaking of the desirable trees leads to the Life tree.  Some of the 
Patristic interpretation of this passage understood that God fully intended Adam to 
partake of the life tree.  John of Damascus (Louth, 2001:60-61) writes for instance:  
 
                                                 
44
 Westerman (1974:212-214 ) believes that the life tree functions similarly as the ‗plant of life‘ in the 
Gilgamesh Epic.  It only serves to remind that all humans cannot escape death.  The central tree to the 
narrative is the one in the middle of the garden and the ‗forbidden tree.‘  Van Seters (1992:117-129) 
opposes viewing the life tree as an addition, and sees its inclusion as essential to viewing Gen 2-3 as a 
literary unity. 
45
 Girard (1972:171ff ) discusses Freud‘s Oedipual complex at length because he believes Freud was 
significantly on to a critical aspect of desire.  Girard, however, believes Freud did not carry through with 
the full implications of his ingenious insight. Girard significantly modifies Freud‘s formula that the son 
seeks to acquire all that that the father has, and in essence replace him.  When the model is thought to have 
the desired object, the object and the model coalesce and eventually, the object disappears all together.  The 
model becomes the desired object. 
46
 Schwager (1978:71) explains: ‗…fundamental human desire, by its very nature, has no proper object.  It 
covets the good that its model designates by its desire.  Two desires thus aim at the same good.  This causes 
jealousy.  But since the rival remains a model, even his or her jealous feelings are imitated.  Under the 
influence of mimesis, rivalry increases until it ends in violence.  
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For God says, ―Of every tree of paradise you shall eat,‖…by means of all created things you will 
be drawn up to me, their Creator, and from them reap the one fruit which is myself, who am the 
true life.  Let all things be fruitful life to you, and make participation in me to be the substance of 
your own existence, for thus you shall be immortal. 
 
Another Father (Louth, 2001:61), Severoam of Gabala, says:  
 
The Tree of Life stood in the middle of paradise like a trophy.  The Tree of Knowledge stood as 
contest.  If you keep the commandment of this tree, you will receive a prize.  So consider the 
marvelous thought: Every tree is paradise was in bloom, and fruit was in abundance everywhere.  
Only in the center are the duo of competition and struggle. 
 
The emphasis of this line of patristic interpretation is that Adam must wait until it is 
offered; in essence he must master his desires.  Ha’dam, as a life consumer, must be able 
to point to the life tree in an imitative void.  Ha’adam can only desire God via 
circumlocution.   Here I am making a very close connection between the life tree and the 
Presence of God.  It is similar, I suggest, to what I have said in the previous chapter about 
light in Gen. 1:3.
47
  This sense of a divine presence in the life tree is something the 
Church Fathers recognized.  The Life tree does point to God, but as I am arguing above, 
twice removed.  There is a metaphorical (indirect) reference to God and only an indirect 
reference to partaking of it.  On the other hand, the Life tree is strategically central and a 
primary focus of God.  At the very least we can affirm that ha’adam is to desire life as 
does God and in this regard.  He is to share God‘s desire without directly acquiring it by 
imitated God.  The author meticulously places the focus of the visual aspect of desire on 
the trees.  
 
This is accentuated further in that the object of desire is a plurality.  Only among a 
diversity of desirable objects, the ‗desirable trees,‘ can the true object be desired.48  The 
plurality of objects further diffuses a singular focus on an object.  The text is meticulous 
in this regard; in no way is God seen as desiring the object.  If ha’adam sees God desiring 
                                                 
47
 Arnold (2009:58) suggests the same, and discusses the menorah, a lighted tree, as having ‗enormous 
iconic power.‘ 
48
 Oughourline (2010:46-47) advocates that humanity‘s mimetic makeup, the propensity to imitate another, 
is precisely what makes humans ‗like God.‘  Unlike the animals, Man is ‗an unfinished being‘ in a 
‗constant state of becoming.‘ 
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the object, this would eventually lead to God becoming an object of desire, for this would 
inevitably promote an idolatrous relationship, one in which ha‘adam would eventually 
view God as a rival.
49
  Ha’adam is made to desire and take in life.  He is to acquire from 
and orientate his desires in God‘s desires, for God also loves life.  Indeed, God and Life 
are identical.  Ha’adam is to be like God in this respect, but his desire for God must be 
distinguished from what God possess.  When the desired object and the one desiring 
become identical, then rivalry is sure to follow.  Here a distance, indeed a chasm, 
between the model and the disciple is carefully articulated.   
The careful picture here is consistent with the expulsion narratives of Abraham and 
Exodus discussed in Chapter 4.  God and His desires are expressed in the picture, but 
never pointed to directly.  His desires are more exposed to the author and the reader, but 
not explicitly to ha’adam.  We are made aware of ha’adam’s restricted understanding; 
even so, they are mostly implied by God‘s actions.  Only once does God express what he 
would want ha’adam to desire—the lusty trees.  In other words, God‘s desires are only 
periphrastically made evident, avoiding an unmediated model/disciple relationship.
50
  It is 
as if God is saying: ‗I want you to desire Life as I desire it,  but in this respect, you must 
not acquire this passion from Me, for in the day that you view me as the possessor of life, 
you will seek to replace me.‘   Ha’adam is to desire what God desires, yet he must not 
directly or immediately imitate God in this respect.   Adam must express his desire for the 
life tree on his own accord, or at least, he must learn about the desire of the Other only 
from understanding his own desires for the ‗lusty trees.‘51   
                                                 
49
 Although this work will not address Gen 3, this, I assert, is exactly what is at issue with the woman‘s 
consideration of the fruit.  
50
 A critical component to Girard‘s thinking about desire that leads to rivalry and one that doesn‘t has to do 
with the distance between the model and the disciple.  If there is a sufficient distance between them, what 
Girard calls external mediation, then no rivalry develops, but if the two find themselves in close proximity 
and in a closed setting, then an internal mediation develops into a rivalry.  It is what Hamerton-Kelly 
(1994:133-134) calls ‗pure imitation.‘  In a sense, there really is no mediation in a rivalry, thus the need for 
a sacrificial mediation. 
51
 C.S. Lewis‘ (1955:e) contemplation on his own desire for ‗joy‘ lead him to a distinction between the 
object being contemplated, what he calls the ‗true object‘ and one‘s own thoughts about the object, which 
he calls a ‗by-product‘ of one‘s desire for an object: ‗The surest means of disarming an anger or a lust was 
to turn your attention from the girl or the insult and start examining the passion itself. The surest way of 
spoiling a pleasure was to start examining your satisfaction. But if so, it followed that all introspection is in 
one respect misleading.‘    
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There is a symmetric relationship between the ‗lusty trees‘ and the life tree still in view 
here, but it is a symmetry of harmony rather than rivalry.  Model and disciple both desire 
the object without imitation.  The object, Life, is significantly distanced from both model 
and disciple.  Thus, the shared object of desire without imitation becomes the critical 
ballast or fulcrum that maintains symmetry without rivalry.  It also maintains difference 
that does not degenerate into a ‗monstrous double‘ because the desire is disproportionate.  
There is a hyponymous relationship where the desire of the disciple is included in the 
desire of the model even while the disciple‘s desire remains distinct.  But significantly, 
God is never explicitly shown to desire the life tree, not even in the narrative.  Even here, 
God is distanced from directly revealing desire to the disciple lest the model become an 
obstacle. 
The vision here is of shared desire without rivalry.  The critical element is the distance or 
gap between model and disciple.  It is the arena in between the two desires where the 
crucial turning point lies.  
We may also consider it strategic that not even the object of desire, the life tree, can be 
directly desired.  It too must only be desired periphrastically, for it is through the 
consumption of ‗any or every tree.‘   Too much fascination with a shared object just as 
easily leads to contention. In the eating command of Gen. 2:17, an issue of separation, 
distinction, or difference still must be addressed.  Here still, I suggest, is a triangular 
relationship of objects.  Ha‘adam stands between two objects, each having a duality or 
symmetry to it: one leads to life and the other to death.  The first, as mentioned above, is 
a hyponymous symmetry in which model and disciple can desire the same object without 
rivalry.  The disciple is to discover the true object of desire in a diffused plurality of 
objects, none of which is remotely viewed to be desired by a model.  In this satiation of 
desire, the disciple enters into a realm where the sharing of the same object is done 
without imitation. 
6.3.4 The knowledge tree of good and evil.  The other object, which also has a 
symmetrical quality, is contained within the knowledge tree of good and evil.  
Brueggemann (1982:45) correctly observes that the particular phrase here, the knowledge 
tree of good and evil is peculiar to this passage. The pairing of ‗good and evil,‘ however, 
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is found, and it is here where we once again find the duality of the sacred.  Certainly, to 
be able to discern the good from the bad seems completely necessary and good, 
especially for governing.  After all, Solomon desired it, so why would God not want his 
earthly ruler to have such an attribute?
52
  There is both a good sense of this pairing and a 
bad sense.  It can mean knowing how to choose between good and evil (Isa.7:15 and 
Deut.15).  In the bad sense, the pairing together is a return to an undifferentiated state 
where there is a confusion of categories.  It is knowledge of both good and evil, and it is 
precisely this congealing of the malevolent and benevolent that constitutes the realm of 
the ‗savage sacred.‘  In Isaiah 5:20,  the inability to distinguish between good and evil—
calling good evil and evil good, darkness for light, and bitter for sweet—is associated 
with wickedness and arrogance.  It is a false wisdom based on self-deception or at least 
self-reasoning, being ‗wise in their own eyes and clever in their own sight‘ (Isa. 5:21).  
Certainly, something of this view is projected in the text (Gen 3:5). 
Compounding the perplexity is the duality of God‘s statements. For consuming the fruit 
of it inevitably produces death, yet God, and the ‗us‘, in some way ‗knows good and evil‘ 
(Gen 3:22).  This ‗divine‘ attribute, however, is not presented as such at this stage in the 
story.  Here, it is presented as strictly a choice ha’adam must make.  What can be 
affirmed here is that this choice of objects has everything to do with ha’adam’s 
understanding of the nature of the divine and of the sacred.  Similarly, to the discussion in 
the last chapter, the author has in view an alternative sacred realm.  In Genesis 1, the 
vision is of an uninhibited march away from the savage sacred realm of emptiness and 
void to a Sabbath sacred realm.  In Genesis 2, the sacred realms are presented as a critical 
choice before the community.  One presumes a mastery over ‗good and evil,‘ but the 
other consumes life in a space of givenness where model and disciple can share the same 
object without rivalry.   
There is plenty of ambiguity in the story, but the best guide is to stick to the details as 
they are presented.  Ha’adam is to avoid consuming (fulfilling the desire) the product of 
good and evil—rivalry.  The fruit is a symmetry of equals, good and evil.  The danger of 
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 Brueggeman (1982:45) considers the issue of royal power and responsibility to be a central focus of the 
text, so this question is not a remote curiosity.  
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good and evil when they are equally perceived means that one must decide, and this 
inevitably means choosing a scapegoat victim to relieve the terrible equilibrium. It brings 
in death.  It brings in the crisis decision of who will die so others may live.
53
 Even more, 
it will be ha’adam on his own who will decide.  When a person or group is faced with a 
crisis, ‗borrowing‘ someone else‘s choice is extremely tempting.  It is here, where we are 
most vulnerable to acquisitive desire, for to choose on our own, relying on our own 
insight, is unbearable.  The verse in Isa. 5:21, in fact, may hold a key here, for it mentions 
a discernment based on sight alone.  It is a wisdom based on the perceived wisdom 
possessed by another.  It is imitative.    
But the story pits the sight of the knowledge tree of good and evil squarely in opposition 
to the voice of God.  Ear is pitted against eye.  Or perhaps more accurately, the 
fulfillment of desires which in this story is sight-related is a part of a disproportionate 
symmetry.  Desire of the eyes is included in listening to God‘s voice.  This view is 
persistent throughout the Old Testament and the signature difference between a wisdom 
that leads to life and one that leads to death.  Here again, I suggest that our 
author/theologian profoundly understands what is at stake with desire and God.  It is 
inherent in Israel‘s great command: ―Hear oh Israel, … you shall love the Lord…‖  Israel 
is to direct all attention, all orientation toward God, but they are not permitted an 
immediate access to God via a visual object, but only through word.  They may not 
directly imitate or acquire God‘s desire, for in the day they do, they will seek to replace 
him.  A rivalry of equals begins. 
6.3.5 Dual command.  The command (Gen 2:16) is emphatic
54: ‗surely eat of every 
tree in the garden.‘  Ha’adam, the open-throated one, is made to take in life, and in this, 
God ‗commands‘ him to eat.55  This command is synonymous with the command in 
                                                 
53
 This is the very dilemma set before Solomon and the two prostitutes and one child.  In a rivalry of perfect 
symmetry the only choice is the death of the child or giving up the child by the mother (1Kings 3:10-28). 
54
 The infinitive absolute before the verb makes the action emphatic.  Most translations, including JPS, read 
this as surely or freely eat.  Even so, the fact that God commands (tzawah) it still carries an imperative 
sense.  Often lka carries the sense of devour (Num. 26:10).  The sense that cannot be lost is God‘s 
insistence that ha‘adam must exercise his desires to the fullest.  This, of course, is precisely the vehicle in 
which man should come to the same desire as God, a shared desire for Life.  
55
 Many commentators such as Arnold (2009:59) speak of one command in the garden, but this is simply 
incorrect.  The first command is ‗eat,‘ ‗partake,‘ ‗be satisfied.‘ Or is it the case that just as there is 
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chapter 1 to ‗be blessed and multiply.‘  ‗Take in Life as so you have been made to do.‘  
Ha’adam is invoked to choose a disproportionate or hyponymous symmetry of objects.  
The life tree is included in every desirable tree, but both are included in the ability of 
ha’adam to heed God‘s voice.  
To eat of every tree does not involve a perfect symmetry, but to eat of the knowledge tree 
requires taking on a dangerous symmetry, experiencing good and evil equally 
proportioned.  The congealing of good and evil is certainly a part of that undifferentiated 
state of which Girard calls the place of ambiguity, the savage sacred.  It is a dangerous 
congealing of difference that only finds resolve or true difference in a scapegoat victim. 
Ironically, God intends for this realm to be the true scapegoat, the object of rejection.  It 
is the knowledge tree of good and evil that is strategically set apart, excluded.  
We must notice the emphatic ‗surely eat‘ with the emphatic ‗surely die,‘ and the key as it 
is presented in Genesis 2 and 3 is not in the choice of object but in the choice of voice.  
Which voice will one listen to?  The issue is what guides or influences the direction to 
which desire goes?  One points to imitating the desire of the other.  The other 
meticulously avoids it.  Desire of the eyes must be tempered by the will to listen.  The 
command is what critically stands in the middle, and here, I suggest, is a periphrastic 
reference to the life tree.  There is an unmistakable allusion to the covenant call to choice 
similar to Deut 30:19-20.  Ha’adam stands critically in the middle just like the Israelites 
stood in the valley between Mt Ebal and Mt. Gerizim, and just like the Israelites, 
ha’adam is called on to choose: 
I have set before you life and death, blessings and curses.  Now choose life, so that you and your 
children may live and that you may love the Lord your God, listen to his voice and hold fast to 
him.  For the Lord is your life, and he will give you many years in the land… 
Note the symbiotic connection between the choice, heeding the voice, having life, and 
loving God.  In addition, the choice includes the subordination of the good, which is 
always by sight, to the right, which is always by sound.  For even though the Israelites, 
‗saw with their own eyes‘ (Deut. 29:2) the mighty works of good, it is only by word that 
                                                                                                                                                 
ambiguity about how many trees are ‗in the middle‘ of the garden, so is there the question as to whether 
there is just one or two commands? 
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they can ‗cleave‘ to both Life and the Lord: ‗…that you may love the Lord your God, 
listen to his voice, and hold fast to him.  For the Lord is your life…‘ (Deut. 30:20). 
In some sense then, ha’adam is situated between two objects just as the Life tree is.  
Ha’adam is in some proximity to the Life tree.  In a sense, this is an inversion to Girard‘s 
triangle of desire where two people desire one object.  Here, it is one ‗person‘ deciding 
between two objects.
56
  The two objects—the ‗lusty trees‘ and the knowledge tree of 
good and evil—are at odds.  If we peek ahead to chapter 3, the author makes clear what is 
at stake—acquisitive desire.  Ha’adam is to partake of the desirable trees, i.e. he can 
freely and openly express desire for an object and obtain it, within the larger context of 
heeding the voice of God.  The voice is ha’adam’s access to the Life tree. Choosing the 
passion trees tempered by God‘s command allows the disciple to desire what the model 
does without rivalry because the distance between the model and disciple is far enough 
apart. The disciple has no direct access to the model‘s desire.  Ha’adam cannot see God, 
and in particular, he cannot see God desiring an object.  Even the object, the Life tree, is 
not directly visible.   
The true ‗death‘ is in the other object.  It is in desiring an object because one has become 
convinced that the Other desires it.  Only after ishah is told that God desires the object 
does the knowledge tree appear desirable (Gen 3:5), or since there is ambiguity as to 
exactly what or who is in the middle of the garden, might we venture to say that the life 
tree then appears as a different kind of tree, one requiring a certain wisdom.   She has 
acquired the desire through the suggestion of imitation.  She still does not see God 
desiring anything.  As the story goes in chapter 3, it is in competing voices, not objects, 
where the true crisis of life and death lie and to which is addressed in the crisis of 
Ha’adam.  For one voice comes from inside the garden community and the other from 
the outside.    
Conferring with Brueggemann (1982:45) then, it is the command that is critically in the 
midst of the garden, but this does not render the trees of little consequence.  The issue as 
the narrative constructs it is not dependent on how the reader (or exegete) understands the 
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 If we are willing to view ha’adam in a communal sense as I believe we should, then it is a communal 
decision that is fundamentally at stake.   
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trees, but how ha’adam does.  It is how ha’adam responds to the command that 
determines whether that which is in the middle of the garden is a Life tree leading to 
Wisdom or a knowledge tree of good and evil leading to death.   The issue is true 
Wisdom verses a false wisdom just as it is in Proverbs and with Qohelet; the fear of the 
Lord is the beginning of wisdom.  Perhaps there is really only one tree in the middle and 
what it is or appears to be depends on the voice ha’adam chooses to heed.  Westermann 
(1974:213) concludes similarly: 
…this procedure of allowing the narrative of the tree of life to speak through that of the tree of 
knowledge—a second voice as it were together with the melody—is an ingenious and intelligent 
resolution. 
Even more striking, however, is Westermann‘s assertion that ‗the tree of knowledge…is 
an imitation of the formula ‗the tree of life.‘  
  
6.4 The Crisis of Ha’adam Gen 2:18-20 
 
Girard (1985a:44) comments on Racine‘s tragedy, Bajazet: 
Atalide brings about the transfiguration of her own suicide into collective murder – or rather, these 
lines bring out the true meaning of all suicide; the total absence of a succour, universal hostility, 
the dark side of the unanimity of persecution. 
Up until this point in the narrative, the emergence of ha’adam addresses a sacrificial 
crisis of the earth, but in the proceeding verses (Gen. 2:18-24), another crisis is 
addressed.  In the ‗not good‘ formula of Gen. 2:18, we a led to the primary ‗crisis,‘ for 
the earthling is alone.  As with the earlier statements of negation (Gen. 2:5), the ‗not 
good‘ statement reveals a severity to the situation, and it is a congealing of difference.  
Several things accentuate what is at stake. 
6.4.1 Crisis of desire: isolation and insulation.  For one, it comes on the heels of 
God‘s dual command to eat of every tree and not to eat from the knowledge tree of good 
and evil.  As mentioned above, when good and evil are congealed, it is deleterious and 
delusional to be strictly confined within one‘s own reasoning.  One is especially 
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vulnerable to acquisitive desire.  Our own inner thoughts become that undifferentiated 
place.
57
  We become as one prayer at the end of the Divine Liturgy states: ‗enslaved to 
our own reasoning.‘ This statement is placed in opposition to compunction, contrition, 
and ‗humility of my thoughts.‘  In some sense, then, it does not work in favor of heeding 
God‘s command that ha’adam is ‗by himself in his separation.‘58   From a mimetic 
standpoint, Oughourline (2010:34) argues that the mimetic nature of humanity renders 
meaningless the modern notion of the ‗authentic self‘ as ‗. . . an ―individual,‖ conceived 
as a self-contained and self-enclosed entity that can find the origin of its identity and 
freedom with itself.‘  It may seem as if the opposite is true here; ha’ adam is too 
differentiated, but as Girard (1972:252ff) has pointed out, exaggerated difference or a 
‗monopolization of difference,‘ such as in coronation rites of kingship, is a way to 
express the loss thereof.  But ha’adam’s condition is dangerous on several fronts.  It is 
here where we realize that ha’adam is a composite figure of opposites.  He represents a 
sacrificial victim, but also a sacrificial participant, a sacrificing community.  Girard 
(1972:252): 
Like incarnations of sacred violence, Oedipus can and does play every part in succession.  The 
sacred king is also a monster.  He is simultaneously god, man, and savage beast…Moral and 
physical monstrosities are thus blended and confused.  Like Oedipus, the king is at once a stranger 
and son, the most intimate of insiders and the most bizarre of outsiders; he is an exemplar of 
enormous tenderness and frightful savagery.  As an incestuous criminal, he stands above and 
beyond all the rules he promulgates and enforces.  
From a mimetic perspective, this is a pretty good description of a scapegoat victim, ‗by 
himself in his separation,‘ but even more so, it is the precise condition of a community in 
                                                 
57
 Lewis (1955: e): ‗The surest means of disarming an anger or a lust was to turn your attention from the 
girl or the insult and start examining the passion itself. The surest way of spoiling a pleasure was to start 
examining your satisfaction. But if so, it followed that all introspection is in one respect misleading. In 
introspection we try to look "inside ourselves" and see what is going on. But nearly everything that was 
going on a moment before is stopped by the very act of our turning to look at it.‘ 
58
 The lamed prefix and the 3
rd
 masculine singular suffix provides a compounded emphasis on isolation 
(wdbl – strictly ‗to his own separation‘ BDB 94).  Surprisingly, the isolation of ha’adam attracts little to 
no attention among exegetes.  Cassuto (1978: 126) makes clear that the bwt-al construction is 
emphatically negative and in opposition to something, much more than the mild Nya. Nonetheless he says 
nothing about wdbl.  It appears that most commentators assume that loneliness and not isolation is the 
problem and do not consider the content of the ‗not good‘ worthy of much consideration.  Brueggemann 
(1982:51) does, however, connect the issue of ‗knowing good and evil‘ with the problem of the monarchy, 
of single-rule.  See discussion of bedilah in chapter 5 (5.5.1). 
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an irresolvable internal rivalry.  It is, of course, the ruler become victim become god 
syndrome.  Extreme isolation is a condition of the scapegoat victim because he so clearly 
exemplifies the communal crisis.  Because the victim can be perceived by the community 
as completely separate from it, it can become the true objective perspective.  Thus, the 
victim easily becomes divine and the ultimate arbitrator of the community.   Repeated a 
hundred-fold in our day is the suicide killer whose repulsive acts of violence are nurtured 
in an environment of extreme isolation.  Again, the isolated one has nothing but an 
internal cycle of reasoning that easily seeks a destructive outlet when it cannot find an 
internal resolve.  To reiterate a central aspect to Girard‘s theory, the sacrificial crisis is 
always an internal one. The extreme isolation of a community gets compounded in 
individuals.
59
 
It is the return of the victim to the community that is critically at issue. In one respect as 
explained above, ha’adam emerged from a separation from the ground, but the question 
is: how does he return to the ground?  What is his relationship to the ground post-
expulsion?  Will he return as the arbitrator of the community, knowing and advocating to 
the community towards the necessity of the sacrificial resolve, a master of violence, 
knowing good and evil?  Ha’adam’s isolation is an issue of what becomes of sacrificial 
victims.  Another way to put the issue is this—what relationship will the victim have to 
the community that expelled it post-expulsion?  The sacrificial community needs to retain 
as much of the beneficiary effects of the expulsion and for as long as possible.  
The sacrificial nature of ha’adam’s situation becomes more evident when considering 
two critical sacrificial rites in ancient societies: rites of passage and exogamy.  Both of 
which, I suggest, are within the author‘s purview.60  
                                                 
59
 This also applies to the ‗rites of passage‘ of maturing males as the discussion below will elaborate.  
60
 This is most evident in the ‗upon thus‘, Nk-le, statement of Gen. 2:24. The particular use of the 
preposition le instead of l indicates a statement of fact more than a prediction or proclamation (BDB 
487).  It simply states the assignment of the origins of a custom and is used throughout Genesis (Gen.10:9, 
11:9, 16:14, 19:22, 21:31, 25:30, 26:33, 29:34, 35, 30:6.)  In several of these instances, the naming of 
something is connected to an event there.  In this verse, it is connected to the naming of something, but the 
formula is reversed here.  The naming, usually of a place or person, follows the event.  Here what follows 
the ‗upon thus‘ is a custom. 
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6.4.2 Dual nature of ha’adam’s sacrificial crisis. Girard (1972:281) has expounded 
on the extreme danger an isolated individual could potentially reek within a community 
in his discussion of the sacrificial nature of rites of passage.  ‗What to us appear to be 
perfectly normal and predictable transitions, essential to the preservation of the social 
unit, are regarded by primitive man as portents of apocalyptic upheaval.‘ The gap 
between the two stages of identity a young man finds himself in within the community is 
terrifying because of its resemblance to the undifferentiated state of a sacrificial crisis.
61
     
In many ways, ha’adam’s crisis follows a pattern common to rites of passage where the 
conventional sacrificial mechanism is reenacted.
62
  The initiate enters a dangerous time of 
undifferentiation. Thus the community actually exacerbates the individual‘s precarious 
status, thrusting the initiate into some semblance of the sacrificial crisis, often as an 
ordeal requiring extreme isolation from the community.  In this stage, he is reduced to ‗an 
amorphous state of anonymity‘ (alone in his isolation) where he assumes the roles of 
sacrificer and sacrificed simultaneously.  In other words, he is made to represent both the 
disease and the cure.  Girard (1972:282) describes this stage:  
To be associated with the sacred [in this case, the initiate is in that terrible place of undifferentiated 
status] is to share in this monstrosity; to be lacking in differences or over-equipped with them comes to 
the same thing.  That is why the initiate can appear both as a hermaphroditic aberration and as a 
creature with no sexual identity at all. 
At some point in many rites, a surrogate victim is supplied.  There is a dismemberment, a 
sparagmos.
63
  Often it is an object viewed as extracted from the initiate‘s body 
symbolizing the ‗final expulsion.‘  Girard (1972:287) explains: ‗The extracted 
object…plays the part of the actual surrogate victim, whereas the human organism, fully 
mobilized against the invader, takes the part of the collectivity.  Finally, as Girard 
(1972:286) views ritual, the initiate comes away from the ritual act, having been 
subjected to the realm of sacred violence, with a sense of ‗control‘ over the violence or at 
                                                 
61
 Girard (1972:56-79) believes that this repulsion of doubles or mirrored images is behind many of the 
more baffling prohibitions found in myth and ritual, such as the fear of twins or mirrors. 
62
 Girard (1972:281ff) 
63
 Girard (1972:131) finds in the sparagmos, dismemberment, of the Dionysiac practice two signature acts 
of the scapegoat mechanism: ‗1) all the bacchantes participate in the killing.  This satisfies the requirements 
of unanimity…2) no weapon is used; the victim is torn apart by the women‘s bare hands.‘ 
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the least, a sense of awe and respect for it.  This ‗control‘ or familiarity over the ‗savage 
sacred‘ realm might very well be the kind of ‗knowledge of good and evil‘ discussed 
above.
64
  The neophyte is made to relive the community‘s past experience of its resolve 
of internal violent reciprocity in the scapegoat victim.  In his discussion of initiation rites 
for shamans, Girard 1972:82 observes, the sacrificial crisis is accented even more 
intensely.  The shaman must emerge as a master of ‗Supreme Violence,‘ that is, the 
violence of the sacred which belongs to deities.  A shaman is a kind of ‗chief 
commander‘ of sacred forces.  A sense of control over human violence is precisely the 
illusion behind ‗knowing good and evil‘ that lubricates the sacrificial mechanism even to 
this present day. 
There is, however, another side to this isolation.  As Girard constantly reminds, the 
sacrificial crisis is always an internal one.  It is about keeping the community from 
imploding, and the prime conditions for this are an internal rivalry that finds no external 
outlet.  The community is isolated and insolated.
65
  In his discussion about exogamy, 
Girard (1972:249) maintains that when two groups exchange a woman in marriage, the 
ultimate goal is not peace between the two groups, but peace within each group.  It is to 
prevent internal violence over the women closest to the males from igniting. 
Here we must return to Girard‘s (1972:164ff) notion of the monstrous double.  It is when 
the rivals become so equal in their desire that the two become mirrored images of each 
other.  And to the community swept along by the contagion of that rivalry, it is the rivalry 
itself that becomes monstrous.  In other words, the rivalry is one terrifying entity, a 
monster of congealed categories.  When this happens, the rivalry (monster) threatens to 
                                                 
64
 ‗To think religiously is to see violence as something superhuman, to be kept always at a distance and 
ultimately renounced‘ (Girard; 1972: 135).  For Girard (1972:138), we, like the tragedies, still dance 
between the extremes of religious truth, transferring the burden of violence to the gods and the ‗unadorned 
truth,‘ ‗which passes the violence back to man.‘ In the dance of good and evil, ‗We enter a universe 
populated by ―good‖ and ―evil‖ influences—the only universe in which we feel truly at home.‘  It is a 
system that always finds its recourse in arbitrary violence, in misdirected violence. 
65
 According to the Violence Policy Center (2009: e), ten murder-suicides occur each week in America.  
Characteristic of such events is not only the isolation of the individual, but also the immediate family.  The 
compulsion of the ‗family annihilator‘ to not limit the destruction to himself speaks loudly to the internal 
crisis of both the individual and the immediate community.  Confoundedly, the killer views his own 
internal plight as synonymous with the family‘s plight.  
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devour everything.  The symmetry of rivals that becomes singular can most certainly 
happen within a person, and when that occurs, it can just as equally devour the person.  A 
tortured soul is potentially destructive, and the ‗not good‘ pronouncement has this in 
view. Here we can view the isolated individual in a similar way as a community seeking 
an ‗objective‘ ‗outside‘ perspective to the community‘s internal strife.  A marriage 
exchange, then, is a sacrificial procedure.  By the ‗expulsion‘ of a woman, internal 
rivalries are diminished, and the rival, the neighboring tribe, becomes a sacrificial 
arrangement which deflects internal rivalries to external ones.
66
  
To repeat, when unresolved internal conflict, whether individual or corporate, is 
heightened, the desired object disappears completely.  There is a strong sense that the 
‗other‘ possesses it.  The loss of a true direction for desire produces a desperate attempt 
to recover or find a new focal point to direct desire.  One is left with, as Lewis (1952:e)  
asserts, only the trace or remnant of the effects of desiring an object.   
6.4.3 The severity of ha’adam and Yahweh’s sacrificial solution.  The severity of 
ha’adam’s crisis is also signaled in the solution, for God must provide an rze.  There are 
mild denotations of ezer, like an assistant, but often strong denotations such as a rescuer, 
succor, or exculpate.
67
  In other words, the strong possibility exists of one who delivers 
from disaster or death  (Ex 18:4, Ez 12:14).  Although Abishai, for instance, was an 
assistant or attendant to David (2 Sam. 21:17), his ‗aid‘ to David in battle is surely one of 
rescue.
68
 
This one to ‗assist‘ ha’adam is further described as one ‗fit for him.‘  This mnemonic 
word play is in synonymous parallelism with ha’adam’s isolation—ha’adam levaddo and 
                                                 
66
 See the discussion of the sacrificial exchange of woman in Chapter 4 (4.3.2). 
67
 BDB 740.  Common among commentators are concerns of gender equality (Westermann, 1974:227; 
Cassuto 1978:126; Arnold 2009:60).  The discussions center on avoiding a subservient connotation and 
stressing mutual assistance.  Problematic to this view is that it limits the scope to a relationship of a man 
and woman almost completely devoid of communal implications.   
68
 We might also note the names of Assyrian military kings that end in eser, Asshur-nasirpal and 
Shalmaneser, or rulers in Israel such as Ezra.  So strong are the associations with deliverer or rescuer that 
we might wonder of a consistent reluctance on the part of male translators to accent these stronger 
associations, emphasizing instead the less prevalent notion of ‗assistant‘ or ‗help-mate.‘ Arnold (2009:61) 
connects the notion with helping the man in cultivation of the ground.  This, however, is never alluded to in 
the story.  The curses (Gen 3:16-19) in particular, make no such association, connecting as it does only to 
the vertical (in the sense Westermann and Jay use it: a crisis of descendents) crisis of blessing.   
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etzer kenegeddo.  The word, dgn, carries the basic sense of going out or being out in front 
of.  Hence, a nagid is a leader, ruler, or prince.
69
  It means to be obvious, conspicuous, or 
even in the sense of opposite or in opposition to someone.
70
 In mimetic terms, nagad 
addresses either a positive parallel model (Ne 12:9, 2 Kings 2:7) or negative polarized 
one (Gen 31:32, 37; 47:15).   
Ha’adam’s ‗cure‘ must be found in someone who must ‗lead him out.‘  As Girard 
(1972:306) advocates, the primary educator is the surrogate victim:  
All religious rituals spring from the surrogate victim…the working basis of human thought, the 
process of ―symbolization‖ is rooted in the surrogate victim…The surrogate victim, as founder of 
the rite, appears as the ideal educator of humanity, in the etymological sense of e-ducatio, a 
leading out.  The rite gradually leads men away from the sacred; it permits them to escape their 
own violence, removes them from violence and bestows on them all the institutions and beliefs 
that define their humanity. 
The question of an adequate surrogate victim is in view here, and at first glance, the 
passage seems to follow the characteristic scapegoat structure.  As the narrative proceeds, 
however, it becomes evident that Yahweh Elohim‘s notion of an adequate surrogate is not 
someone who leads him away from the internal violence, but rather confronts him head 
on with it.   The best way to understand it here, especially in light of the major concern of 
desire, is that ha‘adam needs a co-respondent, someone to not only equally respond to 
‗life consumption,‘ but also to confront the imprisoned reasoning toward the sacrificial 
tendency.
71
  Oughourline (2010:50) explains: ‗Indeed, what was lacking for the creation 
of psychological man was an alter ego.  If God did not create such an alter ego, ―in the 
face of‖ or ―opposite of‖ the man there would have been no possibility of dialectic, of 
psychological movement, that is, of desire.‘  The picture of Moses handing over 
leadership to Joshua (Deut. 31:1-8) is helpful here.  Joshua is to go with the Israelites and 
divide the inheritance, and God will ‗walk‘ with Joshua as Joshua heeds God‘s 
commands.  The nagid is one who is with ha’adam, enabling him toward the proper 
                                                 
69
 BDB 617-618 
70
 Westermann (1974:227)   
71
 Gunkel (1901:11) states: ‗wdgnk means as over against him, corresponding to him, his counterpart.‘ 
Westermann (1974:227 ) also strongly accentuates the notion of correspondence and is correct in placing 
the crucial concern in what constitutes human community.  He (1974:151) concludes similarly in his 
commentary on Gen 1:26-27.  See the discussion of imago dei in chapter 5 (5.4.4.).  
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object of desire, and one whom God is with.  A fuller picture of what a co-respondent 
looks like is provided at the end of the chapter in the description of ‗one flesh‘ that is 
‗naked without shame.‘   
As discussed in the previous chapters, Yahweh addresses the crisis of humanity in a 
sacrificial fashion, at least initially.  A victim is supplied.  But here is where the structure 
makes a dramatic shift, for it is the kind of victim supplied and the way Yahweh presents 
the victim that makes it a counter-sacrifice. 
The question arises as to whether ‗another‘ desiring the same object is simply creating 
another potential rivalry, i.e. two desires on one object.  Interestingly, however, this is not 
the set up.  For one, there is no one clear object; there is a plurality of objects, the 
desirable trees, periphrastically leading to an object, the Life tree which is both object and 
subject.  Second, the response is to voice, not to imitation, and this requires dialogue, one 
which in the chapter 3 unfortunately never transpires. 
To summarize, God‘s implicit desire is for man to desire what He does.  God makes man 
to share His desire in such a way that it does not turn into a rivalry that destroys one or 
the other.  The concern or dilemma, which I submit the author is keenly aware of, is 
whether desire can be filled or satiated without consuming the one who shares it with 
you.  In sacrificial terms, can there be a sharing of life (participation in the same desire) 
that does not rely on the destruction of shared life, to the internal destruction of 
community?  Girard (1965:45) paints the picture this way: 
…to lay down the principle of a reciprocity without limits, would be to doom men to the most 
terrible conflict.  To love a son as son is to see him a possible rival.  To venerate a father as father 
is already to contemplate his undoing.  The system is not conceivable, especially in the beginning, 
without some form of palliative.  There is a need for religious and social institutions capable of 
dissimulating and moderating the convergence of desires, the fundamental contradiction between 
father and son. 
The author, I believe, rigorously paints a picture of the deleterious extent of ha’adam’s 
situation.  Because ha’adam does not have a co-respondent, he still is in fact 
undifferentiated.  Like disenfranchised young men, they are potentially lethal unless he 
finds a way to co-respond with others.  
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The crisis, I propose, is that the extruded or expelled one, when left completely separate 
is surely a scapegoat victim, the one completely isolated and separated from the crowd.  
If one stands in solidarity to that separated state, however, the sacrificial mechanism 
cannot operate.  The isolated one cannot become a victim, nor upon his death a god, an 
object of veneration, one who is perceived to have ‗IT‘, i.e. the power of life.  
 
6.5 Yahweh Elohim’s Sacrificial Resolve: Gen. 2:18-24   
By way of summary, the narrative sets up a description of a crisis of the earth (Gen 2:5-
6).  By God‘s intervention and design, a ‗living soul‘ emerges that alleviates the crisis 
and sets off a series of separations.  In other words, distinctions and boundaries 
(prohibitions) can be established.   The emergence of a ‗living soul‘ (in other words, a 
desiring being) provides an interesting theological commentary that is a particular focus 
of the story.  Desire is first presented as the resolve of a crisis, a desiring being (ha’adam) 
emerges from the sacrificial action of a desiring Being (God).  Because of the primary 
distinction, ha’adam, the earth‘s crisis is reversed.  A garden is established in which 
kinds of trees are cultivated.  A river is established and divides into four directions.  
Ha’adam, like the garden and the river, is the source for further differentiation.  
Ha’adam’s task to differentiate is modeled by God‘s actions in the garden and the river.72  
He is to imitate the order established by God in the garden and its ability to maintain 
distinctions, through the primary task of naming.  In this regard, ha’adam ‗serves‘ the 
garden, rules over it, and completes the reversal of the original crisis.  Ha’adam, 
however, differs from the garden and the river in one critical way—he desires.  In this 
regard, he is not like the natural elements; he is like God, the original sacrificer.  Because 
of desire, a further crisis within ha’adam himself must be addressed.73  Whereas earlier, 
desire brought resolution, it is also presented as its own crisis.  
                                                 
72
 In this respect, Genesis 2 follows the pattern of Genesis 1.  
73
 Although the garden and the river precede ha’adam as models, I remain consistent with Girard‘s 
assertion that the perceived crisis in nature is a projection of the human crisis of desire onto the natural 
world.  Hence, the primary crisis in Genesis 2 revolves around the proper object or direction of desire.  
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To remind, it is God who ‗brought forth‘ the crisis, and it is God who will see it through.  
The solution (Gen. 2:19-22), of primary emphasis, is of God‘s doing and of His own 
prerogative.  It is sacrificial, but of a different kind.  In other words, the two separations 
that follow reveal fundamental issues of distinction common to most rituals and 
mythology—distinction from animals and of sex.  Girard (1972:127-128) points to the 
Bacchae myth as a prime example of the particularly virulent forms of violent loss of 
difference: the loss of sexual distinctions, the loss of distinctions between man and 
animals, and the loss of difference between man and gods.  Genesis 2 obviously 
addresses these same concerns and in the common sacrificial way, but there are critical 
differences in this scenario which again lead to a challenge or at least a questioning 
alternative to the common sacrificial solution.    
6.5.1 Insufficiency of Animal sacrifice.  First, God makes animals by forming them 
from the same substance as ha’adam—the ground (Gen. 2:19-20).  Certainly there is a 
kind of rhetorical staging going on in the text.  The audience hardly needs to be reminded 
that animals cannot alleviate the earthling‘s isolation.74  The failure of animals, however, 
is a critical staging point for what follows.  We are curtly marshaled through this 
sequence to drive home the matter-of-fact point—animals inadequately alleviate 
ha’adam’s crisis of being alone in his isolation.   
Again, the scenario works with ambiguity and an unbalancing of symmetry.  Who does 
not understand that animals fail to resolve ha’adam’s situation?  God?  Ha’adam?  The 
author/theologian?  The audience?  Is God experimenting and unsure, or is God 
orchestrating the sequence on ha’adam’s behalf?75  Is it the earthling who must come to a 
revelation through the process or God?   
In understanding the inadequacy, several things should guide us.  For one, no character in 
the drama pronounces the inadequacy.  It may be especially important to reiterate that it 
is not an issue of whether God found it inadequate.  In other words, God is not looking 
                                                 
74
 Walter Burkert (Mack:1987:22-32) who has been in considerable dialogue with Girard has established a 
theory as to the origins of Greek sacrifice.  Burkert views the origins of Greek sacrifice as going back to the 
central place the ‗hunt‘ had in pre-historic groups. 
75
 Gunkel (1901:226) echoes the sentiment of many when he entertains the notion that God attempted a 
kind of ‗experiment.‘ 
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for any satisfaction from animals.  The only crisis on God‘s part is that ha’adam must be 
alleviated from the crisis in order that he might rightly direct his desires toward the true 
object.  From God‘s perspective, it is ha’adam who must resolve it within himself.  A 
dominant theme reiterated here is that God brings to ha’adam, an action which is 
drastically reversed in Genesis 4.  God holds the key to ha’adam’s dilemma.  God‘s 
sacrificial solution is the adequate one.   
A second point of emphasis is that the animals are formed from the ground in similar 
fashion as ha’adam. In the story, ha’adam’s formation comes from an act of extrusion 
(expulsion) from the ground by an act of God.  This picture is as Girard believes 
conventional to all myth.  Violence is outside of the community.  It is a god who calls for 
sacrifice.  Like the oracle calling Laius to kill his son, Abraham hears God‘s voice 
compelling him to do likewise.  In this respect, Girard (1965:45) envisions the birth of 
patriarchal culture.  As discussed in the previous chapter, patrilineage is established by 
sacrifice.  Animals imitate the original expulsion; they are surrogate victims.  They too 
find their origin in the same sacrificing community as ha’adam.  Girard (1965:45) 
explains:  
Abraham is not another Laius.  It is God, it is the sacred oracle who suggests that he put his son to 
death.  But God, at the last moment, substitutes an animal so that the child will live.  To sacrifice 
an animal is to have recourse to a means of purification that may originally not be simply ritual, 
since it substitutes, for the fathers and sons pitted against each other, for those guilty parties of 
whom the interminable pursuit would lead to a terrible familial vendetta, a living creature, a victim 
still is a ‗neutral‘ one, intermediate between a man and an inanimate object, a victim that can be 
put to death without aggravating the divisions within the city. 
Third, the inadequacy of animals becomes especially evident by ha’adam’s naming of the 
animals.  It was the naming of animals that was ineffectual or at least, most reveals the 
inadequacy.  The breakdown, it appears, comes because ha’adam is not able to 
sufficiently differentiate.  Naming in Genesis 1 is reserved for acts of separation.  
Because God could separate, he names. It is only what is separated that is named.  The 
setting of limits or boundaries, that is prohibitions, is squarely centered on the sacrificial 
victim.  The victim is the archetypal legislator for the community because he represents 
an authentic objective perspective.  The issue of delineating difference is central to the 
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issue of desire and the proper choice of objects in Genesis 2.  Here, God does not even 
name man and women.  It is God who waits to ‗see‘ what ha’adam would call the 
animals.  God waits on ha’adam’s response  (Gen. 2:19).  It is ha’adam who must find an 
adequate resolution to his ‗not good‘ situation. 
The declaration of the insufficiency of animals (Gen. 2:20), however, is less than straight-
forward.  It comes as a commentary from the author.  The lamed prefix to adam, requires 
the normally active verb, find, to be put in a passive voice. ‗For adam, Mdal, there was 
not found an ezer kenegddo.
76
  The same verb construct, aum al, is found in Gen.8:9 
with the dove who could not find dry land.  There is likely a quiet sense of desperation or 
unsettlement.  The phrase, however, blurs the distinction as to who exactly is looking for 
resolve.   Although less than clear, God also appears anxious or unsettled by ha’adam’s 
unresolved plight.
77
 
We can confidently affirm without conjecture one central point from the narrative—the 
naming of animals is an inadequate resolve to ha’adam’s ‗not good‘ situation.  They do 
not alleviate the double problem of ‗being alone in his isolation‘ and needing someone to 
‗lead him out.‘ They will not aid him in choosing the desirable trees and avoiding the 
knowledge tree of good and evil.  In the process of naming the animals (establishing 
prohibitions) ha’adam only exacerbates the crisis.  He comes to a point where his own 
actions exhaust him and the resolution is beyond him.  Hence, God leads ha’adam 
through a sacrificial self-revelatory process.   
In a similar way, Oedipus is taken through the dramatic search for the alleviation of the 
city‘s crisis.  There is a keen impiety on Oedipus‘s part, for he refuses to resort to the 
palliative measures of animal sacrifice.  He insists on getting to the real issue (Girard, 
1965:47).  The narrative in Genesis 2 also is driving towards the real issue which cannot 
be revealed through animal sacrifice.  This, of course, is a well-known objection of the 
prophets (Mic 6:6-7, Amos 4:4-5). 
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 Cassuto (1978:133) argues that the construction does not require such a reading; even still, he admits that 
it is ambiguous.  
77
 Westermann (1974:229) views the resolve coming more from God; even so, he reiterates an intensifying 
of the ‗tension‘ begun in 2:18.  In this respect, this tension is similar to that of God‘s spirit ‗stirring‘ just 
before the expulsion of light (Gen 1;2), and God‘s forceful blowing into the nostrils of ha‘adam (Gen 2:7) 
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There is an inadequacy to surrogate victims, especially animal substitution.  From 
Girard‘s perspective, the original victim is human, not an animal.78  Sacrificial 
substitution relies on a certain resemblance to the original victim.  As Girard argues, 
humans were the first victims of mob violence, the first to be recognized as scapegoats 
for the community.  The naming of animals—the setting of prohibitions—is the 
immediate result of a satisfactory victim being found.   Ha’adam is unable to successfully 
differentiate because both he and the animals have been expelled from the same source—
the ground.  Ha’adam has a sense of being the expelled one, but not the expelling one.  
He has no sense of his origins.  The community has no sense of its origins in a collective 
murder.  Animals only reiterate the need for scapegoat mechanism, but fail to adequately 
reveal the reason.   
How does the naming of animals fail to address the fundamental issue of desire 
predominant in the trees?  As mentioned earlier, the ‗not good‘ proclamation comes on 
the heels of ha’adam being situated between two symmetries, one is to be fully embraced 
and the other to be completely avoided.  Animals for one play completely passive roles in 
the narrative.  They do not respond to ha’adam.  Here again, the animals imitate or 
replicate the original expulsion (that of ha’adam from the ground). As a result of Yahweh 
Elohim‘s offering, the earthling is able to differentiate in similar fashion to God, 
especially ‗living things.‘  There is a sense of control or mastery over the endeavor.  As 
discussed above, ha’adam would maintain the sense of mastery (knowledge) over good 
and evil.   
 The problem (that the author is juggling) is one of effective differentiation.  Because of a 
replication of the original expulsion—living things coming out of the ground—ha’adam 
is able to ‗imitate‘ God‘s discerning characteristics.  He is able to differentiate externally, 
but not internally, and to remind again, the problem of human violence is internal. 
Of priority, it is critical to reiterate the key fixed points of the narrative.  It is Yahweh 
Elohim who pronounces the inadequacy, indeed the crisis, of ha’adam’s situation.  The 
crisis is acute especially because ha’adam stands between two objects of desire.  At issue 
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 As discussed in Chapter 3, the issue of the origins of sacrifice is contentious and unsettled.  But to 
reiterate, priority is given to Girard. 
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is the direction of the earthling‘s desire.  It is God who ‗brings‘ a ‗solution.‘  Already 
there is a split with the conventional sacrificial structure.  In mythical fashion, it is the 
god who provides the solution.  By extruding animals out of the ground, God is pictured 
as the sacrificer.  In other words, the violence of the community is perceived to be outside 
the community, coming from gods.  But uncharacteristic of the mythical structure, the 
crisis remains entrenched on the human level.  The narrative steadfastly refuses to make 
this a theological crisis.  God is not endangered; ha’adam is. Furthermore, it is God who 
says so.  This proclamation of God must take priority since other than the double-sided 
command over what to eat, it is the only time in chapter 2 where God speaks.  For the 
most part, God is pictured as meticulously going about his business, marshalling through 
the sequence with ease and deliberation.
79
  
The problem of ha’adam’s isolation centers on his inability to perceive the depth of his 
own crisis, and it appears that the sacrificial marshaling of animals is first presented as a 
way to exacerbate ha’adam’s awareness of that fact.80   In the end, the sacrifice of 
animals cannot adequate address ha‘adam‘s internal crisis of differentiation.  
 
As in Genesis 1, the text here cannot envision anything other than a sacrificial solution.  
Nevertheless, it understands all too well its weakness.  At issue is an adequate surrogate 
victim to alleviate a life and death internal crisis.  But what also appears at stake, is 
whether the victim will as Girard (1972:306) asserts ‗lead men away from the sacred; 
                                                 
79
 Girard (1982:190) speaks of the superiority of the Gospels in revealing the sacrificial mechanism by 
meticulously going through the sequence.  It is God who leads one into the crisis, in order to lead one out.  
Thus, the depiction of God is similar to Genesis 1.  
80
 Of question is whether the listing of animals is a veiled reference to animal sacrifice.  Girard (1972:9) 
makes clear that it is the animals closest to the community, or internal to the community that is almost 
universally used as sacrificial substitutions.  With the reference to ‗all living things of the field and every 
bird of the heavens‘ in Gen. 2:19, it would seem to move away from such a reading.  Gen. 2:20, however, 
does more strongly suggest that restricted sense.  Here, bahemah, is restricted almost exclusively to 
domesticated animals and rarely to wild animals (BDB 97).  In fact, behemah is a preferred word to 
distinguish between domesticated and wild animals, a distinction especially acute in Genesis (Gen. 1:24-26, 
2:20, 3:14, 9:16).  See also Middleton, (2005:51).  In Gen. 2:20, the specific and prioritizing list of potential 
sacrificial animals, going from the most sacrificial to the least, is perhaps meant to exhaust the inadequacy 
of any animal sacrifice.  All animals are inadequate, domestic or not.  
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permit them to escape their own violence, remove them from violence, and bestows on 
them all the institutions and beliefs that define their humanity.‘  Or, will the victim lead 
them toward an alternative reality?  Of secondary importance is what will constitute the 
community to differentiate in a way that does not eventually lead to yet another crisis 
requiring yet another victim. 
In the coming forth of the woman, God once again takes the initiative and provides the 
right solution, and it is sacrificial.  A life must be taken out of something else.   
In God‘s act of bringing forth the woman, several structural features are reiterated.  There 
is a crisis of a symmetrical loss of difference and a new thing emerges or is expelled, 
resolving the crisis of ha’adam and ushering in difference or distinctions. Most 
importantly, God is master of the whole structure.  He brings on the crisis, but rapidly 
moves through the sequence.  That a god brings on a crisis in order to resolve it is a 
common feature to mythological narratives.  Girard observes (1972:134): ‗He claims 
legitimacy not from his ability to disturb the peace but from his ability to restore the 
peace he has himself disturbed—thereby justifying, a posteriori, having disturbed it in the 
first place.‘  This feature, which is prominent in both Genesis 1 and 2, is significantly 
altered, however, for a powerful movement of God himself is critically implied.  God is 
in and with the one expelled, and it is in this expulsion engineered by God that God 
jettisons the expelled one in a different direction than a return to that place of 
indifference, of symmetrical reciprocity.  The sacrifice that God provides is the key 
difference.  This kind of sacrifice is envisioned in the coming forth of the woman. 
 The uniqueness of a sacrifice initiated by God is demonstrated in the scenario that 
follows (Gen. 2:25), for there is a duality to the sacrifice.  To reiterate, two rituals 
common to almost all cultures, especially ancient ones, are in view here and significantly, 
Girard (1972:239ff, 281ff) features both of them as models of the ‗unity‘ of ritual in the 
scapegoat mechanism.  The first ritual is readily recognizable since this passage is the 
paradigmic expression of sacred marriage—exogamy, the exchange of women.  The 
second, rite of passage, perhaps is less obvious, but it too is expressed here. These two 
rituals in view here explain how ha’adam is both a sacrifice and a participant in the 
sacrifice.  It also, in my view, explains the ritualistic (sacrificial) necessity of both, with 
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the result being a picture of rest similar to the end of Genesis 1—both of them were 
naked and not ashamed.  
6.4.2  Ha’adam’s sacrifice.  In one sense, ha’adam is a victim ready for slaughter 
similar to the neophyte in a rite of passage.  This becomes clear in the initial act of God 
(Gen. 2:21) where ha’adam is caused to fall into a deep sleep.  The few biblical 
references to Mdr discussed below are consistent in two ways.  For one, it is a deep 
sleep.  One is ‗stopped up,‘ ‗stupefied,‘ or ‗deaf‘ to all that is around him.81  The dormant 
posture of the victim is a key characteristic of sacrificial victims.  More pertinent, the one 
falling into such a sleep is facing eminent death.  For example, while hiding in Jael‘s tent 
from Barak‘s pursuit, Sisera falls into a radam, whereupon Jael drives a tent stake into 
his head (Jdg. 4:21).  A revealing feature of this story is that Jael still had to approach her 
victim ‗stealthily.‘  In other words, it was the kind of covert operation characteristic to 
scapegoat murders.  In a similar scene, David and his men, ‗stealthily‘ approach Saul‘s 
camp at night where Saul is in a deep sleep (1 Sam. 26:12).  This story is especially 
significant because it is the only other biblical reference to God causing a radam to fall 
upon Saul.  When finding Saul and his army asleep, David‘s assistant, Abishai, offers to 
kill Saul with Saul‘s own spear.  David intercedes and forbids Abishai from the murder.  
Significant to the story here, David takes from Saul two items which symbolize his vital 
force—his spear, which only moments earlier was the instrument of Saul‘s intended 
death and his water bag. As the story goes, these items also symbolize the sparing of 
Saul’s life.  Saul‘s life was spared, but significantly altered none the same, for David 
holds up Saul‘s spear before Saul‘s own army.  There is a defeat of the persecutor, yet the 
life of the persecutor is spared.   
The other significant example of a victim falling into a radam is Jonah, who is said to 
have fallen into a deep sleep just before he is thrown over-board (Jon. 1:5).  Girard 
(1972:312-13) points to this story as a text-book case of structural scapegoating, yet fails 
to mention the significance of Jonah‘s sleep as singling him out as a scapegoat because 
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 BDB 922. Gunkel (1901:12) reads radam in a ‗beautiful‘ and ‗wonderous‘ way. Yet he relates the deep 
sleep to magical notions and also reminds of its secretive process.  Coincidently, radam is similar in 
meaning to damah discussed in the previous chapter (5.4.4) were it related to the silencing of the victim and 
bloodshed.  
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he appears oblivious to the crisis.  Jonah‘s deep sleep has separated and isolated him from 
the community.  His apparent ‗dumbness‘ to the community‘s crisis raises the suspicion 
that he is a co-conspirator of it.  He is the cause of the crisis.  
The few remaining references to radam curiously but indirectly relate not only to the 
story here, but also to the exodus story.
82
  Revelations come to men in a ‗deep sleep‘ (Job 
4:13), but ironically, the complete absence of revelation is also considered a ‗deep sleep‘ 
coming over men.  In almost every instance, the notion of stealth and impending dread 
accompany a radam.   
Westermann (1974:230) unwittingly reveals something of the sacrificial mechanism in 
his commentary on this verse.  He begins by asserting that ‗an actual event accessible to 
us‘ is not possible.  This is, however, also true of the original murder; it is no longer 
directly accessible.
83
 Westermann concludes the section with a strong certainty that this 
kind of ‗sleep‘ is critically essential to effective completion of God‘s creative act.  Thus 
Westermann describes precisely what Girard identifies as a key element in the 
effectiveness of the sacrificial mechanism—its ability to conceal and reveal 
simultaneously.  It reveals to the initiate the sacrificial resolve of the community all the 
while concealing the most critical factor—the collective stupor to its operation. 
From the structural perspective, then, these stories indicate that ha’adam is an entity 
destined to destruction brought on by his own internal crisis, but finding its resolve in a 
surgical expulsion.  It is one that must be performed without the victim‘s awareness.  Just 
as in a rite of passage, the initiate is made to represent the community in a sacrificial 
crisis.  He (they) is destined to self-destruction unless a substitute is supplied.  The 
initiate internalizes the community‘s sacrificial crisis so as to also comprehend the 
community‘s sacrificial solution.  In the moment a surrogate victim is ‗discovered,‘ the 
once potential victim transforms into a member of the sacrificing community.  The 
sacrifice becomes the sacrificer.   
                                                 
82
 The deep sleep in these stories may function similarly to the Lord ‗hardening Pharaoh‘s heart‘.  
83
 Says Girard (1972:269): ‗Ritual sacrifice is defined as an inexact imitation of the generative act.‘ 
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The community is ‗relieved‘ because an expulsion has occurred from its midst.  This is 
standard sacrificial fair, but what follows takes a decidedly different tack.  In the peculiar 
sacrifice of Yahweh Elohim, the victim experiences a transformation that diverges from 
acquiescence to the sacrificial mechanism.  Yes, the community is spared by a sacrifice, 
but in a similar way as Saul, he is humbled or humiliated in the process.   By the taking of 
his ‗vital force,‘ his ‗side,‘ he survives becoming a sacrificial victim. His very survival, 
however, now reminds him of rather than camouflages the precarious nature of sacrificial 
resolve.  This kind of sacrifice reveals the community‘s inability to resolve its own 
violent resolutions.   
God takes from ha’adam’s side.  The word elu in its feminine form is often translated 
side or rib, and it is used in reference to the supporting side elements of a structure (1 
Kings 6:15).  Of significance, however, is the verb form which means to stumble or 
limp.
84
  Thus, Jacob is incapacitated by a dislocated hip. Girard (1968:69) considers the 
limp of Oedipus significant in scapegoat terms: ‗The symbolism of limping…introduces 
mediation between the symmetry and the dissymmetry.‘   Essentially, the limp becomes a 
prime signifier of something ‗out of place‘ or ‗out of wack,‘ a cause for suspicion that 
something or someone does not belong.  The male noun form, tzela, denotes calamity, 
stumbling, or ruin.
85
 
This sense that a radical surgical operation is further accentuated in that after the ‗side‘ of 
ha’adam is removed, ‗flesh closed up underneath it.‘  Several features of this phrase bear 
on the discussion so far.  For one, since no preposition is attached to flesh, basar, it is 
best to understand flesh as the subject of the ‗closing‘ action.  It is flesh that ‗shuts in.‘86   
Second, the adverbial expression plays a dual function.  Tachtenu, from txt, is a loaded 
sacrificial term, for in Genesis it is used in a clear surrogate sense.  Seth is born ‗in the 
place of‘ Abel (Gen. 4:25), and a ram is used ‗instead of Isaac‘ (Gen. 22:19).  We should 
                                                 
84
 BDB (854) considers a possible root idea of ‗deviate‘ or ‗curve‘.   
85
 Westermann (1974:230) suggests that an ancient practice of making figurines began with the use of a 
bone or piece of word in which to form a clay figure around.  
86
 BDB 688 Cassuto (1978:134) suggests that the subject of the action could go either way.  What probably 
should be more noticed is the ambiguity in the subject of the action.  This speaks more to the mysterious 
congealing of the crowd, its unanimous acquiescence with the will of the sacred and the ability of the 
community to quickly close back up after the expulsion of the victim.  
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not fail to notice that it is instead of a son.  The same surrogate sense is carried over into 
the legal codes as recompense for injury (Deut. 21:23ff).
87
  The closed up flesh 
substitutes for the loss of ‗side,‘ and spares ha’adam in the same way as the ram spared 
Isaac.  In a broader sense within the Genesis narrative, Adam‘s life is spared by Seth and 
Abraham‘s by the ram.88  But also, if we venture to stick to the most fundamental 
meaning of tachat, as underneath,
89
  then it also points to the emergence of the male 
genitals.  One of several denotations of basar has euphemistic references to the ‗male 
organ of generation.‘90   A periphrastic reference to circumcision may be in view since 
fruit is the primary metaphoric exchange with it.  Both the partaking of fruit and 
circumcision speak of the uncovering (peeling) back of flesh in order to get at the ‗flesh‘ 
or seed.
91
   
The thrice repeated ‗flesh,‘ rsb, in this tight pericope (Gen. 2:21-24) plays a critical role 
and is operating on several levels.  For one, from the loss of side, ha’adam becomes 
distinctly male.  The crisis of ha’adam finds its resolve in the splitting off of ‗side,‘ 
whereupon distinctions, such as sexual identity, immediately form ‗in its place.‘   
Here, in my view, is a radical alteration to the conventional sacrificial procedure, for the 
body to which the victim is expelled does not come away unscathed.  Goodhart (2007:61) 
argues from rabbinic tradition that ha’adam was hermaphroditic, a uni-gendered, two-
sided being.  The emphasis being that ha’adam was literally split in two and both sides 
significantly altered.  Cassuto (1978:134) also stress that it was both flesh and bone that 
was taken from ha’adam.  It was not a mild operation.  Unlike the mythical stories, such 
as Enuma Elish, where the new part of the natural world emerges from the excarnated 
corpse, here two significant differences are pronounced.  The sacrificial victim survives, 
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 Gen 44:33, Joshua 2:14 
88
 Girard (1972:102) provides a definitive picture of the original ritual surrogate victim who ‗passes 
unperceived, as the substitution of one member of the community for all, brought about through the 
operation of the surrogate victim, and…comes from inside the community.‘ 
89
 BDB 1065 
90
 BDB 142, Gen. 17:11, 14, Ex. 28:42 
91
 Lev 19:23-25 calls newly planted trees as ‗uncircumcised‘ ‘rl.  It is clear that it means that the seed of 
the tree (fruit) is not eaten.  This could mean that it is ‗unpeeled.‘  NJB calls it ‗forbidden.‘  But a 
‗uncircumcised‘ tree is one which one cannot satisfy one‘s hunger, indulge.  
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and the body carries the ‗wound‘ of its own sacrificial necessity.92  In Gen. 2:21, the first 
of three mentions of ‗flesh,‘ rsb, in rapid succession act in the same way as the 
description here—it closes in on itself.  The flesh that was taken out returns or ‗closes in 
on itself‘ in Gen. 2:24 as ‗one flesh.‘  In exogamic exchange, this is precisely what each 
tribe is able to do after the exchange, close in on itself.
93
  It is a picture of the sacrificial 
resolve. The thrice repetition of ‗flesh,‘ however, reminds the audience of the sacrificial 
cost, for basar is the preferred word in sacrificial description and in reminders of the 
frailty of human existence (Gen 6:3, Ps 56:5).   
Ha’adam’s internal crisis destined him to his own destruction unless an intervention 
occurred.  This crisis is relieved in classic sacrificial terms by the expulsion of a victim.  
In one sense, then, this narrative is structured along Girard‘s (1972:131) notion of the 
mythical structure.  Primarily, a god clandestinely dismembers the victim without 
instruments or weaponry, with his bare hands as it were.  The community is spared in the 
process and distinctions, which if maintained can prevent a future crisis, are established.  
But already, something is amiss.  The community is confronted with the ‗price‘ of its 
own sacrificial necessity.  Ha’adam now lives with the reminder in his flesh of the frailty 
of his own existence and of his own inability to resolve a core problem of his own being.  
The community is made keenly aware of its own violent resolve; Ha’adam is victimized 
by it.  There is a duality to the sacrifice, and in this regard, there is a significant 
difference from the typical (in a Girardian sense) scapegoat mechanism.  The sacrificial 
community is victimized and yet survives, significantly altered albeit.  As in the story of 
David‘s clandestine mission with Saul, a piece of the victim is ‗taken,‘ but the victim 
survives with a much more humble posture than before because the elements of his vital 
force are presented to him. The community has been scandalized by its own sacrificial act 
because it carries the reminder ‗in the flesh.‘  
6.5.3 The sacrifice of ishah.  The true radical turn, however, occurs when the victim 
emerging from the sacrifice, the side, is also significantly altered.  It is not permanently 
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 Hence the structure is similar to the expulsion narratives of Exodus and Abraham discussed in chapter 4 
above.   There is a sparing of both the sacrificial community and the victim.  
93
 Agreeing with Levi-Strauss, Girard (1972:230) asserts that the exchange of women is primarily to ward 
of the internal male rivalries within each community by exchanging (expelling) the women closest to them.  
Thus, upon exchange, each community ‗always closes itself‘ having resolved an internal tension.   
Chapter 6 – Crisis and Resolve in Genesis 2 289 
 
289 
 
discarded; in fact, it never leaves the community.  It becomes a co-respondent.  Unlike 
the animals, she is a ‗desiring being.‘  The victim does not function as either being 
previously malevolent, and now completely benevolent.  It does not stand over or outside 
the sacrificial scene, but returns to the now wounded community.  The two become one 
flesh because both have experienced victimization and survived. 
God now builds the side (Gen 2:22) that he had taken from the critically altered earthling.  
Significantly, none of the previous verbs such as fashion, make, or create are chosen to 
describe God‘s action.  The verb, hnb, best denotes construction or rebuilding of 
structures but is commonly used to describe the creation of humans in the Ancient Near 
East (Cassuto, 1978:134).  God restructures the side, which He had taken from ha’adam, 
into ishah, woman.  At first glance there is nothing too telling of such actions.  After all, 
it is classic mythic fair that the dismembered portions of a victim transform into common 
objects of the natural world.  The proceeding verse, however, indicates that in this act, the 
departure from conventional mythic resolve becomes even more pronounced.  For not 
only has the community been altered by the sacrifice provided by Yahweh, the expelled 
victim assumes a different role.  
Coming from the basic verb, sna, ishah has a variety of interrelated meanings.  At its 
root, it appears to have something to do with being chronically weak, sick, or critically 
wounded, but it may have milder denotations such as to be soft, delicate, or congenial.
94
  
The masculine form, enosh, refers to humanity, humankind, or the commoner. The 
feminine noun can refer to a woman, a wife, or simply the female gender. Goodhart 
(2007:65) argues that the critical factor of ishah is that she is taken from ha’adam, and 
that she precedes iysh, man or husband.  Ha’adam exclaims that ishah was taken from 
iysh, but these names come from different roots.  Cassuto (1978:136) explains the man‘s 
confusion of origins is a simple play on words, but again, the ambiguity intentionally 
emphasizes a struggle to understand something profound.    
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 BDB 60-61 Severe wounds, of course, must be treated tenderly.  
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What was taken out was now brought to ha’adam,95 this time meeting with his seeming 
approval.  It is ha’adam who finds ishah adequate.  Ha’adam’s response, however, 
indicates deep ambiguity, perhaps even shock, as we might imagine a victim of a 
sacrificial act returning to those who eliminated it.  Conventionally, victims return to the 
community as gods or goddesses who mediate between the community and the sacred 
realm, but not as bone and flesh, in other words not confronting the community with the 
reality that the victim was in all ways one of them, a nagid who stands in front of the 
other.  The thrice repeated demonstrative in Gen 2:23, this or this one, emphasizes a 
singling out especially in a contemptuous or derogatory way
96
 as if to question, doubt, or 
even spurn it.  This sense may be in regard to the elongated process,
97
 rather than directly 
at ishah; even so, it would reflect a kind of exasperation towards God.  In a sense, 
ha’adam’s response is something like: This is it?  This will save me?  One thing for 
certain, however, the author places total emphasis on ha’adam’s response. As the 
narrative goes, this is the critical point.  Only ha’adam can come to a resolution to his 
state of being alone in his isolation. 
In sacrificial terms, however, the ‗return‘ of the victim, not as a deity and a master of the 
sacred, one of the sacred community who knows good and evil would be shocking.   It 
would truly represent a threat to the sacrificial system itself.   It is the community being 
confronted with its own violent resolve.  Confrontation with the victim undermines the 
ability for the sacrificial mechanism to operate, so ha’adam’s response is to doubt it 
completely.  A living victim returning to the community would destroy community, not 
save it!  But ha’adam has also been illumined, for now he sees clearly that the victim is 
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 The interchange of the verbs taken, xql, and brought, awb, plays critical roles in Exodus.  Although 
Pharaoh expels the Israelites (oddly against his will), it is God who ‗brought them out of Egypt.‘  In this 
passage, the emphasis should be on returned and presented.  That which has been taken out has been 
returned.  
96
 See BDB 260—the contemptuous connotation is especially prominent with ta—Gen 5:29, 12:12, 1 Sam 
10:27, 16:9, 21:16.   My reading here is admittedly against the grain. Gunkel, Von Rad, and Westermann 
see the ta as a near euphoric affirmation, but even Westerman (1974:232) resists the notion that sexual 
love is the overriding concern.  He provides the examples of the more positive connotations to ta; 
nonetheless, I see nothing in the passage that requires that kind of connotation to be assumed here.  Cassuto 
(1978:135) correctly asserts that in Hebrew, it is simply ‗this—the female.‘  All are in agreement, however, 
that the thrice repeated demonstrative heightens the climax of the story.  
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 The noun, , mep, especially with the definite article expresses a certain exasperation over a process that 
has difficulty finding a satisfactory conclusion, as in the story of Rachael and Leah  (Gen 29:34,35).  
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not substantially different from him, proclaiming instead ‗bone of my bone and flesh of 
my flesh.‘  Indeed, he carries the reminder underneath him. 
Both bone, Mue, and flesh, rsb, denote the whole person including the whole physical 
body. Both are referenced as the seat of human emotional and physical pain (Ps 6:3), and 
this may also be significant since, as I advocate below, iysh and ishah bear the reminders 
of a sacrificial act.
98
  Bone can denote more the strength, substance, and energy of a 
person whereas flesh denotes more the personal expression of a person and is a way to 
refer reflexively to oneself.
99
  When bone and flesh are found in the same phrase (always 
in that order) it commonly references consanguinity.
100
  Here is a return to the same 
concern as Genesis 1 for creatures ‗of the same kind.‘  The same sense is retained even 
when bone is dropped.  The emphasis lies in that the woman is of the same substance as 
the man.  This declaration, then, works against the community‘s fundament ability to 
expel the victim since it relies on the distortion of the victim.  The victim must be viewed 
as a monster, a goddess, an alien, a terrorist, demon, or hero.  It must appear substantially 
different than the community; otherwise, it cannot be successfully expelled.  It must not 
appear human.  
This victim of ha’adam’s crisis who ‗faces‘ him as one alive and of the same substance 
and displaying the same wound of sacrificial necessity as him, is called ishah by 
ha’adam.  In the pronouncement, however, ha’adam also significantly alters his own 
identity.  He is now iysh, man or husband.  Goodhart (2007:67) is incorrect in his 
assessment that ha’adam’s pronouncement is misguided and misleading, for ishah, he 
asserts, came from ha’adam not iysh.  For one, Genesis 3 does not sufficiently maintain a 
distinction between ha’adam and iysh.  More importantly, however, Goodhart 
underestimates the profound revelation coming upon a once conflicted entity.  In a sense, 
iysh has no recollection of the sacrificial resolve.  He was after all in a stupor.  He can 
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 Again, the correspondence between the ‗building‘ of the woman and the making of figurines may be 
more than casual.  Westermann (1974:30) reminds that these figurines so commonplace in the Lavant were 
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 Cassuto (1978:135).  Even though  ‗blood relations‘ is the emphasis with this phrase, the idea of full 
humanness is always present.  Certainly, all of us experience the fullest range of human encounter, both 
good and bad, in the context of familial community.   Many intentional Christian communities incorporate 
the family as a dominant metaphor to define who they are.  This, of course, derives from the words of Jesus 
and the New Testament.  
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now only speak from his known condition as flesh and bone, as one who carries in his 
flesh the wound of his own violent resolve.  
In the above scenario there are several characteristics common in rites of male passage 
which according to Girard (1972:286ff) indicate an origin in a scapegoat murder. In this, 
it becomes clear the kind of duality of ha’adam in sacrificial terms.  The initiated enters a 
dangerous time of undifferentiation reflecting his real ambiguous status in the 
community.  Often, they are sent alone into the place of desolation and exposed to danger 
often times proceeded by an act of disorientation.  In essence, he experiences the 
dangerous environment of undifferentiation, the savage realm of the sacred and of 
unresolved rivalry.  He acts as a victim prepared for slaughter whereupon a surrogate 
victim is supplied.  There is dismemberment, a diasparagmos.  Often this can be a 
symbolic object appearing to be surgically removed from the victim.  This surrogate 
object becomes the ‗final expulsion.‘  Of significance, the initiate plays all the roles at 
once.  Girard (1972:287) states: ‗The extracted object…plays the part of the actual 
surrogate victim, whereas the human organism, fully mobilized against the invader, takes 
the part of the collectivity.‘  Finally, the neophyte returns to the community significantly 
altered.  His identity is no longer dangerously ambiguous, and he now understands in an 
experiential way the toxic realm of rivalry, where good and evil are congealed and 
violent death is its only resolve.  Most of all, he is educated as to the fundamental 
necessity of the sacrificial mechanism.  
There are intriguing differences from the ritual pattern described above as it is presented 
in Genesis 2.  Of paramount importance is that the surrogate victim is not destroyed; 
there is no ‗final expulsion.‘  Instead, the man is confronted by a victim who not only 
survives the collective violence against her but also unveils one of the fundamental 
misconceptions of a sacrificial victim, that of being foreign or outside the group.  No, it is 
the man (community) who in a moment of appalling revelation pronounces, ‗She is one 
of us.‘101  ‗We exposed one of our own to our own violence.‘  In this way, the victim does 
bring resolve to the community, but now with an unsettling knowledge of its own 
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violence.  The process, which Girard reminds is built on misconception, is exposed.  The 
community discovers that the demand for the expulsion of a victim comes from its own 
inability to resolve its own crisis and that the sacrificial resolve is injurious to all.  
Finally, it is Yahweh Elohim who leads them to that discovery by His unique sacrificial 
offering.    
Not only is there a revelation of both victim and sacrificial community, there is also a 
revelation of a different kind of god.  As mentioned above, in some ways Yahweh 
Elohim acts similarly to stereotypical sacrificing deities.  But in Genesis 2, there is not 
the slightest trace of spontaneity, chance, ambiguity or destiny to God‘s act.  There is no 
trickery or magic involved, all of which are often characteristic features in a mythical 
sacrificial structure.
102
  The will of the collective is diffused.   God moves through the 
sequences with meticulous and deliberate force.  All involved in the narrative—iysh, 
ishah, the author/theologian, and the listening community—are caused to understand that 
the choice of the victim was not arbitrary.  It was not by chance, happenstance, or 
destiny.  No, the intentional sacrificial provision of Yahweh Elohim powerfully confronts 
the community with stinging reminders.  For one, this sacrificial sequence does not 
coincide with an act of revenge that will appease an angry god.  The closest implied 
passion displayed by Yahweh Elohim is for ha’adam to desire Life.  The sacrificial crisis 
is not a crisis on God‘s part; it‘s a product of mankind.103  Also, only in the sacrifice that 
God provides can one hope to find a true resolve to human violence.  Critically, in the 
sacrificial intervention of Yahweh, no one dies, the sacrificial resolve and the 
misconception that makes it operate are exposed, and it is completely out of the hands of 
men.  Ha’adam is involved in the sacrificial sequence but sacrifices nothing. 
6.5.4 The outcome of the ‘counter-sacrifice’—one flesh: Gen 2:24.   This last point 
sheds light on the baffling statement of Gen 2:24.  As mentioned earlier this statement is 
presented as a matter of fact, a custom, but whose?
104
  The logic, it seems, is reversed, for 
                                                 
102
 Girard (1972: 310ff) 
103
 Something similar may be in play in Exodus, where God is said to have only ‗taken notice‘ of Israelite 
suffering well into the crisis (Ex 2:25).  God‘s apparent aloofness is employed to emphasize that the crisis 
does not originate in God.  
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it should establish why a woman leaves her family in typical exogamic exchange.  But 
this is not the case.  It is iysh, and not the women who leaves.   
Certainly in the context of Genesis, the pattern of the man leaving his father and mother 
is played out with each patriarch, but leavings also provide critical junctures in the stories 
of Adam and Eve, Cain, Noah, and Babel.
105
  This, of course, may simply be a way to 
explain the peculiar practice of the Hebrews.  The man‘s leaving, however, has clear 
expulsion overtones. Azav, bze, conveys the sense of abandon, forsake, desert or even 
apostasize.
106
  It speaks of a master abandoning (to die) a slave (1 Sam 30:13), soldiers 
deserting the ranks (Josh 22:3), children and wives being abandoned (Jer 49:11, Isa. 
54:7), and even Yahweh abandoning Zion (Isa 54:7).  It speaks of a complete reversal of 
natural relationships.  In this case, the mentioning of father and mother indicates the 
collective nature of his action. Iysh must abandon the community and embrace the 
expelled one.  Yet again, there is a departure from a typical rite of passage.  The initiate 
does not go out to taste the sacred realm only to return to the sacrificial community, 
having accepted the surrogate victim in his stead.  The man does not return to the 
sacrificial community understanding sacrificial necessity and embracing its 
misconception.  There is a double-sidedness to this action, for azav can refer to the 
community who abandons its victim or it can refer to the victim being abandoned.  But 
the fundamental issue is that of return.  How does the expelled one return?  In what state 
is he transformed?   
Man‘s leaving imitates an expulsion of a victim, as is typical of rites of passage.  The 
man must enter into the same experience as ishah, but here is a radical departure from the 
structural pattern—he now clings or clutches on to her.  He embraces or identifies with 
her as one who was expelled from the community in crisis, and yet survives.  He attaches 
himself to the expelled one, not the expelling one.  He abandons the old or original 
ha’adam, the one caught up in reciprocal rivalries and requiring sacrificial resolve.  This 
verse, then, speaks far beyond a commitment to marriage fidelity.  It speaks 
fundamentally of a vision of Israel.  Israel is one who by profoundly understanding the 
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cost of sacrificial resolve has abandoned ‗father and mother.‘  Israel has apostacized from 
the ways of the nations and is clinging to a different version of humanity based on a 
profound insight into humanity‘s long-held notions of violent peacemaking.107    
This verse critically structures the narratives in Genesis that are set in motion by 
departures, for Genesis presents the question repeatedly—what becomes of a man once 
he leaves?
108
  Does he return only as a mirrored image of what he deserted?  To play the 
opposite role, one of a rival, is essential to maintaining the symmetry of the mythical 
structure.  Most of the narratives in Genesis are first launched by a departure, Adam and 
Eve from the garden, Cain from the ‗Presence of the Lord,‘ Noah from the people, Shem, 
Ham and Japheth from Noah, the people from Babel, Abram from Haran and his father, 
and so forth.   In each case, the author presents the question: What will he do?  Will he do 
as Girard (1965: 28) says Oedipus does? ‗Driven by the same desire, the two men 
[Oedipus and his father, Laius] are constantly headed toward the same violence.‘  Does 
his leaving only signal the beginning of his return, like the initiate in a rite of passage?  
Does it signal the beginning of incorporation into the sacrificial community?  Or will the 
man‘s leaving lead him to a revelation of who he is, the fundamental flaw in sacrifice, 
and a different understanding of human and divine relations?  Perhaps the rite of 
circumcision signals precisely such a notion.  
Leavings are typical of mythic structures as well, but the leaving only sets in motion a 
powerful drive to return from whence it came.  Again, the effectiveness of the sacrificial 
mechanism is in its efficient ability to close itself up after an expulsion.  For instance, 
Oedipus‘ flight from his second father and mother in Corinth, only drives him toward a 
direct encounter on the road with his first father, Laius.  Girard (1965:30) comments: 
‗Every man, when he leaves his father and mother, goes towards his father whom he will 
kill and towards his mother whom he will marry.‘  Girard (1965:31) argues that Oedipus‘ 
leaving signals the circularity of myth.  To use the language of our text here, it closes 
itself up.  ‗The structure reverses itself at the moment the son flees.  The circularity of the 
myth turns on perpetual reversals.‘  A similar scenario is played out in the case of Cain. 
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Rather than embrace the mark of Yahweh‘s protection he seeks to return to a sense of 
landedness.  He builds a city, and from there, the cycle of violence flourishes.  The ‗leave 
and cleave‘ formula of Gen 2:24 is a direct rebuttal to the mythical sacrificial structure.  
It abruptly derails myth‘s sacrificial circularity, by calling on the man to not return to the 
community who thrives on the scapegoat mechanism.  It calls him to forge a new 
community, ‗one flesh.‘ 
 The closing lines of Genesis 2 impose a theological commentary on this question of 
leaving.
109
  It is not only a question, but an assertion, a vision.  It addresses both the 
expelling community and the one being expelled, and assuredly, Genesis is constantly 
concerned with both.  It calls on the man to ‗cleave‘ to the rejected one, the one who 
caused him to realize that the violent resolve of his own desires is grievous.  It calls on 
the man to abandon the sacrificial community and not return to it.  Instead, the man must 
embrace the reality that the victim of his own internal conflict is substantially like 
himself, and therefore cannot be discarded.  In this leaving and cleaving, a new flesh, one 
flesh jettisons a different order altogether.  
 
6.5 Naked without Shame – the precarious vision of a covenant community    
The closing statement (Gen 2:25) pictures a paradisiacal resolve similar to the Sabbath 
day that closes off Genesis 1.  It envisions a sense of completeness, wholeness, and 
rest.
110
  A new reciprocity is established, one that carries the reminder of the violent 
resolve of ha’adam.  This is what is radically altered and is acknowledged.  The two—the 
crowd who because of a sacrificial crisis needed a sacrificial solution, and the victim who 
returns—now become one flesh.  One flesh is a restored, but radically altered ha’adam.  
Ha’adam is now iysh (the one who carries in his body the wound of his own sacrificial 
necessity) and ishah (the one expelled but now returned, not as divine but one revealing 
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true humanness).  Together they live out the faultiness of the sacrificial system and 
choose life instead of death.  They are ‗naked without shame.‘ 
There is a surprising lack of investigation from commentaries into the phrase ‗naked 
without shame,‘ most of which focuses on a childlike innocence driven by inquiries into 
guilt and its connection with sexuality.
111
  There are several key concerns from the text 
that must bear on the understanding here.  The set up of the ‗lusty trees,‘ as expounded 
above, demonstrates that desire is a key concern of this passage.  What Girard (1965:30) 
says of the Oedipus myth could easily apply here as well: ‗There is nothing in the myth 
that is not governed by it [the dialectic of desire].‘  Correspondingly, this verse is 
intended in some sense to not only resolve the fundamental crisis of ha’adam’s ‗not 
good‘ isolation especially as it relates to the direction of desire, but also complete the 
setting of distinctions set in motion by Yahweh‘s initial sacrificial act (Gen 2:7).  It is as 
it were the good situation.  In this respect, chapter 2 ends similarly to chapter 1, with a 
picture of completion, wholeness, rest, and resolve.  It imagines a new, covenantal 
community based on a profound shift in sacrificial structures. 
6.6.1 Naked: the dual nature of desire.   The verse also sets up the scenario of 
Chapter 3.  There is a loosely chiastic arrangement to chapters 2 and 3 and this verse 
stands as the ballast or fulcrum.
112
  The critical elements in chapter two are reversed in 
chapter three, returning ha’adam, as it were, to a crisis with the ground once more.  
Several connections with nakedness and shame elaborated in chapter 3 come into play.  
The ‗shrewdness,‘ Mwre, of the snake in 3:1 and the word play with the naked, Mymwre, 
state of the couple is one of several connections with chapter 3, along with the 
relationship of nakedness with ‗open eyes,‘ the ‗clothing‘ or covering of their nakedness, 
the hiding from Yahweh, the acquisitive desire to be like God in knowing good and evil, 
and the return of enmity.  All of this, of course, is entwined with shame, swb, and 
interestingly, an investigation into both naked and shame reveal close associations with 
most of these variables in the scenario. As with ritual and sacrifice, the text is functioning 
on multiple levels.  
                                                 
111
 Arnold 2009:61 
112
 Even though Westermann (1974:234-236) asserts this, he exemplifies the surprising lack of attention to 
the words ‗naked without shame‘ typical of commentators.   
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The word naked, arummim is derived from the root rwe to which there are three basic 
denotations.
113
  Each one creates a possible connection with this passage and with each 
other.  In the piel, ‗awar, means to make blind.114  This has a ready association with 
gouging out the eye, a common punishment for conquered kings. It may otherwise be 
connected with another denotation, skin.  Hence one becomes blind from skin covering 
the eyes, cataracts. Another derivative means to arouse, awaken, incite, or agitate.  It is 
associated with the full expression of passions both good (love) and bad (enmity, strife, 
anger).  As has been the case with many words examined, the duality of the word carries 
vestigial traces of the sacred.  The final denotation is apparently related to the idea of 
arousal or agitation.  It is to be exposed or laid bare, stripped.   Here too is a connection 
with skin, and it has horrific reminders from the exile in which the golah, hlg, are 
stripped and shorn in an act of utter humiliation.   
Most surprising in this is what little associations rwe and its denotations have with 
references to sexuality, especially compared to the vast majority of references to war, 
strife, enmity, humiliation, and poverty.  It has strong covenantal connotations, for Israel 
should be aroused and awakened to responsiveness to God (Isa. 64:7, Ps 57:8).  In final 
gasps of exasperation due to Israel‘s despondency, Yahweh is provoked into stirring up 
the nations against Israel and Jerusalem (1 Chron. 5:26, Ez. 23:22), yet He also inspired 
Cyrus to return the exiles (2 Chron. 36:22) and stirred the exiles up for the endeavor (Joel 
3:7).  It is also a preferred word in personal appeals on the part of the pious for God to 
awaken and respond to the penitents cry.  In this regard, the pious especially appeal for 
Yahweh to deliver from disaster (Ps.44:23, 59:4).   rwe is the preferred word for expected 
responsiveness in a covenant relationship.  Significantly, it is mostly an exilic word, 
reflecting on the disaster at Zion.  
The word ‘ur used in Gen. 2:25 derives from the basic denotation to lay bare or to 
expose.
115
  Even when the more literal understanding of being unclothed is present in 
biblical use, figurative associations are still often present, such as in the case of Noah‘s 
nakedness and the response of his sons (Gen. 9:20-26).  Again, it bears strong covenant 
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associations especially where a breach of the covenant exposes one to open accusation.    
In this sense, to be naked means to stand before an accuser with no defense.  It is a 
preferred word to speak of Judah‘s wanton breach of the covenant (Ez. 16:7ff, 23:29ff).  
Similarly literal nakedness still has close associations with being stripped of privilege, 
wealth, security, and even life.  Thus its interplay with the literal stripping of exiles is 
strong indeed (Isa. 20:1ff).  Exiles or ‗the stripped ones‘ (golah), are nearly synonymous 
with ‘ur in this sense. 
In the more priestly codes, nakedness is nearly equivalent to the marriage union.
116
  Here 
is the curious construction that to have an incestuous sexual relationship is to ‗uncover‘ 
(golah) the nakedness (‘ur) of both partners.  Lev. 18:6ff is significant because 
uncovering nakedness of his flesh is the equivalent of saying incestuous sexual 
relationships. Along with Lev. 20:11, this phrase only refers to incestuous relationships 
(Lev. 20:10 does not use the phrase when speaking of committing adultery).  In this 
sense, then, I would venture to agree with Girard (1972:219ff) that the marriage is itself a 
sacrificial entity.  It barely legitimizes sexual relationships, and at its core is still 
‗covered‘ or hidden from the community.  At the core of the marriage, then, is conceded 
a fundamental weakness, one that is held together by sacrifice.  Kinship marriage 
arrangements are keenly aware of the potential for violent rivalries to erupt, both within a 
group and between groups, if the exchange of women is not meticulously arranged.  
Contrary to much contemporary myth, I agree with Girard that sexuality and violence are 
inextricably linked.   
A final denotation, ‘or, refers to literal skin.  Here, oddly enough, it prominently 
references skin as a covering or clothing of the body (flesh).  To remind, skin covers the 
flesh as dust covers the earth.  Violation of the skin (Mic 3:2 and perhaps the concern in 
Leviticus to ‗atone‘ for skin disease and mold in a house) is indicative of a violation to 
the person.   The hides of animals are one of the primary materials to cover items.  It 
clothes the flesh, so in a sense, the couples nakedness means that they were ‗covered‘ in 
skin.  It is this covering that allows the bone and flesh, the substance of the body, to be 
expressed. 
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There is, then, a double meaning to nakedness here, for in one clear sense, it means ‗to be 
skinned‘—stripped, exposed, or uncovered.   In another sense, it means ‗to be skinned‘—
having a covering for the flesh.  This double play is remarkably similar to the precarious 
nature of desire, both revealing and hiding or covering.   This double sense is at play here 
especially because of the placement next to shame.   
6.6.2 Absence of Shame: the end of scapegoating.  In every way, swb carries the 
primary idea of being targeted by a community.  It is a scapegoat term.  Found mainly in 
Isaiah and Jeremiah, it is ‗often in parallel with kalam ‗to be humiliated,‘ and less 
frequently with hatat ‗to be shattered or dismayed.‘  The direction of the word rarely is 
used in an internal sense of feeling guilty or remorseful, but rather as an external reality 
of being publicly or openly disgraced.
117
  Its primary reference is of a targeted individual 
or group who has been singled out for communal retribution.
118
  The internal emotions 
associated with shame or being ashamed such as confusion, shock, horror, surprise, 
consternation, remorse, awkwardness, and so forth are connotations from bosh, but all of 
these are derived from the primary sense of the external reality of being publicly 
humiliated.  In other words, it is a loaded scapegoat term and signals victimization in 
every way.  
Using a phrase similar to Gen 2:25, Mic 1:8, 11 speak of being ‗naked in shame.‘ It 
directly references the exile, literally being stripped, humiliated, and violated.  This 
passage is significant because it is also in connection with the land being ‗stripped‘ and 
bare;
119
 that is, it returns to a land of barrenness, the desert.
120
  It is a return to the savage 
sacred realm, the land of desolation.  The literal stripping of exiles becomes the 
paramount symbol for the prophets (Mic.1:8, Isa 20:2ff, Ez 16).  It becomes evident that 
the lines between the literal and the figurative use of nakedness are blurred.  
As with nakedness, shame also has a double sense as in the common construction of 
being ‗clothed‘ or ‗covered‘ in shame.  In Ps 44:16, a covering of shame equates to being 
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a lone individual in the face of a taunting crowd.  This sense, as Schwager (1978:92-93) 
reminds is a dominant theme in the Psalms where 100 out of the 150 Psalms address the 
torment of enemies.  Oddly then, the duplicity in the words signals the duplicity of the 
sacrificial mechanism, for to be naked, bare, uncovered, or exposed is to be clothed or 
covered in shame.  Daniel 9:7, 8 speak of ‗faces of shame‘ implying a kind of mask that 
is worn.  Importantly, the shame that is put on the face is directly associated with a 
complete lack of covenant response and in contrast to Yahweh‘s righteousness.  In this 
case, to have a ‗face of shame‘ is to visibly acknowledge the truthfulness of the 
accusation.  It is to be found out, exposed. 
Bosh carries a strong causative sense to it, to be put to shame or to bring shame upon 
oneself, which again points back to the origin of shame—the crowd.121  Gen 2:25 is the 
only time it is found in the hithpolel, making it both causative and reflective; hence, they 
did not cause shame to each other.  Thrice within this line is the emphasis on reciprocity.  
‗Both of them were naked, the man and the woman, and they did not cause shame to each 
other.‘ Acquisitive desire that leads to rivalry appears to be addressed here.  It is in their 
open, unveiled responsiveness to each other that enables them to ‗eat of every desirable 
tree‘ and avoid the fruit of knowing good and evil.  In other words, they can partake of 
life and not death.  They can openly express and direct their desire toward Life and be co-
respondents without rivalry.  They can mutually express and fulfill desire without 
imitating or looking for clues from the other.   
This is quite significant in terms of mimetic desire.  One would be hard pressed to find a 
better way to emphatically negate the ‗circularity of myth‘ or the scapegoat mechanism.  
It is as it were a picture of paradise—full expression of desire, open without accusation, 
without rivalry, without viewing the other as possessing or being the object of one‘s own 
desire.  The violent reciprocity is replaced by a reciprocity of humility mainly because 
both parties bear in the flesh the wound or reminder of sacrifice.  Both carry the reminder 
of the community‘s inability to resolve its own conflicting desires without resorting to 
sacrificial victims.  
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6.6.3 Wisdom and the precarious nature of nakedness.  A final consideration is the 
word play between the nakedness of the couple, Mymwre in Gen 2:25 and the ‗craftiness,‘ 
Mwre, of the serpent in Gen 3:1.  As far as the latter, it comes from the root Mre, and it 
primarily means to be stripped.  Aram mainly references a stripped or barkless tree (Gen 
30:37, Ez. 31:8), but in 2 Chron 28:16, it refers to stripped exiles.
122
  It is only once found 
in the verb form referring to heaping up of the waters at the Reed Sea (Ex 15:8); 
otherwise, its noun form refers to a pile or heap.  It does have some connection to ‗strip‘ 
in that the mound is considered exposed.  In other words, it is a bare, uncovered heap like 
a mound of grain (Ruth 3:7), a ruined city (Jer 50:26), or a trash pile.  Nehemiah 3:34 
speaks of the ruined temple.  Interestingly, the taunter calls it a heap of ‗dust‘ rpe. 
The pertinent point to the above is its relatedness to naked.  As far as its use in Gen 3:1, it 
of course means shrewd or crafty.  It is mostly found in wisdom literature where it holds 
a double sense.  Similar to the sense in Gen 3:1 is the notion of crafty, wily, clever, or 
shrewd (Jb 5:12; 15:5).  It is viewed negatively in the sense of the common psalmist 
complaint about people plotting one‘s demise, conspiring.  The positive sense is restricted 
to the use in Proverbs where it conveys the idea of prudent or sensible.  Curiously, it is 
mentioned in Proverbs 12:23 with covering (kasha) or concealing and always in 
connection with knowledge and understanding (Prov 13:16, 14:8).  The non-wisdom uses 
are rare.  It can mean premeditated murder (Ex 21:14) or to connive as in the case of  the 
Gibeonites who tricked Joshua into thinking they were foreigners and not inhabitants of 
the land in order to avoid annihilation (Josh 9:4).  As with our two words, naked and 
shame, so the craftiness of the serpent holds a double sense.  Its primary sense is to 
expose or strip away the essence of something from the non-essential, yet simultaneously, 
it strongly suggests a kind of toying with what is concealed and what is exposed.  If 
wisdom is associated with the snake‘s ability to shed its skin and skin is associated with 
the expression of the human body, we may surmise that wisdom and its counter-part, 
conspire, can connote a sense of hiding and concealing simultaneously.  Like a slick 
salesman, wisdom can turn on and off its persona as the situation deems necessary.  It 
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 BDB 790 surmises from the Arabic that it describes the stripping of meat off of bones or of leaves or 
bark from a tree by animals.  Westermann (1974:238) connects the snake‘s ability to shed its skin with 
craftiness. 
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strongly implies a sense of command over the dynamics of a situation.  It suggests a 
hubristic knowledge that confidently controls what is exposed and what remains hidden, 
and this especially applies to desire.  Once again the symmetry of the sacred is found in 
the duality of meaning. 
Cassuto‘s (1978:142) explanation of Gen 3:1 further lends to the notion of duality, for he 
argues that in the end, the voice of the snake is simply the alternative voice of the woman 
herself.  The difference between the nakedness of Gen 2:25 and 3:1 is a deliberate 
misspelling.  It perfectly sets up the scenario of Genesis 3, for the precarious nature of the 
community is dependent on what one will or will not presume about the prohibition.  To 
what extent will one presume to ‗understand‘ the operation of violence within the 
community?  The delicate symmetry hangs on a daghesh. 
The word play points to the precarious nature of nakedness without shame, for it can 
easily turn towards acquisitive desire, a calculated preoccupation with the dynamics of 
desire.  When there is mutual nakedness without shame, desire is openly expressed 
because the object of desire is viewed as being external to the one desiring it.  Neither 
party can be viewed as possessing the object.  The latter already signals a suspicion that 
the object is internal or intrinsic to the one desiring it, and it presumes an ability to ferret 
that out.  It assumes a mastery over the dynamics of desire. Like the Israelites choosing 
Life or Death in between the two mountains, so here the ‗one flesh‘ is situated between 
the ‗desirable trees‘ and Life or the knowledge tree of good and evil, i.e. of acquisitive 
desire and the belief that one can manage its volatile force.  One relies on mutual 
vulnerability based on an experience of the violence of sacrificial resolve.  The other 
relies on a sense of control over it.  
 
6.5 Summary  
The phrase wssbty alw wtsaw Mdah Mymwre is as loaded a statement as the Shabbat 
statement closing off Genesis 1.  It is a multi-nuanced yet calculated phrase of resolution.  
Several pertinent streams converge here. There is a double-play to the phrase because it 
speaks of a kind of exposure and a kind of covering simultaneously.  In a sense, it should 
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be read: ‗both of them were covered in skin and not covered in shame.‘  It speaks of a 
bold openness that is sufficient in and of itself.  It requires no further covering, i.e. no 
further sacrifice.  To be naked without shame is the definition of ‗one flesh.‘  It rounds 
out the picture of wholeness, unity, and sacrificial resolve.  
The framing of the sacrificial crisis is within a broader context of a covenant relationship.  
In this respect, one of the primary meanings of the passage has to do with the ‗garden 
community‘ being a co-respondent to the consumption of life.  In this respect, the 
connection of nakedness and being openly expressive of desire reflects a covenantal 
responsiveness that is devoid of rivalry and reciprocal violence.  Rather than reciprocal 
violence it is based on reciprocal responsiveness.  The special emphasis is that the two 
were open to full expression of desire without shame toward each other.  Since shame is 
a victimization word, nakedness means they did not victimize each other.  There is an 
affirmation that victimization does not occur because desire has its proper object, 
direction and focus. Ultimately, it is a desire (life consumption) that is directed towards 
and moves towards Life itself.   
This ‗good‘ situation is expressly and exclusively generated by a unique sacrificial 
resolve on the part of Yahweh Elohim.
123
  As in Genesis 1, the necessity of sacrifice is 
presumed, yet intentionally and radically altered.  It is as Girard has proposed; the 
scapegoat mechanism can only truly be dismantled via the scapegoat mechanism. The 
sacrifice prepared and offered by Yahweh Elohim propels the community in a decisively 
different direction.  It dismantles the sacrificial system as it moves through the sequence.  
The listening community encounters a departure from the mythical cycle.  Although there 
is a crisis constituting a sacrificial resolve (i.e. the earth has no growth and man is alone), 
God is not viewed as the one requiring the resolve.  God‘s desire is not openly displayed 
even though it is strongly and periphrastically suggested in the Life tree.  God desires 
Life and indeed is the source of it.  Other than this, Yahweh Elohim acts apathetically but 
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 There is much discussion of this binary designation for God as Westermann (1974:198) summarizes.  
Perhaps, a very reconciliation between the ‗crowds‘ view of God and the view of a God who identifies with 
victims is also intended.  
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deliberately
124
 through the sequence.  Importantly, neither the crisis of the ground that 
ha’adam was taken out of nor the crisis of ha’adam in which ishah emerged is viewed as 
an appeasement of an angry deity.  The crisis is restricted to the earth, but the earth 
cannot resolve it on its own.   
Most significantly, the sacrificial resolve of God seriously moves the community away 
from a preoccupation with sacrifice.  It challenges the very notion that death (and to 
remind, we are talking about any kind of violent resolve whether actual shedding of 
blood or expulsion.  It is the notion that something must be jettisoned away from the 
community) is the only viable response to where desire inevitably goes.   This is revealed 
in several ways.   
For one, the expulsion of ha’adam from the ground immediately leads him to being 
situated among ‗every desirable tree.‘  He is called on, commanded even, to fulfill desire, 
to take in life.  The consuming of ‗every desirable tree‘ will inevitably lead to its source, 
Life itself.  Nowhere in this idyllic picture is there a sense of reversal.  Ha’adam has no 
need to return to the ground, to close in on himself.  On the contrary, he is free to let his 
desire propel him toward ever greater openness to Life.  
The garden community is further pulled away from sacrificial inclination by the dual 
sacrifice of man (iysh) and woman (ishah) offered by Yahweh Elohim.  In a real sense, in 
fact, the emergence of man and woman negates sacrifice as it moves through it, for both 
survive the experience, return to the community in a humble state, not as deities who are 
masters of the savage sacred realm, but as humans who out of their heightened awareness 
of the sacrificial system‘s deleterious effect can now mutually and openly respond to 
(desire) Life as it is offered. Viewed from the perspective of the reflecting author, 
ha’adam’s capacity to respond to Life is critically jeopardized by his ‗being alone in his 
isolation.‘  In mimetic terms, this simply means the prime condition for a sacrificial 
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 In notion of apatheia is well-developed in Eastern monasticism.  According to Chryssavgis (2003:303):   
‗Apatheia is neither aloofness nor insensitivity.  Rather, it is freedom from misdirected passions and the 
suffering they cause.  It involves, as Abba Abraham says, not the elimination of  the passions but their 
control…Apatheia, then, has nothing to do with apathy; on the contrary, it is the ultimate expression of 
empathy for others. .  Along with this is of course the strong notion of chastity.  Chastity primarily 
references a singleness of heart, in other words, a characteristic tendency, virtue, to remain undeterred and 
undistracted from one‘s purpose. It is to singularly channel all desire in one direction.‘ 
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crisis, for it is always internal in nature.  Because the community is closed in on itself, it 
cannot see through its own rivalries besides expelling something to the outside.  It is the 
expelled one that generates an objective, third party perspective.  Indeed, as Girard 
insists, the expelled one becomes the object.  
Initially, Yahweh Elohim provides such a sacrifice in the removal of ha’adam’s side.  But 
with a surprising jolt, the victim not only returns, but stands in front of the very one who 
just expelled her. She does not return as a quasi-deified being who now arbitrates for the 
community as part of a sacred court (i.e. the voice of the crowd).  She stands as bone and 
flesh boldly confronting the community with a stark reality.  They have expelled one of 
their own.  The sacrificial victim was not substantially different than the one‘s expelling 
her.  
Iysh has also passed through a sacrificial sequence.  At first glance, it appears standard 
fare for a male rite of passage.  The initiate already stands in a precarious position of 
isolation within the community.  He is sort of in but sort of not.  While in a deep sleep (a 
ritual act in which the initiate is partially aware, but must be dangerously open to the will 
of the community), he is marshaled through a sacrificial sequence as if a victim ready for 
slaughter.  A surrogate victim is extracted from him sparing his own demise.  At this 
point, however, the neophyte does not return to the community understanding now how 
dangerous the loss of difference is and how the scapegoat mechanism operates.  In other 
words, he does not return as a devoted participant in the crowd.  For one, the sacrifice in 
his place took it out of him as it were.  It left permanent and deep scares, reminders of the 
grievous cost of his isolation, his ‗not good‘ crisis and the consequences of his own 
resolution.  He carries in his body ‗flesh closed in on itself.‘  In a sense, the initial 
ha’adam is no more.  The community that relied on sacrificial resolve died in the process 
of a sacrifice provided by God.  He does not return to his initial state.  Instead, he cleaves 
to the victim of his own sacrificial resolve.  In this act, he generates a different ha’adam, 
man and woman, one flesh.  The one flesh of mutual woundedness, of profound 
awareness of the cost of violent resolve creates a new community, one that can mutually, 
correspond to life and can never go back to the old adam.  
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Most powerfully, Yahweh‘s unique sacrificial resolution no longer requires sacrificial 
resolution.  It is not maintained by sacrificial repetition, but by choice.  Mutual 
responsiveness to Life, i.e. reciprocal fulfillment of desire towards a true object, must 
heed the voice of God.  Unlike the ‗stupor‘ of reciprocal violence and its resolve, Life is 
not dumb.  It has a voice.  Heeding the voice is the critical avenue to direct passions away 
from mimetic, acquisitive desire.  God‘s passion, which the community can be led into if 
it heeds the voice, is for ha’adam to have ‗all that the father has‘ but without replacing 
him.   
The garden community is situated by God in such a way that they can acquire that.  They 
can consume life from a state of nakedness without shame.  That is, they can be fully 
expressive of desire without acquiring desire from the other and without viewing the 
other as possessing or being the object.  They can mutually respond to Life when they are 
acutely aware of their mutual vulnerability.  They understand the deleterious effect of 
their own crisis and their own means to resolve it.  They are keenly aware of God‘s 
unique sacrificial intervention that not only spares both community and victim, but unites 
them in such a way as to ‗expose‘ the folly of believing that the other holds the key to 
desire and actually possess what is desired.  To be ‗one flesh,‘ ‗naked without shame,‘ 
destroys model/disciple relationships.  Rivalry itself is banished from the community.  
In this way, the community can consume life that leads to the Life tree, to the source of 
Life.  But here too, this desire for Life cannot be acquired by imitation.  The One who 
actually does posses what is desired cannot be seen.  His desires cannot be directly 
accessed.  It is only through the mutual, humble responsiveness to both the goodness of 
life and the commanding voice that the community will find its ultimate satiation. 
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7 CONCLUSION  
The challenge of this thesis was to inquire into the viability of Girard‘s mimetic theory of 
generative violence as a valid and perhaps even essential tool, method, insight, model or even 
criticism for the ongoing work of biblical exegesis and interpretation. The fundamental objective 
was to test the extent mimetic theory offers a viable and compelling explanatory model of the 
anthropological origins of the sacred.   
If confession be acceptable even in academic work, I have through the course of this work often 
felt a bit bifarious.  The work of Girard over the last half century is enough for one thesis,
1
  and 
of course, the book of Genesis continues to provoke a library of ongoing inquiry.  If one is 
somewhat amiable with Girard‘s thought and assumptions to begin with, as I was, one can 
become quite comfortable with working within this paradigm and vocabulary.  The most recent 
publication from Studies in Violence, Mimesis, and Culture
2
 in honor of René Girard‘s work 
repeatedly affirms a conversion type quality to those who have encountered Girard and his work, 
and they have fully integrated mimetic theory into their various academic domains. In fact, the 
more one delves into Girard‘s thought, the harder it is to come away unscathed from the 
encounter. It becomes a point of no return.  Even if one rejects the fundamental assumptions and 
opts for a different or modified explanatory model, one would sense an obligation to engage 
mimetic theory if only to neutralize its assertions.  
That mimetic theory so easily weaves into nearly any domain is a tremendous strength.  
Admittedly, it also provokes the sharpest attacks for the same reason.  Simultaneously, if one 
sticks within the more conventional historical critical methodologies of Old Testament studies, 
one‘s reasoning and concerns can take off into an array of different directions.  The biggest 
challenge, however, exists when the reader is not familiar with one or the other.  This has 
prompted at times the need for digression and additional explanation that may feel tedious and 
cumbersome.  Even worse, I may have done a disservice to both sides.  
 
                                                 
1
 In 2008, Girard received the MLA Lifetime Achievement Award (The Bulletin of the Colloquium on Violence and 
Religion, No. 34 May 2009)  
2
 SVMC 2009 
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7.1  Verification of Thesis, Validation of Mimetic Theory 
The exegesis of Genesis 1 and 2 above affirm the basic contours of Girard‘s structure of myth.  
They share in common with what Girard (1999:182) calls the ‗founding paradox of archaic 
societies‘ encapsulating a ‗generative violence‘ at the inception of its community.  The expulsion 
of a victim at the height of a mimetic crisis of indifferentiation converts the bad violence, 
mimetic rivalry, into a good violence that saves the community.   
The opening lines of the Bible incorporates the ‗crisis‘ state of all ritual as its starting point.  Gen 
2:5 cannot conceive of generative human life coming from any other situation other than that of 
utter negation, a complete absence of difference and distinction.  Human community is assumed 
to play out in a context of symmetry, dissymmetry and re-symmetry. Both accounts follow suit 
in the structural sequence, a central figure must come out or emerge from the ‗terrible 
equilibrium‘ and it is this figure who becomes the arbiter of difference.  It restores balance and 
provides for communal orientation.  Distinctions, difference, and boundaries are established all 
of which reflect in some way the founder of difference, the expelled one.  Despite a long held 
insistence on the Bible‘s divergence from myth, its paradigmic worldview is still mythical at 
least from a mimetic point of view.  
The Bible shares the common anthropological truth of myth—humanity seeks to cure its 
violence by violence. And Girard (1999:190-192) insists that without acknowledging this, the 
radical difference of the Judeo-Christian tradition does not transcend other religious perspectives. 
Only through its comparison with other mythological narratives does a radical juncture become 
evident.  Since the very emergence of human culture, humanity has only figured out one way to 
successfully curtail its own all-consuming reciprocal violence—human sacrifice.  This Girard 
(1999:174) argues is precisely the point Nietzsche came to: ‗To elude his own discovery and to 
defend mythological violence, Nietzsche is obliged to justify human sacrifice.‘   
Someone must go or we all will perish.  This is the foundational anthropological truth, but our 
awareness of this does not necessarily lead us to a viable alternative.  To be ‗anti-sacrificial‘ in 
effect only leads to an exchange of victims.  The victimizer now becomes the victim, and as a 
result, the mythical structure is restored.  Those who rid themselves of the victimizer have 
successfully diverted their own violence away from themselves.  As Girard (1999:164) argues: 
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‗From now on we have our anti-sacrificial rituals of victimization, and they unfold in an order as 
unchangeable as properly religious rituals.‘   
Girard (1999:183) proposes that if we were to become aware to some extent of the ‗problem‘ 
with our solution, we are still faced with a false or a true alternative. It can never come by 
denying the ‗sequence of a mimetic crisis and its violent resolution.‘ The radical difference is in 
how we tell the story:  
1. We don‘t detect the mimetic snowballing because we participate in it without realizing it.  In this case 
we are condemned to a lie we cannot rectify, for we believe sincerely in the guilt of our scapegoats. 
2. We detect the mimetic snowballing in which we do not participate, and then we can describe it as it 
actually is.  We restore the scapegoats unjustly condemned. 
Girard (1999:183) concludes only the Bible and especially the Gospels do the latter, and the 
exploration of Genesis 1 and 2 in this work confirm this.  
Genesis 1 retells the mythical story but permanently severs its ties to the structure as it 
meticulously moves through the sequence.  From the emergence of light as the precursor of all 
generative acts to the seventh day of Sabbath rest, neither God, nor light, nor anything that 
follows ever returns to that ‗savage sacred‘ realm where light and darkness and heaven and earth, 
congeal into a ‗conglomeration of difference.‘  As was identified in this work, the ‗theme‘ of 
going out or leaving and not returning structures a good deal of the narratives in Genesis and 
Exodus.  This peculiar biblical feature that the thesis here emphasized could more than anything 
signal the beginnings of a ‗historical perspective.‘  In the beginning (urzeit), God cut down the 
old heavens and earth, and even to this day all human and cosmological history is marching to its 
Sabbath day (endzeit).  It does not return from whence it came.  
Genesis 2 relates the sequence similarly to Genesis 1.  It can only start from a condition of utter 
negation, an utter barren waste land, the antithesis to human community.  The emergence of a 
‗living being‘ immediately reverses the deleterious effect of non-difference.  Distinctions can be 
established, boundaries set, and names given.  Genesis 2 delves even deeper than the previous 
one and frays the layers of protection around the sacrificial community.  The core issue is 
exposed, but not as a cancer to be removed, but as a question to be answered: ‗what will you do 
with your desire.‘  Or it is as God puts it: ‗Where are you?‘  It doesn‘t negate imitative desire nor 
Chapter 7 – Conclusion 312 
 
312 
 
portray it as evil.  It postulates the possibility that a true Object of desire exists that can be shared 
without seizing possession of it.  It envisions a shared Life without the destruction of it.  
Genesis 2 unfurls the very heart of the structure and places it ‗in front of him.‘  What will you do 
with the victim?  Why do we expel victims? What the Gospels do, Girard (1999:184) insists, is 
problematize our ‗solution.‘ It forces us to ask: ‗Why do we do this madness.‘  Only through a 
revelation of the victim as human is the community jolted into questioning its own violent 
resolve.   
In our relativistic late modern world, Girard (1999:177) persists that the influence of the Gospel 
has infiltrated human culture on a global scale—the concern for the victim is our absolute.  The 
concern for the victim is ‗the one rubric that gathers together everything I am summarizing…‘ 
proclaims Girard (1999:167).  This ‗rubric‘ is laid out in Genesis 2 setting in motion a nagging 
vision that works its way into Israel‘s narrative from Genesis onward.   The God of the Hebrews, 
it appears, favors or ‗smiles upon‘ the victim. This seems anything but radical to us now, but in a 
world dominated by the ‗founding paradox,‘ it must have been ‗unbelievable.‘ 
But the vision of Genesis 2 of a community of reciprocal humility, of ‗naked without shame,‘ of 
‗one flesh,‘ and co-responsiveness toward a true Object is still, I suggest a radical notion.  
Contrary to our contemporary ‗victim advocacy,‘ the ultimate goal of Genesis 2 is the 
redemption of the entire community, not just the victim.  That the sacrificing community would 
carry the ‗wound of its own sacrificial necessity‘ is Yahweh‘s alternative sacrifice which 
effectively moves each one of us away from the desire to posses being by seizing it from another.  
That ‗wound‘ I suggest is the clear ownership of one‘s own participation in the ‗sacrificial 
mechanism.‘ It is to realize that everyone participates in the mob.  Thus, in the case of Abraham 
and Pharaoh, Abraham, Isaac, and Abimelech, Joseph and his brothers, and Moses and Pharaoh, 
God not only resuscitates the victim, but He also returns the victim from whence it came, and by 
so doing, redeems the sacrificing and sacralizing community.
3
  This God proves by such action 
that there is ‗none like you among the mighty…majestic in holiness, awesome in splendor, 
                                                 
3
 It would take a considerable amount of space to fully explain the redemption of the whole community in the case 
of the exodus story.  The gist is as follows: the narrative consistently plays out as an internal crisis. Both Hebrew 
and Egyptian boys were to be thrown into the river.  Both Egyptians and Hebrews experienced the plagues.  Both 
experienced the death of the firstborn sons—the Pascal lamb was a surrogate victim for the Israelites.  Both 
experienced the pillar of cloud and fire, and both experienced the utter fright of the Reed Sea (both experienced the 
threat of annihilation from a sacrificial crisis, being overtaken by the waters). 
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working wonders!‘ (Ex 15:11).  It is as Isaiah proclaims: ‗apart from me, there is no God (Isa 
44:6).  This vision, I suggest, still has not fully taken hold.  
The most salient feature in both Genesis 1 and 2 is surely theological.  It is only God who sees 
through the structure and orchestrates the sequence in such a way as to dismantle it as it goes.  
Both accounts emphatically affirm God‘s sole prerogative and authentic transcendence from 
humanity‘s contrived sacred realm.  They depict a God who cannot leave ‘ha’adam’ ‗alone in his 
separation.‘  It is a non-violent God willing to engage our own violence.  It is a non-sacrificial 
God offering our sacrifice, and it is a truthful God willing to don the mask we all hide behind.  
 
7.2 The Historical/literary Context of Israel’s Primeval Narrative from a Mimetic 
Perspective 
Based on the exegetical results of Genesis 1 and 2 in this work, I venture some suggestions as 
how the mimetic reading of Genesis 1 and 2 might contribute to the more conventional Old 
Testament historical criticisms.  Collins (2005:2) defines historical criticism as: ‗…any method 
or approach that attempts to interpret the biblical text first of all in its historical context, in light 
of the literary and cultural conventions of the time.‘   
 For one, Girard challenges us to rethink categories of historical and non-historical.  Similarly to 
Middleton‘s (2005:192-193) discussion of ‗nature/history‘ or Westermann‘s (1968:1ff) 
discussion of ‗salvation history,‘ mimetic theory cautions us to be weary of discounting the 
historical relevance of seemingly less historically flavored texts, especially mythological texts 
which appear an-historical. Girard‘s insight allows us not so much to ‗get behind the text‘ but to 
trace the historical transformation of a narrative away from its generative beginnings.  Girard 
(1985b:110) reminds that the more ‗mythical‘ a narrative, the more graphic its violent resolve in 
a victim, and the more guilty the community views its victim, the more centered it is in an actual 
event, the closer we are to its beginnings.  The closer the narrative is to its ‗original‘ version.  
In another way, however, Girard relativizes some of the past concern for historical/sociological 
context because the same fundamental problem of how we deal with violence is concurrent 
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throughout human history.  There is infinite variety on the same structure.
4
  This is not to say that 
the historical data of all kinds doesn‘t contribute to our understanding of the text.  It certainly 
does, and it is a necessary endeavor for any serious exegete.  What it does mean, however, is that 
if one accepts a mimetic reading of a biblical text, then the narrative could fit a variety of 
sociopolitical historical contexts.  The implication here is that many of the reasons for dating a 
text pre-, post-, or exilic become less compelling.  It also means that a perspective presented in 
the text at one point and addressing a particular situation can be re-applied to another situation. 
Thus, we have a kind of ‗retrospective theology‘ as Finkelstein and Silberman (2001:249) put it. 
Thus we can have gradual shifts in adaption of the narrative in a similar fashion as how ritual can 
shift emphasis and meaning over time, even when the structural sequence remains relatively 
constant.  
Finkelstein and Silberman (2001:318) sound similar to Girard in this regard: 
The Bible‘s integrity and in fact, its historicity, do not depend on dutiful historical ―proof‖ of any of its 
particular events or personalities…The power of the biblical saga stems from its being a compelling and 
coherent narrative expression of the timeless themes of a people‘s liberation, continuing resistance to 
oppression, and quest for social equality.  It eloquently expresses the deeply rooted sense of shared origins, 
experiences, and destiny that every human community needs in order to survive. (Emphasis mine) 
Israel is no different than its neighbors when it comes to the paradigmic or ‗ideological‘5 
framework for articulating origins.  They are fundamentally after the same thing—how did 
human community come to be?  What generated our ability to come and stay together?  Agreeing 
with Middleton (2005:194), the ancient Israelites forged a unique perspective precisely in 
answering this question.  Simply put, the Hebrew Scriptures reflect a nagging sense that 
something is wrong with the storyline. 
In this respect, there is an added bent to ‗retrospective theology,‘ for even in our day we only 
detect scapegoating at work, we when are not directly involved in it.  It is only in retrospect—and 
the very fact of reflection means that one has already been sensitized to scapegoating—that we 
                                                 
4
 Honestly, a jazz musician would have no problem understanding such a concept.  For ‗left brain‘ thinkers, who 
require a high degree of sequential thinking structures, this may seem nearly impossible to grasp.  I conjecture that 
most modern biblical criticism has been dominated by ‗left brain‘ thinking.  
5
 See Middleton (2005:191) and Janzen (2004:35) for the particular use of ‗ideology.‘ 
Chapter 7 – Conclusion 315 
 
315 
 
understand our own involvement in it.  It is only then, that we see it.  Post-Third Reich Germany 
should be ample exemplification.  
Several things lead to a possible and plausible scenario for the writing of Genesis 1 and 2 (and 
possible all of Genesis). 
7.2.1 Weight of current archeological data.  First, there is the debate around the ‗origins of 
Israel‘ based on the current weight of archeological data.6  Finkelstein and Silberman (2004:23) 
aptly summarize: ‗From the analysis of the archaeological evidence, there is no sign whatsoever 
of extensive literacy or any other attributes of full statehood in Judah—and in particular, in 
Jerusalem—until more than two and a half centuries later, toward the end of the eighth century 
BCE.‘  Perdue (1994) and Davies (1992) present scenarios pushing the data to a seemingly 
logical end, arguing that ‗Israel‘ and the literature that tells its story is a post-exilic ‗invention‘ of 
a new aristocracy commissioned by Persia to ‗colonize‘ Palestine.  The Bible was a way to 
legitimize their ‗claim‘ to inheritance by giving it a sense of heritage.  This view is oft labeled 
‗minimalist‘ mainly by its detractors.  
The collection and interpretation of archeological data is, of course, politically charged in its own 
right.  Even so, Finkelstein and Silberman (2001:14) offer a more moderate hypothesis: 
‗Archaeology has provided enough evidence to support a new contention that the historical core 
of the Pentateuch and the Deuteronomistic History was substantially shaped in the seventh 
century BCE.‘  Finkelstein and Silberman (2001:21) advocate a shift away from using 
archeology to simply ‗illustrate‘ the text, and more toward viewing the Bible as a ‗characteristic 
artifact‘ that reveals the ‗anthropology of Ancient Israel.‘  Thus Finkelstein and Silberman 
(2001:23) share a critical characteristic with a mimetic approach to the text.  The text itself is a 
participant in revealing something about humanity: ‗…the biblical narratives are themselves part 
of the story.‘  Critical to my discussion here is what Finkelstein and Silberman (2001:23-24) 
advocate along these lines:  
It is a story not of one, but two chosen kingdoms, which together comprise the historical roots of the people 
of Israel…These two kingdoms represent two sides of ancient Israel‘s experience, two quite different 
societies with different attitudes and national identities. 
                                                 
6
 Finkelstein and Silberman (2001:21) remind that it is not just an acceleration of the amount of new artifacts, but a 
major shift in methodology.  
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It is the radical attempt to resolve a rivalry between two kingdoms with different hopes, 
attitudes, history, memories, and ‗ideologies‘ into a ‗new community‘ and a new telling of the 
story that ‗more than any other document ever written, shaped—and continues to shape—the 
face of Western society‘ (Finklestein and Silberman, 2001:24). 
It must be noted that this rivalry between two paltry societies was nothing new, nor was the 
attempt at ‗unification‘ anything extraordinary.7  There must have been something at the core, 
however, that profoundly shaped the unrelenting drive towards this.  In that respect, the 
resolution envisioned, but never fully realized in this body of literature called the Old Testament 
jettisoned an obscure political agenda into an unstoppable force. In Genesis 1, there is a vision of 
a light emerging from an undifferentiated ‗heaven and earth‘ that steadfastly marches toward a 
Sabbath day.  Genesis 2 presses in even further by envisioning a new being, a new humanity that 
is ‗one flesh‘ and ‗naked without shame‘ because it has come to understand how deleterious the 
‗unanimity minus one‘ communal operation is.   
That something, which I can only suggest here by way of conclusion that encourages further 
investigation, is grounded in a profound experience of having survived the ‗death‘ of being a 
sacrificial victim.  To put another way, both sides of this rivalry have a profound sense of having 
survived being the expendable ones in a political ‗unification‘ agenda.  This comes from two 
different and distant nagging memories.
8
  Each memory works its way into the consciousness of 
the community‘s sense of identity.  The first was from a migrant community who was expelled 
from Egypt under a very weird sequence of frightful circumstances.  I will call this the Moses 
tradition; the second was from the miraculous survival of a petty little kingdom in southern 
Palestine who ‗miraculously‘ survived the onslaught of an over-whelming and merciless 
invasion of ‗sea peoples.‘9 This we can call the Davidic tradition.  At the core of these narratives, 
regardless of how colored or distorted the retelling of the story becomes, is an alternative 
experience of the sacred.  A god rescues and defends a sacrificial victim contrary to the will of 
the ‗gods,‘ the logic of the crowd or the size of the enemy‘s army.  The mutual bond between 
                                                 
7
 Northern Israel had longstanding relationships with Damascus, Tyre, and various Canaanite city/states.  Judah, 
likewise, was closely tied to Edom and Moab.   
8
 There are, of course, multiple strands or streams of tradition that are woven into the Biblical record.  I address the 
two here because of their pivotal force and historical plausibility.  
9
 Finklestein and Silberman (2001:87-89) aptly point the frightful picture of the ‗Sea Peoples‘ expansion into the 
Levant.  
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these two ‗survivor‘ kingdoms, obligated them to be responsive and responsible toward their 
‗brother‘ even when he is a ‗rival.‘ Perhaps equally at the core is the memory of a community 
who oddly ‗didn‘t eat their king,‘ ruler, father, or brother.10  There is an understanding of human 
community and its relationship to those who rule over them that is clearly desacralizing and 
moving toward what Middleton (2005:207) calls the ‗democratization of the image.‘11  
7.2.2 Neglect of Internal Context.  Another contribution to a possible scenario for a plausible 
sociopolitical context for Genesis 1 and 2 is cued by Middleton‘s (2005:186-193) discussion as 
to the extent in which exegetes consider the broader Ancient Near Eastern cultural and 
ideological context.   This discussion rehearses one of the longest standing debates within 
modern biblical scholarship.  Simply put, it is the question as to what extent Israel should be 
compared to its neighbors in ideology, social and political patterns, religious formulation and 
such, or to what extent should it be contrasted.  Here, Middleton (2005:190) returns us to the 
‗contextual‘ solution discussed at length with Janzen in Chapter 3 above (Chapter 3.2.1). 
Middleton (2005:192) echoes the general position of Mendenhall and Gottwald,
12
 who see the 
early egalitarian formation of Israel as a ‗sociopolitical and ideological rebellion against the 
oppressive hegemony of Egypt and the Canaanite city-states.‘   Middleton (2005:190) reasons 
that it is a broad ‗contextual‘ approach which can accommodate both a comparison and contrast 
with Israel‘s situation within the Ancient Near Eastern milieu.  
 I suggest, however, that a key element is critically absent.  This ‗contextual‘ rubric fails to 
adequately consider what was going on internally within Israel.  The broad contours of this 
history are indisputable.
13
  A ‗community‘ (for now we will call it ‗Israel‘) came together rather 
inauspiciously, haphazardly, and ‗amazingly‘ (Genesis through Deuteronomy).  After some 
struggles in a formative period (Joshua through 1 Samuel), Israel enjoyed a brief period of quasi-
                                                 
10
 This phrase is borrowed from a recent movie adaption of a children‘s book, Where the Wild Things Are.  A boy, 
who is angry at his world, journeys in a dreamlike state to an island of monsters who make him ‗king of the 
monsters.‘  After becoming disappointed in the king, the monsters expel him, but proudly proclaim in a way that 
says they learned something from the experience: ‗You‘re the first king we haven‘t eaten.‘ 
11
 Finkelstein and Silberman (2001:110) conclude from archeological evidence in the hills of northern Israel that a 
strong egalitarian socioeconomic system must have flourished in the early Iron Age.  
12
 Middleton cites several works by these two scholars.  The seminal works are Mendenhall (1973) and Gottwald 
(1979).  He also brings in the contributions of Brueggemann (1978), Hanson (1986), and Hallo (1980).  
13
 This is true even for radical views of Davies and Perdue.  However, ‗invented‘ the history of Israel is, those 
‗inventors‘ clearly envisioned a protracted internal conflict as an integral element of their past.  Be that as it may, it 
does not seem plausible for an aristocracy seeking to establish control or ‗possession‘ of the land to so thoroughly 
place the failure of a rivalry at its core.  
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unity and prosperity (2 Samuel through 1 Kings 11)
14
  Communal tensions, however, arose and 
there was a dividing into two communities (1 Kings 12 through 1 Kings).  This internal rivalry 
preoccupies most of this divided community‘s history, and ultimately the rivalry itself destroys 
‗Israel‘ (2 Kings and all the prophets).   Then, I would suggest, the process begins again come 
the exilic period onward.   When one thinks of it, in fact, this same scenario applies to almost any 
communal formation.
15
  It is infinitely repeatable.  
One finds a remarkable similarity with the above sequence and Girard‘s (1985a:167) 
interpretation of the two disciples on the road to Emmaus (Lk 24:25).  Girard calls, not his 
theory, but the revelation in the Gospels a ‗radical criticism‘ of mythology.  Girard believes it is 
paradigmic of a community who is coming to a realization of the mythical structure: 
Two disciples are leaving Jerusalem after the Passion and are talking on the way about the collapse of their 
hope. Here again is the same attitude of skeptical and suspicious discouragement with regard to a 
revelation that has clearly failed.  The discouragement even brings about its own reversal: at the destructive 
moment of suspicious criticism, suddenly Christ is walking with the disciples and explaining to them the 
Scriptures [retrospective theology]. (Emphasis mine) 
Girard (1985a:167) goes on to proclaim: ‗We may one day understand that the entire history of 
Western thought conforms to the mode of these two stories and to a third similar one, also found 
in Luke: that of the Prodigal Son.‘ 
It is possible to conceive of a version of Genesis 1 and 2 as well as the Pentateuch being 
inscribed during the seventh century BCE in Jerusalem as advocated by Finkelstein and 
Silberman.  It is written within the ideological, symbolic matrix of the Ancient Near East during 
the Iron Age I.
16
  It accurately ‗remembers‘ its beginnings in the same structural pattern of all 
communities, yet having odd hiccups on the way.  The hiccups have one remarkable similarity—
they all had to do with a victim who survived and even thrived post-expulsion.  Because of this, 
                                                 
14
 We will leave for now the dispute over how significant David, Solomon, and Jerusalem might have been.  Despite 
the probable over-estimations of the Bible, I think it highly probable that Jerusalem played a key iconic role for 
Israel.  
15
 Having been a part of an intentional Christian community and a greater ‗communal‘ movement in America over 
the past forty years, I can attest to the predictable similarities.  
16
 I agree with Middleton (2005) that Genesis 1 is heavily influenced by Mesopotamian royal mythology.  Assyrian, 
Egyptian, and Greek influences, however, had already made inroads into Palestine by the seventh century BCE. 
(Van Seters, 1992:78ff).   Mesopotamian influence does not require an exilic situation.  
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Israel cannot shake its egalitarian tendency and its suspicion of kings, temples, idols and 
sacrifices.
17
  Most of all, it is obsessed with a nagging question: ‗Can‘t we all get along.‘18   
It is intriguing at times, how the probing into rivalry and internal strife in the Bible has eluded 
much of Old Testament theological focus.  Girard‘s focus on oft neglected narratives in the Old 
Testament such as Joseph, Job, and Jonah remind us of the intensity the issue of rivalry and 
jealous desire are in the Bible.  The terse mythical versions of Israel‘s origins in Genesis 1 and 2 
with their vision of an alternative community find an expanded narrative counterpart in the story 
of Joseph.  Even though Girard (1985b:111) finds striking similarities with the Oedipus and 
Joseph stories, he notes that: ‗It is only the Joseph story in the Bible that repudiates the 
deceptions and violence of myth.  I could go to other biblical stories and show every time the 
absolutely essential difference…They expose the belief on which mythology relies as a coherent 
and cruel system of representation.  The mythical hero is guilty and punished rightly even if he is 
a god and even if he later restores order, whereas the biblical figure is punished wrongly; he is 
innocent.‘  This portrayal is not just one between Israel and its neighbors.  It is equally focused 
on an internal reconciliation that sees the folly of expelling the ‗brother.‘ 
Girard‘s (1985b:107ff) comparison and contrast of the Oedipus myth and the Joseph story serves 
as a starting point for evaluating the historical data.  Both are ‗heroes‘ who were rejected, ‗cast 
out,‘ by their families.  They had experienced profound and painful ‗leavings.‘  Both were 
‗highly successful immigrants‘ who were known for solving riddles and applied that wisdom to a 
communal natural disaster.  Both were accused of incestuous relationships.
19
  Here the narratives 
diverge.  Nothing in the narrative shakes Oedipus of possible guilt; the ‗truth‘ of the accusation 
is never dispelled.  The Joseph narrative goes to extra measures to demonstrate the ridiculous 
nature of the accusation, always pointing to the same fundamental cause—the envy of the rival.  
In the Oedipus myth, nothing is said of the natural disaster that prompted the communal crisis.  
The narrative simply ends with the expulsion of the victim, only suggesting an alleviation of the 
crisis.  Joseph, on the other hand, wisely responds to the famine, alleviating the crisis without an 
                                                 
17
 Girard (1985b:111) is emphatic that kings are simply the next scapegoat in line.  Thus, Israel‘s skepticism about 
kings and sacrifices may in fact originate from an inherent sense of its origins grounded more in being the victim 
than creating victims.  
18
 In America, this is a rather infamous quote.  In 1993, a video was taken of Rodney King being mercilessly beaten 
by Los Angeles police.  This video set off a wave of rioting and violent protest which threatened to engulf the whole 
city.  In an interview a few days into the riots, Rodney King appealed for a secession of reciprocal violence.  
19
 The wife of the Egyptian master is said to have treated Joseph like a son.   
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expulsion.  ‗Do the communities to which Oedipus and Joseph belong act justly when they expel 
these heroes from their midst?‘ asks Girard (1985b:108).  For Oedipus, the answer is yes, but for 
Joseph it is a resounding no. 
7.2.3 Emerging sensitivity of ‘sacrificial arrangements’ in the Pentateuch’s formation. Let 
me postulate that emphatic no to a brief assessment of the formulative years of Judah‘s 
prominence and of the Pentateuch.  To remind, I am only postulating a scenario based on the 
explorations of my thesis.  The intent is to invite or suggest further inquiry, not to fully develop 
and defend the suggestions below.   By way of outcome, I briefly want to demonstrate how 
mimetic and conventional criticisms could work together to achieve a clarity to textural 
interpretation.  I am working here with Finkelstein and Silberman‘s (2001:149-318) historical 
rehearsal.  Their proposition is not definitive, but it offers a high degree of probability based on 
the current collection of data.  Some of the conclusions from the mimetic exegesis of Genesis 1 
and 2 lend themselves to a plausible scenario of the ‗reformation‘ movement in seventh century 
BCE Palestine centered in Jerusalem.  
As mentioned above, sensitivity to surviving sacrificial expulsion was already instilled in the 
distant memories of certain inhabitants of the Levant during the early Iron Age.   This sensitivity 
was aggravated by key events within Israel‘s history in the land where the problem of ‗sacrificial 
arrangements‘ reared its head.  These seminal events where generated by a combination of 
external and internal events.  In mimetic fashion, the internal factors are more critical.  
Finkelstein and Silberman (2001:230, 235, 238) cast doubt that a golden age of a united Israelite 
kingdom under Solomon existed to the extent portrayed in the biblical record.  There is plenty of 
evidence that an extensive kingdom did flourish in Northern Palestine in the ninth and eighth 
centuries BCE that were distinctively ‗Israelite.‘  If this be accepted, then Judah had also been a 
‗younger brother‘ for a long time.  Judah was for centuries placed in a similar situation as we 
have in the stories of Abraham and Abimelech—having to negotiate sacrificial arrangements 
from a more precarious position. Thus, in many ways the story of the patriarchs and the Hebrews 
in Egypt is not just (and maybe not predominantly) an issue between a community and 
foreigners, but an issue between rival brothers. This is, to remind, the way Genesis sets up the 
scenario.  There are the descendants of Abel and those of Cain.  They definitively collide on 
Paschal night and at the Reed Sea.  
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At the height of Israelite dominance during the Omride dynasty (876-843 BCE), Judah (or at 
least the Davidic line in Jerusalem) had a near death experience.
20
  It started with the sacrificial 
marriage arrangement between Jehoshaphat‘s son and a daughter of the Omride dynasty.  The 
effects proved disastrous.  Judah relinquished their most prosperous territories, and the worship 
of Baal was instilled in Jerusalem.  When Jehu‘s coup massacred the line of Omri, Athaliah took 
measures to ensure here own survival by having the Davidic line massacred (2 Kings 11:1).  A 
sole survivor, Joash, clandestinely escaped the purge and later was installed as king.
21
   
Several critical sensitivities were heightened through this.  For one, sacrificial marriage 
arrangements proved disastrous, and could have easily spawned a vision for an alternative.  Also, 
the ruthless internal violence involved in the sacrificial arrangements of kings and coups, and its 
associations with ‗sacrificial ideologies‘ or theologies were seriously questioned.  The 
associations of royal cults with bloody exchanges of rivalry were being fused.
22
   Hence, 
prophets arose who began to preach the folly of sacrifice to ‗gods‘ as in the infamous showdown 
with Elijah and the priests of Baal.   
The land of Israel enjoyed a brief period of relative prosperity and independence during the 
reigns of Uzziah and Jeroboam II before the storm clouds of Assyria began to loom heavily upon 
the land.  The sacrificial sensitivities against sacrificial abuse and its accompanying social 
oppression intensified prophetic activity, Amos and Hosea in the north and Micah and Isaiah in 
the south.  The sacrificial arrangements of the royal cult only seemed to exacerbate mimetic 
violence, not alleviate it.  In particular, this awareness was emerging from within the community.   
The fall of Samaria at the hands of the Assyrians further heightened a sense of futility with the 
scapegoat mechanism.  The ‗sacrificial arrangements‘ of royal authority based on the massacre 
of bloodlines and its accompanying hubris accelerated a sacrificial crisis that went unrestrained.  
The frightful destruction of Samaria sent shockwaves through the land.  It is in the shadows of 
Israel‘s catastrophic end that our current Bible takes its unique shape (Finkelstein and Silberman, 
2001:229).  It takes on a Judeo-centric flavor from the start.  
                                                 
20
 Finkelstein and Silberman (2001:232) 
21
 The story has remarkable similarities to Miriam and Moses.  
22
  This correlation between idolatry and violence is commonly overlooked. 
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After two stormy centuries the kingdom of Israel had come to a catastrophic end.  Finklestein 
and Silberman (2001:222) assert that a significant population of Israelites still inhabited the 
region after the fall of Samaria while others migrated south.  This new population of survivors 
‗played a major role in the foreign policy of Judah and in the development of the biblical 
ideology of the seventh century BCE.‘  Assyria was clearly a ruthless aggressor, but amazingly 
enough, many in the land only asked an internal question.  How did we cause this?  Girard 
(1982:99-101) points out that this is the beginning of religious thought. It is intermediary 
because it begins to question the logic of the crowd and assigns a collective guilt or 
responsibility for violence.  Certainly, the acceleration of bloody rivalries that enveloped 
Samaria toward its demise was cause for a profound interrogation of conventional structures for 
establishing communal stability.  
This event instantly transformed Judah and Jerusalem into a unifying force in the region.  It 
proved a powerful impetus for a reformation fueled by those who in various ways had come out 
of a sacrificial crisis where the usual mechanisms for restoration of peace had collapsed.  The 
conventional systems for restraining an all out exchange of reciprocal violence had proved 
ineffectual.  Fueled by the collective experience of surviving a sacrificial meltdown, visions of 
an alternative society with an alternative sacrificial view of their God was gaining momentum.  
At the foundation of this vision was a profound sense of having ‗come out‘ from the disaster of 
the past.  Along with this came great hopes of a messiah king, Hezekiah, who would usher in a 
revolutionary kingdom. The associations of bloody coups and many gods who fed off such 
carnage fueled a vision of a single god who transcended the violent and jealous rivalries that 
engulfed communities (both heavenly and earthly).  Thus a ‗Yahweh only‘ movement gained 
momentum.  The prophet Isaiah (Isa 1-12) was probably a major advocate.  
Despite the rather myopic version presented in the Bible, Finklestein and Silberman (2001:262-
263) assert that the Hezekiah‘s resistance to Assyria was thoroughly disastrous.   The destruction 
of the land by Sennacherib‘s campaign was horrific in its thoroughness and veracity.23  Once 
again, this emerging people had a frightful experienced of complete devastation.  The hope of a 
                                                 
23
 Destruction of Lachish bears ample witness with a mass burial of over 1500 men, women , and children 
discovered in a cave west of the city (Finklestein and Silberman, 2001:263).  
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ruler who could lead a people toward an alternative set of premises for addressing the problem of 
reciprocal violence was dashed by royal hubris.  
More than likely, the disaster caused the already skeptical rural communities to return to ‗ole 
time religion,‘ and this is what is behind the idolatrous relapse of Manasseh‘s reign.  The 
‗Yahweh only‘ experiment failed, so it was time to go back to what had always worked.  The 
long and prosperous reign of Manasseh appeared to validate that claim. Finkelstein and 
Silberman (2001:271-273) suggest that a kind of pre-monarchical less centralized movement 
surged during this time as evidenced by the ‗problem‘ of high places.  In other words, there was 
a return to a more localized ritual, based more on territorial occupation of clans. Equally 
prominent was skepticism over the ‗wisdom‘ of kings that somehow seemed to escalate rather 
that alleviate violence. Most certainly, there was a return to the kind of ‗sacrificial arrangements‘ 
between neighboring clans.   This quite possibly included sacrificing children.  
At the death of Manasseh and because of the decline of the Assyrian domination, the ‗Yahweh 
only‘ ideology once again came to prominence in Jerusalem with the coronation of Josiah. The 
attempt to eradicate the ‗ole time religion‘ only superficially seemed successful as the prophets 
Jeremiah (Jer 5:19) and Ezekiel (Ez 8) bear witness.  The Yahweh only movement itself seemed 
fractious.  The vision was split between those who envisioned the glorious triumph of Yahweh 
and equated it with empire building.  Others like Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel, all victims of the 
community‘s sacrificial resolution envisioned a God and a people who understood by experience 
that the ‗solution‘ of reciprocal violence was itself a problem.  
Finkstein and Silberman (2001:284) believe much of the Pentateuch was written within the time 
span of Hezekiah to Josiah and believe it is not possible to pinpoint exactly which parts.  Much 
of the image of ‗heroes‘ of the past are painted in a Hezekiahesque or Josiahesque fashion.  Both 
of these heroes, however, suffered bitter failure.  We can return here for a moment to Girard‘s 
(1985a:167) phases of sacrificial revelation: ‗collapse of hope,‘ ‗skeptical and suspicious 
discouragement,‘ a ‗revelation that clearly failed,‘ and ‗the destructive moment of suspicious 
criticism.‘  
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The Deuteronomistic emphasis on law demonstrates a heightened sensitivity to ‗sacrificial 
reform‘ during Josiah‘s reform.24  Again, this development had a long background, and from 
where?  Where were these sensitivities developed?  Law was beginning to be viewed as a way to 
mitigate rival tensions and move away from sacrifice as a way to restrain violence. A late 
seventh century potshard was found with Hebrew writing demanding justice and an appeal to 
law.  Finkelstein and Silberman (2001:286) suggest from this: ‗A demand of rights by one 
individual against another is a revolutionary step away from the traditional Near Eastern reliance 
solely on the power of the clan to unsure its members‘ communal rights.‘  
From a mimetic standpoint, this sensitivity must have come from a growing awareness of the 
victim of sacrifice, one that grew in questioning the sacrificial logic of the community.   
In Finklestein and Silberman‘s (2001:271) rehearsal of the seven century, they paint a nearly 
opposite version of events than the Bible, making the Deuteronomistic perspective or Yahweh 
alone movement appear extreme.  They never venture, however, into what motivated the 
Yahweh only movement.  This I suggest is a critical question.  Why is the biblical perspective so 
adamantly opposed to other sacrificial cultic systems, both royal and rural?  It may be that it 
comes from a collective consciousness of having been the surviving victims of the ‗mythical 
structure.‘  Survival is a key word.  It is as the Psalmist sometimes appeals; who can proclaim the 
mighty works of God from Sheol?  It is the survivors of expulsion who most profoundly and 
critically contemplate the meaning of ritualistic expulsion.  It is this kind of ‗retrospective 
thinking‘ that begins to question the ‗utility‘ of social structures of cohesion.   
Finklestein and Silberman do not and as archeologists cannot get to the underlying causes for a 
group, the Yahweh only group, to so steadfastly stick to their agenda, despite all setbacks.  As 
many late modern commentators do, they suggest that the central issue is the classic culprit of 
control and power.  This argument makes sense when the Yahweh only group is at the height of 
its power and control.  Ironically, the insistence of Yahweh‘s supremacy only intensifies when 
they are not in power and in control.  Something else or at least alongside this must be at work.  
The objection here might be to insist that exploring underlying motivations is a speculative 
enterprise.  In a sense, however, we revert into mythical thinking (and sacrificial arrangements) 
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 Finkelstein and Silberman (2001:285-286). 
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when we refuse to explore the ‗why‘ question.  This is precisely what we do with our violence.  
We never question its origins.  The genesis of our violent communal behavior must be spoken of 
in mythical terms.  We don‘t explore what is generating our violence both individually and 
corporately.  We only develop more and more sophisticated techniques for policing it and 
containing it, all the while and always regressing to its uncomfortable necessity.  We send our 
violent males to ‗anger management‘ classes and refuse to make the obvious connection that 
victims inevitably become victimizers.  From there, they can easily become scapegoats, always 
keeping the collective violence from exposure.  
 
7.3 Implications of Mimetic Theory on Old Testament Theology and Exegesis 
The current consensus on the nature and role of Old Testament theology and the historical-
critical task is clear—there is no consensus. Collins (2005:4) defines it as ‗non-foundationalism,‘ 
and views Brueggemann as one who has most successfully attempted a ‗sweeping formulation‘ 
of a promising approach.  For Brueggemann (1997:62): ‗The great interpretive reality is that 
there is no court of appeal behind these many different readings.  There is no court of appeal 
beyond the text itself…The postmodern situation is signified precisely by the disappearance of 
any common universal assumption at the outset of reading.‘  Collins‘ (2005:11) assessment 
declares the decline of biblical theology—defined as a descriptive enterprise to explain the 
meaning of a text to the present (Collins, 2005:3)—precisely because of its inability to reconcile 
the ‗perennial tension‘ between theology and the historical method.  He concedes that the current 
trend is toward literary criticism. 
Middleton (2005:36) reiterates the interpretive problems involved when certain Old Testament 
texts are weighted down by a long history of interpretations and doctrinal formulations.  Similar 
to the discussion of theory and method in Chapter 3, Middleton (2005:36) confirms that 
subjectivity is an ‗undeniable‘ reality.  There is no more ‗viable hermeneutical alternative 
waiting in the wings.‘   
Middleton (2005:37) concedes that the search for a more ‗objective‘ hermeneutical approach still 
tempts the scholarly community: ‗This aspiration, though now widely recognized as unattainable 
(and illegitimate), still exercises a profoundly unsettling influence over the sense of epistemic 
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security among many across a wide spectrum of disciplines in the contemporary academy.‘ 
Middleton (2005:37) suggests that the lack of objectivity should not be resisted; instead, 
subjectivity should be viewed as a positive asset to the interpretive enterprise.   Our predilections 
enable us to set perimeters around what an interpreter considers.  
I echo Middleton‘s (2005:36) assessment of millennial exegesis that it is still ‗in massive 
ferment, with a plurality of conflicting paradigms in evidence, where much is up for grabs.‘  This 
is equally acute to attempts at finding the ‗context‘ for texts such as Genesis 1 and 2.   The 
current exegetical work attempted to broadly ‗cast the net‘ within Ancient Near Eastern parallels 
similarly to Middleton (2005:36).  In other words, the tendency is swinging back to a neo-
comparative methodology.   This interpretive paradigm is still fraught with difficulties, requiring 
‗hypothetical reconstruction of the sociohistorical context.‘ 
Middleton (2005:38) speaks of the ‗dialogical character‘ of interpretation where ‗the meaning of 
a text does not strictly speaking reside in the text at all, but is always a product of an encounter 
between the text and an interpretive community.‘  Most certainly, mimetic interpretation should 
be included as one of many interpretive communities who ‗work with preconceptions and 
paradigms that both limit and enable what meanings they see.‘   
This ends up similarly to the discussion of ritual.  It is similar to saying the meaning of a ritual 
does not reside in the ritual, but only in the encounter with the ritual.   Thus we are back to the 
problem of who exactly is determining the meaning of the ritual.  If this be the posture of many, 
it is curious why Girard is accused of reading our modernity on the ancient world.   Surely, this 
would be acceptable, and in a real sense, Girard ought to be applauded for it.  This kind of 
thinking is a regress into mythological thinking which ultimately dodges the issue of what 
creates or generates the ritual or text in the first place.  
Part of the way forward, Middleton (2005:39) suggests, is the ability to ‗cross current 
disciplinary boundaries.‘  Finkelstein and Silberman (2001:21) reiterate the need for a more 
collegial approach to historical and literary inquiries and the end of ‗living in separate 
intellectual worlds.‘  One need only look at a current addition of Contagion to see how effective 
Girard‘s theory is in this regard.  It has a broad academic appeal. 
Chapter 7 – Conclusion 327 
 
327 
 
I agree with Middleton (2005:40).  Not all hermeneutical approaches are equally valid.  
Hopefully, this work has demonstrated care in respecting the ‗alterity of the text.‘  I did not 
recklessly abandon the careful scholarship built up over the last century, nor would Girard.  
Middleton (2005:41) suggests that any interpreter must be willing to listen to the text and be 
impacted by its message.  Perhaps the uncomfortable assertion of Girard which demands a 
decision on the part of the interpreter is that the text itself, like ritual, is not ‗above board‘ in all 
respects.  I can conceal just as easily as it can reveal, and part of the hermeneutical task is to be 
vigilante in this regard.  Mimetic theory challenges any interpretive reading to be keenly aware 
of what the text or the ritual wants us to understand or embrace and what it does not want us to 
see.  A mimetic approach presents an irony to those who assert the unquestioned givenness of the 
text or ritual as the only viable interpretive foundation.  It lends itself to a ‗mythical‘ reading of 
the text.  For one, we become obligated to affirm the text or ritual above all else.  We in effect 
become theatre critics, only focused on the mastery of the presentation.  Even more so, the more 
disturbing aspects of overt expressions of human violence are ignored or explained away as 
rhetorical devises.  Meyers‘ (2005:38) interpretation of the slaughter of Hebrew children in 
Exodus 1 reveals the kind of ‗theological conundrum‘ Levinson (1993:6) insists scholars get into 
when dealing with the hideous violence so prevalent in the Bible and myth.  Meyers, following 
Greenberg, reduces the veracity of the verse on infanticide to a ‗literary and not literal‘ 
understanding.  It is just added for affect.  Such interpretations fail by presuming that the primary 
purpose of the writers is to be good novelists.  Even more so, however, this is the kind of reading 
we are compelled to offer when we can‘t reconcile or don‘t understand how the violent impulses 
found in ancient literature are operating.  Levinson is not a Girardian, but he forces the reading 
of disturbing violent biblical passages, such as Ez 20:25-26, to be dealt with straight away 
without imposing a theory of ‗double causality‘ on the text.   It is now those who have little to do 
with the Bible or who are antagonistic towards it who most readily notice the shear amount of 
violent episodes (and oft times grotesque justifications of it) within it.  
Levinson shares with Girard a central interpretive premise.  The biblical narratives are full of 
violent depictions because at a fundamental level it is attempting to deal with the most 
profoundly disturbing effects of rivalry and reciprocal violence.  Habakkuk‘s (Hab 1:1-4) lament 
reverberates throughout the Bible: 
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How long O Lord, must I call for help, but you do not listen?  Or cry out to you ‗Violence!‘ but you do not 
save?  Why do you make me look at injustice? Why do you tolerate wrong?  Destruction and violence are 
before me; there is strife, and conflict abounds. 
Now is the time to ask how it is that modern interpreters of ancient literature have so 
systematically glossed over its violent depictions especially when it comes to narratives of 
origins?  How is it that Mesopotamians, for example, were compelled to depict the origins of 
their culture and king in terms of a grotesque dismemberment?  To put it in modern terms, why 
is it that in a culture which repeatedly negates universal ‗foundations‘ universally accepts the 
necessity of violence? 
As discussed in this thesis, one objection to Girard is that he projects the condition of the late 
modern dilemma on the ancient world. 
I suggest, however, that we consider the proposition in reverse (which is how I believe Girard is 
looking at it).  The late modern world is reverting back into mythological thinking.  The fault lies 
with modernism itself, asserts Girard (1999:160), for erroneously seeking ‗the absolute 
separation of the archaic and the modern.‘25  Our violence is diverted away from our detection by 
a new god of the collective—technology.   
Ellul (1990:xvi) postulates that the onslaught of technique in the late modern era essentially 
functions to ‗bluff‘ us into systematic participation without critical awareness of the implications 
of such involvement.  Ellul asserts that there is no true ‗discourse on technique‘ that envelops us 
and beckons our unanimous involvement.  Ellul‘s (1990:xvi) description of the technological 
bluff sounds remarkably similar to the discussion of ritual in Chapter 3 of this work: 
Why do I say bluff?...It is because technique is regarded in advance as the only solution to collective 
problems or individual problems, and because at the same time it is seen as the only chance for progress 
and development in every society.  There is bluff here because the effective possibilities are multiplied a 
hundredfold in such discussions and the negative aspects are radically concealed.  But the bluff is the 
unavowed last resort into a technique of explicit and avowed last resort.  It also causes us to live in a world 
of diversion and illusion which goes far beyond that of ten years ago.  It finally sucks us into this world by 
banishing all our ancient reservations and fears.  
                                                 
25
 Wallace (1989:322) concludes something similar. 
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Like ritual, technique beckons our unanimous acquiescence by shear participation in it.  There is 
no need for critical discourse on the subject.  There is no such thing as ‗technology,‘ a critical 
discourse on technique.  As Eagleton (2003:72) has remarked, we are ironically moving towards 
our greatest universal foundation all in the name of no universal foundation. 
There will always be those who will find mimetic interpretation intriguing, yet are uncomfortable 
with fully embracing it.  Girard‘s theory will not find broad acceptance.  Perhaps this is the way 
it needs to be.  The effectiveness of Girard‘s insight will probably be more in the way it seeps 
into an array of disciplines and domains without being labeled as such and even in emphatic 
negations of it.  
To what extent am I or am becoming a ‗Girardian?‘  It is quite easy to be absorbed in Girardian 
thinking.  In fact, the more one is willing to contemplate the full force of his ideas, the easier it is 
to see how much makes sense.   
The true and radical dividing line is simply this—who is responsible for human violence?  
Girard‘s emphatic answer is ‗us.‘  And to this, I would say that I am a ‗Girardian‘ regardless of 
what aspects of his theory I find difficult.  
The true struggle over our violent nature as a species only happens when we cannot find or 
produce a convincing scapegoat.  If one has already experienced the process as a victim, one is 
not terribly inclined to willingly succumb to the group think again.  Besides we are running out 
of room to expel someone to the outside.  We don‘t have acquiescing victims or places to expel 
them. 
My home in Denver Colorado was once considered the ‗Wild West.‘  Here individuals, many of 
whom were rejects of society on the established eastern coast of America, could escape the logic 
of the crowd and forge a ‗to each his own‘ identity.  Now, however, that ‗rugged individualism‘ 
is convulsing under the looming cloud of the encroaching ‗crowd.‘  There is nowhere to go now.  
There is no place to fly away. 
My suspicion is that ‗Ancient Israel‘ for various reasons and circumstance came to a similar 
situation.  They came to a point where there was nowhere else to turn.  There were no more 
scapegoats.  They had successfully victimized each other and consequently were victimized by 
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others.  They came to a point where they were forced to explore the very fundamental aspects of 
‗getting along‘ in order to survive.   
We are coming to that same point.  
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